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This thesis argues that in the Lawes of Ecclesiastical Polity, Richard Hooker 
presented a coherent and skilful defence of the 1559 Settlement as being congruent 
with wider Protestantism. It then explores how Hooker’s theory of episcopal 
ecclesiology as presented in the Lawes has influenced the contemporary episcopal 
polity of the Church of England. The question of how far the Church of England’s 
doctrine and practice was congruent with wider Protestantism was a key theme of the 
controversies with which Hooker engaged. Throughout the Lawes, Hooker constructs 
a defence of the 1559 Settlement as sitting within that doctrinal tradition. Whilst 
scholars have long noted Hooker’s arguments for the apostolic origin of the 
episcopate in selected passages of Hooker’s Lawes, the practical, theological, and 
political outcomes of his defence of episcopacy in the 1559 Elizabethan Settlement, 
and especially its influence upon the Oxford Movement and contemporary twenty-
first century episcopal ecclesiology, have not been explored in detail, and this is one 
of the main focuses of this thesis. 
 
Chapters two to five show how Hooker, in the Lawes, uses a theological and political 
framework in order to provide a systematic defence of the place of the Royal 
Supremacy, the division of ecclesiastical jurisdiction between the monarch and the 
clergy, and the place and power of bishops in the 1559 Settlement. This thesis shows 
that the subsequent attempt to claim Hooker for the cause of the Tractarians in the 
nineteenth century (chapter six) was far-fetched, and that by the twenty-first century 
(chapter seven), Hooker had largely fallen out of use in episcopal ecclesiology as 
viewed by traditionalist catholics. In so doing, this thesis firmly places Hooker in the 
ambiguous central ground of contemporary Anglican episcopacy. 
 
Hooker’s ability to write simultaneously both theologically and politically needs to be 
taken seriously. It is only by doing so that his dexterous rootedness in these two 







sufficient defence of the doctrine and practice of the Church of England, and 
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Two scholarly editions of the Lawes have been published since Keble’s edition of 
1836. The Folger Library Edition of the Works of Richard Hooker was first published 
in 1977, edited by a committee led by W. S. Speed-Hill and Georges Edelen. In 
addition to this, in 1972, Speed-Hill edited Studies in Richard Hooker: Essays 
Preliminary to an Edition of His Works. The Folger Library Edition is still held to be 
the most accurate and thorough edition of Hooker’s Lawes. In 2013, the most recent 
edition of the Lawes was published, edited by A. S. McGrade, in which the decision 
was taken modernize the spelling and phraseology of Hooker’s text.  
 
This thesis uses the Keble (1836) edition of the Lawes, unless otherwise stated 
(references to ‘FLE’ = ‘Folger Library Edition’). This is due to the difficulty and cost 
of obtaining a copy of the Folger edition due to location as a distance student, as well 
as accessibility and movement restrictions resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. 
 
After the initial citation in each chapter, the format adopted follows the convention of 
‘book, chapter, verse’. The same is true for citations from the works of John Whitgift, 
John Jewel, and John Calvin. Citations from the editorial preface of Keble’s 1836 
edition of the Lawes are clearly marked as such. Citations from Luther’s works are 














1  Introduction 
 
This thesis examines the construction and influence of Richard Hooker’s episcopal 
ecclesiology in the Church of England. In particular, it investigates the episcopal 
polity advocated in Hooker’s magnum opus, The Lawes of Ecclesiastical Polity (the 
‘Lawes’), which has had a significant influence upon Anglican ecclesiology since its 
publication. 
 
Argument of the Thesis 
 
This thesis argues that Hooker was able to present the episcopal ecclesiology of the 
1559 Religious Settlement as being congruent with wider Protestantism, in answer to 
Puritan calls for further reformation and the parity of ministers. This thesis then 
argues that Hooker’s presentation of an episcopal ecclesiology congruent with wider 
Protestantism was subject to attempts by John Keble, in his editorial preface to his 
1836 edition of the Lawes, to claim that Hooker took a higher view of the authority 
and prestige of the episcopate than was in fact the case. The most recent development 
of episcopal ecclesiology in the Church of England, the introduction of women 
bishops, no longer sees Hooker being invoked in support of the traditional catholic 
position. Instead, Hooker is cited in the evidence presented by official Church of 
England documents, and also by those arguing for a more liberal application of 
ecclesiological rules. By bringing these three periods together, this thesis is first of all 
able to present Hooker’s justification for the place of episcopacy within a Church of 
England congruent with wider Protestantism; second, to argue that Keble, in his 
editorial preface to the 1836 edition of the Lawes, attempted to twist Hooker’s 
justification of episcopacy to an absolutism that Hooker never claimed for himself; 
and third, to argue that usage of Hooker subsequently moved away from the 











Bishops have been part of the structure of the Church of England since Henry VIII 
broke away from the Roman Catholic Church in 1534 and are part of the historic 
threefold order of bishops, priests, and deacons. 
 
Exactly what authority a bishop in the Church of England can exercise has often been 
subject to debate, however.1 Bishops in the Church of England are part of the so-
called Established Church, and as such, receive their authority from two different, but 
related, sources. At their episcopal ordination or consecration, bishops receive their 
spiritualities or spiritual authority from their fellow bishops at the laying on of hands. 
This means that from this point, they can exercise functions particular to bishops, 
such as ordaining other clergy, bearing in mind that the functions pertaining to each 
type of Holy Order are cumulative. However, bishops need a particular place to 
exercise their temporalities or temporal authority, and this is granted to diocesan 
bishops2 at their confirmation of election by the archbishop of the province in which 
they minister, on behalf of the monarch, who is Supreme Governor of the Church of 
England. 
 
                                                
1 For example, the argument as to whether a Church of England bishop should sit in the House of Lords 
(Justin Parkinson, ‘What is the role of bishops in UK politics?’, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
politics-16702806, accessed 11 September 2020); and whether or not a bishop has the right to tell 
clergy who hold a different theological opinion from him/her that they do not belong in the Church of 
England (Gafcon UK, ‘A Statement on the Appointment of the Archbishop of York’, 
http://www.gafconuk.org/news, accessed 11 September 2020). Hooker himself engages in substantial 
dialogue regarding the question of whether bishops are necessary to make the sacrament of ordination 
valid in VII.xiv.12.  
2 For suffragan, or assistant, bishops they receive their authority from the diocesan bishop of the 
diocese in which they operate. The legal basis for this in modern times can be found in Canons C1 and 
C20.2 of the Canons of the Church of England (The Church of England, ‘Canons of the Church of 
England: Section C Ministers, their ordination, functions, and charge’, 
https://www.churchofengland.org/more/policy-and-thinking/canons-church-england/section-c, 
accessed 11 September 2020). See also Section 13 of the Dioceses, Pastoral and Mission Measure 2007 
(UK Government, ‘Dioceses, Pastoral and Mission Measure 2007, Part II, Section 13, 







Elizabeth I’s Religious Settlement in 1559 was necessary to define the practice and 
basis for the Church of England subsequent to the reign of her Catholic sister, Mary. 
Bishops were an important part of that Settlement, yet the return to Protestant rule in 
England meant that the English Puritans called for further reformation of the Church 
of England to completely eradicate any traces of Catholicism, and establish a Church 
based solely on scriptural principles: one of which, some of them claimed, was the 
parity of ministers, leaving no place for bishops.3 
 
It was in answer to such calls for further reform, including for the abolition of the 
episcopate, that Richard Hooker produced his eight-volume magnum opus, the Lawes 
of Ecclesiastical Polity, whose first volumes were published in 1594. Hooker’s Lawes 
presents the case that the Church of England, as expressed in the 1559 Settlement, is 
consonant with magisterial reformed principles, and thus needs no further reform. 
 
It is the place of bishops in the Church of England, as argued by Hooker, and in 
particular their authority, that this thesis argues is based on wider Reformed Protestant 
principles. This thesis argues that Hooker saw English episcopacy as congruent with 
such principles. 
 
The first half of the thesis presents three key areas of episcopal authority in the 1559 
Settlement of Religion: first, in chapter one, the Royal Supremacy and Hooker’s 
understanding of that, and in chapter two, Hooker’s consequent views on State power 
and its relationship with natural law and dominion. Second, issues of jurisdiction, and 
                                                
3 See Norman Sykes, Old Priests & New Presbyter (Cambridge: 1956), especially chapters II and III. 
Also A. L. Peck, Anglicanism and Episcopacy (London: 1958), 17, 62-63 – Peck presents a thorough 
disagreement with Sykes’ argument, among others, regarding ministerial parity. Importantly, Peter 
Lake, Anglicans and Puritans? Presbyterianism and English Conformist Thought from Whitgift to 
Hooker (London: Urwin, 1988), 213-25. Anthony Milton presents a useful argument regarding the 
example of foreign reformed Churches with respect to models of polity in Catholic and Reformed: The 
Roman and Protestant Churches in English Protestant Thought 1600-1640 (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press: 1995), 448-494. It must also be borne in mind that conformist defences of the place 
of episcopacy were by no means uniform, especially in the interpretation of Iure Divino. See Margaret 
R Sommerville, ‘Richard Hooker and his Contemporaries on Episcopacy: An Elizabethan Consensus’, 







the balancing act between the areas in which the monarch and the episcopate can 
exercise their authority. And third, the consequent exercise of episcopal authority 
itself. 
 
Since the publication of his great work, Hooker’s name has often been claimed by 
Anglicans seeking to define an authentic episcopacy. The second half of this thesis 
will argue that an attempt was made, unsuccessfully, by the Oxford Movement in the 
nineteenth century, most notably through Keble’s editorial preface in his 1836 edition 
of the Lawes, to shoehorn Hooker’s episcopacy into a model that claimed authority 
for bishops far beyond that found in the Lawes. The influence of the Oxford 
Movement upon subsequent traditional catholic movements in the Church of England 
meant that there was a risk of this distorted, pseudo-Hookerian episcopacy becoming 
part of current episcopal polity in the Church of England. However, the last chapter of 
this thesis will argue that Hooker’s model of episcopacy is no longer claimed by 
traditional catholics in the Church of England, but is instead being claimed by the 
porous and loosely defined middle ground. 
 
Omissions and Exclusions from this Thesis 
 
The breadth of the theological spectrum in the Church of England from the sixteenth 
century onwards is so vast that examining every possible strand for traces of 
Hookerian influence would quickly create an unwieldy thesis. Therefore, it has been 
necessary to deliberately exclude some areas and topics. 
 
I have chosen not to draw upon Hooker’s corpus of writing outside of the Lawes, 
because my thesis is predicated on Hooker’s defence of the Elizabethan Religious 
Settlement as presented in the Lawes. Keble’s 1836 edition of the Lawes contains, as 
back matter, various sermons on matters such as faith in the elect, pride, sorrow, and 
fear, and also the biblical book of St Jude. Amongst the Kebellian endpapers is also 







Faith is Overthrown, which is indicative of Hooker’s more liberal approach to who is 
saved – the sermon was written in answer to a Puritan accusation that Hooker 
believed that Roman Catholics were among those who were saved by faith in Christ. 
 
The third volume of the 1836 work also includes a supplication to the Council 
containing objections to Hooker’s doctrine. This came from Hooker’s colleague 
Walter Travers, who had a dispute with Hooker at the Temple Church in London 
(1585–86). It also contains Hooker’s answer to Travers. An anonymous letter, A 
Christian Letter of Certain English Protestants, thought to be written by Puritans with 
further objections to Hooker’s doctrine, is included in volume IV of the Folger 
Library edition of Hooker’s Works. Though Hooker’s full response to this was never 
published, the Folger edition prints it with Hooker’s marginal notes in response.  This 
thesis has not drawn on these additional texts. 
 
Though it would undoubtedly be interesting to employ the entirety of Hooker’s 
corpus in this quest to bolster an argument for an ecclesiology congruent with wider 
Protestantism, a line of exclusion must be drawn at some point, and not doing so 
would likely result in precious little extra material directly relevant to episcopacy. 
 
Though a great deal of the larger Zurichian and Genevan debate surrounding 
Hooker’s influence upon the character of an English Church congruent with wider 
Protestantism could be of tangential interest to those seeking to develop a thorough 
portrait, again, it is not possible to comb through large swathes of the continental 
reformed material. Due to the geographical movements of English and continental 
churchmen during the sixteenth century, a case could doubtlessly be made for 
anything being of relevance as various clergy and theologians took refuge in ‘safe’ 
foreign countries, in many cases maintaining a significant level of correspondence 
after they returned to their respective original countries. Yet again, though, for the 
comparatively small amount of material that may be directly relevant to my thesis, the 








Hooker’s Lawes are of course only part of the wider debate in the Elizabethan 
Church surrounding the place and nature of the episcopate. There are a number of 
figures that would have had a larger influence upon Hooker, such as his patron, 
Archbishop John Whitgift; and his colleague and sparring partner at the Temple 
Church, Walter Travers. Of particular interest is Hadrian Saravia, whose definite 
opinions on the authority of bishops and their Iure Divino (divine right), and the 
consequent superimposing of Saravia’s beliefs onto Hooker by Keble, are drawn on, 
where relevant. Other notable figures include of course Richard Bancroft, especially 
his Sermon at St Pauls’ Cross in 1589, which is noteworthy for its call for greater 
episcopal power. 
 
As this thesis covers not just the sixteenth century, but also the events surrounding the 
publication of Keble’s 1836 edition of the Lawes, it is necessary to highlight what has 
not been included in relation to the large amounts of material written by, and about, 
the Tractarians and the Oxford Movement in general. The primary source of material 
for chapter six has been the editorial preface of Keble’s edition of the Lawes, and in 
order to ascertain the extent to which other members of the Oxford Movement have 
either influenced or shared in Keble’s argument, I have conducted a search of the 
correspondence of John Henry Newman’s Letters and Diaries, together with relevant 
secondary material, looking specifically for that related to episcopacy. Hurrell 
Froude’s Remains, edited by Newman, have been included in chapter seven, in 
respect of a historical comparison tracing the influence of Hookerian episcopacy in 
Anglican Catholic sources from the nineteenth to twenty-first century material. 
However, it is simply not possible, given the scope of this thesis, to conduct anything 
more than an indicative search of the wider extant material related to the Oxford 
Movement and Tractarians. 
 
Chapter seven argues that Hooker is no longer claimed by traditional catholics in the 







official documents in relation to the ordination of women priests and bishops. 
Contextually, this debate in the Church of England took place amidst similar debates 
in the wider Anglican Communion, and it would be interesting to discern the scope 
and reach of Hookerian episcopacy across that Communion, but again this lies beyond 
the scope of the thesis: both because of the wider ‘liberalizing’ ecclesiological issues 
that would come into play, such as homosexuality and the exercise of Holy Orders, 
and because the thesis is limited to the influence of Richard Hooker’s episcopal 
ecclesiology in the Church of England. 
 
Within the tradition of the Church of England, it is not only traditional catholics who 
hold views that mean they regard women priests and bishops not to be a legitimate 
theological development. Conservative evangelicals who subscribe to a ‘headship’ 
view of gender roles also cannot accept the authority or ministry of a woman priest or 
bishop. There is also the argument that this theological grouping may have inherited 
elements from the Puritans against whom Hooker sought to defend the reformed 
nature of the Lawes. However, I have not included this theological standpoint here 
because the second half of this thesis considers the legacy of Keble’s 1836 edition of 
the Lawes, and not a more conservative evangelical ecclesiology. It is also a 
reasonable assumption that the ecclesiological tradition of conservative evangelicals 
in the contemporary Church of England has not adopted the inheritance of the 




Key Terminology  
 
Inevitably in a thesis that deals with a number of ecclesiological groupings – the exact 
definitions and identities of which are contested - it is important to introduce certain 








Puritan and Presbyterian 
 
Puritanism is essentially a Calvinist grouping which originated in England, 
characterized by the twin goals of inner piety and outward holiness.4 Attempts to 
define English Puritanism have been going on for well over four hundred years; it has 
proved exceptionally difficult to find any common ground, and still the definition 
remains unclear.5  We can say, however, that Puritanism began with non-conformists 
in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, when religious discontent evolved 
into puritanism.  The emergence of Puritanism in Elizabethan England is 
conventionally traced to the returning Marian Exiles, some of whom were content to 
return to Edwardian styles of worship, and some who wished to adopt forms more 
akin to those which they had encountered during their continental exile in Geneva and 
other Reformed cities.  This latter group found particular difficulties with some 
aspects of the 1559 Religious Settlement.6   
 
Although Puritanism eventually led, especially in the post-1662 period, to 
nonconformity and Dissent, during Hooker’s lifetime almost all ‘puritans’ regarded 
themselves as loyal members of the Church of England. Michael Winship’s recent 
study observes that almost all Puritans at this period supported the religious tasks and 
monopoly of the Church of England, with England having ‘only one monarch and one 
church that governed the country together in their different paths.’7  This does not 
mean unqualified support, however; Winship argues that the problem for Puritans was 
that the Church of England was following God’s law only erratically.8 As David Hall 
explains, English Puritanism ‘took a strong stand on the Bible as “law” and insisted 
                                                
4 Alec Ryrie, Protestants: The Radicals who made the Modern World (London: William Collins, 
2017), 473. 
5 For a further discussion on the difficulty of defining this term, see Christopher Durston and 
Jacqueline Eales (eds) The Culture of English Puritanism 1560-1700 (New York: St  Martin’s Press, 
1996), 1-2. 
6 Ryrie, Protestants, 135. 
7 Michael Winship, Hot Protestants: A History of Puritanism in England and America (Yale: Yale 
University Press, 2018), 3. 







that the state churches in England and Scotland eliminate all aspects of Catholicism.’9 
Puritanism in this sense was a very broad church which blended seamlessly into the 
established church’s mainstream.10 But as Patrick Collinson and others have argued, a 
sharper-edged element within Puritanism also came into being in the wake of a group 
of ‘radical’ intellectuals largely associated with Cambridge University, who 
questioned the Royal Supremacy, the legitimacy of the Book of Common Prayer, and 
the scriptural basis of episcopacy.11  Collinson notes, however, that even so, the 
leaders of this radical group did not want a separation from the Church of England – 
they still wanted an inclusive state Church and a Christian prince, the latter to 
preserve uniformity in practice and belief.  This, for Collinson, meant that English 
Puritanism struggled with its own internal wrangling whilst it battled against its 
opponents in Church and State.  
 
John Hooper, who served as Bishop of Gloucester and latterly Worcester between 
1550 and 1554, before being burnt at the stake the following year, was perhaps the 
most important archetype of this radical movement within Puritanism. In the early 
Elizabethan period Thomas Sampson and Anthony Gilby also played prominent roles, 
Prominent radical Puritans with whom Hooker himself locked horns included Thomas 
Cartwright and Walter Travers: the former was deeply involved in the Admonition 
Controversy, and the latter served at the Temple Church alongside Hooker for a 
period.12   
 
                                                
9 David D. Hall, The Puritans: A Transatlantic History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019), 
2. 
10 Peter Lake, Moderate Puritans and the Elizabethan Church (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1982). 
11 See, for example, Patrick Collinson, The Elizabethan Puritan Movement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1967), as well as The Religion of Protestants: The Church in English Society 1559-1625 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1984). 
12  See Patrick Collinson, ‘Thomas Cartwright’, 
https://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-
e-4820?rskey=xHKoV2&result=2, accessed 12 March 2021; and Alan Ford, ‘Walter Travers’, 
https://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-







Cartwright and Travers belonged to the distinct subset of Puritans who were also 
Presbyterians. ‘Presbyterianism’ is an ecclesiastical model in which the Church is 
governed by presbyters or elders by means of a hierarchy of councils which remain 
independent from state control.13  All Presbyterians were puritans, but not all puritans 
were Presbyterians. The movement drew on Calvin’s acknowledgement of elders as 
one of the four ministries of the Church, alongside pastors, teachers, and deacons. For 
Calvin, this was based on Biblical passages such as Romans 12.8; 1 Corinthians 
12.28; and 1 Timothy 5.17. The role of elder included, crucially, a responsibility for 
discipline, which, importantly, meant a role for lay persons in the government of the 
Church: this will be of particular relevance to chapter four of this thesis. In sixteenth 
century Geneva, in Scotland and in other Calvinist churches, elders participated in 
Church discipline, including the issuing of censures and reconciliation.14 
 
Sixteenth-century advocates of Presbyterianism did not consider it an innovation, but 
rather a return of the model found in the New Testament, with some regarding it as 
the only permissible form of Church government, and thus permanently binding – yet 
the model was adapted to fit local circumstances. The term ‘presbyterian’, indeed, 
was not used in Geneva itself, but originated in Scotland.  The Scottish church’s 
Second Book of Discipline (1578) envisaged a presbyterian system, and the first 
actual presbyteries were erected in Scotland in 1581: regional synodical bodies, 
serving a quasi-episcopal function. Many English Puritans looked enviously at this 
innovation and hoped to emulate it. As well as pressing for legal change, some 
English Presbyterians began trying to build the new system from the ground up by 
creating ‘classes’ (giving us the term classical Presbyterianism), meaning a group of 
representative elders and ministers drawn from a certain area, which oversaw 
congregations, and ministers in that area.15   
                                                
13 Ryrie, Protestants, 473. 
14 F. L. Cross and E. A. Livingstone (eds.), The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, 3rd Edition 
Revised (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 1331. 








Presbyterianism itself became an issue in England in the 1570s, with its early leaders 
seeking further reform of the Elizabethan Religious Settlement.  The nascent 
movement presented a threat to the established order by insisting on an 
ecclesiological model which was based on equality of ministers and the inclusion of 
lay elders in the government of the Church.  Matters came to a head in 1592, with the 
Star Chamber trials and Crown suppression and deprivation of the movement’s 
leaders.16  This suppression was regarded to be so successful that the movement has 
until recently been considered dead – but as Polly Ha’s work has made clear, this did 
not stop prominent Presbyterians such as Travers and Julines Herring continuing their 
activities in a clandestine manner.17 
 
Hooker in the 1590s was well aware that the strong challenge to the established 
structure of Church and State as presented by the Presbyterians was such that the 
actions of the Crown in 1592 appeared necessary, and that prominent leaders such as 
Travers and Cartwright had merely been pushed underground. As such his defence of 
the Elizabethan Religious Settlement was written to engage with Presbyterian critics 




This thesis argues that Hooker defended the 1559 Elizabethan Settlement as being 
congruent with wider Protestantism, but this clearly raises a question of how that 
wider grouping should be understood.  Hooker did not hold to any one particular 
national Church as a gold-standard, but drew on an eclectic and diverse number of 
                                                
16 Polly Ha, English Presbyterianism 1590-1640 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010).  See 
also Patrick Collinson, The Religion of Protestants: The Church in English Society 1559-1625 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1984); Nicholas Tyacke, Anti-Calvinists: The Rise of English Arminianism 
c1590-1640 (Oxford Historical Monographs) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); and Anthony 
Milton, Catholic and Reformed: The Roman and Protestant Churches in English Protestant Thought 
1600-1640 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 







Protestant theologians.  These included Calvin, Bullinger, and Zwingli, but also 
Lutherans such as Melanchthon and Luther himself.  In doing so, it was Hooker’s aim 
to argue that the Elizabethan Church was able to fit into that broad family.  The 
diversity of that family made Hooker’s argument all the easier, since he was able to 
cherry-pick elements from whichever Church or theologian suited his arguments.  
This was not mere evasion, but genuinely reflected Hooker’s view that most of the 
variations within that family were adiaphora, matters of indifference. 
 
The deeper point is that Hooker was, despite his reputation for being antagonistic 
towards the Reformers, engaged with the theologies of the wider Reformation; he 
drew upon them extensively, even if selectively; his engagement was serious – going 
beyond an opportunistic proof-texting. It is one of the arguments of this thesis that he 
needs to be taken seriously as a magisterial Protestant theologian in his own right. 
 
Hooker and the ‘Via Media’ 
 
Perhaps an even more problematic term is that of Via Media, or the middle way.  This 
term was first applied to Hooker by John Keble (Hooker never used it of himself), but 
in modern times is now taken to mean Hooker as representing the moderate, centrist, 
or mainstream view of Anglican Church polity – neither too far towards Rome, nor 
too far towards that polity espoused by the English Puritans.18  This thesis does not 
use these terms because of their contested natures. Nor indeed does it use the term 
‘Anglican’ to refer to the Church of England of Hooker’s day. For completeness, it is 
also important to recognize that there are some who do not believe Hooker represents 
a Via Media at all, but rather a harking towards a more Romish polity.19  Such a view 
is not the argument of this thesis, however. 
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All terminology is open to question to a certain extent, and this thesis has chosen to 
use the term ‘moderate’ rather than ‘centrist’ or ‘mainstream’, when referring to 
groupings in Elizabethan times.  An important study in relation to the problems 
surrounding this term is that by Ethan Shagan.  Shagan discusses the importance of 
moderation and the early modern era’s preoccupation with that concept.20  Shagan 
argues that moderation in this period did not mean compromise, tolerance or 
openness, but a process by which a ‘golden mean’ could be enforced onto a society by 
means of the law, in an attempt to expunge dangerous excesses in state, society and 
Church.21  According to this muscular, potentially coercive variety of ‘moderation’, 
the State had a justification for its dealings in all these areas, and it was in this climate 
that Hooker attempted to chart a course for English Church polity which ultimately 
tried to prove that no further reform was needed to that espoused in the 1559 




This thesis uses Iure Divino, especially in respect of episcopacy, to mean that which 
is founded on divine law or right, and, by implication, therefore is not open to 
change. 22   The thesis shows that Hooker is consistently reluctant to interpret 
episcopacy in this way;23  and that the nature of this concept, and the terms which 
others such as the Oxford Movement and traditional catholics have associated with it, 
including, for example, apostolic succession and sacramental assurance, are 
contested.24  The Oxford Movement, for example, ascribed to Hooker a Iure Divino 
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and other related terms. 
22 Leo F. Stelten, Dictionary of Ecclesiastical Latin (Peabody, 1995), 311. 
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concept of episcopacy which was far more absolute than Hooker intended, despite 






Part I of the thesis uses a threefold approach to episcopal ecclesiology in the sixteenth 
century, as reflected in the Lawes. Such an approach is necessary due to the 
interwoven nature of authority in Church and State if we are to understand the three 
most important elements of episcopal ecclesiology at the time of the 1559 Settlement 
and the composition of the Lawes.  
 
The argument that Hooker’s Lawes presents an ecclesiology that is compatible with 
mainstream reformed religious principles in the face of arguments for further reform 
from English Puritans begins with chapter two. Chapter two, together with chapter 
three, argue that Hooker’s interpretation of the Royal Supremacy as laid out in the 
1559 Settlement presents it as being compatible with mainstream reformed religious 
principles. Chapter two examines Hooker’s understanding of the monarch as Supreme 
Governor, and the authority associated with that title. The legal basis for this is, of 
course, the 1559 Act of Supremacy. Chapter two argues that the sovereign’s authority 
is based on both a divine sense of calling and ‘right’, but also on the community 
having given their consent to be so governed. Though there are subtle differences 
between the Henrician and Elizabethan models, Hooker’s defence of the Royal 
Supremacy is not one of justification for an absolutist monarchy, arguing instead for a 
model of lawmaker and parent. Hooker bases his defence simultaneously on 
theological and political grounds, a reflection of the atmosphere at the time – a 
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theological justification for a layperson to exercise ecclesiastical authority and 
supremacy, and a political justification that it was necessary for the monarch to base 
their theological authority within political means. 
 
As we examine the existing literature on Hooker and the Royal Supremacy, we will 
see that he is generally regarded as following political expediency in his support of it. 
Daniel Eppley, in Defending Royal Supremacy and Discerning God’s Will, provides 
an examination of the various defences for Royal Supremacy in Tudor England, in 
light of the drive to establish orthodoxy primarily, but also order, accord, and unity, 
among English Christians.26 Arguing for a moderate stance in respect of the authority 
associated with the Royal Supremacy,27 Eppley also cites the importance of the 
monarch gaining the consent of the community to be so governed.28 The theme of 
governing by consent is also argued by Charles Miller in Richard Hooker and The 
Vision of God,29 who claimed that Hooker was influenced by Marsiglio in developing 
consent rather than contract. McGrade is more specific in a point made earlier, in that 
the Crown’s power to govern in religious matters is ‘directly dependent on the 
consent of the community as given in Parliament.’30 
 
Alison Joyce, in Richard Hooker & Anglican Moral Theology, argues that one role of 
the State is to govern both the sincere and depraved forms of human nature – and that 
Hooker’s view of this ‘differs from the reformed doctrine of the Two Realms.’31 
Joyce, however, acknowledges that there is a difficulty in assimilating Hooker for or 
against any one ‘theological anthropology’ due to the shifting sands of his argument 
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according to the topic in question: this being acknowledged, it is not possible, argues 
Joyce, to claim a reformed emphasis for Hooker in exclusion of any Thomistic 
influence. 32 On a wider scale, Patrick Collinson, in England and International 
Calvinism, argues however, that rather than ascribing the Elizabethan Settlement as an 
attempt to align with any one form of Protestantism, it was primarily about securing 
independence from Rome.33 Whilst this chapter cites the scholars above in support of 
its argument that Hooker presents a defence congruent with wider Protestantism, there 
are nevertheless areas in which disagreement occurs, such as Hooker’s argument 
being merely one of expediency.  Chapter two argues for a cross-cultural, theological, 
and political basis for Hooker’s defence of the Royal Supremacy as having a rightful, 
yet unique, place in a reformed ecclesiology. 
 
Chapter three, which continues this thesis’ examination of Hooker’s defence of the 
place of Royal Supremacy within the 1559 Settlement, interrogates the role of State 
Power, and in particular, the role of natural and supernatural law in Hooker’s defence 
of an ecclesiological structure congruent with wider Protestantism. Chapter three 
examines the interplay between natural law, and, variously, positive law, Zurich, 
Geneva, the magisterial reformers, and the monarch. A key element of Hooker’s 
argument was the role of the consent of the community in their acceptance of the 
Royal Supremacy, and the monarch’s consequent role as ‘parent’. In order to argue 
that Hooker’s defence of the Royal Supremacy was consonant with reformed religious 
principles, the classic Lutheran ‘two kingdoms’ doctrine is utilized to argue that, as 
Hooker saw it, the English Puritans held a faulty understanding of the two kingdoms 
argument, and that it was on this basis that they rejected the legitimacy of the Royal 
Supremacy within a reformed Church. 
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Essentially, chapter three argues that underpinning Hooker’s theo-political defence of 
the Royal Supremacy is an orthodox Christology, which avoids either a Nestorian 
separation of the two natures of Christ, or a Eutychian conflation. Hooker was 
ultimately after unity-in-distinction, which he saw in a particular form of monarchy 
expressed through two united, yet distinct, kingdoms. Hooker did not want any 
separation of the munus triplex Christi, that is, of Christ’s offices of prophet, priest, 
and king. It is the argument of chapter three that in such a structure, Hooker was able 
to offer a strong defence of the Settlement, and hence of the ecclesiological structure 
of the Elizabethan Church as being compatible with mainstream reformed religious 
principles. 
 
As we examine the existing literature on Hooker, the Royal Supremacy, and the 
influence of the continental reformers, we will see that he generally refuses to adopt 
one approach over another, with elements of Bullinger, Luther, Calvin, and, from the 
non-reformed side, Aquinas and the Scholastics. 
 
Kirby believes that the Royal Supremacy was for Hooker a means of securing a right 
distinction between the spiritual and temporal realms;34 and, further, that the Church 
in the external, political, realm, is subject to positive human law, and, ultimately 
therefore, subject to the monarch as the highest uncommanded commander.35 Exactly 
what the monarch could adjudicate within the Church, however, was for Hooker open 
to debate – Eppley warns, however, of the risk of the monarch, say, interpreting 
Scripture in conjunction with Parliament, as being ‘frightfully absolutist.’36 
 
Hooker’s defence of the Royal Supremacy as being consonant with reformed religious 
principles, would, therefore, have required him to draw upon the continental 
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reformers for support in his argument. As part of this angle of defence, Hooker used a 
system of law that is more complicated than that used by Calvin or Luther, but exactly 
why this was the case is neatly side-stepped by Kirby, who merely claims that 
Hooker, alongside Luther, Calvin, Bullinger, and Melanchthon, ‘maintains an 
orthodox, dialectical balance between the claims of natural law and the doctrine of 
sola scriptura, each within its proper sphere’, 37  with Kirby believing Hooker 
depended on the dialectical paradigm of the two kingdoms. Further, Littlejohn 
highlights the influence of Vermigli upon Hooker’s theology, most notably upon 
areas that Littlejohn claims are ‘often seen as most distinctive, out of step with other 
English Protestants, and maybe non-reformed.’38 Littlejohn thus declares that the 
reader should be ‘attentive to the ways in which [the Zurich connection in Tudor 
England] should be a variegated Zurich connection, capable of sustaining a number of 
different, and occasionally contradictory, emphases.’39 Kirby refers to the legacy of 
Zurich (notably Bullinger and Vermigli) upon the English Church as giving a 
foundation for a continuous and coherent tradition of political theology in England in 
the latter part of the sixteenth century.40 Nygren makes the important point that 
Puritans confused the two kingdoms, which, he claims, is a serious soteriological 
error.41  Hence, whilst various scholars claim a number of influences upon Hooker 
and his Lawes, this chapter is clear that it is not possible to tie Hooker down to any 
one support – and that the genius of his defence comes from the multiplicity of his 
sources.  Only thus was Hooker able to make a thorough defence of the Settlement. 
 
Given Hooker’s multiplicity of divisions within natural law, it would be unsurprising 
that the level of Thomistic (and, therefore, scholastic) influence has been assessed. 
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Spinks 42  contrasts the approach of Cargill-Thompson with Munz, with Spinks 
claiming the former saw Hooker using Aquinas’ views on natural law as being hardly 
unique, and claiming that the latter regarded Hooker as using Aquinas in a deliberate, 
but diffused, manner. Spinks himself makes it clear that whatever use Hooker may 
have made of Aquinas and natural law, Hooker ‘will have nothing to do with Aristotle 
and the schoolmen when it comes to the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist’43 – 
an important point to make, given that usage of a scholastic may have muddied the 
claim for a reformed defence of ecclesial polity. 
 
Despite increasing research on the role of the monarch within the Religious 
Settlement and the governance of the Church within the sixteenth century, the vast 
majority of studies thus far have concentrated on presenting Hooker’s Lawes as a 
work of political expediency.44 Whilst undoubtedly this is true to a large extent, what 
studies have by and large ignored is the strong element of the Lawes and Royal 
Supremacy which is presented as a thorough work of political theology, necessary in 
order to reconcile Hooker’s argument in the Lawes that the Settlement is congruent 
with wider Reformed Protestant understandings.  
 
Continuing the argument of part one of this thesis that Hooker’s defence of the 
episcopal ecclesiology as espoused in the Lawes needs to be placed within a threefold 
structure, chapter four argues that Hooker’s understanding of jurisdiction is congruent 
with wider Protestantism. The Royal Supremacy cannot be exercised without 
somewhere to exercise that power. Thus, jurisdiction is necessary. Under Elizabeth I, 
all ecclesiastical jurisdiction was annexed to the Crown, and according to Hooker, in 
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the context of a justification of the monarch as Supreme Governor, jurisdiction meant 
having the power to make binding decisions and judgments within the temporal and 
spiritual realms, the two realms combined in the ecclesiastical realm. Hooker had to 
defend his argument against Puritans who wanted a definite and permanent divide 
between Church and State. 
 
In the Lawes, Hooker’s argument on jurisdiction is largely contained within Book VI, 
and centres around the question of Presbyterian demands for lay elders in the Church. 
Contrary to these demands, Hooker argues that the existing laws of Church and State 
are not corrupt and are not repugnant to the laws of God – power exercised by the 
monarch, and power exercised by the clergy, are qualitatively different. Hooker 
argues that the Act of Supremacy in 1559 makes it clear that Christ is head of the 
invisible and spiritual realm, and that the monarch, as Supreme Governor, is such 
over the visible and political realm. Chapter four argues that Hooker achieved a 
harmony between the Thomist structure of Book VI and the Augustinian structure of 
Book VIII of the Lawes, thus demonstrating that the mechanics of Church and State 
are mediated by eternal and natural laws, assisted by the grace of God. The two areas 
of spiritual power and the power of jurisdiction gave Hooker a framework for 
understanding how authority and jurisdiction were exercised within the realm and 
who could challenge what authority. In doing so, chapter four argues that Hooker 
again echoes Luther’s ‘two kingdoms’ theory, with bishops being key members of the 
conformist system. Hooker also utilizes Calvin and Bullinger, but in so doing, lays 
himself open to the charge of cherry-picking the parts of each argument suiting his 
cause, which ultimately risks a contradiction of principle, and hence the coherency of 
the Lawes. 
 
As we examine the existing literature on Hooker and jurisdiction, we discover a 
paucity of concentration on Hooker, jurisdiction, and whether or not the theory of 
jurisdiction as presented by Hooker in the Lawes is congruent with wider 







Admonition Controversy’s correspondence between Whitgift and Cartwright. It is 
therefore unsurprising that Rudolph Almasy claimed that Book VI was more 
polemical than the ordered consideration of Book I, due to the specialized nature of 
jurisdiction, rather than the ordered nature of natural law in Book I.45 Book VI is also 
seen as being the least complete of those in the Lawes, and hence a certain degree of 
uncertainty must be accepted when considering what Hooker may and may not have 
meant in that book. 
 
The Act of Supremacy in 1559 spelt out that ecclesiastical and civil jurisdiction 
coincided in the person of the monarch (though Hooker makes efforts to distinguish 
jurisdiction from dominion – unlike the understanding of the Act of Supremacy 
during the Henrician era, which used jurisdiction, superiority, and authority 
interchangeably, and somewhat confusedly, argues Miller).46 
 
Significant studies regarding the issue of jurisdiction in the latter half of the sixteenth 
century include Ethan Shagan’s The Rule of Moderation: Violence, Religion, and the 
Politics of Restraint in Early Modern England, which regards bishops as part of the 
State framework, being ‘worldly authorities whose coercive power was authorized by 
the monarch and by law.’47 However, Shagan’s study does not have a specific 
concentration on Hooker and jurisdiction. 
 
This thesis is particularly concerned with three types of jurisdiction in relation to 
Hooker: temporal, spiritual, and ecclesiastical. 
 
Dean Kernan’s 2008 study, ‘Jurisdiction and The Keys’, was published as part of the 
Brill Companion to Richard Hooker, and consequently has a much tighter focus on 
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Hooker and jurisdiction. Kernan suggests that for Hooker, the ability to exercise 
jurisdiction, spiritual or temporal, is based in law,48 and that claims for the power of 
judgment to be exercised on behalf of the Church grew as ‘courts and the canon law 
increasingly took on an institutional life of their own, as canonists creatively 
borrowed from the civil law and expanded their reach.’49 Kernan is also clear that 
should Hooker have definitively finished Book VI, Hooker would have used it:  
to defend the existing church courts (and canonico-civil law used in 
those courts) as theologically sound ([being] descended from 
powers that inhered in the church and the office of bishop) as an 
appropriate means to police all sorts of offences that derived from 
the church’s mission and as a politically justifiable expression of a 
power-sharing justified by custom and history that together with the 
common law worked to maintain civil peace and order.50 
Kernan51 regards Hooker as believing that the power of order given to ministers at 
their ordination grants them abilities to make the sacraments effective and to exercise 
spiritual jurisdiction appropriate to their ministerial order (e.g. deacon, priest, or 
bishop) – that is to say, the ability to exercise the ‘power of the keys’, which is not 
granted to laity. Hooker is quite clear on this in Book VI when discussing the ability 
of lay ministers to remit sins. 
 
Another important strand of argument in relation to Hooker and jurisdiction is the 
influence of continental reformers. If Hooker were to argue that the jurisdiction 
inherent in the Religious Settlement was congruent with wider Protestantism, he 
would have to be able, therefore, to argue that that theory of jurisdiction was not in 
conflict with the theories of the Magisterial Reformation. There is very little extant 
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secondary material that has specifically studied the links between Hooker, magisterial 
reformers, and jurisdiction, save for the studies already mentioned by Kernan52 and 
MacCulloch,53 which do so as part of a wider study into the magisterial reformers and 
Hooker in general. It is the aim of chapter four of this thesis to do just that. 
 
The last chapter of the first part of the thesis concerns episcopal power, the third of 
the three central tenets of my argument for Hooker’s defence of the 1559 Settlement 
being congruent with wider Protestantism. Chapter five examines what Hooker 
regarded episcopacy as consisting of: its origins, the nature of its power, ordination, 
the argument for a metropolitan, and the placement of presbyters and bishops. This 
chapter also considers the links between episcopacy and Iure Divino; whether or not 
Hooker redefines episcopacy in the Elizabethan Church; how bishops acquire their 
episcopal authority; and the links between bishops and the civil magistrates. This 
chapter also looks at the relations between reformed religious principles and episcopal 
power, and, especially, between English Puritans and episcopal power. 
 
Chapter five argues that Hooker did not believe the monarch to be able to exercise 
any kind of spiritual jurisdiction, using the example of the power of the keys (that is, 
the ability of a priest or bishop to ‘bind and loose’ people from the consequences of 
the sins they have committed, as given to the disciples in, for example, Matthew 
16:19, and 18:18). Hooker believed that officers of Church and State held jurisdiction 
in temporal and ecclesiastical spheres, but not in spiritual spheres, which were for 
clergy alone. However, there were grey areas of this jurisdiction in the Settlement, 
which meant that bishops were involved in contentious debates. Another example 
used by Hooker to illustrate his argument was the granting of spiritualities and 
temporalities to bishops, in that the bishop was only granted spiritualities upon their 
episcopal ordination by fellow bishops, and their temporalities by the monarch upon 
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their confirmation of election by the archbishop of the province in which they 
minister on behalf of the monarch. Hooker regarded oversight as amongst the core 
aspects of episcopacy (whilst acknowledging that episcopacy was not the only form 
of oversight); he was very reluctant to embrace a concept of Iure Divino episcopacy; 
and his thinking tended towards an uneasy relationship between episcopacy and 
monarch as regards intervention in ecclesiastical affairs. 
 
Chapter five argues, therefore, that Hooker’s stance on episcopacy is far closer to 
elements of mainstream reformed principles than anything proto-Anglican;54 that 
Hooker believed the English Puritans’ argument against episcopacy to be weak and 
contradictory; and therefore that, as will be explored in chapter six, the claim made by 
John Keble and the Oxford Movement in the nineteenth century that Hooker 
embraced a Iure Divino notion of episcopal authority was ill-founded.  
 
In respect of the existing literature on Hooker and episcopacy, the claim for 
ministerial parity by the Puritans, as advanced in the Admonition Controversy, 
became a driver for the defence of the place of episcopacy by Hooker in the Lawes. 
McGrade55 simply highlights in his introduction to the Folger edition of Book VIII of 
the Lawes that Cartwright considered that ‘titles and offices implying a superiority of 
one pastor over others were devised by Antichrist centuries after the apostolic age.’56 
Lake, when speaking of the Puritans, wrote that they believed the truth of their claim 
for ministerial parity as being ‘self-evident’,57 thus inferring that it was the self-
interest of the conformist clergy that explained the failure of the discipline. Further, 
Lake states that ‘the bishops were pilloried [by the Presbyterians] for their wealth and 
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pomp’,58 yet McGrade contrasts this with the fact that the loss of lands, property, and 
influence at Court prevented bishops from carrying out their traditional duties of 
charity, hospitality, and patronage.59 Bishops had lost a lot of their wealth, but 
Presbyterians still regarded them as having too much. The parlous state of the bishops 
led Edwin Sandys, then Bishop of London, to state in 1573 that they are 
‘excrementum mundi’. McGrade regards the Presbyterians as viewing the bishops in 
the later sixteenth century as ‘obstacles to further church reform and as lingering 
symbols of unreformed “lordship” and worldliness.’60 The question of the existence 
and status of the episcopate was thus ‘up in the air’ in the half-century before Hooker 
– McGrade argues that this ‘was in part because the episcopal ideal in post-
Reformation England needed redefinition…it was also unclear what a bishop could in 
fact do.’61 
 
The Iure Divino, or otherwise, of bishops was a contentious topic, and has remained 
so ever since. Lake argues that the stalemate in Elizabethan episcopal polity came 
with the development of the Iure Divino concept62 – and that, for Hooker, ‘while 
episcopacy was of apostolic origins and therefore the best, it was not the only form of 
church government.’63 MacCulloch argues that ‘the innovation of the group around 
Bancroft was to take up this Iure Divino claim and re-apply it to the institution of 
episcopacy’,64 and in doing so, they went beyond anything claimed by Whitgift, thus 
attacking the Presbyterians on their own theological ground. It is important to note, 
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though, that MacCulloch regards the aggressive championing of Iure Divino as not 
necessarily, in the eyes of its champions, abandoning a Calvinist soteriology.65 At the 
risk of us thinking that Hooker adopted Iure Divino whole-heartedly,66 Lake argues 
that Hooker’s adoption was only half-hearted and somewhat belated67 – ‘Christ’s 
kingdom remained too exalted, too spiritual to contain episcopacy as one of its central 
pillars.’68 McGrade claims that Iure Divino was never given ‘official status’, yet still 
gained dominance in the early Stuart Church.69 
 
McGrade describes the Supremacy Act as giving the Crown authority ‘to visit, 
reform, and redress virtually all ills in the church’,70 at times delegating this to 
ecclesiastical commissions of both laity and bishops. The High Commission under 
Whitgift in the 1580s and 90s, which suppressed the Puritan movement, led Sir 
Francis Knollys, a Protestant privy councillor, to ask the question, ‘should not the 
bishops be compelled to…acknowledgement that all of their authority came from the 
queen?’71 McGrade illustrated this problem further: ‘besides the knot of difficulties 
for episcopal administration stemming from the bishops’ dependence on the crown, 
there were demands by the lower clergy for their own independence from bishops.’72 
The Elizabethan churchmen, however, whilst distinguishing the English episcopate 
from that of the papacy, compared their own theology with that of the continental 
reformers, and in doing so, ‘presented episcopacy…as not forbidden in the Word of 
God and as maintained in the English Church by decision of the Christian ruler.’73 
Note here, though, that Elizabeth did not insist, as did her brother, Edward VI, on 
stipulating in the letters of episcopal orders, that bishops were to serve at the pleasure 
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of the Crown.74 MacCulloch, however, adds a note of caution in stating ‘it is 
important to realize that the aggressive championing of Iure Divino episcopacy by 
Bridges, Bancroft, Saravia, and Sutcliffe did not represent part of this new approach, 
although the Iure Divino theme did merge with the new theological pre-
occupations.’75 
 
Eppley makes an important point, however, in relation to this particular question: 
because much opposition to government policies during this period 
[the 16th century] was based solely or partly on a perception that the 
authorities were not acting in accordance with the divine will, 
effective defence of the English Church and of royal supremacy 
over the Church required that the issue of the discernment of God’s 
will be addressed.76 
Eppley considered ‘Hooker’s efforts to ensure obedience and order in the Church by 
claiming for the Church’s royal governor authority to define as well as to defend the 
faith.’77 Eppley claims to have found a failure in Whitgift’s inability to identify a 
‘hermeneutical principle’, which would ‘exclude disobedience to the Crown based on 
prior obedience to God’s will’.78 Constitutionalism is an important factor for Eppley, 
as ‘royal ecclesiastical authority [is] limited not only by divine law and natural law 
but also by the laws of the English Church formulated by the Crown in Parliament 
with the Convocation.’79 In essence, Hooker bases all royal ecclesiastical authority on 
delegation from the community.80 
                                                
74 Serving at the pleasure of the Crown took a new turn at the Synod of Dordt in 1618-19 when the 
English delegates ‘declared publicly and unequivocally that they were delegated to the synod by their 
king and not by their church’ (Milton, Catholic and Reformed, xxv). James I later referred to the clergy 
having authority over doctrinal matters (Milton, Catholic and Reformed, xxxvi). 
75 MacCulloch, Later Reformation, 78. 
76 Eppley, Royal Supremacy, 2. 
77 Eppley, op. cit., 3. 
78 Eppley, op. cit., 147. 
79 Eppley, Royal Supremacy, 166. 








Whilst a number of studies have already argued that the Lawes presented a convincing 
picture that episcopacy originated with the Apostles,81 but that the exact form of 
ecclesial governance was a matter of adiaphora and, therefore, did not need to be 
specified in the Bible, chapter five of this thesis will argue that Hooker’s episcopacy 
was one of non-essential oversight, which did not embrace a whole-hearted concept of 
Iure Divino episcopacy. Chapter five will also argue that an uneasy relationship 
existed between the monarch and the episcopate, that Hooker’s stance on episcopacy 
was far closer to that espoused by the magisterial reformers, than to any kind of high-
church polity, and that the argument of the English Puritans against episcopacy was 
often weak and contradictory. 
 
Having constructed a threefold justification for Hooker’s defence in the Lawes of the 
episcopal ecclesiology in the 1559 Settlement as being compatible with mainstream 
reformed principles, part two of this thesis then argues that the episcopal ecclesiology 
as defended by Hooker was twisted by the nineteenth-century Oxford Movement, and 
in particular, the editorial preface of John Keble’s 1836 edition of the Lawes. The 
thesis will go on to argue that the Lawes has fallen out of usage as a bulwark of 
defence by traditional catholics in the debates surrounding the ordination of women to 
the priesthood and episcopate in the twentieth and twenty-first century. 
 
Academic engagement with Hooker and the Lawes largely lay dormant from the 
publication of Keble’s 1836 edition of the Lawes until the second half of the twentieth 
century. Since that time, there have been a number of influential books published in 
the field, both those that look at the general circumstances that gave rise to the 
publication of the Lawes in the first place and those that act as general readers or 
introductions to Hooker. It is my intention to consider these general volumes before 
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moving on to those that deal more specifically with the five areas that this thesis 
focuses on: that is, Royal Supremacy, jurisdiction, episcopal power, Keble, the 
Oxford Movement, and Hooker, as well as Hooker and issues surrounding women in 
the episcopate. 
 
Hooker scholarship in the first half of the twentieth century, including the editions of 
the Lawes themselves, were either the product of, or were influenced by, the 
Tractarian movement in the nineteenth century. As shall be discussed in some depth 
in chapter six, Keble’s 1836 edition of the Lawes contained Izaak Walton’s biography 
of Hooker: a somewhat surprising inclusion, considers MacCulloch, when ‘one of the 
most remarkable features of Walton’s work was its deliberate effort to undermine the 
authenticity of the last three books of the Polity, which contained such unpalatable 
material on divine right and episcopacy.’82 It was Keble’s edition that would have 
been the most recent version of the Lawes available to Addleshaw,83 and also Sisson84 
and Thornton 85  – and perhaps surprisingly, still exercising an influence upon 
McAdoo86 in 1992 when the Folger edition was at least partially published.  Despite 
all the distortions of the introduction, the actual text of Keble’s edition is thoroughly 
scholarly and reliable. 
 
The argument as to which theological party Hooker belongs, and his subsequent 
reputation, is discussed, for example, by Brydon87 and MacCulloch.88 It is, however, a 
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more centrist and reformed Hooker of which the great majority of contemporary 
Hooker literature speaks.89 Hooker is perhaps most well-known for the moniker Via 
Media, first ascribed to him by Keble in the nineteenth century: ‘We owe it, that the 
Anglican Church continues at such a distance from that of Geneva, and so near truth 
and apostolical order.’90 This Via Media concept held sway until the latter half of the 
twentieth century, and even then still influenced those who wished to ascribe to 
Hooker an Anglican nature that did not exist for him. This was particularly so 
amongst the editors of the Folger edition: 
Although W. Speed-Hill, the general editor, suggested that Keble’s 
edition now seems ‘unduly narrow in the focus of its commentary 
and unduly pious in its retention of Walton’s Life as the gateway to 
the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity’ most of the editors continued to 
treat Hooker as the quintessential Anglican divine.91 
Despite the intellectual weight that the opinions of the editorial board of a major new 
edition of the Lawes would have had, this did not stifle challenges to the 
synchronization of Hooker with Anglicanism. Recent scholarship such as that of W. J. 
T. Kirby,92 Nigel Atkinson,93 and Rowan Williams 94 suggests that Hooker is rather 
closer in his thought to that of the magisterial continental reformers – Luther, Calvin, 
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Bullinger, and Melanchthon. Though others such as Peter Lake95 and Nigel Voak96 
questioned Kirby and Atkinson’s somewhat sweeping views, nonetheless, the 
consensus changed towards seeing Hooker as a more reformed theologian. This thesis 
argues rather that whilst Hooker is able to defend the 1559 Settlement as being 
congruent with wider Reformed Protestant understandings, it is from a thoroughly 
theological and political basis that Hooker does so: he is not just a political 
opportunist. 
 
Chapter six of the thesis argues that Keble decided a new edition of the Lawes was 
necessary in 1836 in order to correct what Keble regarded as grave errors in the 
editions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (for example, the erroneous 
Gauden edition of 1662 and subsequent additional errors that were added to the Lawes 
by John Strype in 1705). Keble, by presenting what he regarded as an authentic 
edition of the Lawes, hoped to stir the Church of England to reclaim its true 
inheritance of the ancient faith, a time before latter-day corruptions. 
 
Chapter six argues that there were several areas surrounding the publication of the 
Lawes that proved tricky for Keble, however, when attempting to corral Hooker for 
the Tractarian cause. First of all were the arguments regarding the integrity of the last 
three books. If the last three books on jurisdiction, episcopacy, and Royal Supremacy, 
as published in the 1836 edition of the Lawes, were authentic, then their argument for 
a less authoritarian model of episcopacy would not chime with Tractarian claims for 
an ecclesiology and episcopate with a definitive structure of authority. If the last three 
books were not authentically Hooker’s, then Keble would have been able to claim in 
his editorial preface, with more integrity, that Hooker had actually argued for an 
episcopate more in line with the Tractarians. Keble included those three books in his 
edition, but also included the Walton biography of Hooker, which cast some doubt on 
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the authenticity of the three books – something that in itself would have helped 
Keble’s cause to lessen the importance of the material in those chapters. Walton 
openly attacks John Gauden’s claims that the last three books were authentic.97 
 
Chapter six argues that Keble nevertheless felt compelled to include the last three 
books because to not do so would go against the scholarly consensus at the time, thus 
harming Keble’s presentation of the Lawes and his hope that the edition would 
become part of the ecclesiological canon. It is for the same reasons that chapter six 
argues Keble did not alter the actual text of the Lawes itself, preferring to add 
thematic titles at the heads of pages and minimal divisions into paragraphs in long 
swathes of text. 
 
Hence, Keble’s Tractarian polemic was contained to the editorial preface, with the 
three disputed areas of the necessity of bishops, the issue of Iure Divino, and hence 
the consequences for the authority of bishops being heavily manipulated by Keble in 
order to fit Hooker into the Tractarian mould. In particular, the preface claimed that 
Saravia and Hooker’s opinions on the Iure Divino of bishops were more or less 
identical, despite the latter remaining largely silent on the issue. Thus, chapter six 
argues that Keble’s edition placed too much emphasis on the tenuous Iure Divino 
argument because of Hooker’s alleged friendship with Hadrian Saravia and too much 
emphasis on the esse, rather than on the bene esse of bishops. As a consequence, the 
Tractarian proposals of episcopal authority as espoused in Keble’s editorial preface to 
his 1836 edition of the Lawes were not what Hooker himself would have recognized. 
There simply was not enough evidence to prove conclusively that Tractarian 
episcopal ecclesiologies were compatible with Hooker’s presentation of episcopacy in 
the Lawes. 
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Though this thesis has not been able to identify any extant studies surrounding the 
impact of Keble’s Hookerian episcopal ecclesiology, there are nonetheless some 
scholars who have touched on the broader picture of the Oxford Movement and 
episcopal ecclesiology, albeit with scant mention of Hooker. 
 
The first such scholar is Georgina Battiscombe, in her John Keble: A Study in 
Limitations.98 Keble is somewhat neglected as regards scholarly assessment within the 
legacy of the Oxford Movement, and Battiscombe’s study was a trailblazer in this 
respect. Having completed his edition of the Lawes in 1836, Keble then moved to a 
rural parish, which led Battiscombe to level a charge of intellectual indolence against 
him due to the increasing demands of family and parish life taking away time 
available for dedicated academic endeavour. Battiscombe does not seem to settle 
upon one particular picture of Keble, however, later describing his personality as 
vitally affecting the whole ethos of the Church of England.99 
 
Keble remains a neglected figure within the Oxford Movement’s influence upon the 
Church of England, and so it is inevitable that other studies focus on, for example, 
John Henry Newman, and only tangentially consider Keble in relation to Newman. 
Camilla Imberg’s 1987 In Quest of Authority: The ‘Tracts for the Times’ and the 
Development of the Tractarian Leaders, for example, traces the differences between 
Newman and Keble.100 
 
Other studies by John Rowlands101 and Peter Nockles102 are more generalist in their 
approach to the Oxford Movement and their usage of Hooker, giving scant attention 
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to the influence of Hooker upon Keble, save for Rowlands claiming that Keble was 
‘more thoroughly acquainted with the works of that writer [Hooker] than any other 
English churchman.’103 
 
A more direct study of some of the issues raised in this chapter is Jessica Martin’s 
Walton’s Lives: Conformist Commemorations and the Rise of Biography,104 which 
grapples with Walton’s biography of Hooker, and thus the reasons why Keble may 
have decided to include it in his 1836 edition. Martin’s study is by far the most 
comprehensive on the implications of Walton’s biography of Hooker for 
understanding not only Hooker himself, but also why Hookerian ecclesiology was 
included and the desired influence upon subsequent ecclesiology by Keble. 
 
Though Martin’s 2011 work is by far the most influential for understanding Keble’s 
reputation and influence upon Hookerian episcopal ecclesiology, being a general 
study into the biographer Izaak Walton, it does not extend into Keble’s editorial 
influence upon the 1836 Lawes, or subsequently for the legacy of Tractarian episcopal 
ecclesiology upon the Church of England. There are few or no studies that 
concentrate upon Keble’s legacy for contemporary episcopal ecclesiology. It is this 
that chapter six aims to do. 
 
Chapter seven proposes that the traditional catholic arguments surrounding women in 
the priesthood and episcopate in the twentieth and twenty-first century have ceased to 
draw comprehensively from Hooker as the Tractarians did, and suggests that this is 
due to the intransigence of Hooker’s episcopal ecclesiology, notably in areas that are 
dear to the traditional catholic cause, such as sacramental assurance and the apostolic 
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succession. It is simply not possible to utilize Hooker’s argument in the Lawes to add 
weight to traditional catholic claims in these two areas. 
 
Chapter seven introduces three key documents in relation to the legislation on women 
bishops for General Synod in 2014, and then takes a number of indicative texts in the 
development of Anglo-Catholic ecclesiology in the twentieth and twenty-first century, 
arguing that usage of Hooker dropped out of favour pretty much as the Tractarian era 
came to a close at the end of the nineteenth century. Anglo-Catholic texts in the 
twentieth century made little or no mention of Hooker, with Hooker instead being 
claimed for the more centrist, liberal ground, two examples used in this chapter being 
a paper by Bishop Stephen Sykes in 1990 prior to the ordination of women as priests 
in 1994 and The Rochester Report, a 2008 text from a Church of England working 
group that examined the theological issues for and against the ordination of women as 
bishops. 
 
Chapter seven identifies two issues of distinct importance for traditional catholics in 
relation to the ordination of women as priests and bishops – those of apostolic 
succession and sacramental assurance – and argues that these issues did not arise from 
Tractarian usage of Hooker, but rather from an ecclesiology that is largely alien to 
accepted Anglican mainstream tradition. 
 
Hence, chapter seven concludes that Hooker once more sits in the centrist 
ecclesiology of the Church of England, not too much towards either of the parties, 
either evangelical or catholic, which advocate further reform of the Church of 
England’s polity or ecclesiology. 
 
With chapter six having argued that Keble attempted to present an erroneous version 
of Hooker’s episcopal ecclesiology in the editorial preface of the 1836 edition of the 
Lawes, chapter seven argues that Keble’s picture of Hooker is no longer used by 







presented in the debate surrounding women and the episcopate in the latter part of the 
twentieth century and early twenty-first century. Modern-day traditional catholics 
instead argue that two fundamental characteristics of episcopacy are the apostolic 
succession and sacramental assurance. 
 
In the material considered by chapter seven, Hooker is no longer utilized by those 
arguing for a more traditional understanding of the episcopate. Mark Chapman, in 
Anglo-Catholics and the Myths of Episcopacy, argued that the concept of apostolic 
succession, as presented by the Tractarians, is an innovation that has no place in 
Church of England episcopal ecclesiology.105 
 
Stephen Sykes, in an earlier paper on Richard Hooker and the ordination of women to 
the priesthood,106 argued that any one model of Church polity is not wedded to any 
particular time and place, and that any such model of polity is therefore mutable. This, 
he argued, is entirely compatible with the tenets laid down by Hooker. 
 
Lastly, following the ordination of women to the priesthood, the Church of England 
began to explore a rationale for the ordination of women to the episcopate, and the 
Rochester Report (2004),107 published by the Church of England as the report of a 
working group of theologians considering such a development, utilizes Hooker, and in 
particular Sykes’ 1990 study, as evidence for the legitimacy of women bishops. 
 
What no study has previously done, however, is to trace where and why Hooker fell 
out of use by traditional catholics – and this is part of the findings of chapter seven. 
                                                
105 Mark D. Chapman, ‘Anglo-Catholics and the Myths of Episcopacy’, in Women as Bishops, ed. 
James Rigney (London: Continuum, 2008). 
106 Stephen Sykes, ‘Richard Hooker and the Ordination of Women to the Priesthood’, in After Eve, ed. 
Janet Martin Soskice (London: Collins Marshall Pickering, 1990). 
107 ‘Women Bishops in the Church of England?’ (London: Church House Publishing, 2004). [Usually 
known as ‘The Rochester Report’], https://familyofsites.bishopsconference.org.uk/wp-









Hooker’s Lawes began their existence as a defence of the ecclesiology of the 
Established Church at a time when the English Puritans were calling for more reform. 
The Tractarians in the nineteenth century later tried to use Hooker as a bulwark of 
established religion to argue that the Church of England was in need of further reform 
to align it once more with the faith and practice inherited from the ancient Church. 
The texts arguing for the development of women priests and bishops in the twentieth 
and twenty-first centuries used Hooker once more to claim that this was a legitimate 
development within the bounds of the inheritance of faith of the Church of England. 
 












It has often been claimed that Richard Hooker’s magnum opus, Of the Lawes of 
Ecclesiasticall Politie, was a work of political expediency, neatly balancing the 
authority of the monarch with that of the episcopate. Such a picture of Hooker’s 
Lawes is neither accurate nor fair. The Lawes were, in fact, a thorough work of 
political theology, and Hooker neatly weaves his defence of the Elizabethan Religious 
Settlement of 1559 with fully magisterial reformed ecclesiological theology. 
 
To do this, Hooker needed to consider the authority of the monarch, the authority of 
the episcopate, the jurisdictions both entities held, and how these interacted in the 
Church. This chapter will consider Hooker’s understanding of the monarch as 
Supreme Governor, and the authority associated with that title. 
 
The exercise of lay ecclesiastical supremacy required Hooker to present an acceptable 
justification. Namely, the monarch had her ecclesiastical supremacy bestowed on her 
by the community: 
Howbeit laws do not take their constraining force from the quality 
of such as devise them, but from that power which doth give them 
the strength of laws. That [power] which power God hath over all: 
and by the natural law, whereunto he hath made all subject, the 
lawful power of making laws to command whole politic societies of 
men belongeth so properly unto the same entire societies.108 
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We will discuss the issues surrounding the bestowal of authority upon the monarch by 
the community briefly in section 2.2c, and more fully in chapter 3.2c. 
 
This chapter will begin by considering Hooker’s analysis and defence of the 
Elizabethan Settlement, first in relation to the source of the sovereign’s authority; 
second, regarding the relationship between the community and the nature of the Royal 
Supremacy; and third, by bringing these two elements together in Hooker’s 
understanding of the Royal Supremacy. This chapter will conclude that Hooker’s 
Lawes are neither a blind defence of the Settlement and unrestrained lay ecclesiastical 
authority, as some Puritans and Reformers would have it, nor a work merely of theo-
political expediency. Hooker’s defence of the Settlement is made on thoroughly 
reformed grounds: he argued that the Settlement was sufficiently governed by law, 
thus demonstrating that Puritan fears were mis-placed. 
 
By so doing, we will identify the grounds on which Hooker believed lay ecclesiastical 
supremacy could be exercised alongside that of bishops, in a manner that would 
demonstrate that the Church of England was congruent with wider Protestantism. 
Having thus outlined how Hooker regarded the monarch’s authority was to be held 
and exercised, chapter three will then argue that this authority was exercised 
consonant with natural law and magisterial reformed principles. 
 
2.2 Hooker and the Elizabethan Settlement 
 
The 1559 Act of Supremacy asserted Queen Elizabeth as Supreme Governor of the 
Church of England, enshrining in law the State’s power over and within the English 
Church. Though the limits of the Supremacy were perhaps deliberately never 
defined,109 the sovereign’s prerogatives included the calling of ecclesiastical councils 
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or convocations, the making of ecclesiastical laws, the making of ecclesiastical 
governors, 110  involvement in ecclesiastical courts and judgments, 111  and the 
monarch’s exemption from excommunication.112 These were the legal contours of the 
sovereign’s supremacy, but, in Hooker’s view, by what authority did she exercise that 
authority? 
 
2.2a Origin of the Sovereign’s Authority 
 
Elizabeth herself appeared to hold a very high view of the source of her authority, 
believing herself in the Declarations to be ‘by God’s grace the sovereign Prince and 
Queen next under God, and all the people in our realm are immediately born subjects 
to us and our Crown and no-one else.’113 This divine authority bound the queen, in her 
own words: 
to direct all estates, being subject unto us, to live in the faith and the 
obedience of the Christian religion, and to see the laws of God and 
man observed, and the offenders against the same duly 
punished…and to provide that the Church may be governed and 
taught by archbishops, bishops, and ministers according to the 
ancient ecclesiastical polity of this realm, whom we do assist with 
our sovereign power.114 
If this were not sufficient an exaltation of the queen’s religious obligations as 
determined by law, some scholars even seem to argue that the Royal Supremacy was 
largely responsible for the survival of the episcopate, and in particular, Elizabeth’s 
                                                
110 Note the three stages of ‘creating’ a new bishop – episcopal election, consecration, and the granting 
of the See, only the latter of which could be granted by the monarch. 
111 Which involved two types of judge – bishops and lay (commissionaries), with the monarch’s judges 
as the last court of appeal. 
112 We will explore this area further in 2.2c ii. 
113 W. E. Collins (ed.) Queen Elizabeth’s Defence of Her Proceedings in Church and State, Church 
Historical Society, vol 58 (London: SPCK, 1958), 45f. 







fulfilment of the role – she considered it a part of the power vested in her.115  The 
monarch maintained the ecclesiological form of episcopacy and its role in the proper 
administration of religion. 
 
The monarch believed her authority to be given to her by God’s grace – the Act of 
Supremacy (through which the queen would have believed God’s grace to have acted) 
placed Elizabeth at the top of a hierarchical system that encompassed both sacred and 
secular within her realm. Hooker considered both sacred and secular spheres to be 
part of the whole beneath the sovereign, and therefore all were her subjects. Much as 
Elizabeth may have wished it otherwise,116 the authority given her was not absolute, 
and the queen could only undertake the task of building a national Church using the 
structures of ecclesiastical polity already in place, which were focused on the bishops 
and on the ecclesiastical prerogative embodied in the Court of the High Commission. 
Hooker makes this clear in Book VIII of the Lawes, when he says: ‘Wherefore to 
define and determine even of the Churches affaires by way of assent and 
approbation…thus to define our Churches regiment, the Parlament of England hath 
competent authoritie.’117 Yet, even though here Hooker indicates that Parliament is 
able to make laws relevant to the Church, the monarch retains her royal assent,118 
therefore retaining a right of veto for the monarch, because the queen was part of 
Parliament, and most fully queen when Queen-in-Parliament. 
 
Hence the authority of the monarch, exercised in the form of the Royal Supremacy, 
was given to her by statute law, by the grace of God. The moot point remains as to the 
limits of the exercise of that authority, limits that of course remained deliberately 
                                                
115 Ebenezer Thomas Davies, Episcopacy and the Royal Supremacy in the Church of England in the 
Sixteenth Century (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1950), 72.  
116 See Susan Doran, ‘Elizabeth I’s Religion: The evidence in her letters,’ Journal of Ecclesiastical 
History 51, no.4 (2000) 699-720, 702. ‘One dominant theme in Elizabeth’s letters is her assertion of the 
Royal Supremacy.’ 
117 Hooker, Lawes, VIII.vi.12. 







vague as specified in law – and Hooker was not going to risk contravening statute law 
by specifying what it did not. 
 
This section has argued that the monarch had her ecclesiastical supremacy bestowed 
on her by the community – through a combination of God’s grace and the people of 
God (the latter being given by the consent of the people to be so governed through 
parliament, whose MPs the people themselves elected).  The monarch’s authority was 
not absolute, and only used existing structures (of which bishops were a part), 
including the ecclesiastical prerogative and high commissioners.  The authority 
exercised by the monarch was exercised under a form of Royal Supremacy, which 
was given to the monarch by statute law, through which the grace of God acted to 
give the necessary skills, gifts, and power.  Hooker remained vague about the limits of 
royal authority. 
 
2.2b Community, the Nature of Royal Supremacy, and the Meaning of that Title 
 
Though we have argued that the authority associated with Royal Supremacy was 
bestowed upon the monarch by God’s grace and by statute law, and have identified 
initial aspects of how Hooker believed that authority was to be exercised over the 
Church, there are important nuances to explore, especially given the climate in which 
Hooker wrote his Lawes. 
 
It would be naïve to think that a blind acceptance of theocratic kingship was sufficient 
for those who sought to defend the Settlement – there was another aspect to the Royal 
Supremacy, which was explored by Hooker to an equal degree.119 Hooker suggests 
that God and the community are the source of the monarch’s authorization to occupy 
the office of monarch, and are responsible for defining the extent of Royal Supremacy 
                                                







over the Church 120  – perhaps suggesting the foundations of constitutional 
monarchy:121 
for that every supreme govenour doth personally take from thence 
his power by way of guift bestowed of their own free accord upon 
him at the time of his entrance into the sayd place of soveraigne 
government.122 
Hooker talks about the sovereign power being bestowed upon the monarch by the free 
accord of Parliament – theoretically Parliament could refuse – but this would be a 
dangerous point, which Hooker does not explore, perhaps on purpose. 
 
With the Royal Supremacy, the supremacy of the monarch over the English Church 
was re-established,123 as was the right to delegate this authority under the Great Seal 
of England to those deemed fit. The Act required that ‘all and every archbishop, 
bishop, and all and every minister…shall make, take, and receive a corporal oath [of 
obedience to the monarch] upon the Evangelist.’124 Refusal to take the oath meant 
deprivation from office. Establishing Elizabeth as ‘Supreme Governor’ rather than 
‘head’ meant that whilst the exact wording changed, ‘the same Act [1559] 
nevertheless claimed the same scope of royal authority over the Church for Elizabeth 
as the Act of Supremacy had claimed for Henry.’125 Elizabeth, as did her father and 
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brother, deliberately followed the precedent of being vague in respect of the limits of 
the Supremacy, lest any unintentional limitation of the Supremacy creep in. This did 
not, according to Eppley, mean that the monarch could make pronouncements 
regarding the Church at random, for example, particularly in respect of the Puritan 
dislike of monarchical control over the Church: 
the traditional notion of the prince as the divinely appointed vicar of 
God over all temporal matters embraced by most defenders of the 
supremacy…is not sufficient [my emphasis] to legitimate the 
authority of the Crown to definitively pronounce regarding God’s 
will.126 
This moderate view articulated by Eppley is, however, one which Hooker himself did 
not spell out in black and white for fear of alienating himself from the other end of the 
political spectrum. 
 
Puritans thought that discernment of beliefs or practices that were not adiaphora in 
respect of salvation should be reserved for those in authority in spiritual matters. Does 
this mean that the Crown (for Puritans, at least) had no, or limited, authority over 
spiritual matters? Hooker himself, when writing of the historical development127 of 
the Royal Prerogative, or monarchical power, believes that ‘a king which hath not 
supreme power in the greatest things, is rather entitled a king, than invested with real 
sovereignty.’128 It would seem evident that, according to Hooker, a king has to have 
supreme power in order to actually be a king, rather than just be called one – though 
Hooker is careful to explain that royal power should be limited to some degree 
through natural law and state law: 
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I am not of opinion that simply always in kings the most, but the 
best limited power is best…which rule is the law; I mean not only 
the law of nature and of God, but very national or municipal law 
consonant thereunto.129 
Hence, because the Crown exercises its power through both natural and state law, the 
Crown is therefore the representative of the people, having ‘two bodies’, completely 
and unalterably empowered by the nature of the God-given office of monarch to 
speak with authority and with finality on behalf of the nation, the will of which she is 
exclusively able to give voice. 
 
The Act of Supremacy referred to the monarch having supremacy for the 
‘conservation of peace and unity.’ Hooker is clear that the monarch should not 
interfere in spiritual matters,130 but the issue when disagreement over spiritual issues 
threatened peace and unity – particularly so with a monarch who wilfully disregarded 
such restraints when it suited her, created grey areas. 
 
Whilst Hooker defends the authority associated with the title of Supreme Governor, 
rather than the title itself,131 he nevertheless attempts to address the Puritans’ concerns 
that only Christ could be head of the Church, arguing that the monarch’s headship 
differs from Christ’s headship in three ways – in order, in measure, and in kind: 
In order, because God hath given him to his Church for the 
head…in measure of power also, because God hath given unto him. 
The ends of the earth for his possession, unto him Dominion from 
Sea to Sea, unto him all power in heaven and in earth…nor is there 
any kinde of lawe which tyeth him but his own proper will and 
wisdom…the last and weightiest difference between him and them 
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is in the very kinde of their power. The Headship which we give 
unto Kings is altogether visibly exercised and ordereth only the 
externall frame of the Churches affayres heer amongst us, so that it 
plainly differeth from Christs even in very nature and kinde.132 
Here, Hooker clearly distinguishes between the overarching Lordship of Christ, which 
affects the internal and external workings of the Church, and the headship of the 
monarch, which affects only the external, or governance, structures of the Church. It 
is the Puritans, argues Hooker, who conflate and confuse the headship of the monarch 
with that of Christ, because they do not realize the distinction between internal and 
external governance structures of the Church. It is entirely plausible to think that 
Hooker is here ‘selling out’ the authority of the monarch by limiting it to the external 
sphere only. This may have been something the monarch herself would not have been 
comfortable with, despite the perhaps apocryphal phrase attributed to her, ‘who am I 
to make windows into mens’ hearts?’ This element of discussion will be further 
explored in 3.2e. 
 
Hence, although Christ is spiritually present in every part of the Church, Christ cannot 
rule visibly over the tangible elements of the Church, and therefore, ‘Heads indued 
with supreme power extending unto a certaine compasse are for the exercise of visible 
regiment not unnecessary.’133 The Church, as a political society, requires authority, 
rule, and public order, in common with any other political society. 
 
This section has argued that as God and the community are responsible for defining 
the limits of Royal Supremacy, both are responsible for defining the limits thereof, 
potentially pointing to a constitutional form.  The Royal Supremacy re-established the 
supremacy of the monarch over the English Church, strengthened by the Oath of 
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Obedience which public servants (including clergy) were obliged to take.  Hooker did 
not spell out the limits of Royal Supremacy, and believed that a monarch without 
supreme power is only in title a king.  It is important to grasp that as the Crown 
exercises their power through natural and state law, the Crown is the representative of 
the people, having two bodies.  It is also important to grasp that Hooker is clear that, 
whilst the monarch should strive for peace and unity in the realm, they should not 
interfere in spiritual matters.  Hooker addresses Puritan claims by stating that the 
monarch’s headship differs from Christ’s in three ways – order, measure, and kind.  
According to Hooker, the mistake the Puritans make is to conflate and confuse these 
things, as they do not realise the distinction between internal and external governance 
structures of the Church. 
 
2.2c Hooker’s Understanding of the Royal Supremacy 
 
i)  The Royal Supremacy 
 
Key to understanding Hooker’s argument in Book VIII is the concept that Church and 
State are so interconnected that they can be viewed as one entity – ‘there is not any 
man of the Church of England, but the same man is also a member of the 
Commonwealth, nor any man a member of the Commonwealth which is not also of 
the Church of England.’134 This iconic phrase suggests that, like it or not, all English 
subjects are also Christians, and vice versa, so all subjects must therefore be obedient 
to, and live within, the laws and structures of the realm. However, whilst this phrase 
seems to suggest a relationship between the Church, the State, and its inhabitants, 
Hooker muddies the water somewhat by saying that there is no reason for religious 
authority to be based in a political system,135 hinting at the difference between 
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authority in the secular and the sacred spheres: ‘there is nothing in the nature of man, 
or of the nature of the State, or in the law of God, which demands that religious 
authority of any kind be vested in the political organs of a society.’136 
 
It may be convenient or expedient, but it is not necessary. This is an important 
corollary, in that Hooker is only ever making a case for the ecclesiastical system in 
England, and not in any other country. In England’s case, where Church and State are 
co-existent, Hooker can avoid making any kind of judgment about ecclesiastical 
structures in other countries. Because the Church and State were co-existent in the 
legislation of the realm, that is what Hooker had to defend in the Act of Settlement, 
even if that co-existence was not the case in practice. 
 
When considering the authority of the monarch and the authority of the bishop, the 
question of  Iure Divino needs to be examined, because by so doing, we can assess the 
weight with which such figures governed, and the level of obedience they expected. 
Whilst Hooker does not explicitly consider that episcopal governance was instituted 
by Christ, but rather by the Apostles themselves, and hence handed down through the 
ages, the same cannot be said of monarchy. Hooker traces in Lawes VIII.i and iii a 
clear biblical precedent for godly monarchy, and therefore it could easily be said that 
monarchical governance is Iure Divino. However, what the Bible does not mention is 
the level of involvement that a monarch was permitted in the governance of the 
Church (or indeed religious establishments of the biblical era). 
 
The idea of Iure Divino has always been hotly contested, and indeed Hooker himself 
appears to give little support to it: ‘it seemeth to stand altogether…by human right 
that unto Christian Kings there is such dominion [that of supreme power in 
                                                







ecclesiastical affairs] given.’137 Yet, almost immediately, Hooker performs an about-
turn regarding the power exercised by the monarch: 
…on whom the same [power] is bestowed, even at men’s discretion, 
they likewise do hold it by divine right, if God in his own revealed 
word have appointed such power to be, although himself 
extraordinarily bestow it not, but leave the appointment of the 
persons unto men.138  
Hooker seems to be saying that the power exercised by the monarch is done so at the 
discretion of men (in other words, by implicit, ancient, one-for-all consent of the 
people)139, the monarch is given this power by divine right – that is, by God – and 
finally, this power may be exercised by the consent of the populace as Hooker seems 
to infer that the appointment of the one exercising power is by man (that is to say, the 
succession to the Crown is governed by statute law, i.e. by Parliament). Hooker 
clarifies who may appoint a person to the office of monarch: 
That the Christian world should be ordered by kingly regiment, the 
law of God doth not any where command; and yet the law of God 
doth give them right, which once are exalted to that estate, to exact 
at the hands of their subjects general obediences in whatsoever 
affairs their power may serve to command. So God doth ratify the 
works of the sovereign authority which kings hath received by 
men.140 
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Hooker states that to be governed by kingly rule is not commanded anywhere, save 
for historical precedent as documented in the Bible and thereafter – you could say that 
it is by custom that kings have existed. What Hooker does clarify is that once kings 
are in office, there is a clear biblical precedent for their right to occupy that office, 
thus God ratifies their power. By so doing, Hooker avoids making any judgment 
about discerning God’s will about who should hold sovereign power. 
 
It is important to note here that once this election has been made, or the consent been 
given, it is irrevocable. It may not mean quite the levels of accountability that 
opponents of Iure Divino may be seeking, but nonetheless, it seems to give a greater 
level of accountability than a de facto Iure Divino would allow.141 These levels of 
accountability do not mean that the populace has too much influence over the 
monarch, however. The convenience, or indeed expediency, of the system that 
Hooker defends is dependent on the obedience of the populace to the laws formed by 
human wisdom and enforced by its agents in order to secure peace and harmony. We 
might also ask to what extent society, in consenting to be governed by a monarchy, is 
the ultimate source – or perhaps more accurately, authorization142 – of the monarch’s 
authority. This authorization, argues Hooker, cannot be taken away: 
for unlesse we will openly proclaime defiance unto all law equitie 
and reason, we must (there is no remedie) acknowledge that in 
Kingdomes hereditary birth giveth right unto soveraigne dominion 
and the death of the predecessor putteth the successor by blood in 
seisin…143 
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Hooker is here stating that to put away the authority of the monarch by means of 
disobedience would be to defy natural law and the law of reason, both of which are 
key elements in societal law. 
 
Hooker believes that the Supremacy is not absolute, because it is limited in three 
ways,144 it being ‘subordinate to God, the laws of the realm, and the community as a 
whole…but it does not entail in causes Ecclesiastical that ruling authoritie…can 
lawfully overrule [in matters spiritual].’145 It may well be that Hooker had no option 
other than to discuss the limits of royal authority in a deliberately vague manner: 
Kings by conquest make their own charter, so that how large their 
power either civil or spiritual is, we cannot with any certainty define 
further, than only to set them in general the law of God and nature 
for bounds.146 
To risk setting definite boundaries to the monarch’s authority would either anger the 
monarch or give those who opposed royal authority in the Church the opportunity to 
disobey such authority if it was outside explicit boundaries. It is in the nature of the 
Crown (in a real, rather than titular, sense) that the extent of its powers is undefined. 
A monarchy that is bound by anything other than the laws of God and nature is not 
truly sovereign, but rather is subject to another sovereign that imposes those bounds. 
 
If then, as Hooker claims, the Royal Supremacy is necessarily vague, what does it 
achieve? As monarch of the realm, and as Supreme Governor of the Church of 
England, it is therefore evident that the monarch would somehow co-ordinate both 
Parliament and the Church. The monarch, below Christ, is the pinnacle of that 
authority, and therefore all such authority flows from the monarch to the entirety of 
the realm – ‘the very essence of all government within the kingdom doth depend 
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[upon the monarch]’. It would seem, therefore, that Hooker is defending the principle 
of the monarch as Supreme Governor, sitting as she did at the head of both Houses of 
Parliament, who were both convened in her name, as well as being entitled ‘Supreme 
Governor’ of the Church of England. It is possible that Hooker made sure that he 
remained loyal to the monarch by not setting any boundaries to her ecclesiastical 
authority when making his defence of the Religious Settlement in the Lawes. 
 
The authority with which the monarch operated in the temporal and spiritual spheres 
had, for Hooker, repercussions for producing legally binding legislation in the 
country. If Hooker regards the monarch as a ‘figurehead’, then in relation to solely 
temporal matters, she will act as the person in whose name the Houses of Parliament 
are convened, with no recourse to her role as Supreme Governor of the Church of 
England. In spiritual matters, the monarch would act in conjunction with the 
government of the Church, that is, Convocation. However, due to the Church of 
England’s established nature, any putative laws from Convocation would need to be 
ratified by Parliament, as well as receiving royal assent, thus bringing together 
spiritual and temporal spheres.147 By remaining vague about the limits of royal 
authority, Hooker allows the monarch in his defence of the Settlement the freedom to 
assert her authority in pretty much whatever sphere she wished when laws were being 
made. 
 
Hooker believes that this concept of supreme governorship is entirely proper and in 
accordance with the tenets of reformed religion: 
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there is no one [example] which doth prove it a thing repugnant 
unto the law either of God or nature that all supremacie of externall 
power be in Christian Kingdomes graunted unto the Kings thereof 
for preservation of quietnes, unitie, order and peace in such manner 
as hath been shewed.148 
Hooker is presenting the role of the monarch as that of a parent, or ‘common parent’, 
hinted at in his discussion of theocratic kingship – ‘God appoints the king to rule over 
his subjects, and to care for their souls as well as their temporary existence.’149 Any 
restrictions on the supreme governorship, as argued by Hooker, would be implicit, 
rather than explicit. 
 
The parental role of a monarch as suggested by Hooker is qualitatively different from 
the absolutism that proponents of Iure Divino would seek – and neither is it the 
democratic isolationism of the Church from the State that the Puritans sought. Neither 
is it the ‘via media’, a label that scholars have attempted to fix to Hooker throughout 
the latter part of the twentieth century. Due to the queen’s ‘two bodies’, she is 
empowered to speak fully and authoritatively on behalf of the nation, whose will she 
alone, because she is Supreme Governor, is able to give voice to. It is a unique 
position, with a ‘foot in both camps’, which gives the monarch a ‘parental’ position in 
and for the nation, a uniqueness to care for the wellbeing of the nation and the souls 
therein, as Supreme Governor of the Church, and as the highest authority in 
Parliament. 
 
This section has argued that Church and State are so interconnected that they can be 
viewed as one entity, although there is no reason for religious authority to be based in 
a political system.  Hooker laid out a clear Biblical precedent for a godly monarchy – 
yet despite this, he did not explicitly believe in Iure Divino for kings (as the power of 
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the monarch, given by God, was exercised due to the discretion and consent of men).  
Hooker argued that though consent still needs to be given for the monarch to exercise 
power, once given, this consent is irrevocable.  Hooker further states that Royal 
Supremacy is limited in three ways, because it is subordinate to the laws of God, the 
realm, and the community.  Even then, Hooker is only talking about vague limits to 
the Supremacy – this vagueness allows the monarch the flexibility to exercise power 
where she wants.  The monarch, as Supreme Governor, co-ordinated parliament and 
the Church, and through her two bodies, was able to speak on behalf of the nation. 
 
ii) Hooker and the Royal Prerogative 
 
Though we have seen in 2.2b that the monarch should not intervene in doctrinal 
matters, there is justification in other areas – indeed, perhaps even an imperative when 
the role of the monarch as ‘matriarch’ and governor, maintaining good order in the 
Church, is taken into account.150 Hooker necessarily examines issues of jurisdiction 
and the authority of the episcopate, which will be discussed later, and which reflect 
the importance of the exercise of the Royal Prerogative. 
 
Chapters iv to ix of the eighth book of the Lawes set out five specific prerogatives that 
are the especial purview of the monarch, according to Hooker: 
1. Of their prerogative to call general assemblies about the affairs of the 
Church (VIII.v.1); 
2. of their power in making ecclesiastical laws (VIII.vi.1); 
3. of their power in making ecclesiastical governors (VIII.vii.1); 
4. of their power in judgment ecclesiastical (VIII.viii.1); and 
5. of their exemption from judicial kinds of punishment by clergy 
(VIII.ix.1). 
                                                







The first, in practice in Elizabethan times, meant the calling and prorogation of 
convocations of the clergy. The second prerogative is expounded in a rather long and 
complicated chapter but is ultimately distilled down to the view that ‘to the King 
belongeth power of maintaining laws made for the Church regiment and of causing 
them to be observed.’151 The third refers to the process of electing and consecrating 
bishops, and granting them their territories.152 This prerogative will be considered in 
chapter four of this thesis. The fourth prerogative makes provision for the monarch’s 
dealings in the ecclesiastical courts and their judgments, in which Hooker makes a 
clear distinction between judges Ordinary, that is, bishops, and Commissary judges, 
the latter of whom may be laity. Provision is also made for the monarch to be the final 
‘court of appeal’ in ecclesiastical causes.153 The question of the monarch’s role in 
ecclesiastical judgments will be examined in chapter three. In the fifth prerogative, 
Hooker believes that ‘till better reason be brought to prove that Kings cannot lawfully 
be exempted from subjection unto Ecclesiastical Courts we must and do affirm their 
said exemption lawful.’154 
 
The legislation of the 1559 Act of Supremacy was closest to Hooker’s fourth point 
listed above, as the Act stated that the Royal Supremacy may be used for ‘the 
Visitacion of the Ecclesiastical State and Persons, and for Reformation Order and 
Correcion of the same and of all manner of Errours Heresies Scismes Abuses 
Offences Contemptes and Enormities’, 155 although the 1559 Act forbade ‘royal 
agents’ from judging as heresy that that was not judged to be so by Scripture; 
Scripture remained the primary measure of heresy. This is perhaps a moot point, 
given that both the Henrician and Elizabethan Acts allowed the monarch to exercise 
their supremacy to maintain unity and peace, albeit by methods unspecified – or at the 
very least, uncertain. 
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Hooker intends his argument in the Lawes to be read in a linear manner – we should 
already have read the arguments constructed in Book I regarding the system of laws 
on which government of society and the Church are constructed, and consequently, 
the importance of obeying these. Scripture has revealed a divine law, which together 
with the law of reason may illustrate how essential elements of the Church are to be 
ordered, but this leaves many elements of the life of the Church undefined.156 If 
certain elements are left un-ordered within a community, there is the risk that unrest 
may follow, hence: 
there is not one [example] which doth prove it a thing repugnant 
unto the lawe either of God or nature that all supremacie of 
externall power be in Christian Kingdomes graunted unto the Kings 
thereof for presentation of quietnes, unitie, order and peace in such 
a manner as hath been shewed.157 
Thus, according to Hooker, the monarch had a pivotal role in ensuring good order in 
society: this role was ‘ordained’ for the monarch in Scripture, and also revealed in 
law.158 Whilst there are many examples of Elizabeth intervening in religious matters, 
which could feasibly be justified under the second prerogative above, even in areas 
that would have been considered adiaphora, the queen maintained a tight rein on 
religion in her realm, lest any dissension or deviation from conformity be seen as a 
challenge against her authority. 
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Yet the argument as to whether anyone has superiority over the monarch raises the 
greater question as to whether the monarch could be excommunicated, which Hooker 
discusses in Book VIII – concluding that no one may do so, but that the monarch 
should abstain, by their own conscience, from Communion whilst they are in a state 
of sin.159 
 
Hooker then continues, ‘for which cause till better reason be brought to prove that 
Kings cannot lawfully be exempted from subjection unto Ecclesiastical Courts we 
must and do affirm their said exemption lawful.’160 This double negative, which 
manages to make the claim of monarchical exemption modest and provisional at the 
same time, neatly avoids Hooker having to pass judgment on this tricky topic. Hooker 
also writes that ‘concerning excommunication such as is only a dutiful religious and 
holy refusal to admit Notorious transgressors [to Holy Communion]…this we grant 
every king bound to abide at the hands of any Minister of God wheresoever 
throughout the world’:161 this means that kings need to respect the Church’s decision 
to excommunicate others – and implicitly indicates that kings should respect, in their 
consciences, that notorious sinners cannot be admitted to Holy Communion (again, 
remaining silent on the issue of a king being a notorious sinner).162 Hooker perhaps 
suggests that it is the monarch’s fear of God as their ultimate judge that may prevent 
their own consciences from taking Holy Communion, rather than realistically 
expecting the minister to refuse the sacraments. 
 
So, if the monarch has power over the bishops in respect of granting them their 
temporalities, the monarch cannot grant bishops their spiritualities, without which the 
bishops cannot be bishops. In respect of their sacramental functions, then, bishops 
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have powers that kings do not have.163 With this sacramental function goes the power 
to administer the sacraments, but also by turn, the power to deny them to those 
deemed unworthy – that is, unrepentant sinners – so there is a power of jurisdiction 
that is linked to the power of order (sometimes referred to as the ‘power of the keys’). 
Does, then, a priest or a bishop have the power to excommunicate the monarch? 
Hooker’s answer to this is one of the most oblique in the entire Lawes, which is 
perhaps not surprising: 
The question itself we will not determine. The reasons of each 
opinion being opened, it shall be the best for the wise to judge 
which of them is likeliest to be true. Our purpose being not to 
oppugn any save only that which reformers hold; and of the rest, 
rather to inquire than to give sentence.164 
Hooker did not wish to question the validity of the opinions of the magisterial 
reformers – it is to this group that the Lawes appeals in its quest: to examine and 
appeal to the opinions of other groups may well have been counter-productive – but 
rather those of his Puritan opponents. Hooker’s view of the monarch’s authority, and 
of the sacraments, means that he cannot, as a subject of the monarch, legislate for the 
issue of the excommunicability of the monarch – to do so would be to set himself 
above the sovereign. 
 
If Hooker was attempting to claim that the Settlement was congruent with wider 
Protestantism, what did the continental magisterial reformers, notably Zurich, say on 
the Royal Prerogative? Dependent upon our definition of the Royal Prerogative, yet 
assuming here that it would be to allow for the monarch’s intervention against the 
advice of her councillors in Parliament, sometimes through her agents of State and the 
Privy Council, the Zurich tradition could comfortably have aligned itself with a non-
absolutist understanding. However, a letter from Peter Martyr Vermigli to Richard 
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Cox in 1559 suggests that Zurich’s support was qualified, being offered so long as the 
Queen surrounded herself with ‘councilors who excel in zeal and true doctrine.’165 
This qualified support of the Supremacy, and indeed the Royal Prerogative, is 
dependent upon taking the counsel of wise advisors (wise so long as their opinions 
were aligned with Zurich and Vermigli, one presumes). Should the queen act without 
this counsel, this may risk upsetting this moderated prerogative, and thus support 
from Zurich may well be lost. Vermigli’s designation of the queen as a ‘Holy 
Deborah for our times’ was of course written at the beginning of Elizabeth’s reign, 
before she had had time to prove herself as not always willing to stick to the precepts 
that Zurich had laid out for an acceptable royal exercise of power within the Church 
and society.166 
 
We have therefore outlined Hooker’s understanding of the Royal Prerogative, and the 
areas in which the monarch had an especial responsibility as Supreme Governor of the 
Church of England. As chief magistrate, the authority vested in the monarch had 
implications that will be examined in later chapters. Yet, we have seen that there were 
many examples of the queen intervening in matters that would have been best left to 
others for the peace and prosperity of the realm. The queen, however, was in charge, 
and she would not let that be forgotten. 
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We saw earlier that a particularly contentious issue was the possibility of the 
monarch’s excommunication – an issue of far greater importance than one purely of 
polity – to acknowledge that someone had greater power than she would be to 
acknowledge an authority in the realm that was not completely hers – and so Hooker 
neatly dances round this by suggesting that the queen is exempt from 
excommunication until such time that a good reason for excommunication is proven. 
Lastly, we briefly looked at whether the Zurich school would have, in principle, 
supported the Royal Prerogative. To which the answer is yes – yet in a non-absolutist 
sense, so long as the queen surrounded herself with godly advisors in counsel, as 
Vermigli and the Zurichians were suggesting. 
 
This section has argued that the Royal Prerogative gave the monarch the power to call 
general assemblies of the Church, make ecclesiastical laws, make ecclesiastical 
governors, exercise power in ecclesiastical judgments, and meant that the monarch 
was exempt from clerical judgment and punishment.  A key topic in this section was 
whether the monarch could be excommunicated.  Hooker would not be drawn to a 
definitive conclusion, but proposed instead that the monarch’s fear of God is their 
ultimate judge.  Hooker also argued that the grant of spiritualities and temporalities to 
bishops meant that bishops, in their spiritualities, had power which the monarch did 
not have, linking this power of jurisdiction to the power of order.  Finally, Hooker 
suggested that the Zurich school would have supported the idea of Supreme 
Governorship, and argued that this was so only if the monarch, in the eyes of Zurich, 




This chapter has argued that Hooker was able to defend the concept of Royal 
Supremacy as acceptable within a wider Protestant ecclesiology.  Hooker achieved 
this by bolstering his claims for the monarch as Supreme Governor using arguments 







Hooker attacks Puritanism from within the reformed tradition.  Hooker’s defence of 
the Royal Supremacy is a work of theological expediency, which combined 
ecclesiastical and secular checks and balances on State Power within the Settlement. 
 
We began this chapter by asking to what extent Hooker’s account of the Royal 
Supremacy could be considered an orthodox defence of the Elizabethan Religious 
Settlement, which established the English monarch as being Supreme Governor of the 
Church of England. We have seen that Hooker consistently plays a fluid game, apart 
from defending the Settlement as being congruent with wider Protestantism in answer 
to the claims of the English Puritans. As such, the Lawes should be interpreted from 
that standpoint, rather than as evidence of nascent Anglicanism. 
 
By examining various aspects of the legal landscape, as well as that of Hooker’s 
approach, we demonstrated that Hooker’s approach to the Royal Supremacy is largely 
compatible with orthodox reformed understandings of the Church and State. One 
crucial aspect in this argument is the concept of the two kingdoms – the allegedly 
false interpretation of which influences the entire argument of the Puritans that the 
monarch claims authority over the Church, which belongs only to Christ. 
 
We have also shown that Hooker’s interpretation of the role of a prince within the 
Church, which went against the arguments of the English and continental Puritans, 
suggests that Hooker attacks Puritanism from within the reformed tradition, thus 
showing again that Puritan claims for further reform are groundless. 
 
Hookers’ Lawes are not a blind defence of the Settlement and unrestrained royal 
ecclesiastical prerogative as some Puritans and Reformers would have it, but rather a 
work of political earnestness and sincerity in demonstrating that the ecclesial and 
secular checks and balances upon State Power evident within the Settlement show 








However, significant questions are raised about the exact limits of royal authority 
over the Church, especially when considering who has authority in secular and sacred 








3 Hooker on State Power, Natural Law, Community, and Dominion 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
Chapter two argued that Hooker’s understanding of the Royal Supremacy was based 
on a gift of authority by God’s grace, which in turn was grounded in the consent of 
the community so governed, for the ultimate good order of society. This conception of 
sovereign authority needed to be consonant with magisterial reformed principles in 
order to demonstrate that the 1559 Religious Settlement was congruent with wider 
Protestantism. This chapter will argue that Hooker was able to demonstrate this, using 
not just one model of continental reform, but instead picking elements from several 
magisterial schools – yet in so doing, laying himself open to the accusation of ‘cherry-
picking’ and contradicting himself. 
 
One of the frequent cries of the Puritans was for further reform of the 1559 
Settlement, based on the argument that the laws governing the Church should come 
from Scripture alone. This chapter will argue that Hooker does not meet this 
challenge with the partisan rhetoric of a number of his contemporaries, but with a 
careful political theology of the governing law: 
when the mind doth sift and examine them, it must needs have often 
recourse to a number of doubts and questions about the nature, 
kinds, and qualities of laws in general, whereof unless it be 
thoroughly informed, there will appear no certainty to stay our 
persuasion upon.167 
It is in terms of this political ecclesiology that this chapter will assess Hooker’s 
understanding of the laws governing the nature of the Elizabethan Church, and in 
particular, how Hooker argued that it was lawful and consonant with magisterial 
                                                







reformed principles for the Church to be governed by a right mixture of lay 
ecclesiastical supremacy and episcopacy. The Royal Supremacy was thus consonant 
with natural and political law, to which all society was bound, regardless of religious 
affiliation or confession, as a source of moderation for the good of society. 
 
This chapter will argue that Hooker’s defence of the Settlement was able to argue 
from the principles of reformed theology to its Puritan critics that the monarch, as a 
lay person, did not exceed the boundaries of her calling. By using the evidence of law, 
this chapter states that Hooker answered the critics of the Settlement by claiming that 
the laws of the realm annexed royal ecclesiastical jurisdiction to the Crown – which 
for Hooker created a controversy of its own by claiming that the Royal Supremacy 
was based on statute law, and not divine law. 
 
By claiming that the Settlement was in accordance with reformed religious principles, 
Hooker needed to demonstrate this compatibility by extrapolating key reformed 
religious principles, such as the ‘two kingdoms theory’ of the supernatural and 
worldly realms. Hooker, looking at the division between sacred and secular in the 
exercise of authority, used Luther and Calvin as key allies. 
 
That did not mean that Hooker restricted himself to using Luther and Calvin as his 
sole guarantors. The Zurich tradition, including Vermigli, and indeed Bullinger, are 
shown to be significant, reflecting the importance of the former upon the Edwardian 
Church, as well as the influence of works such as Bullinger’s Decades upon the 
Elizabethan Church. This chapter will therefore attempt to show that Hooker was 
defending a far more reformed concept in this sense than has been claimed not only 
by the Oxford Movement in the late nineteenth century, but a significant number of 
twentieth-century commentators, too.168 
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This chapter will also consider the basis for Hooker’s defence and understanding of 
the Royal Supremacy, using an analysis of the different types of law; the relation 
between Church and Community; the role of consent in that relationship; the role of 
Parliament; and the relationship of the monarch’s ecclesiastical dominion with 
reformed religious principles, considering the influence of Luther and Calvin, and the 
role of adiaphora. 
 
This chapter will also propose that Hooker, by drawing on the traditions of both 
Geneva and Zurich, places himself with the magisterial reformers, but not in one 
particular group, in order to draw upon what he sees as the best of the reformed 
tradition in his defence of the 1559 Settlement against those pushing for further 
reform. 
 
Essentially, underpinning Hooker’s theo-political defence of the Royal Supremacy is 
an orthodox Christology that avoids either Nestorian separation of the two natures or 
Eutychian conflation. Hooker was ultimately after unity-in-distinction, which he saw 
in a particular form of monarchy expressed through two united, yet distinct, 
kingdoms. Hooker did not want any separation of the munus triplex Christi, that is, of 
Christ’s offices of prophet, priest, and king. It is my argument that in such a structure, 
Hooker was able to offer a strong defence of the Settlement, and hence the 
ecclesiological structure of the English Church as being compatible with magisterial 
reformed tenets. 
 
3.2 Hooker and State Power 
 
An understanding of Hooker’s system of law is key to a clear rationale of how he 
reconciled the Royal Supremacy with a reformed understanding of reasoned and 
justified authority given to the magistrate. Having outlined this argument, we will 
now consider how Hooker created a justification for an acceptable theology of 







overall argument of the Lawes. One of the major arguments of those pushing for 
further reform in the Church is that the monarch should have no ecclesiastical 
dominion. Hooker does not accept this as a legitimate claim, and hence attempts to 
justify the ecclesiastical dominion of the monarch as being acceptable to mainstream 
reformed notions of ecclesiology. 
 
3.2a The Role of Natural and Supernatural Law in Hooker’s Defence 
 
One of the most immediate areas of contention that faced Hooker was the balance 
between State and sacramental power. Kirby argues, contrary to many of his peers, 
that Hooker regarded the Royal Supremacy ‘as the principal means of securing and 
stabilizing a right distinction between the spiritual and temporal realms.’169 Kirby 
founds this distinction upon Hooker’s concept that ‘the Church and Commonwealth 
are names which import things really different. But those things are accidents as may, 
and should always lovingly dwell together in one subject.’170 Though they are 
different things, there is no reason that they should not dwell together in one subject. 
Indeed, they positively should dwell together – that is, in the person of the monarch, 
being a divinely appointed representative of the Commonwealth, a locus between 
natural and supernatural law. 
 
Whilst concentrated in Books VII and VIII, the arguments concerning State Power 
and the Royal Supremacy developed in Hooker’s Lawes build upon the framework set 
out in Book I, which examines the set of laws, both natural and divine, that order the 
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governance of things secular and sacred.171 Hooker takes great care to explain the 
development and relevance of the system of natural and divine law, because it is upon 
these laws that the created order (which includes the sacred and secular power) is 
based. There are several kinds of law, according to Hooker.172 For Hooker, Scripture 
has revealed a divine law, which, together with the law of reason, may illustrate how 
essential elements of the Church and Commonwealth are to be ordered. 
 
Whilst all humans are subject to law, argues Hooker, not all humans are able to 
discern how their right conduct (laws inferior) is derived from the supreme law. 
Therefore, if only a few wise humans can make this judgment, then the majority of 
humans are not endowed with that ability – it is an ‘ignorance of how laws inferior 
are derived from that supreme or highest law.’173 By setting down the expected 
parameters of behaviour in a system of laws, Hooker attempts to demonstrate that not 
only is the Religious Settlement a proper outworking of this, but that it is also in 
accordance with magisterial reformed doctrine. This system of laws is echoed by 
Calvin and Luther,174 who believed that a system of acceptable societal behaviour was 
already evident in natural law, and did not need a system of laws based on the Bible, 
unlike Zwingli, who regarded a system of revealed law based on the Bible as 
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necessary.175 Hooker’s analysis is closest to that of Luther, who thought that a secular 
government did not need to model its laws on the Bible, as the negative law contained 
therein was echoed in natural law – as in the cases of murder and theft.176 
 
Hooker emphasizes that all people live under this system of law, for their good, that 
these laws influence the laws of the Church, and also that consequently, it is these 
laws that are now being questioned by those calling for further reform: 
whereby for so many [years] together we have been guided in the 
exercise of Christian religion and the service of the true God, our 
rites, our customs, and orders of ecclesiastical government, are 
called into question.177 
The consequence of not obeying these laws, and deviating from them, is outlined by 
Hooker at the end of Book I: 
if men had been willing to learn how many laws their actions in this 
life are subject unto, and what the true force of each law is, all these 
controversies [and contentions in the Church] might have died the 
very day they were first brought forth.178 
This rather generous interpretation of those matters about which Scripture is silent – 
adiaphora – conveniently allows for a very broad application of obedience to the 
Crown, which is illustrative of Hooker’s Erastian position upon obedience to the civil 
magistrate. Hooker is arguing for a divinely ordained law other than that in Scripture 
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that provides for adiaphora, and in doing so makes the case for an authority other than 
Scripture, one which should be obeyed in the way that society is governed, and people 
live their lives. Because there is another form of law that does not have its origins in 
Scripture, Hooker can claim that there is more than one form of Church law, thus 
justifying differing forms of Church polity – and giving credence to the form extant in 
the Church of England as being in accordance with divine law, legitimizing the Royal 
Supremacy and the ecclesiastical hierarchy – and he can do so without un-churching 
other traditions. 
 
In order to understand why Hooker believes the Church and State have power or 
authority over individuals, we need to examine his development of natural law and 
positive law. Hooker assumes that we have understood the division between positive 
law and natural law as explained in Book I: crucially, that the Church has power 
because governmental forms, even if they are divinely instituted, are positive laws 
and not natural laws: 
the public power of all societies is above every soul contained in the 
same societies. And the principal use of that power is to give laws 
unto all that are under it, which laws in such case we must obey, 
unless there be reason showed which may necessarily enforce that 
the law of reason or of God, doth enjoin the contrary.179 
It is these laws that influence the laws of the Church, and these that are contested by 
the Puritans, argues Hooker.180 In his discussion of divine law, Hooker believes that 
in a Christian Commonwealth, ‘man is in his actions directed to the imitation of 
God.’181 Hooker believes that man has an appetite to be that which he is not – that is, 
they shall be ‘perfecter than now they are,’182 these perfections being called goodness. 
These perfections resemble, in some degree, that from which they came: God. 
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Further, the souls of men, according to Hooker, are like an empty book:183 Hooker 
believes that man learns to discern between good and evil, and indeed what ought to 
be ‘written’ in the pages of their book, by education and instruction, which ‘are the 
means, the one by use, the other by precept, to make our natural faculty of reason both 
the better and the sooner able to judge rightly between truth and error, good and 
evil.’184 According to Hooker, humanity’s will is guided by the laws of action; guided 
by the fact of his being made according to the likeness of his Maker, and thus also 
resembling God in the manner of men’s working – this, humans do ‘wittingly’ and 
freely:185 
to choose is to will one thing before another. And to will is to bend 
our souls to the having or doing that which they see to be good. 
Goodness is seen with the eye of understanding. And the light of 
that eye, is reason.186 
 
Thus, Hooker is at pains to explain the logic and process of natural and divine law 
because it is important to understand how the balance of State and ecclesiastical 
power is tackled in his defence of the Elizabethan Settlement. Hooker makes the 
following claim: ‘For that which all men have at all times learned, Nature herself 
must needs have taught; and God being the author of Nature, her voice is but his 
instrument.’187 Hence the discernment, using the gift of reason, of a system of public 
good from the principles of natural law is in accordance with the will of God. Miller 
argues that as Hooker was writing: 
in the tradition of Christian Aristotelianism as developed by 
Aquinas [Hooker knew] that, as important as natural virtue and 
perfection are, the human person also has a capacity for 
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supernatural virtue and perfection through the exercise of spiritual 
life and the appropriation of grace.188 
Hence as ‘engraced’ virtues aim towards the summum bonum, the social groups that 
inevitably form in Christian societies are ordered by the principles God has made 
known through the use of reason in natural law: the motivations for which are aimed 
towards the betterment of humankind.189 
 
By explaining the system of laws that govern the universe and the created order, and 
therefore the systems of government within which we live, Hooker can give his 
defence a grounding in argument that is also shared by Calvin and Luther (see 
footnote 178). The entire argument of the Lawes is based upon these foundations, and 
so it is important that Hooker demonstrates right at the beginning that what he is 
defending is acceptable to wider Protestantism. 
 
There are two foundations to public society, argues Hooker, ‘the one, a natural 
inclination, whereby all men desire sociable life and fellowship; the other, an order 
expressly or secretly agreed upon touching the manner of their union in living 
together.’190 Hooker refers to the latter as the ‘law of Commonweal’, which is ‘the 
very soul of a politic body, the parts whereof are by law animated, held together, and 
set on work in such actions, as the common good requireth.’191 This is the distinction 
between natural law and societal law. Like it or not, all human beings are subject to 
such laws by virtue of their existence within some form or other of society. Yet, 
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Hooker does not believe in a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach; laws must be tailored 
according to the place in which they will be effected. Furthermore, laws ‘whether 
mixedly or merely human are made by politic societies: some, only as those societies 
are civilly united; some as they are spiritually joined and make such a body as we call 
the Church.’192 This latter comment from Hooker is clearly designed to justify the 
application of such laws in a society in which the monarch has jurisdiction over two 
spheres. 
 
A particular problem, Hooker argues, is ‘ignorance [on the part of the Puritans] how 
laws inferior are derived from that supreme or highest law.’193 Hooker highlights this 
as an understanding of how the laws of State are derived from natural and divine law, 
and how these laws are binding upon all citizens effectively requires conformity 
because all the citizens of the country in which they operate have no choice but to 
conform, by virtue of their residency in that country. Hooker uses this method to 
demonstrate to the Puritans that the English Church, as well as the English State, has a 
system of laws that are validly formulated according to magisterial reformed religious 
principles, and hence that because the monarch is the chief part of this system, then 
obedience to her is lawful.194 Hooker believes that the Puritans, and other non-
conformists, by following their own reasoning (‘the law of private reason’), ‘breed 
disturbance,’195 and are acting contrary to the good order in society that was ordained 
by God and set forth in Scripture and natural law. 
 
In order to make a convincing argument that laws taken from places other than 
Scripture are binding, Hooker needs to demonstrate that positive law, or human law, 
has ‘divine sanction’: 
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therefore the laws which the very heathens did gather to direct their 
actions by, so far forth as they proceeded from the light of nature, 
God his selfe doth acknowledge to have proceeded even from him 
selfe, and that he was the writer of them in the tables of their 
hartes.196 
Hooker thus attempts to argue that the laws of the realm, though not taken directly 
from Scripture, were still binding upon society. The divine sanction for these laws, 
according to Hooker, is in evidence due to natural law (which Hooker had already 
argued a Christian basis for by following an Aristotelian-Thomistic heritage) inclining 
the human telos towards the good. The positive, human laws of the group, or society, 
of which they were a member, gave form or expression to the pursuit of this good. 
 
Whilst it may seem perhaps harsh for a society to be ordered by a set of laws, 
obedience to which by definition is not optional, these laws are made by the consent 
of society: ‘a law is the deed of the whole body politic, whereof if ye judge yourselves 
to be any part, then is the law even your deed also.’197 Here, Hooker is maintaining 
that the Puritans, if they deem themselves to be part of the society in which they live, 
are also the authors of these laws, having given their consent to being governed by 
them by living in the society that is framed by these laws – in other words, that the 
whole of society is part of the legislative process. However, Hooker does not seem to 
give much thought as to whether the Puritans regarded themselves to be a part of the 
society in which they lived, or whether they set themselves apart. 
 
That having been said, I would argue that Hooker’s principle of consent by residence 
enables this polity of legal moderation by societal membership to be compatible with 
magisterial reformed principles of lay participation. Hooker uses Luther’s distinction 
of the two different purposes of the law: 
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The lawe of reason doth somewhat direct men how to honour God 
as their Creator, but how to glorifie God in such sort as is required, 
to the end he may be an everlasting Saviour, this we are taught by 
divine law, which law both ascertayneth the truth and supplyeth 
unto us the want of that other law. So that in morall actions, divine 
lawe helpeth exceedingly the law of reason to guide mans life, but 
in supernaturall it alone guideth.198 
For Hooker, in the supernatural realm, the revealed word alone is guide, whereas in 
the created order, natural law is prime. Due to the fallen state of humanity, natural law 
requires some sort of ‘public regiment.’199 As the mystical body of Christ, Hooker 
regards the Church as being beyond natural knowing (yet encompassing natural 
knowing within its supernatural order), but, within the political realm, he regards it as 
being subject to positive human law; it is therefore subject to the remit of the 
Christian prince as the highest ‘uncommanded commander’ in the temporal realm.200 
 
A parallel can also be seen with Bullinger’s account of idolatry in the Decades on 
Romans 2.15. Here, Bullinger argues that God has planted natural law in the minds of 
humans in order to direct and inform man’s distinction between good and evil. 
Hooker considers idolatry to be an example of the blindness against the ‘manifest 
laws of reason’ and proof of man’s inability to ‘rightly perform the functions allotted 
to it, without perpetual aid and concurrence of the Supreme Cause of all things.’201 
This suggests that, according to Hooker, by whatever cause, humans have chosen not 
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to follow natural reason, and have thus blinded themselves to the operation of divine 
law and grace in them. 
 
Calvin’s account of the duplex cognito Dei in the 1559 Institutes is key to his 
systematic organization: 
Since, then, the Lord first appears, as well in the creation of the 
world as in the general doctrine of Scripture, simply as Creator, and 
afterwards as Redeemer in Christ, a twofold knowledge of him 
arises.202 
Calvin, unlike a great many of his contemporaries, uses Cicero and Ovid’s reasoning 
for knowledge of the divine being implanted on human hearts.203 Calvin, however, 
agrees with Luther in that fallen man can only glimpse the mysteries of redemption 
with the illumination of divine grace.204 These passages can be compared with, for 
instance, I.viii.3 of the Lawes: ‘For that which all men have at all times learned, 
nature herself must needs have taught; and God being the author of nature, her voice 
is but his instrument.’ Therefore, Hooker draws from, and is consequently supported 
by, magisterial reformers such as Calvin, Luther, and Bullinger. Knowledge of God, 
and hence also of eternal law, is learnt by both Scripture and reason. 
 
Hooker’s marginal notes to A Christian Letter show that the question uppermost in 
Hooker’s mind was the need to justify his discourse on natural law within the 
parameters of Protestant orthodoxy. Calvin wrote thus to Martin Bucer, which is 
quoted by Hooker: 
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Philosophy is, consequently, the noble gift of God, and those 
learned men who have striven hard after it in all ages have been 
incited thereto by God himself, that they might enlighten the world 
in the knowledge of the truth.205 
Hence, Hooker, in utilizing these magisterial reformers, hoped to justify his use of 
natural law in arguing that the Royal Supremacy was not against the tenets of wider 
Protestantism: the Royal Supremacy was, according to Hooker, doubly sanctioned in 
reason and Scripture. 
 
Yet, the concept of ‘reason’ within people’s consciences could also work in tandem 
with external moderation. Hooker uses an Aristotelian framework in the following 
warning: ‘Otherwise how can it be that some other sinews there are from which that 
overplus of strength in persuasion doth arise? Most sure it is, that when men’s 
affections do frame their opinions.’206 Here, Hooker is inferring that reason (as 
opposed to affection) was the principal moderator of undue passions. 
 
This section has argued that Hooker regards the monarch to be also subject to 
moderation – or limitation – on their authority (albeit somewhat obtusely): 
what power the king hath he hath by law, the bounds and limits of it 
are known. The entire community giveth general order by law how 
things publicly are to be done, and the king as the same head 
thereof, the highest authority over all, causeth according to the same 
law every particular to be framed and ordered thereby.207 
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That the monarch’s power may be limited by law is explained by Shagan, who 
believes that what Hooker says about the moderation of monarchical power can also 
be extended to bishops, whom he regards as an instrument of State Power: 
[in respect of] the authority of the prince as Supreme Head of the 
Church, we find in essence an extension of [the] arguments about 
bishops, the same reciprocal relationship between internal and 
external moderation, only now these arguments seem infinitely 
more radical because they involve the moderation of royal 
authority.208 
Radical it may be to suggest that the monarch’s power is limited – and limited by 
statute law at that – but Hooker himself is deliberately vague about how exactly that 
power is limited. This leads us to conclude that Shagan may be trying to claim more 
limitation on the monarch’s power than Hooker had in mind – another example of 
how subsequent commentators have woven their own agenda into Hooker. Episcopal 
power is discussed further in chapter five. 
 
This section has argued that Hooker sees the monarch as a locus between the natural 
and the supernatural, with a careful explanation of the development and relevance of 
natural and divine law.  These dictate how essential elements of Church and the 
Commonwealth are ordered.  The parameters contained in such a system have close 
parallels with those of Luther – all people live under these laws, which govern both 
the universe and created order.  The system of public good is derived from principles 
of natural law.  Hooker argued that the Puritans were ignorant on how inferior laws 
were derived from the supreme or highest law.  Further, consent to be governed by 
such set laws was given by virtue of residency in that country, which in itself 
constituted lay participation in so being governed.  The Christian prince was the 
highest uncommanded commander in this system.  Further, humans were sometimes 
                                                
208 Ethan Shagan, The Rule of Moderation: Violence, Religion, and the Politics of Restraint in Early 







blinded to the operation of divine law and of grace, with Hooker giving the example 
of Calvin’s duplex cognito Dei.  Hooker argued that knowledge of God, and hence 
also of eternal law, was learnt by both scripture and reason, with philosophy being a 
noble gift of God. 
 
3.2b Hooker and the Relationship Between Church and Community 
 
One of the key aspects of Hooker’s defence of the Royal Supremacy is the 
interconnectedness of Church and Community,209 key to which was a broad and 
inclusive definition of Church membership. Hooker clarified matters by stating that: 
we heare meane true religion in grosse, and not according to every 
particuler for they which in some particular pointes of religion to 
swarve from the truth, may neverthelesse most truly, if we compare 
them to heathenish religion, be said to hold and profess that religion 
which is true.210 
 
Hooker’s vision of a unified Church and State also makes a distinction between 
accident and substance,211 which leads him to conclude that it is an error that spiritual 
affairs are separated from temporal affairs, using Aristotle to strengthen his argument: 
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…so in all commonwealths things spirituall ought to be above 
temporall to be provided for. And of things spirituall the chiefest is 
Religion. For this cause persons and thinges imployed peculiarly 
about the affayres of religion are by an excellence termed 
Spirituall.212 
 
That Hooker believes the Church and Commonwealth to be a unity, he argues in three 
ways. First, the difference of ecclesiastical affairs or offices from secular ones is ‘no 
argument that the Church and the Commonwealth are always separate and 
independent the one from the other.’213 Second, although the names Church and 
Commonwealth imply different things, ‘those thinges are accidents and such 
accidents as may and should always lovingly dwell together in one subject.’214 Third, 
we see the unity in the matter of punishment, ‘because that Church and 
Commonwealth he was of were both one and the same societie, so that whatsoever 
doth separate utterly a mans person from the one it separateth also from the other.’215 
 
There is, argues Hooker, a need for order in all of society, and the monarch has a 
crucial role in maintaining that order.216 Like it or not, because the Church exists in 
the physical world, ‘they [Churches] have political and structural histories, and their 
relation to the sacred is invariably bound up with ways in which power and control 
are exercised.’217 The interconnectedness of Church and Commonwealth in Hooker 
being an axiom, he nevertheless took a broad and pragmatic route, ‘which reviewed 
religion as a prop and servant of a prior political good.’ From officeholders in both 
the civil and ecclesiastical spheres, therefore, ‘loyalty to the Crown was an essential 
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requirement.’ 218  Yet, the 1532 Submission of the Clergy was a constitutional 
earthquake, which fundamentally altered the connection between clergy in 
Convocation and the sovereign. 
 
In conclusion, Hooker’s belief that Church and State are intrinsically interconnected 
is fundamental to how he addresses the relationship between them – one cannot be a 
member of one part without being a member of the other. Hooker believes in a highly 
inclusive model of Church membership, which means that Roman Catholics may 
even be considered Church members in law (Puritans were considered Church 
members by almost any definition). That the spiritual and temporal realms may dwell 
together in one subject is a hypostatic Christological device used to enforce the idea 
of unity. The monarch, according to Hooker, held together the order and unity of 
these two realms – but how could this possibly be reconciled with an orthodox 
reformed understanding of ecclesiological principles? 
 
3.2c Community and Consent in the Royal Supremacy 
 
Although some may regard Elizabeth as tending towards an absolutist style of 
government, this was not necessarily always the case, with the queen seeking at least 
a nominal consultation with her advisors and Council, which would suggest the 
monarch believed that any religious changes were to be enacted through the proper 
political process. 
 
We have already explored Hooker’s opinion that the community gives the monarch 
the mandate to occupy her role, and hence, it could be argued that only people 
approved by the community gain supremacy, and consequently, the community could 
remove unfit rulers from office. This is not what Hooker argues, though. In an 
hereditary monarchy, 
                                                







birth giveth right unto the sovereign dominion and the death of the 
predecessor putteth the successor by blood in seisin…and therefore 
in case it doth happen that without right of blood a man in such 
wise be possessed…the inheritor by blood may dispossess him as a 
usurper.219 
In England, we observe that no formal sanction for the taking up of office is needed 
by the community (it being a hereditary monarchy), and further, the community may 
not withdraw their consent for the monarch’s supremacy (it being necessary therefore 
that royal authority is limited).220 
 
Hooker believed that the monarch was under the law, but not subject to it – the 
monarch enjoyed the ability to make laws, but this power was assumed only in 
Parliament.221 Remember, though, that whilst the Royal Supremacy is grounded on 
consent, the Act of Supremacy itself does not constitute that consent. God would act 
improperly if He intervened directly in human affairs, and this is what might be 
implied if the monarch exercised their supremacy without consent – creating an 
interesting point of tension when considering Iure Divino. For example, if the 
monarch did not have the approval or consent of the people to govern, and the 
monarch governed regardless, outside the bounds of governing by consent, then the 
monarch could be seen to be abusing their divine right. 
 
The monarch was under the law, though not subject to it, due to being under the oath 
she took at her coronation, which is clearly a significant point. The coronation oath 
itself could be seen as having contractual overtones, and therefore risking the opinion 
                                                
219 Hooker, Lawes, VIII.iii.2. 
220 The only two occasions when consent can be withdrawn are when the putative heir is not the lawful 
heir and when the putative heir has a natural or legal inability that makes them incapable of office 
(VIII.iii.2).  
221 Each Act of Parliament began with the wording, ‘Be it enacted by the Queen’s most excellent 
majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in 







that royal authority was not based on succession by blood alone (see above). Hooker 
himself is of the opinion that it is the monarch’s hereditary birthright that gives 
dominion, rather than anything in the coronation service itself.222 
 
An example of how Hooker views the consent of the community, in the form of 
Parliament, as working together with, and thus legitimizing, the authority of the 
monarch, can be seen in how a law is passed: 
we are to hold it a thing most consonant with equitie and reason that 
no Ecclesiasticall lawe be made in a Christian Commonwealth 
without consent as well of the laitie as of the Clergie but least of all 
without consent of the highest power.223 
Of these powers, the monarch’s authority is the highest. McGrade questions the extent 
of this authority by suggesting that ‘on Hooker’s account, the crown’s executive 
power in religion was directly dependent on the consent of the community as given in 
parliament.’224 That is, the Crown’s ‘chief’ power in religion could only be exercised 
with the consent of the community’s elected representatives in Parliament. Taken 
alone, McGrade could be here thought to suggest that Parliament bestows power upon 
the monarch in ecclesiastical affairs – but this is not what Hooker suggests: for 
Hooker, the power is passed on in an hereditary sense: ‘but the cause of dependency 
is in that first original conveyance. … Original influence of power from the body into 
the King is cause of the King’s dependency in power upon the body.’225 
 
The 1559 Act of Supremacy established Elizabeth as Supreme Governor, by the 
authority of ‘this your High Court of Parliament, with the assent of your highness.’226 
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Therefore, given that the monarch, though having inherited their power by succession, 
exercises their ecclesiastical power in Parliament, which is the body of elected 
representatives of the nation, and together with the Convocation of the Church of 
England, these three ‘bodies’ can be regarded by Hooker as speaking for the entire 
nation. 
 
Binding Church laws in relation to ecclesiastical matters may be one thing, but what 
does Hooker say about the authority to interpret Scripture, which is key to his 
argument with the Puritans? Hooker again believes that this authority belongs to the 
Crown in Parliament with Convocation – that is, the Holy Spirit leads Christians (in 
this case in England) to a true understanding of the Bible by empowering reason to 
achieve a valid interpretation. With the guidance of the Holy Spirit: 
the general and perpetual voice of men is as the sentence of God 
himself. For that which all men have at all times learned, nature 
herself must needs have taught; and God being the author of Nature, 
her voice is but his instrument.227  
Eppley finds the idea of authoritative interpretation of Scripture by the Crown in 
Parliament as ‘whiffing’ of a ‘frighteningly absolutist monarchy.’228 However, whilst 
the idea of an Established Church taking this line in the sixteenth century may have 
been perhaps a little forthright, it is only from the vantage point of 400 years later that 
it seems extraordinary. It is worth noting here that Hobbes, writing in Leviathan, 
agrees with Hooker.229 Yet, in the Elizabethan era, if the Crown in Parliament had the 
legal ability to make authoritative pronouncements, this meant that the English 
Church could not be accused of making these changes without the proper authority. 
The proper authority was the Crown in Parliament, with Convocation, according to 
Hooker, with the potential implication that the Crown in Parliament has the authority 
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to determine ‘truth’ for the subject, beyond which the subject must not enquire, 
immaterial of whether the determination is ‘true’ in any absolute or ontological sense. 
 
The community’s implicit authorization and consequent definition of royal authority 
has the advantage of eliminating avenues of resistance to the Crown, because it is the 
community that has authorized the actions of the Crown. It is important to note that 
Hooker avoids any legitimization of direct divine appointment in the manner of the 
Old Testament. There are two important reasons for Hooker’s refusal to countenance 
this idea: first, by doing so, Hooker refuses to allow the possibility of resistance to the 
Crown and second, in acknowledging direct divine intervention in the government of 
the Church and State, this would very likely lead to individuals claiming a direct 
mandate from God to ignore those laws, and to propound alternatives to further their 
own cause. The two reasons are highly related because if there were direct divine 
intervention, there could be resistance to the State based on particular groups claiming 
that they had access to divine will. When discussing this point, Eppley seems to back 
himself into a corner by intimating that authorities as varied as Tyndale, Gardiner, and 
Whitgift suggest Christians must disobey royal policies that counter God’s will, and 
therefore pointing out a focus of authority other than the Crown in Parliament as the 
definitive standard of Christian truth.230 He argues that this would have amounted to a 
seditious and potentially heretical thought at the time – and is not the concept of the 
Settlement Hooker himself would have been defending. However, it is hardly a new 
concept that the orthodox Christian believer may sometimes have to obey their 
conscience above the State. 
 
By explaining the role of community consent in the model of government defended 
by Hooker, we could argue that a more accountable model of government was more 
acceptable to those who would not have agreed with an absolutist form of monarchy. 
Hooker is an advocate of the hereditary monarchy, yet demonstrated his dislike and 
                                                







disapproval of a sacred kingship by holding the coronation service to be of little 
purpose: according to Hooker, it is the hereditary birthright that gives dominion 
(though Hooker does not subscribe to direct divine appointment), and not the 
coronation service (or indeed the anointing therein). Hooker also believes the 
coronation oath to have contractual overtones, which could be problematic, especially 
if the monarch were deemed to have broken it – laying them open to censure – but by 
whom (God), and how. Yet, consent to a system of Royal Supremacy also meant, by 
extension, consent to the laws promulgated by the Crown in Parliament, which also 
meant Parliament and the Crown’s authority to interpret Scripture. 
 
This section has argued that any changes to the religious system in the country were 
enacted through proper legal and political process.  The mandate for the monarch to 
occupy this role was given by the community, although the hereditary nature of 
monarchy in England may have made this tricky to explain (noting that once the 
community had given their consent, it could not be taken away).  Further, the 
monarch was under the law, but not subject to it.  Though the coronation oath could 
have been seen as putting the monarch under the law, Hooker argued that the 
hereditary birthright was more important.  For Hooker, the monarch, who inherited 
their power, exercised that power in parliament, which in itself is the body of the 
representatives of the nation: thus, these two bodies, with Convocation, spoke for the 
nation.  In relation to the authority to interpret Scripture, Hooker believes this 
authority belonged to the Crown in Parliament with Convocation, with the 
consequence that the community’s role in authorisation and consequent definition of 
royal authority helped eliminate avenues of resistance.  It is also important to state 
that Hooker does not legitimate direct divine appointment. 
 
 








Did Parliament act as anything more than a rubber stamp for the monarch’s 
ecclesiastical authority? Hooker argues that in making laws, it is natural to ask those 
who have the greatest knowledge in that area to judge them. By extension, the same 
could be argued to apply to articles of Christian faith, rites, and ceremonies suitable 
for the exercise of religion, in that bishops and pastors are more suited than secular 
persons. Yet, 
laws they could never be without consent of the whole Church… 
Wherefore to define and determine even of the Churches affaires by 
way of assent and approbation as lawes are defined of in that right 
of power which doth given them the force of lawes; thus to define 
our Churches regiment, the Parlament of England hath competent 
authoritie.231 
 
The power to make these laws is given to Parliament by a free and deliberate assent of 
the people. Hooker argues, though, that whilst ecclesiastical persons are most suited 
for the care of ecclesiastical laws,232 this does not take away the power of the 
monarch’s authority to be highest in legislative procedure: 
the Parlament of England together with the Convocation annexed 
thereunto is that whereupon the very essence of government within 
this kingdome doth depend…it is even the bodie of the whole 
Realme, it consisteth of the King and of all that within the Land are 
subject to him.233 
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The role of the laity in making ecclesiastical law is also considered important, as 
without this, the consent of the whole community could not be gained.234 Hooker’s 
argument is essentially that the laity235 need to play a part in the formation of 
ecclesiastical laws, otherwise the clergy may use their power in this respect to 
dominate lay people: ‘power should belong to the whole, and not certain sections, 
though some may have greater sway than others. There is no reason it should be 
different for the Church.’236 It is Hooker’s opinion that God controls the royal head of 
the Church through the human agent of the Church as a whole. The agent speaks 
through Parliament (including the Crown), with the Convocation – that is, the Crown 
in Parliament, rather than the Crown solus.237 Eppley, McGrade, and Lake argue that 
the ecclesiastical constitutionalism of Hooker is an effort to prevent any potential 
royal absolutism from affecting the Church, ‘underwriting his vision of a royal 
authority limited by the rule of law, not only divine and natural law, but also English 
Church Laws.’238 
 
Hooker therefore argues that Parliament has the competent authority necessary to 
define law in England, yet the monarch retains the royal assent (and therefore also a 
veto), which is needed before laws become binding in the realm. Yet, the monarch’s 
actions are (in theory) restrained by divine and natural law, but also the law of the 
land. (As we have seen, it would be unwise to suggest that Hooker believed the 
coronation oath to offer a restraint on the royal powers, as he believed it to have 
contractual overtones, and thus by implication, problems of redress when a breach 
occurred.) The focus of the law-making powers for both the ecclesiastical and secular 
realms was concentrated in the person of the monarch, a concept that was aligned 
with a reformed understanding of the two kingdoms, which we shall discuss shortly. 
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3.2e The Ecclesiastical Dominion of the Monarch and Wider Protestantism 
 
Hooker argued strongly that the Church and Commonwealth are not to be regarded as 
having a perpetual and personal distinction. But what was his argument for the 
monarch having dominion over the Church? In the early chapters of Book VIII, 
Hooker defends the power of a civil ruler over the Church, conducting a survey of 
kingship in the Old Testament – ‘Jewish kings were invested with both Ecclesiastical 
Supremacy and Civil Chiefty’239 – examining accounts of Simon in 1 Maccabees, 
David, Asa, Jehosaphat, Ezekiel, and Josiah. If it had not been for the virtue of the 
king’s power, then how was it that the piety or impiety of the king changed the public 
face of religion, which the priests could not have done by themselves? 
The altering of religion, the making of Ecclesiasticall laws with 
other like actions belonging unto the power of dominion are still 
termed the deedes of the Kinge, to shewe that in him was placed 
Supremacie of power even in this kinde over all, and that unto their 
High Priests were also Kings or Princes over them.240 
Those who argue that the king should not have power over the Church, Hooker 
believes, must make a perpetual separation between the Church and the State. He and 
also states that: 
they so tie all kinde of Power Ecclesiasticall unto the Church as if it 
were in every degree their only right, which are by proper spirituall 
function termed Church-Governours and might not unto Christian 
Princes in any wise appertaine.241 
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Hooker would have been influenced by predominant Tudor thinking that its monarchy 
was considered a model of theocratic kingship.242 But Hooker does not take this 
approach in justifying Royal Supremacy – instead, he took the line that no divine 
mandate exists for any particular form of institutional structure, thus leaving the 
distribution of ecclesiastical authority to each Church’s discretion.243 
 
It must be remembered that although Hooker was defending the status quo against the 
claims of the Puritans for further reform, his audience would likely, aside from 
Puritans, have been ecclesiastical divines. Kirby argues that many of these divines 
‘were uncomfortable with certain aspects of the established Church order, including 
royal supremacy.’244 If this is to be believed, then Hooker would also have been 
justifying the existing religious landscape against claims for further reform from those 
within it. This may give another reason as to why Hooker was deliberately vague in 
certain areas such as the limits of the monarch’s authority over the Church, and in 
which particular areas (in theory) she could intervene. 
 
In conclusion, Hooker argues that ecclesiastical dominion of the monarch had a 
certain degree of biblical precedent, and quotes from the Old Testament to give 
credence to this argument. Yet, Hooker does not justify theocratic kingship, arguing 
that no divine mandate exists for any one system of government, and thus opening the 
way for a politically expedient model to suit prevailing conditions. Hooker believes 
that the civil governor has a legitimate and necessary role in the Church, even if he is 
not absolutely explicit in what that role is and the limits of that role. In doing so, 
Hooker attempts to prove wrong those who argue for a separation between secular 
and sacred spheres. 
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i) The importance of the two kingdoms argument 
 
Hooker argues in the Lawes that Cartwright confuses the distinction between the two 
realms. Calvin and Luther, by and large, do not, and this is where Hooker begins his 
argument that the Settlement is compatible with wider Protestantism. It is no surprise 
that in discussing how the Royal Supremacy could be reconciled with reformed 
thought, Hooker focused on the distinction between the visible and invisible body of 
the Church, using theologians who had a strong influence on the Elizabethan Church 
as evidence, such as Vermigli and others from the Zurich school, as well as Calvin – 
hoping that by appealing to a broad section of continental theologians, he could 
demonstrate the orthodoxy of the Settlement. 
 
Vermigli used his commentary on the role of the magistrate in the Book of Judges, 
Chapter 19, as a basis for an appropriate form of government. Kirby offers an 
exploration of Vermigli’s understanding: 
the power exercised by ministers through the Word in the ‘inward 
motions of the minde’ is sharply distinguished from that wielded by 
the magistrate through the sword in matters of ‘outward discipline’. 
Conversely, civil power has become sacralised, chiefly owing to its 
unmediated link with the divine fount of power.245 
Kirby is thus arguing that the monarch is for Vermigli that link with divine power, 
though not perhaps to the extent that Iure Divino proponents would argue. 
 
If Vermigli was able to make a convincing case for the distinction between the visible 
and invisible body of the Church, without compromising the authority held by Christ 
over the Church, the monarch would have been able to occupy a role of supreme 
                                                








governorship. Therefore, for Hooker, the fields of political theory and theology had 
little distinction between them. This was Hooker’s apologetic intention – the Lawes 
and their function as an apology for the Settlement cannot rightly be explained 
without a clear understanding of Hooker’s concept of magisterial reformed divinity in 
the tradition of Zurich, which I have outlined in this section. 
 
Vermigli is quite clear that Christ alone can be the head of the Church in the ‘inward 
motions of the minde’: 
Christ alone is given to be head of the Church for the Church is a 
celestial, divine, and spirituall bodie…for regeneration and 
remission of sinnes doe flowe from the spirite of Christ and not 
from man…so that everie sense and moving of the church floweth 
from Christ alone, not from any mortall man.246 
Yet, in the realm of ‘politike subjection’, the magistrate can assume the position of 
Supreme Hierarch, a lex animata, giving life and order to the body public: 
Kings maie be called the heads of the Commonweale…For even as 
from the head is derived all the sense and motion into the bodie, so 
the sense by good laws, and motions, by edictes and 
commandements are derived from the prince unto the people...So 
when as princes by laws and edictes drive their subjects unto 
actions, they also drive them unto vertues. But the Spirit of God and 
regeneration are not attained by manie actions, but onelie by the 
blessings of God.247 
Vermigli does not entirely reject the ‘mediated hierarchy’, and the notion that any 
support is necessarily qualified. Vermigli still believes, though, in the Christian 
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Commonwealth, and the idea of all subjects being in obedience, in ecclesiastical as 
well as civil matters, to the monarch – the idea being that this system of polity brings 
stability to the nation. 
 
Whilst at Oxford, Hooker was encouraged by his tutor, John Rainolds, to study 
Vermigli, as well as Aristotle.248 It can therefore be hardly surprising if Hooker was in 
some degree influenced by the work of these two luminaries in the fields of natural 
and divine law when constructing the Lawes. Though Bullinger was more inclined to 
draw on biblical sources in his Decades, nonetheless, the two Zurichers’ work gave a 
foundation for ‘a continuous and coherent tradition of political theology in England 
throughout the latter half of the sixteenth century.’249 Littlejohn explores the link 
between Hooker and Vermigli in the former’s defence of the Royal Supremacy and 
states that there are three main areas of interest250 for comparison between Hooker 
and Vermigli, concluding first that: 
it may be plausible to discern the influence of Vermigli in areas of 
Richard Hooker’s theology…indeed, these resemblances are 
particularly…arresting, given that they concern those elements of 
Hooker’s thought often seen as most distinctive, out of step with 
other English Protestants, and maybe non-reformed.251 
And second, that: 
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[when] we trace intellectual influences in this period, we must not 
expect them to be straightforward and linear. Vermigli influenced 
Jewel, and Jewel in turn influenced Hooker, but in key respects, 
Hooker’s political theology resembles Vermigli’s more than 
Jewel’s.252 
Most importantly, Littlejohn draws the overall conclusion that: 
while this paper confirms Torrance-Kirby’s suspicion of a ‘Zurich 
Connection’ in Tudor England, we should be attentive to the ways 
in which it remains a variegated Zurich connection, capable of 
sustaining a number of different, and occasionally contradictory, 
emphases.253 
Littlejohn is right to state that the influence of continental magisterial reformers upon 
Hooker’s defence of Royal Supremacy is variegated, and especially that it is not 
always possible to expect, or draw, direct lines between the reformers and Hooker. 
Even so, just because this is not possible, it is not accurate to discount their influence 
upon the Lawes. Hooker is far more nuanced than that: an approach that I will now 
explore. 
 
Hooker bases his defence of the Royal Supremacy on a threefold premise of, first, a 
Thomist concept of a natural inclination towards the divine or supernatural; second, a 
concept of the two kingdoms of the spiritual and civil spheres; and third, an 
Aristotelian concept of the purpose of civil government. Littlejohn and Joseph J. 
Ballor claim that Vermigli’s attempts to ‘bind’ various tenets of natural and revealed 
theology in his political theory are echoed in the threefold Hookerian approach as 
                                                
252 Bailor and Littlejohn, op. cit., 82. 
253 Bailor and Littlejohn, op. cit., 82. Bailor and Littlejohn also make reference to John Patrick 
Donnelly, Calvinism and Scholasticism in Vermigli’s doctrine of man and grace, (Leiden: Brill, 1976), 
19-40; and also Luca Baschera, ‘Aristotle and Scholasticism’ in Companion to Peter Martyr Vermigli, 








outlined above: as Littlejohn puts it, ‘a strong doctrine of the natural knowledge of 
God, a two kingdoms distinction between the natural/civil and the 
supernatural/spiritual orders of reality, and a conviction that politics is concerned with 
cultivating virtue.’254 
 
First, Vermigli sets out his Thomistic approach to nature and grace: 
The goal of philosophy is that we reach that beatitude or happiness 
that can be acquired in this life by human powers, while the goal of 
Christian devotion is that the image in which we are created in 
righteousness and holiness of truth be renewed in us, so that we 
may grow daily in the knowledge of God until we are led to see him 
as he is, with face uncovered.255 
Vermigli argues that Scripture is the highest authority in the two realms256, not just 
the eternal realm, although he does argue that there is also a great deal in common 
between Scripture and philosophy in the natural realm. He goes on to suggest that 
there is not a mutually exclusive interplay between the magistrate and the minister: 
That we attribute the supreme faculty to the wisdom contained in 
holy scripture should not make anyone think that anything is taken 
or detracted from the political administration…We have tried only 
to show where [magistrates] should have derived the rules and 
principles of their own faculty…The faculty in question is called 
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civil because its responsibility is to determine which policies should 
be retained in the state and which should be suppressed.257 
 
What is of particular interest to us are the similarities Vermigli draws between 
Aristotelian claims for politics, and the scriptural claims for itself, with the conclusion 
seeming to be that the ruler subjects himself to the minister, and that the ministers 
frame the operations of the magistrate.258 Yet, acknowledging Aristotle’s claim for 
human nature demonstrating a summum bonum (that is to say, Aristotle holds that the 
telos of human nature is a summum bonum, or, ‘living well’), Vermigli endorses 
Aristotle’s argument that ‘political science spends most of its pains on making the 
citizens to be of a certain character, viz. good and capable of noble acts.’259 Thus, 
Vermigli is able to argue that as piety is essential for a well-ordered soul, the 
maintenance of a right religion is crucial to the political task, and hence the health of 
the Commonwealth rests on this: ‘it ought to be a magistrate’s concern that his people 
behave virtuously and that their prime virtue be piety…Those who do not do this do 
not keep the true way of governing a state.’260 We can see here a philosophical 
justification within the bounds of natural-law theory for the Royal Supremacy, 
drawing close comparisons with Hooker’s Thomist outlook – though of course it is 
entirely predictable that there are some differences, such as Vermigli not stating, as 
Hooker does, that Royal Supremacy in ecclesiastical affairs ‘seemeth to stand 
altogether by humane right.’261 We must also acknowledge that Vermigli does not 
provide a systematic account of the three types of law as does Hooker. Yet, it is 
reasonable to conclude that Vermigli would not, at the least, be opposed to the 
magistrate having care of religion, and that this is a constant feature of governing 
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well, though exactly how this works in practice may of course change according to 
local circumstances. 
 
Luther, in On Secular Authority, wrote of the two kingdoms that both kingdoms are 
‘indeed our Lord God’s Reich, albeit a temporal law and regiment. He wills us to 
respect this Reich with his left hand, but at his right hand is where he rules in 
person’.262 That is, law-abiding citizens are urged by God to respect the proper 
authorities (civil magistrates) in the secular sphere, but in the sacred sphere, Christ 
alone rules. Further, 
God has therefore ordained two regiments: the spiritual by which 
the Holy Spirit produces Christians and pious folk under Christ, and 
the secular which restrains un-Christian and evil folk, so that they 
are obliged to keep outward peace albeit by no merit of their 
own.263 
It is clear, according to Luther, that one of the key tasks of the civil magistrate is to 
keep the peace, in order to provide some restraint on worldly evil.the eternal souls of 
the faithful are not damaged. 
 
Whilst Hooker defends the authority associated with the title of Supreme Governor, 
rather than the title itself,264 he nevertheless attempts to address the Puritans’ concerns 
that only Christ could be head of the Church, arguing that the monarch’s headship 
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differs from Christ’s headship in three ways: in order (Christ is subordinate to no 
one), in measure, and in kind.265 Hooker believes that Christ is: 
spiritually always united to every part of his body which is the 
Church…from every Church here visible, Christ touching visible 
and corporal presence is removed as far as heaven from earth is 
distant.266 
Thus, Hooker believes Christ to reign invisibly over the Church, but this does not 
mean that Christ’s spiritual realm can order the external realm of the visible Church. 
Hence: 
visible government is a thing necessary for the Church…wherefore 
not withstanding that perpetual conjunction by virtue whereof our 
Saviour remaineth always spiritually united unto the parts of his 
mystical body, Heads are endowed with supreme power extending 
unto a certain compass are for the exercise of visible regiment not 
unnecessary.267 
 
Hooker is explaining here why he believes the Puritan argument to fall at this point. 
Cartwright failed to see the inherent distinction between the spiritual realm and the 
temporal realm. Hooker, and the Settlement that he sought to defend, never claimed 
that the monarch had any right to the title of Supreme Governor in the spiritual realm 
– a title and headship that belonged to Christ alone – which was a claim that the 
Puritan camp sought to assign to the Establishment. The Admonition Controversy 
may have crystallized the arguments here, and yet again Hooker demonstrates why a 
correct understanding of the two kingdoms is important: 
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we make the Spirituall regiment of Christ to be generally that 
whereby the Church is ruled and governed in things spiritual. Of 
this general we make two distinct kinds, the one invisibly exercised 
by Christ himself in his own person, the other outwardly 
administered by them whom Christ doth allow to be the Rulers and 
guiders of his Church.268 
Hence whilst Christ is spiritually present in every part of the Church, Christ cannot 
rule visibly over the tangible elements of the Church,269 and therefore ‘Heads indued 
with supreme power extending unto a certaine compasse are for the exercise of visible 
regiment not unneccessarie.’270 The Church, as a political society, requires authority, 
rule, and public order, in common with any other political society. 
 
Amongst others, Littlejohn, Kirby, and McGrade, have argued that Hooker’s response 
in VIII.iv.10 to Puritanism was heavily influenced by his doctrine of the two 
kingdoms.271  This was in turn espoused by Luther’s geistliches and weltliches Reich 
(which if confused, as Hooker alleges the Puritans did, would have been the source of 
serious soteriological error):272 
There are two forums, civil and theological. For God judges far 
differently than the world does. Civil law is contained in my civil 
justice, of whatever sort it is, and external justice. But the justice 
which justifies me in the face of a civil judge is not immediately 
justice (which will justify) before God, and yet they still pertain to 
this life and to preserving good order.273 
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It was also espoused by Calvin’s forum conscientiae and forum externum: 
Let us observe that in man, government is twofold: the one spiritual, 
by which the conscience is trained to piety and divine worship; the 
other civil, by which the individual is instructed in those duties 
which, as men and citizens, we are bold to perform….To these two 
forms are commonly given the not inappropriate names of spiritual 
and temporal jurisdiction…The former has its seat within the soul, 
the latter only regulates the external conduct.274 
Hooker understands that the two realms are joined in Christ, who, as head, is the 
fountain of all order in each, as well as the souls of Christians. Therefore, because 
Christ is lord of both kingdoms, this lordship is effective even in the flawed structures 
run by humans. Kirby also adds a degree of caution in that Hooker, having based a 
large part of the Lawes upon the Admonition Controversy, would therefore have been 
influenced to a significant degree by Whitgift’s contentious interpretation of the 
doctrine of the two regiments.275 
 
Acknowledging the importance of Calvin and Luther for his Puritan opponents, 
Hooker did not use his continental sources without criticism. Calvin believed that 
although ministers derived their authority from Christ as man, the magistrate derived 
their authority solely from Christ’s divinity. Hooker believed that Calvin’s 
understanding was based on a faulty Christology, which meant that the work of Christ 
was divided by underplaying the personal union of human and divine, as we will 
discuss later. The dominion of Christ, therefore, could not be contained to any one 
realm, and so, in the person of the monarch, above all other humans, the two spheres 
are joined in a personal union. 
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We have already seen that Puritans believed that the monarch or indeed magistrate 
could have no dominion over the Church: that responsibility lay with those elected 
from within the congregation, and with the lay elders in conjunction with them. 
Whilst some of Hooker’s Tudor contemporaries, in their defence of the Royal 
Supremacy, made the hostile accusation of simply replacing the Pope with the king 
(for example, Harding’s response to Jewel’s Apologie of the Church of England),276 
this was not quite so with Hooker. 
 
Hooker’s concept of the two kingdoms is fundamental to his defence of the Royal 
Supremacy. In the Lawes, Hooker argues that Cartwright’s opposition to the Royal 
Supremacy is based on the error of confusing the spiritual and temporal realms – that 
is to say, Hooker believes that whilst only Christ can reign in the spiritual realm, it is 
necessary for the good order of society that the person of the monarch takes on this 
role in the temporal realm. Hooker is, of course, seeking to answer his opponents’ 
claims that the monarch as Supreme Governor is contrary to the headship of Christ in 
order, measure, and kind. Contemporary scholars such as Littlejohn have correctly 
and helpfully argued that sixteenth-century citations of the two kingdoms argument 
were plagued by two major tensions: firstly, that whilst the magistrate’s authority in 
the Church was only over things indifferent, this authority in itself was not 
indifferent; and secondly, that the authority of the monarch, being answerable to no 
one but God, did not allow for any freedom of conscience on the part of the subject.277 
If Hooker could resolve these tensions successfully, then the Royal Supremacy may 
well appear creditable to the Puritans. 
 
Calvin and Luther’s exploration of the doctrine of the two kingdoms is somewhat less 
confused, and therefore gives Hooker the opportunity to align his defence of the 
                                                
276 Edwin Sandys, The Sermons of Edwin Sandys, D. D., successively bishop of Worcester and London, 
and archbishop of York [ob. 1588]; to which are added some miscellaneous pieces. ed. J. Ayre 
(Cambridge: Parker Society, 1845-50) vol III, 132. 







Royal Supremacy with orthodox reformed doctrine. Hooker makes significant use of 
the extant correspondence from the Admonition Controversy278 in his defence, thus 
relying heavily on the orthodoxy or otherwise of Whitgift’s interpretation of the two 
kingdoms. 
 
Though we can make every effort to map out which theologians are influenced by 
whom during this period, ultimately we cannot be absolutely certain, and we also 
cannot claim either, say, that the Zurich tradition was mutually exclusive from the 
Genevan tradition. Clearly there was a lot of cross-pollination, and certainly in 
reference to Hooker, his Lawes were not monogamous in their usage of the 
magisterial reformers. 
 
This section has argued that, for Hooker, political theory and theology had little 
distinction between them.  Hooker, having studied Vermigli and Aristotle, made his 
defence of Royal Supremacy on a three-fold concept.  First, Thomism uses a telos 
towards the divine; second, the concept of Two Kingdoms covers the spiritual and 
civil spheres; third, the Aristotelian concept of civil government.  Taken together, 
these concepts have parallels with Vermigli in respect of Thomism, the chiefty of 
Scripture in the Two Kingdoms argument, and Aristotelian claims for politics having 
a telos towards the summum bonum.  Hooker made use of Luther’s On Secular 
Authority, which believed that law-abiding citizens were urged by God to respect the 
proper authorities.  Crucial for Hooker, he defended the authority associated with the 
Supreme Governor by countering Puritan claims, arguing that the monarch’s headship 
differs from Christ’s in order, measure, and kind.  Cartwright does not see the 
inherent distinction between the spiritual and temporal nature of the Church – the 
Church, as a political society, required authority, rule, and public order, in common 
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with any other political society.  Hooker, influenced by Luther, argued that the 
Puritans confused the zwei Reiche to serious soteriological error – also using Calvin’s 
forum conscientiae and forum externum to back him up.  Again, Hooker argued that 
the two realms were joined in Christ, but pointed out that Calvin’s understanding of 
such was based on a faulty Christology.  Despite this, Hooker’s argument 
demonstrated a cross-pollination between Zurich and Geneva. 
 
ii) The English Puritans and Royal Supremacy 
 
As we have already seen, it is simply incorrect to categorize English Puritans as being 
of one mind in respect of the Elizabethan Settlement. Due to Hooker’s anxiousness to 
make the Elizabethan Settlement appear acceptable to his opponents, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that he attempts to utilize mainstream reformed sources from Europe to 
bolster his argument, rather than anything distinctively proto-Anglican, or indeed, 
Iure Divino. Whether we are able to say that Hooker’s line of argument is due to his 
drift towards the fundamentally reformed nature of his thought in the Lawes or 
whether it is polemical opportunism is perhaps impossible to do with certainty. A 
pragmatic approach would be to say that he uses the approach most useful dependent 
upon the matter in question. 
 
Hooker, in his defence of the Royal Supremacy, sought to answer the claims of the 
Puritans that kings, being only lay persons, exceeded the lawful boundaries of their 
calling by assuming leadership of the Church,279 and that there must be a necessary 
separation between Church and Commonwealth. Further, the Puritans argued that all 
ecclesiastical power must be exercised by Church governors and not Christian 
princes.280 The beginning of Book VIII outlines Hooker’s reasoning for the prince’s 
mandate to lead the English Church – this authority, argues Hooker, is ‘by the lawes 
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of this Realme annexed unto the Crowne.’281 This is in fact a highly controversial 
point – by claiming that the Royal Supremacy depends on statute law and not divine 
law, Hooker goes against the consensus of the Tudor Church. 
 
The Puritans’ view of the monarch’s power of dominion was one that may have 
allowed foreign powers a degree of dominion.282 Hooker argues in an elegant but 
tricky political manoeuvre that by not holding to the supreme authority of the 
monarch, this may allow the Puritans to envisage foreign political powers holding 
sway in England,283 whilst the Roman Catholics believed that the Pope held supreme 
power in ecclesiastical causes throughout the world (a power that Elizabeth expressly 
vetoed in the Act of Supremacy). Further, in respect of the limitation of royal power 
over the Church, whereas Puritans argued that explicitly clergy (and therefore 
implicitly the monarch) may only rule if they measure up to a certain standard, 
Hooker argues that ‘the King alone hath no power to do without consent of the Lordes 
and Commons assembled in Parliament…with the assent of Clergie in 
Convocation.’284 With the monarch’s ecclesiastical authority being vested by the 
Crown in Parliament, rather than the Crown by itself, this, argues Hooker, has the 
effect that the monarch’s power is limited.285 
 
We have already seen that Hooker uses the reasoning of continental reformers such as 
Luther and Calvin to disprove the idea that the Royal Supremacy is incompatible with 
the tenets of a reformed Church. Yet how did the theories of the English Puritans 
differ from the continental reformers, and how did Hooker use these arguments to 
counter the claims of the English Puritans? 
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First, we have already demonstrated that Luther and the two kingdoms argument are 
entirely compatible with, and thus pivotal to, Hooker’s defence of the Royal 
Supremacy. By contrast, those opposing the Settlement in England based their 
opposition on what Hooker argued was a faulty understanding of the two kingdoms 
doctrine – that is to say, they failed to recognize the inherent distinction between the 
spiritual realm and the temporal realm: 
that even in the outward society and assemblies of the Church 
where one or two are gathered in his name…our Saviour Christ 
being in the midst of them as Mediator must needs be there as 
Head…it followeth that even in the outward society and meetings of 
the Church no mere man can be called the Head of it seeing that our 
Saviour Christ doing the whole office of the Head himself alone 
leaveth nothing to men by doing the whereof they may obtain that 
title.286 
And further: 
if there be no head but Christ in respect of the spiritual government, 
there is no head but He is in respect of the Word Sacraments and 
Discipline administered by those whom he hath appointed, 
forasmuch as that is also his spiritual government.287 
To which Hooker answers: 
we make the Spiritual regiment of Christ to be generally that 
whereby his Church is ruled and governed in things spiritual. Of 
this general we make two distinct kinds, the one invisibly exercised 
by Christ himself in his own person, the other outwardly 
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administered by them whom Christ doth allow to be the Rulers and 
guiders of his Church.288  
Specifically here, Hooker would argue the ‘rulers and guiders’ to be the monarch, as 
Supreme Governor, but also the bishops and priests under her in ordering the Church 
and Commonwealth. The point is that the external spiritual regiment consists of two 
types of organization: power of order (concerning administration of the sacraments)289 
and power of dominion (concerning the administration of the laws of the land, which 
are annexed unto the Crown as a right and responsibility) – hence, administration of 
the former is undertaken by bishops, priests, and deacons, and administration of the 
latter by the monarch. 
 
Yet whilst Hooker draws on the reformed divide between nature and grace in utilizing 
the two kingdoms argument in his defence, it is also important to highlight the role 
and grace of unction,290 which is capable of bridging the division between depraved 
nature and sanctifying grace. It is this ‘blurring’ of the boundaries that is reflected in 
Hooker’s Lawes, as well as in Christological theology – just as Christ unites the 
spheres of humanity and divinity, the monarch, according to Hooker, can represent a 
union in one person of things temporal and things spiritual, which, Edwin Sandys 
remarks in his notes on the sixth book of the Lawes, means the prince is a ‘mixt’ 
person.291 
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How does Hooker deal with the citation by Cartwright of Calvin’s complaint292 (in 
Calvin’s commentary on Amos 7.13) that the English monarch usurps that power 
which is not theirs in the ecclesiastical sphere? Hooker appeals to the unity of the two 
natures in Christ, thus alleging that Cartwright has committed a Nestorian heresy by 
arguing for a separation of the two natures: 
These two natures are as causes and original groundes of all things 
which Christ hath don. Wherefore some thinges he doth as God, 
because his deitie alone is the well-springe from which they flowe: 
some thinges as man, because they issue from his meere humane 
nature: some thinges jointlie as both God and man, because both 
natures as principles thereunto.293 
To divide Christ’s power to rule over the Church as Son of Man, and over the State as 
Son of God is a ‘manifest error’, says Hooker.294 Yet how does Hooker believe this 
should work? Assuming an orthodox understanding of Christology, he argues, 
‘Dominion belongeth unto the Kingly office of Christ as propitiation and mediation 
unto his priestly, instruction unto his pastoral or prophetic office.’295 Calvin uses the 
same formula in his Institutes 2.15.1–6, in a discussion of Christ’s threefold office of 
prophet, king, and priest, which Hooker in turn uses to confute Cartwright, claiming 
that he has confused Christ’s kingly and priestly offices. Hence, argues Hooker: 
We…truly and rightly discern a power external and visible in the 
Church exercised by men and severed in nature from that spiritual 
power of Christ’s own regiment, which power is termed spiritual 
because it worketh secreatly inwardly and invisibly: His, because 
none doth or can it personally exercise besides or together with him. 
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So that Him only we may name our Head in regard of this and yet 
in regard of that other power differing for this, term others also 
besides him heads without any contradiction at all.296 
 
In Hooker’s refutation of Cartwright’s claims, there are a number of passages in the 
Lawes that are in very close agreement with Calvin’s Institutes.297 It is in Book V of 
the Lawes that Hooker sets out his Christological position, the outcome of which is 
played out in Book VIII in relation to the issue of headship. We should also bear in 
mind that issues of Christological and Trinitarian orthodoxy were themselves subject 
to considerable debate amongst the reformers. However, Calvin, from whom Hooker 
derives his defence of the Royal Supremacy, places great store in the Church Fathers 
in their discourses against heretics: 
Calvin had made the traditional Trinitarian teaching his own 
without the slightest reservation. The same attachment to the 
dogmatic tradition is prominent in his Christology. What is original 
in his contribution to this never touches the fundamental 
affirmations of the Councils of the ancient Church. He adopts in full 
the dogma of the two natures of Christ and the current explanations 
of the relation between the two natures.298 
Calvin accused the Lutherans of a ‘Eutychian fusion’299 of the two natures of Christ, 
and further Zwingli of having a tendency towards a ‘Nestorian separation.’300 In Book 
V of the Lawes, Hooker follows Calvin most closely, in order to avoid either a 
Eutychian or a Nestorian error in his refutation of Cartwright’s errors in the latter. 
Hooker regards the unity of Christ’s person as the source of all power in both the 
                                                
296 Hooker, Lawes, VIII.iv.9. 
297 I.e. Hooker’s refutation of Calvin’s complaint: for Hooker, Calvin ‘spake by misinformation, and 
thought we had meant thereby far otherwise than we do’ (VIII.iv.8). 
298 Francois Wendel, Calvin: The Origins and Development of his Religious Thought, tr. Philip Mairet 
(London, 1963), 215. 
299 Calvin, Institutes, 4.17.30 







sacred and secular spheres – thus, civil authority is, in ecclesiastical affairs, according 
to Hooker, ‘from God by Christ.’301 The Commonwealth is also under Christ’s 
dominion.302 So, whilst both Hooker and Cartwright agree that all power is from God, 
the difference – and again, here Hooker agrees with Calvin – is in the manner in 
which the divine power is communicated to humanity. 
 
Hooker is clear that the unity of Christ’s two natures is crucial to the universal nature 
of his power: ‘Christ hath supreme dominion over the whole universall world. Christ 
is God, Christ is the consubstantiall word of God; Christ is also that consubstantiall 
word made man.’303 It is therefore only in a secondary sense that this undivided 
sovereign power can be distinguished in the two spheres of the Church and the 
Commonwealth. Though the two regiments are invisibly unified in the person of 
Christ, they are visibly unified in the Royal Supremacy. Cartwright, in making a 
distinction between Christ’s mediatorial authority over the Church by means of his 
human nature and his kingly authority over the Commonwealth, could therefore be 
said to remove the Church from the sphere of Christ’s kingship. Hooker is therefore 
clearly on the side of Calvin and the magisterial reformers, over and against those 
pushing for further reform. Hooker argues, using Calvin’s affirmation of the orthodox 
Church Fathers, that the Church and the Commonwealth are both subject to Christ as 
king, and therefore both spheres are subject to Christ’s rule as God and man. 
 
Hooker also accords dominion over men to Christ’s kingship as distinct from his 
offices as priest and mediator: ‘Dominion belongeth unto the Kingly office of Christ 
as propitiation and mediation unto his priestly, instruction unto his pastorall or 
propheticall office.’304 Calvin uses exactly the same distinction in the Institutes 
2.15.1-6, showing that the ‘Disciplinarians’ object to the Royal Supremacy from a 
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confusion of the kingly and priestly offices of Christ.305 Hooker claims that Christ’s 
‘Dominion’ is a consequence of the unity of his person: 
and yet the dominion whereunto he was in his humane nature lifted 
up is not without divine power exercised. It is by divine power that 
the Sonne of man, who sitteth in heaven doth work as King and 
Lord upon us which are on earth.306 
We can compare this with Calvin: ‘…that [Christ] reigns by divine authority, because 
his reason for assuming the office of Mediator was, that descending from the bosom 
and incomprehensible glory of the Father, he might draw near to us.’307 We can see 
therefore that Hooker’s defence of Royal Supremacy builds on the foundation of 
orthodox Christology as put forth by Calvin in the Institutes. 
 
Previously, we noted that Hooker’s ability to prove that the monarch is able to be 
Supreme Governor rests upon the distinction between the headship of Christ and the 
headship of the monarch in order, measure, and kind, and that these corresponded to 
systematics, ecclesiology, and soteriology. Having discussed a systematic approach, 
we now move on to an ecclesiological approach. Here, it is key for Hooker (and 
Whitgift before him) to be able to distinguish ecclesiologically between the visible 
and invisible Churches. We have already seen that Hooker believes Christ’s invisible 
dominion to be inclusive of, yet distinct from, the visible dominion of the monarch. 
Cartwright fundamentally believes that the Church and Commonwealth are entirely 
distinct. 308  Hooker accuses Cartwright of confusing the visible and invisible 
Churches, and thus the universal and mystical domain of Christ to be sufficient for the 
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ordering of the visible Church. Christ, argues Hooker, can only govern both spheres if 
he is of a mystical and spiritual character.309 Thus, the ecclesiological problem at hand 
is the manner of the connection and distinction between Christ in his mystical form, 
and the Church as an association of physical human beings. Hooker argues that whilst 
the invisible Church is one indivisible body, the visible Church is divisible: just 
because Christ’s mystical body is universal, this does not get rid of the need for a 
physical governing presence in the temporal realm.310 It is here that Hooker uses the 
extra-Calvinisticum to explain the two sorts of headship: ‘…we doe all knowe and 
they themselves who alleage this will (I doubt not) confesse also that from every 
Church heer visible, Christ touching visible and corporall presence is removed as far 
as heaven from earth is distant.’311 
 
Calvin criticizes the tendency of the Lutherans to bend the communicatio idiomatum 
beyond received orthodox wisdom: 
Although the whole Christ is everywhere, yet everything, which is 
in him, is not everywhere. I wish the Schoolmen had duly weighed 
the force of this sentence, as it would have obviated their absurd 
fiction of the corporeal presence of Christ.312 
Thus, the ability of Christ to be universally present in the physical world is a sole 
property of his union with the divine nature, and therefore he is not head of the 
Church because he is the Son of Man, but rather the Son of God. Calvin does not wish 
to equate the Church with Christ in totality: for Calvin, just because the Church is the 
body of Christ, this does not mean that the Church is Christ. 
 
Lastly, the soteriological approach to Hooker’s refutation of Cartwright looks to both 
Luther and Calvin. Here, the key aspect for Hooker is to consider the difference 
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between the spiritual and mystical headship of Christ, and the visible and physical 
headship of the monarch. We have already discussed at length the two realms and 
their consequent regiments, with the kernel of Hooker’s argument thus: ‘Christ is 
Head as being the fountaine of life and ghostly nutriment, the welspring of spirituall 
blessinges powred into the body of the Church, these Heads as being his principall 
instruments for the Churches outward government.’313 It is because there is this 
distinction between the outward and visible realm and the inward, invisible realm, 
that the Royal Supremacy is justified. Hooker again states in VIII.iv.9 that Cartwright 
believes Christ’s invisible, spiritual regiment to be indistinguishable from the 
physical, worldly, management of invisible, spiritual, things. Here we can see clearly 
that Hooker mirrors Luther’s distinction in his geistliches Reich and weltliches Reich, 
two spheres that cannot be confused lest one risk soteriological heresy: ‘Duplex enim 
est forum politicum et theologicum’.314 Likewise, Hooker can be said to echo closely 
Calvin’s distinction between the forum conscientiae and the forum externum.315 It is 
clear that Hooker wishes to make this distinction, based on orthodox reformed 
sources, explicit.316 
 
In this section we have observed the crucial rhetorical aspect of Hooker choosing to 
use his adversary’s argument and to disprove it, rather than seeking to start from his 
own viewpoint, unlike many contemporaries of his day. In doing so, we have shown 
that Hooker believes the English Puritans to have espoused a faulty understanding of 
Luther’s two kingdoms doctrine, and thus to have wrongly propagated the notion that 
the Royal Supremacy is contrary to orthodox reformed teaching. Equally, Hooker 
believes the English Puritans to have misunderstood Calvin’s threefold doctrine of 
Christ’s offices as prophet, king, and priest, with Cartwright confuting the kingly and 
priestly offices. Demonstrating these errors has enabled us to argue that Hooker’s 
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defence of the Royal Supremacy is entirely consonant with orthodox reformed belief. 
This will be particularly important when we come to discuss why Hooker goes against 
the majority of Tudor thought that the monarch’s authority was Iure Divino, and the 
consequential implications for episcopal authority. 
 
This section has argued that once again Hooker uses wider Protestantism to disprove 
the claims of English Puritans against the Royal Supremacy, with Luther and the Two 
Kingdoms argument being pivotal.  Hooker argued that the Puritans failed to 
recognise the inherent distinction between the spiritual and temporal realms – for 
Hooker, Christ allowed rulers and guiders (the monarch, bishops, and priests) of the 
Church to administer its outward elements, which consisted of the power of Order, 
and the power of dominion.  For Hooker, the unity of the two natures in Christ meant 
Cartwright had committed a Nestorian heresy by arguing for a separation of these two 
natures, an argument which had similarities to Calvin’s three-fold office of prophet, 
priest, and king.  Hooker used the munus triplex Christi to counter Cartwright’s 
confutation of Christ’s kingly and priestly offices; in so doing, a number of passages 
in the Lawes bore close similarity to Calvin’s Institutes.  Hooker argued, using 
Calvin’s affirmation of the Church Fathers, that Church and Community are both 
subject to Christ as king, hence both spheres are subject to Christ’s rule as God and 
man.  As a consequence, Hooker’s defence of the Royal Supremacy builds on the 
foundation of orthodox theology as put forth by Calvin in the Institutes.  Key to 
Hooker being able to make this defence is the clarification of the ecclesiastical 
difference between the visible and invisible Churches, with Hooker using the extra-
Calvinisticum to explain the two sorts of headship.  Thus, Hooker’s soteriological 
approach to his refutation of Cartwright looks to both Luther and Calvin. 
 
3.2f  Adiaphora 
 
One final aspect to consider is the concept of adiaphora. Hooker’s view that the Royal 







be changed; and hence there is the potential for sedition. Yet, Hooker also understood 
that the Royal Supremacy could only be invoked in adiaphorous matters – which, 
given that all matters pertaining to salvation were defined in Scripture, potentially 
meant a very wide scope for Elizabeth to influence the life of Church and State. 
 
The question of adiaphora and the Royal Supremacy is therefore of especial 
importance. Hooker argues that ‘unto the Governours of the Church alone, it was first 
given and doth appertaine even of very right divine in every Church established to 
make such laws concerning orders and ceremonies as occasion doth require.’317 In 
defending the authority of the Crown to promulgate laws for the Church, Hooker 
recognized that at stake is not merely obedience to the Church in adiaphora, but also 
who had the power to define what is orthodox practice and belief, and also what 
should be defined as adiaphora. 
 
Hooker believes that all free and independent societies should make their own laws, 
and that this power should belong to the whole, and not certain parties, though some 
may hold greater influence than others. There is no reason why this should be any 
different for the Church.318 In sum, ‘we are to hold it a thing most consonant with 
equalitie and reason that no Ecclesiasticall lawe be made in a Christian 
Commonwealth without consent as well of the laitie as of the Clergie but least of all 
without consent of the highest power.’319 Of this, the queen’s authority is the chiefest. 
To be explicit: 
the Parlament of England together with the Convocation annexed 
thereunto is that whereupon the very essence of government within 
this kingdome doth depend…it is even the bodie of the whole 
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Realme, it consisteth of the King and of all that within the Land are 
subject unto him.320 
 
The queen, however, was not afraid to make proclamations about the seeming 
minutiae of religious ceremony, such as the forbidding of the elevation of the Host. 
MacMillan suggests that this was not just about minutiae. Instead, he argues that in 
doing so, the queen wished to make clear that her supremacy was absolute: ‘the 
proclamation was highly problematic; likely designed to maintain stability in the 
realm by disallowing priests from publicly challenging magisterial governance and 
perhaps even the rule of a woman.’321 The queen’s habit of interfering in what the 
bishops regarded as their territory was highly irritating for them, and indeed 
disorientating on occasion: Elizabeth’s understanding and application of adiaphora 
was rather broad.  Hooker’s Lawes did not permit royal interference in spiritual 
matters. 
 
3.3  Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have argued that Hooker used elements from several wider Protestant 
traditions in his defence of the Settlement, leading to accusations of cherry-picking 
and inconsistency.  In Hooker’s argument, this chapter has shown that Hooker uses a 
careful political theology of the governing law, hence for Hooker, the Royal 
Supremacy is consonant with natural and political law, to which all society is bound.  
To attempt to ensure that the monarch did not exceed the boundaries of her calling, 
the laws of the realm annexed royal ecclesiastical jurisdiction to the Crown (which in 
itself was a controversy as this based the Royal Supremacy on statute law, rather than 
divine law).  The citation of the Two Kingdoms theory was key to Hooker, which 
enabled him to look at different types of law, the relation between Church and 
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Community, the role of consent, the role of Parliament, and the relationship of the 
monarch’s ecclesiastical dominion with wider Protestantism.  In sum, Hooker places 
himself with wider Protestantism, but not any particular branch of it.  Underpinning 
Hooker’s theo-political defence of the Royal Supremacy is an orthodox Christology 
which avoids Nestorian separation of the two natures and Eutychian conflation. 
 
Chapter two argued that Hooker’s concept of the Royal Supremacy held an acceptable 
origin of authority for the monarch as being bestowed by God, and that the remit of 
that power was consonant with magisterial reformed principles. This chapter has 
argued that the outworking of that power is consonant with magisterial reformed 
principles. 
 
By examining various aspects of the legal landscape, as well as that of Hooker’s 
approach, we demonstrated that Hooker’s approach to the Royal Supremacy is largely 
compatible with magisterial reformed understandings of the relationship between the 
Church and the State. One crucial aspect in this argument is the concept of the two 
kingdoms – the allegedly false interpretation of which influences the entire argument 
of the Puritans that the monarch claims authority over the Church, which belongs only 
to Christ. By demonstrating that, in Hooker’s view, the Puritans’ claims are based on 
a faulty Christology and understanding of the two kingdoms, we are able to show that 
Hooker is able to sufficiently reconcile royal ecclesiastical authority with a reformed 
doctrine of the Church. 
 
We have also shown that Hooker’s interpretation of the role of a prince within the 
Church against the arguments of the English and continental Puritans suggest that 
Hooker attacks Puritanism from within the reformed tradition, thus showing again 








However, significant questions are raised about the exact limits of royal authority 
over the Church, especially when considering who has authority in secular and sacred 












In the previous chapter, we argued that Hooker’s defence of the Royal Supremacy 
was compatible with the tenets of reformed religious practice. Royal Supremacy 
cannot be exercised without jurisdiction – and so this chapter will analyse what the 
Lawes say about the three areas of jurisdiction relevant to the Elizabethan Religious 
Settlement, and how Hooker attempts to prove that these areas of jurisdiction are 
compatible with the tenets of reformed religious practice. 
 
Under Elizabeth, all ecclesiastical jurisdiction was annexed to the Crown. When 
referring to jurisdiction, the discussion of which was the focus of Book VI of the 
Lawes (for example, in VI.ii.1), Hooker would have used a definition of who had the 
power to make binding decisions and judgments within the temporal and spiritual 
realms. The two combined in the ecclesiastical realm, and it was in this latter category 
in particular that Hooker attempted to defend the Religious Settlement against the 
claims of the English Puritans for further reform. The English Puritans against whom 
Hooker was defending the Settlement thought that there should be a definite and 
permanent divide between Church and State. 
 
The majority of Hooker’s thoughts on jurisdiction are contained in Book VI of the 
Lawes, in which he responds to the Puritans’ fifth assertion, namely that lay elders are 
established for the exercise of ecclesiastical jurisdiction.322 Hooker addresses the issue 
by clarifying the aim of spiritual jurisdiction as being the power of ruling the Church, 
as opposed to and distinct from the power of order, which clergy receive at their 
ordination, and by which they administer the sacraments. Hooker attempts to prove 
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that the laws by which the Church (and State) are governed are not corrupt, and not 
repugnant to the laws of God.323 That is to say, the monarch’s exercise of jurisdiction 
is not equal to, and is qualitatively different from, the jurisdiction and power of order 
(spiritual power) canonically bestowed upon the clergy at their ordination, and upon 
their licensing to a particular post. 
 
The Lawes are Hooker’s defence of the 1559 Religious Settlement, in which he states 
that the sovereign was not only head of the commonwealth, but that the 
commonwealth embraced both the sacred and the secular.324 The Act of Supremacy 
meant an emphasis on Christ remaining head of the invisible and spiritual Church, 
whereas the monarch had dominion over the visible and political sphere. Using 
examples from mainstream reformers, as well as examining the logical coherence of 
Books VI and VIII of the Lawes, in which the bulk of the jurisdictional arguments are 
contained, I will argue that Hooker achieved a harmony between the Thomist 
structure of Book VI and the Augustinian structure of Book VIII.325 This results in 
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important consequences for relations between Church and State, as the mechanics of 
Church and State are mediated by eternal and natural laws, assisted by the grace of 
God. 
 
In the previous chapter, I established that Hooker’s defence of Elizabeth’s temporal 
jurisdiction over the Church was consonant with mainstream reformed religious 
principles, even if that theoretical jurisdiction was exercised in practice in a rather 
different way. The queen was the Head of State, and whilst those in positions of 
power, or at least her councillors, were dependent upon Elizabeth for their 
livelihoods, they were unlikely to take a principled stand against her without wishing 
to risk a great deal. This applied just as much in the ecclesiastical sphere as in the 
temporal sphere, and consequently affected the independence and ability of the 
bishops to question the affairs of State.326 
 
With all ecclesiastical jurisdiction annexed to the Crown, this inevitably created 
blurred lines as to where the ecclesiastical and civil jurisdiction separated. I will argue 
that the two areas of spiritual power (power of order) and power of jurisdiction gave 
Hooker a framework for understanding how authority and jurisdiction were exercised 
within the realm, and who could challenge what authority. I will show how Luther’s 
treatise On Secular Authority affirms the authority of the prince, but that, through his 
two kingdoms theory, the bishops had a prophetical office of spiritual jurisdiction, 
whereas it was the monarch’s duty to promulgate laws relating to the Church. I will 
show that Hooker’s distinction between order and jurisdiction echoes, to some extent, 
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Luther’s two kingdoms theory, and will draw direct parallels between them, giving 
evidence for Hooker’s eagerness to find magisterial reformed support for the 
Elizabethan Settlement. Care of religion was important in a society so that its 
members can live well; because of this, it was the monarch’s duty to care for the 
Church. Yet, the bishops were key members of the conformist system, and their 
ability to exercise temporal jurisdiction327 in this country was granted from the 
monarch. 
 
An increasing number of scholars over recent years have unearthed the importance of 
the continental magisterial reformers in the formation of Hooker’s thought.328 It is not 
possible to say that Hooker favours one reformer over others. He deliberately and 
selectively picks chunks of Calvin, Luther, Bullinger, or indeed others, and in so 
doing may risk undermining the integrity of his defence of the Settlement: the 
magisterial reformed polities of Calvin, Luther, and others were written to be taken as 
a whole, and indeed even, arguably, solely within their contexts.329 To use certain 
sections, but not the whole corpus, could suggest that Hooker’s claim to the 
magisterial reformers was fundamentally flawed, although his consistent method of 
using elements from a wider range of reformers would rather suggest a broader 
support for his argument. 
 
                                                
327 Though of course there were more than a few continental magisterial reformers who would disagree 
with this concept. 
328 W. J. Bradford Littlejohn writes of four ‘schools’ on Hooker interpretation in ‘The Search for a 
Reformed Hooker: some modest proposals’, Reformation and Renaissance Review, 16:1 (2014) 68-82: 
the ‘old “via mediaists”’; the ‘new “via mediatorists”’; the ‘soft reformists’ and the ‘hard reformists’. 
Littlejohn allocates scholars to these four groups, and places himself in an additional, ‘nuanced’ 
category, alongside Alison Joyce, Daniel Eppley, and Scott Kindred-Barnes. Littlejohn’s article also 
discusses what it might mean to ‘be reformed’ in this particular context. See also W. Bradford  
Littlejohn and Scott N. Kindred-Barnes (eds.) Richard Hooker and Reformed Orthodoxy (Reformed 
Historical Theology, Vol 40) (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2017). 
329 Voak argues that if people try to take a conciliatory view towards Hooker as a via media, and also as 
a mouthpiece for Calvinism, this is to create a paradox rather than a satisfactory synthesis between the 
two. Nigel Voak, Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology: A Study of Reason, Will, and Grace 







One such example for Hooker is that of excommunication, because this gives Hooker 
the chance to argue the differing claims for the interplay of authority between Church 
and State. Yet here there are also differences between continental understandings of 
excommunication330 and Hooker – the latter had a more liberal understanding of the 
effects of excommunication than his continental contemporaries, in the sense that 
Hooker perceived excommunication as only cutting off from the visible Church, and 
not from the invisible Church. A significant show of support for the Religious 
Settlement comes from the Continent – Bullinger and Vermigli being amongst the 
most fervent supporters,331 besides the influence that Hooker drew from Luther and 
Calvin. 
 
Hooker’s Lawes were intended as a defence of the Elizabethan Settlement of 
Religion; hence a large proportion of Hooker’s argument is structured against the 
Puritans,332 who pushed for further reform. The Puritans sought further reform by 
challenging the Established Church’s right to enforce conformity through its courts, 
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laws, and legal processes, and suggested a system along Genevan lines instead. 
English Puritans such as Cartwright argued that ecclesiastical persons should not 
wield the sword of secular jurisdiction, but Establishment figures such as Whitgift 
countered this by arguing that it was acceptable for clerics to be magistrates – and 
therefore by doing so justifying the monarch’s jurisdiction over the Church and 
bishops’ exercise of civil jurisdiction alongside the spiritual jurisdiction given to them 
at their ordination. On the contrary side, Hooker refuses to consider the idea of lay 
elders having any kind of spiritual jurisdiction over the Church – the monarch was not 
a lay elder, and she did not enjoy the spiritual jurisdiction that belonged to the bishops 
by right of ordination. Hooker, in a Thomist structure, uses and subsequently builds 
on the existing documents in the correspondence between Whitgift and Cartwright 
during, amongst others, the Admonition Controversy. 
 
4.2 Hooker and Temporal Jurisdiction 
 
Anyone who held public office within the Elizabethan State could be argued to hold 
at least some temporal jurisdiction – that is, the right to exercise authority within the 
temporal sphere. Book VIII, within its discussion of the Royal Supremacy, establishes 
the bounds of temporal jurisdiction in relation to the monarch as Supreme Governor, 
as does chapter II of Book VI, which distinguishes between spiritual power and the 
power of jurisdiction.333 The former, argues Hooker, ‘is of order [Holy Orders], and 
was instituted for the performance of those duties…[and] there is in the Church, no 
less necessary, a second kind, which we call the power of Jurisdiction.’334 The power 
of jurisdiction refers, says Hooker, to ‘ruling with the Church of God,’335 and the 
power of order (spiritual power) ‘cannot be challenged by right of nature, nor could 
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by human authority…be instituted, because the forces and effects thereof are 
supernatural and divine.’336 
 
The 1559 Settlement established the monarch as Supreme Governor of the English 
Church, removing the Pope and consequently any authorized foreign jurisdiction over 
Elizabeth’s realm. Those who sought further reform of the English Church (which in 
the case of the Lawes meant the English Puritans) challenged its power to ‘enforce 
conformity by its courts, laws, and legal processes.’ To consider the exercise of 
authority within the Elizabethan Church, and hence to consider jurisdiction, means 
considering both the spiritual realm and the temporal realm, which meet in 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction.337 
 
The Act of Supremacy makes clear that ecclesiastical and civil jurisdiction coincide in 
the person of the monarch – yet Hooker is at pains to distinguish jurisdiction from 
dominion, moving on from the Henrician era, during which time the concepts of 
jurisdiction, superiority, and authority, were used interchangeably, thus confusing 
their understanding.338 Hooker believes the Puritans made the mistake of conflating 
jurisdiction and dominion, thus excluding ‘the soveraigntie of the estate from bearing 
anie soveraigntie in the Church. Which in England is to denie the princes supremacie 
in causes ecclesiasticall.’ 339  Treating the issues of jurisdiction and dominion 
separately, Hooker considers ministerial jurisdiction in Books VI and VII, and 
supreme royal ecclesiastical dominion in Book VIII. Hooker is clear that the headship 
of the monarch in relation to ecclesiastical authority is derived from and in relation to 
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the absolute headship of Christ,340 in the same way that all ecclesiastical authority is 
annexed to the Crown. 
 
In an Established Church, bishops were regarded as part of the state framework: 
[In] the civil governance of England, the maintenance of order was 
reliant on moderation in the form of bishops…but the lynchpin of 
the conformist system was that they were also civil officers, not 
merely spiritual doctors for troubled souls, but worldly authorities 
whose coercive power was authorized by the monarch and the 
law.341 
Hence bishops not only had their spiritual power by virtue of the power of order, but 
also the civil power, given to them by their place in society, authorized by the 
monarch and given power by the law:342 thus, the monarch, under statute, was the 
source of jurisdictional power for the Church. The root of jurisdiction was the ability 
to judge and command according to law, whereas spiritual jurisdiction was likewise 
according to spiritual law.343 
 
The power of jurisdiction must also have a power to punish, in order for the former to 
be effective – it would be an empty authority if administering that authority were not 
possible. According to Hooker, ‘jurisdictio sine modica coercitione nulla est.’344 
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To exercise that authority over the citizens of the country, those holding that authority 
must be publicly authorized to do so – they must be able to hold authority and judge 
according to the laws of that sphere, spiritual or civil, and that power must include the 
ability to punish those who transgress the laws set down in public for the good 
ordering of society. 
 
This section concludes that as Hooker defined temporal jurisdiction to be ‘the right to 
exercise power within the temporal sphere,’ the monarch is legitimately able to do so, 
by virtue of her being Supreme Governor of the Church of England – a person in 
whom ‘accidents lovingly dwell together.’ Hooker does not permit interference from 
the queen on matters spiritual, using the example of penitence to outwork this 
concept. Hooker cites Luther, Calvin, and Vermigli to illustrate that the monarch had 
a duty as prince to ensure that the right practice of religion was carried out in their 
land. Hooker draws on the extant correspondence between Whitgift and Cartwright 
during the Admonition Controversy to illustrate that the Puritan calls for a permanent 
division of Church and State are not compatible with orthodox reformed religious 
principles. 
 
4.2a The Lawes and Temporal Jurisdiction 
 
Hooker’s defence of the monarch as the highest uncommanded commander,345 both in 
civil and ecclesiastical spheres, has been described as ‘Tudor Averroism’.346 Marsilius 
of Padua was a vocal critic of papal claims to jurisdiction over princes on ground 
similar to that of Augustine. Anticipating Hooker, Marsilius was attempting to 
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highlight the papal quest for total domination over both the temporal sphere and the 
spiritual realm – he added that this ‘over-reaching of spiritual authority was the 
central cause of conflict and disorder within Christendom.’347 
 
Though a connection cannot be proven, it is highly likely that this informed Hooker’s 
theory of relations between Church and Commonwealth, and thus the unity of 
ecclesiastical and civil jurisdiction in the person of the monarch: 
A Church and a Commonwealth we graunt are thinges in nature the 
one distinguished from the other, a Commonwealth is one way, and 
a Church another way defined…For the truth is the Church and the 
Commonwealth are names which import thinges really different. 
But those thinges are accidents, and such accidents as may and 
should always lovingly dwell together in one subject.348 
The Church and Commonwealth are accidents united in a single subject, and therefore 
civil and ecclesiastical jurisdiction may legally coincide in the person of the monarch. 
Whilst headship of the supernatural society belongs to Christ, headship of the external 
society is within the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the monarch – hence this concept 
depends upon the clear Augustinian demarcation between the two spheres.349 
 
However, in the autograph notes from the Dublin Fragments, Hooker borrows heavily 
from Boniface VIII’s papal bull Unam Sanctam (1302), in which the Pope defends the 
papal plenitudo potestatis, insisting upon the subordination of temporal to spiritual 
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jurisdiction: ‘For according to the Blessed Dionysius, it is the law of divinity (lex 
divinitatis) that the lowest things are led to the highest by intermediaries…Therefore 
if the terrestrial power err, it will be judged by the spiritual power.’350 This link 
establishes the ‘ecclesial hierarch’ as the ordained intermediary between two worlds. 
Yet, although Hooker refers to the Aristotelian and Thomist concept of the unmoved 
mover, the metaphysical concept regarding the type of mediation has changed.351 
Hooker does not imply any required subjection of the temporal to the spiritual: 
instead, he gives civil power to the magistrate. Ecclesiastical power is redefined as 
belonging to the civil government, the Church now being a politic society. Yet, Christ 
still reigns alone in the supernatural society, and the monarch in the temporal society 
(albeit the latter, as always, with derived authority from Christ). The Aristotelian and 
Thomist concept of the ‘unmoved mover’ is important here, as it indicates that there 
must always be an ‘ultimate end’ or ‘source’ of the movement: in this case, that in the 
temporal sphere, the monarch is that source or ‘implementer’ of movement in society, 
which means that order can be maintained. The monarch is subject to no one, bar God 
Himself. Again, Unam Sanctam echoes Hooker’s argument in the Lawes that the 
monarch is subject to no one bar God Himself, and that consequently, the monarch is 
the source and maintainer of order in the terrestrial sphere. 
 
Hooker, therefore, attempts to suggest that the ‘accidents’ of the Church and the 
Commonwealth (the ‘politic society’) dwell together in the person of the monarch by 
drawing on Augustine’s Civitatis Dei. By setting his argument amidst Augustine’s 
wider political theology, and also Aquinas’ more narrow, legalistic, theory, Hooker 
tries to demonstrate that as God is law, then the Church and Commonwealth are 
accommodated within that law, and that it is entirely acceptable for the magistrates to 
govern both spheres (excepting areas of spiritual jurisdiction, which is restricted to 
                                                
350 Latin text in Corpus Iuris Canonici: Decretum Magistri Gratiani (Lipsiae: Bernhardi Tauchnitz, 
1879); English text in Documents of the Christian Church, second edition, ed. Henry Bettenson 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963, 1982 reprint), pp. 115-16. 







those who hold the power of order).352 Exactly what consequences this has for the 
monarch and their jurisdictional operation according to Hooker, especially when we 
consider this alongside episcopal jurisdiction, we will explore in the next section. 
 
A natural consequence of exercising jurisdiction is the ability to administer 
punishment. Hooker uses this example to discuss the boundaries and limits of 
jurisdiction held by the monarch and by ecclesiastical persons in the Church. What 
power of discipline does the Church possess, and where does it claim to get that 
authority to discipline?353 There are some powers of discipline that the Church is 
instilled with by divine right – yet, this discipline can only be administered in the 
Church courts by the authority of the Crown. That is to say the spiritualities of the 
Church are exercised by virtue of their holding temporalities, given to the bishops at 
their confirmation of election by the Crown. Further, there are some powers that are 
restricted to the order of a bishop or priest, but others that are due to dominion, which 
can be exercised by a lay person or a cleric. Book VI of the Lawes contains Hooker’s 
thoughts on jurisdiction, with an extended argument for the necessity of repentance 
and consequent restitution of the sinful person to the Christian community – events in 
which the minister plays a key part. 
 
Hooker starts from the assumption that repentance is a reasonably justifiable basis for 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction in England. For an individual to demonstrate true 
repentance, this may be through a combination of discipline, judgment on social 
problems, and regulation of morals (the cure of souls, which, for an Established 
Church, meant that everyone’s souls within a geographical area were to be cared for, 
justified the involvement of the Church in these areas) – rather like, in this instance, 
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the ground covered by the Puritan opponents to the Settlement in their proposed 
Discipline. Kernan suggests jurisdictional claims for the powers of judgment on 
behalf of the Church grew as ‘courts and the canon law increasingly took on an 
institutional life of their own, as canonists creatively borrowed from the civil law and 
expanded their reach.’354 Kernan seems to suggest that the ecclesiastical lawyers were 
increasing their hold over civil society, beyond what was originally intended for the 
Church to govern – perhaps, one might say, venturing into canonical adiaphora.355 
 
When discussing the imposition of penalties, there are several areas that will have an 
influence on how the transgression is defined, which area of jurisdiction it falls under, 
and how the penalty is imposed. Ministers of the Church will have the authority that 
the magistrate has, and vice versa. The ‘power of the keys’ refers to the spiritual 
authority, the ‘power of order’ given to priests and bishops at their ordination, which 
was their ability to absolve (or not) penitent sinners. The crucial phrase here is 
‘penitent’, and thus our basic human need to be forgiven sins in order to enter heaven 
needs repentance to be demonstrated in the individual if forgiveness is to be obtained. 
If only the Church can provide the means to be forgiven sins – that is, the exercise of 
the keys – then it is the Church that needs to make people aware of the need for 
repentance, thus creating a social and theological responsibility, in turn creating a 
raison d’être for the jurisdiction that the Church holds. Crucial to this argument is, of 
course, the assumed unity of Church and State, which Hooker holds to throughout the 
Lawes. 
 
There are elements of Church teaching that hold that some punishments such as 
excommunication or exile would exclude a person from the Commonwealth and 
visible Church. Hooker writes that excommunication in particular excludes from 
being in communion with the Church (i.e. the excommunicated person could no 
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longer receive Holy Communion), but not the Commonwealth: ‘as for the act of 
excommunication it [n]either shutteth out from the misticall [Church] nor cleane from 
the visible [Church], but onely from fellowship with the visible in holy dueties.’356 It 
must be clarified that exactly who had the power to impose a sentence of 
excommunication was a matter of jurisdiction, as its effects are consonant upon the 
individual’s spiritual life, and so should be restricted to those granted the power of 
Holy Orders. Hooker cites Matthew 16:19 as giving ‘his [Christ’s] Apostles regiment 
in general over God’s Church’, and that: 
because their office herein consisteth of sundry functions, some 
belonging to doctrine, some to discipline, all conteyned in the name 
of the keyes: they have for matters of discipline as well litigious as 
criminal, their Courts and Consistories erected by the heavenly 
authority of his most sacred voice, whoe hath said, Dic Ecclesiae: 
Tell the Church.357 
Yet, the most frequent form of excommunication ‘had no moral or censorious quality, 
but served as the mere “pain of contumacy”.’358 In the Church of England, the social 
stigma of being declared excommunicate was often the worst aspect of such 
punishment. However, this was not always the case, and as Elizabeth’s reign 
progressed, there was 
a tendency for this apparatus [ecclesiastical censure] to be 
strengthened, for in the hands of energetic administrators the church 
courts shared in the growth and elaboration of the institutions of 
government which accompanied internal security and rising 
prosperity.359 
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The punishments that were once exclusively those of the Church became yet another 
instrument of control and conformity. To declare someone excommunicate would 
bring social stigma and sacramental isolation, a status in excess of the situation 
envisaged by Hooker in III.i.3. 
 
All of this leads us to the inevitable question as to whether the highest uncommanded 
commander, the Supreme Governor, could be excommunicated – an issue in which 
the power of State and Church overlap. Hooker cites Jewel as saying that the king’s 
prerogative does not exempt him from ‘the coercive power of all spirituall both 
persons and Courtes within the compasse of his own dominions.’360 Hooker’s stance 
on the liability of the monarch to censure has been argued to be rather vague – 
perhaps because it was the best Hooker could do in the circumstances. McGrade 
implies that Hooker seems to take a middle course – ‘[Hooker] is quite definitely 
against the Puritan idea that Kings should be treated like ordinary parishioners…[but 
is] not insensitive to the problems of a “highest uncommanded commander”.’361 Lake 
expands on this point: ‘…princes could not ordinarily be subject to the spiritual 
authority of their clerical subjects…but Hooker did not include excommunication 
here, only making reference to the jurisdictional oath.’362 
 
If pushed, McGrade believes that Hooker’s final opinion ‘would seem to be that in 
quite exceptional cases – those of notorious transgressors in extreme degree, any 
minister is bound to excommunicate and any king is bound to respect the ban.’363 
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Eppley cites Hooker’s use of Ambrose excluding Theodosius from the sacraments as 
not setting a precedent for princes being subject to church courts, and that ‘historical 
examples typically cited give no real evidence to prove that ecclesiastical judges 
should have authority to call their own sovereign before them.’ 364  Concerning 
excommunication, Eppley agrees with McGrade in that ‘this form of 
excommunication does not infringe upon the monarch’s right to govern the Church’. 
Hooker himself on the subject of excommunication tentatively decides that ‘till better 
reason be brought to prove that kings cannot lawfully be exempted from subjection 
unto Ecclesiasticall Courtes we must and doe affirme their sayd exemption 
lawfull.’365 The royal exemption from excommunication is a clear rejection of a 
cornerstone of reformed discipline. 
 
Throughout this discussion, Hooker uses the example of the potential 
excommunication of the monarch as a practical example with which to grapple with 
issues of overlapping jurisdiction between Church and State. In respect of ordinary 
citizens, Hooker suggests that the Church and State operate in parallel, with criminal 
offences resulting in a civil punishment – either a fine or a jail term, which would 
satisfy the requirements of justice in the civil sphere; and also a spiritual punishment, 
with the individual not having their sins forgiven until appropriate contrition and 
repentance had been shown (with fulfilment of the civil penalty being part of that 
repentance). 
 
This section has argued that Hooker believes that the Church and Commonwealth, 
being ‘accidents united in a single subject’ (i.e. the monarch), are key to the ability to 
defend the Settlement against claims for segregation of Church and State. In doing so, 
Hooker also draws upon Augustine’s Civitatis Dei, with the monarch reigning in the 
external sphere, and Christ dominant in the supernatural sphere. Given the union of 
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Church and Commonwealth in the person of the monarch, the ability to administer 
justice in various spheres of jurisdiction gives rise to potential overlap and conflict 
between Church and State, thus Hooker uses various practical examples of the 
outworking of authority through jurisdiction to illustrate the temporal exercise of that 
jurisdiction. Repentance is one such example, demonstrated through various 
mechanisms of discipline, judgment, and regulation.  Hooker then cites the exercise of 
the keys to illustrate his argument.  The example of excommunication, for Hooker, 
has less drastic outcomes in that although the individual is cut off from visible 
fellowship in the Church, the greatest punishment is the social stigma.  Inevitably, 
Hooker reaches the point as to whether the monarch can be excommunicated, and 
unsurprisingly, does not reach a definitive conclusion on the subject. In this manner, 
we are able to illustrate how the Lawes demonstrate, or at least earnestly attempt to 
demonstrate, a reformed understanding of the outworking of temporal jurisdiction. 
 
4.2b Reformed Religious Principles and Temporal Jurisdiction 
 
Hooker drew from a number of magisterial reformers on the Continent, in his attempt 
to show that the Settlement, together with its jurisdictional framework, was congruent 
with wider Protestantism. Calvin was amongst the most powerful and influential of 
these, although Hooker uses him selectively and critically. Though Calvin was quite 
certain that ordained ministers could not exercise civil rule or earthy authority,366 this 
did not stop Hooker from citing Calvin (selectively) in order to bolster his argument. 
As Hooker cites the correspondence between Whitgift and Cartwright in Book VI, it 
is reasonable to assume that Hooker did not disagree with Whitgift when the latter 
argued with Cartwright regarding civil authority being of assistance to ecclesiastical 
function: ‘an ecclesiastical pastor must (and may) use that discipline that is appointed 
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unto him by the magistrate and orders of that church whereof he is minister, be it civil 
or ecclesiastical.’367 
 
Calvin’s view of the magistrate as an enforcer of virtue can also be seen thus. As the 
only power that the Church had in the enforcement of morals was spiritual, they had 
to rely on the magistrate to give weight where the Church could not: ‘for the church 
does not have the right of the sword to punish or compel, not the authority of force; 
not imprisonment, nor the other punishments which the magistrate commonly 
inflicts.’368 Hooker, in his preface, intimates that Calvin’s discipline instilled a sense 
of chaos, anger, and discontent in Geneva (Preface ii.2), which resulted in Calvin’s 
banishment from and subsequent return to the city. In his preface ii.10, Hooker 
acknowledges how Calvin’s ‘mixed polity’, whatever errors it contained, eventually 
succeeded in bringing about order to the general populace.369  
 
Luther, in common with the vast majority of continental reformers, accepted the 
emergence and involvement of the magistracy in the Church, who were, in 
‘evangelical’ countries, de facto salaried public officials. Luther presided over and 
consented to the nascency of this system – albeit grudgingly. Both Calvin and Luther 
encouraged people to obey the secular magistrate, not from any advantages that might 
accrue, but rather from the divine imperative to ‘love thy neighbour’, and to ‘render 
unto Caesar.’ Luther’s argument for the civil authorities having any jurisdiction in the 
religious schema was hampered by his belief that authority in the Church belonged to 
all Christians equally, and also the fact that he had experienced a number of 
difficulties with Christian princes in his own time. Luther believed that secular 
authority is for the temporal welfare of a country’s subjects, and also for punishing 
transgressions of the ‘Second table of the Decalogue’ (i.e. murder, theft, adultery, 
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public drunkenness, etc.), rather than the ‘First table’ of preaching, faith, or the first 
three commandments (in his preferred numbering).370 
 
Luther’s arguments regarding secular authority and the prince are somewhat unwieldy 
because they rely on a distinction between: 
1. the routine authority that the prince exercises as a political sovereign; 
2. the routine authority that the prince as a baptized Christian shares equally with 
all other Christians; and 
3. the special authority that the prince as [a] baptized Christian has in an 
emergency because he happens to be a prince.371 
Therefore, though Luther cannot call on the prince to intervene in religious matters 
(the prince would not have that authority, according to Luther), the prince could 
theoretically be called upon to exercise his special responsibility as a Christian who 
happens to be a prince (and therefore be of especial importance in the public 
square).372 Stephenson frames this well: ‘it is essential to grasp that Luther regards 
secular government within this framework as an integral part of the good divine work 
of preservation, for…civil authority acts as a curb against the kingdom of the 
devil.’373 It is quite clear that Luther believes the civil sword to serve the purposes of 
God: ‘And for the rest God has established another government, outside the Christian 
estate and the kingdom of God, and has cast them into subjection of the Sword.’374 
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Hooker writes, ‘that which Calvin did for the establishment of his discipline seemeth 
more commendable than that which he taught for the countenancing of it 
established.’375 Hence, Hooker believed that the underlying principles of Calvin’s 
discipline were sounder than its actual practise – so here is another example of 
Hooker selectively using the magisterial reformers when their argument suited his. 
 
Peter Martyr Vermigli defended the necessity of a single supreme magistrate, or 
governor, uniting ecclesiastical and civil jurisdiction in that person. Kirby,376 in his 
account of Vermigli and the union of civil and ecclesiastical jurisdiction, believes 
Vermigli 377  to have identified the Christian Commonwealth with Aristotle’s 
Community of Virtue, thus allotting the care of the nation to its head.378 Hooker took 
care to illustrate the framework for his argument by setting out his understanding of 
natural law and the relevance for a defence of the Settlement. Vermigli takes a similar 
approach, connecting his treatment of the magistrate’s authority to fundamental 
soteriological assumptions: the sovereign’s powers are restricted to those ‘lawes 
touching outward discipline’ and are distinct from those that specifically concern the 
‘inward notions of the soul.’ Therefore, if Vermigli is using the framework of natural 
law to give credence to the systems out of which the Elizabethan Settlement is drawn, 
then it is in tandem with Hooker’s explanation of natural law, upon which he bases 
his defence of the Settlement in Book I of the Lawes.379 
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Hence, we see that the relationship between the continental magisterial reformers and 
civil jurisdiction is a complicated one, with no uniform outcome. Hooker, in his wish 
to justify the Elizabethan Religious Settlement, borrowed whichever sections of the 
magisterial reformers agreed with his argument, leaving some questionable holes in 
doing so. It seems that Hooker did not believe in one particular stream of continental 
reformed theology, but instead used what elements of Calvin, Luther, Zwingli, 
Bullinger, et al bolster his case that the Settlement is congruent with wider 
Protestantism: for example, using Calvin’s argument that magistrates could be 
enforcers of virtue and Luther’s belief that the civil sword can serve the purposes of 
God alongside Vermigli’s insistence that a single supreme magistrate can unite 
ecclesiastical and civil jurisdiction. These were arguments that, together, supported 
Hooker’s defence of the Religious Settlement. Considering them apart, when taken 
together with the entirety of the individual corpora of Calvin, Luther, and Vermigli, 
may create irreconcilable concepts. For instance, why does Hooker state that the 
motivations behind Calvin’s Institutes are more worthy than the Institutes 
themselves?380 We may suspect that the motivations of Calvin to bring order and 
stability to his context are transferable aims (who would not want to bring order and 
stability to their countries?). This is in contrast to the Institutes themselves, as the 
Institutes would have been conceived for a certain context (that is, Calvin’s 
ecclesiastical ordinances for the Genevan church), and therefore limited in their 
transferability to another country and political set-up. If Hooker were to be influenced 
by the magisterial reformers themselves, we would need to ask the question as to why 
he uses parts of one corpus, and not their whole works – indeed, does this 
fundamentally undermine his defence of the Settlement? 
 
I have argued in this section that Hooker citing the example of Calvin’s mixed polity 
is useful because it illustrates that, despite resistance and disruption in Geneva, it 
eventually brought about order. This may indicate that Hooker realised such a polity 
                                                







would not receive a smooth reception immediately in England.  Further, for Hooker, 
both Luther and Calvin are of especial use because both argued for obedience to the 
civil magistrate.  In the case of Luther, secular authority related particularly to the 
second table of the Decalogue, and although the arguments at times created an 
unwieldy distinction between the secular and the sacred, Luther believed that the civil 
sword was able to serve the purposes of God.  Hooker also backed up his argument by 
citing passages of Calvin’s discipline, as well as Vermigli’s belief of the necessity of 
a single supreme magistrate.  Yet again, however, Hooker’s use of a multiplicity of 
wider Protestant sources leaves Hooker open to accusations of inconsistency and 
selectivity. 
 
4.2c English Puritans and Temporal Jurisdiction 
 
Hooker built his argument for jurisdiction upon the existing correspondence between 
Cartwright and Whitgift in the Admonition Controversy, and so we should at least 
touch on those points relevant to our argument here. Whitgift argued that: 
God hath given the chief government of his church to the Christian 
magistrate, who hath to consider what is most convenient; and we 
must therewith be content, so that nothing be done against faith and 
the commandment of God.381 
Cartwright was exacting in his Reply when he said, ‘the commonwealth must be made 
to agree with the church and the government thereof with her government.’ Whitgift 
went further in his rebuttal of Puritan claims for parity in the controversy by saying 
that ‘[God’s order is kept] when due obedience is given to the civil magistrate’, and 
further, that ‘God hath appointed the multitude, how godly and learned soever they 
be, to obey and not to rule.’382 Further, Whitgift responds to Cartwright’s call for a 
permanent distinction between the Church and State, saying that: ‘the queen’s 
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majesty, being Supreme Governor in all causes, both ecclesiastical and temporal, 
committeth the hearing and judging of ecclesiastical matters to the archbishops and 
bishops, and temporal matters to the lord chancellor and other judges.’383 
 
Hooker, as ever, only draws particular attention to Whitgift and other predecessors 
when they help his argument – and Almasy points out that ‘Hooker concludes, in 
contrast to Whitgift, that Jehosaphat restored only one high court that judged both 
ecclesiastical and civil matters. Therefore, separation of the two as envisioned by the 
Presbyterians has no scriptural warrant.’384 It would seem that Almasy has mis-
interpreted Whitgift in this case, when in fact, given what Whitgift says above, he 
does in fact agree with Hooker. 
 
When constructing his defence of the Settlement in response to the claims of the 
English Puritans, Hooker began his text by drawing from correspondence between 
Whitgift and Cartwright during the Admonition Controversy, with references to 
which the preface is littered.385 Hooker then surveyed the texts of the magisterial 
reformers in order to give weight to his argument that the Settlement was congruent 
with wider Protestantism. By engaging with the correspondence of the Admonition 
Controversy, Hooker is able to directly counter the arguments of the English Puritans 
with those of the magisterial reformers. Given that Hooker could not effectively draw 
on the polity of the Church of Rome when discussing temporal jurisdiction, he had to 
use the polity of the continental magisterial reformers, who only had recourse to 
scriptural precedent for polity, along with the outworking of natural law in that 
respect. 
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4.3 Hooker and Spiritual Jurisdiction 
 
In Book VI, Hooker deals with what he terms the ‘weightiest and last remains’ of the 
debate between the Elizabethan Establishment and the Puritans – ‘Jurisdiction, 
dignitie, and Dominion Ecclesiasticall.’386 In particular, ignoring in the most part the 
issues surrounding ceremonials, Hooker concentrates on what is required to judge and 
rule. In this chapter, I have identified three subsets to Hooker’s discussion on 
jurisdiction: civil, spiritual, and ecclesiastical. Here I will concentrate on issues of 
spiritual jurisdiction. 
 
This section will conclude that, according to Hooker, to exercise spiritual jurisdiction, 
an individual must have the power to judge and command in spiritual matters, 
according to spiritual laws. This power is given by the conferral of Holy Orders, and 
to illustrate this, Hooker uses the example of the ‘power of the keys’.387 As this is a 
power given at ordination, this power cannot be exercised by lay people. Developing 
this example, Hooker uses confession and priestly absolution to demonstrate the 
reformed nature of the Elizabethan Religious Settlement, in that priestly absolution, 
according to the Church of England, is not essential for the forgiveness of sins.388 
Though Hooker again cherry-picks from the continental magisterial reformers, he 
does so in order to refute Puritan claims for a lay eldership – to exercise spiritual 
jurisdiction requires the ‘power of the keys’, which it is simply not possible for a lay 
person to exercise. 
 
4.3a The Lawes and Spiritual Jurisdiction 
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Spiritual power, or jurisdiction, argues Hooker, ‘is of order [i.e. Holy Orders], and 
was instituted for performance of these dueties…[and] there is in the Church, noe 
lesse necessarie, a second kind, which wee call the power of jurisdiction.’389 Hence, 
spiritual jurisdiction is the power to judge and command in spiritual matters according 
to spiritual laws. The power of order, thus, refers to Christ giving his disciples charge, 
‘saying, Preach, Baptize, Doe this in remembrance of mee.’390 This ‘spirituall power’ 
of the Church ‘cannot be challenged by right of nature, nor could by human 
authoritie…bee instituted, because the forces and effects thereof are supernaturall and 
divine.’391 Christ gave this spiritual power ‘for the benefit and good of soules, as a 
meane to keepe them in their due and convenient bounds, and if they doe go astray, a 
forcible help to reclaim them.’392 Hooker regards the Church as having been given 
‘noe kind of spirituall power, for which our Lord Jesus Christ did not give both 
commission to exercise, and direction how to use the same.’393 Hooker also seems to 
imply that given this, it is absurd to imagine the Church ‘abridged of this libertie’, and 
equally absurd for further ‘law, constitution, or canon to be made for limitation or 
amplification’394 in the carrying out of Christ’s ordinances. Clearly, in order for the 
Church to exercise spiritual jurisdiction, it must have people who are publicly 
authorized to command and judge in matters spiritual, and also to have some power to 
punish transgressors of established laws. 
 
Hooker uses the example of penitence and the forgiveness of sins to illustrate the 
difference between spiritual power and power of jurisdiction. There are two kinds of 
penitence – one a private duty towards God, and the other a duty of external 
discipline. Repentance stems from the former, and contrition to the latter.395 Hooker 
believes that the main cause of spiritual jurisdiction is ‘to provide for the health and 
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safety of men’s soules…bringing them to see and repent their grievous offences 
committed against God.’396 How can Hooker argue that repentance is a cornerstone of 
spiritual jurisdiction? Clearly, if repentance is a private duty towards God, then it is 
the responsibility of the Church to guide men toward appropriate repentance, and to 
ensure their ‘inner’ health. The Church therefore deals with the internal and spiritual 
aspects of repentance and ‘making whole’, whereas the State deals with the exercise 
of the civil law: those aspects that are legal and political, rather than theological acts, 
which are dealt with by the Church.397 
 
Though the 1559 Settlement was that of a Church that claimed to be reformed from a 
Roman Catholic structure, there was remarkably little evidence in Scripture for the 
tenets of spiritual jurisdiction as claimed by the Church in the Settlement.398 In 
VI.ii.2, Hooker writes that: 
The spiritual power of the Church [is] such as neither can be 
challenged by right of nature, nor could be by human authority be 
instituted, because the forces and effects thereof are supernatural 
and divine…I therefore conclude that spiritual authority is a power 
which Christ hath given to be used over them which are subject 
unto it for the eternal good of their souls, according to his own most 
sacred laws and the wholesome positive contribution of his Church.  
Thus, though Christ gave these laws as a foundation for the Church, they are only a 
ground upon which to build a positive contribution, and not, perhaps, prescriptive to 
the extent that the Settlement may have claimed for the Church. 
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Even so, this particular issue of spiritual authority as discussed in VI.ii.2 did not 
specify who would hold such power.399 Exactly what kind of power is being claimed 
for the prince with regard to ecclesiastical jurisdiction needs clarity (we have already 
seen that jurisdiction, unlike dominion, can be held by others than just the monarch). 
Hooker writes: 
so the considerations for which it were happily convenient for Kings 
to sit and give sentence in spiritual Court, where causes 
Ecclesiastical are usually debated can be no bar to that force and 
efficacy which their sovereign power hath over those very 
Consistories and for which we hold without any exception that all 
courts are the Kings.400 
That is to say, ‘[that] which cannot be of Kings and Princes ordinarily be presumed in 
causes merely Ecclesiastical…even Common sense doth adjudge this burden unto 
other men.’ 401  Yet, ‘this power [of ecclesiastical jurisdiction] was for just 
considerations by public consent annexed unto the King’s royal seat and crown.’402 
This is a key point that links directly to the Act of Supremacy. 
 
How did Hooker understand the spiritual power that clergy exercised? The argument 
that Book VI of the Lawes is the least complete has caused significant problems 
amongst those who wish to cite the book as a justification and explanation of the way 
that the Elizabethan State ran its courts and ecclesiastical systems.403 Kernan believes 
that in a finished Book VI, Hooker would have framed his argument 
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to defend the existing church courts (and canonico-civil law used in 
those courts) as theologically sound ([being] descended from 
powers that inhered in the church and the office of bishop) as an 
appropriate means to police all sorts of offences that derived from 
the church’s mission and as a politically justifiable expression of a 
power sharing justified by custom and history that together with the 
common law worked to maintain civil peace and order.404 
Exactly who could lay claim to exercising the power of the keys405 was a defining 
argument for the Church’s nature – yet not only for the nature of the Church, but also 
that of society, as it defined boundaries of governing conduct in the sacred and secular 
areas.406 Though many areas of the doctrine of the power of the keys were hotly 
disputed, what was universally accepted was the health of individual souls being 
maintained by the commission of Christ to the Church to carry out this spiritual 
mission. Exactly what were the limits of that spiritual mission and how it should be 
conducted were the subject of much debate – as was the concept and definition of 
uniformity. Despite the undoubted levels of change in the Elizabethan era, Kernan 
argues that some things endured, and thus created tensions surrounding the limit of 
the Church’s powers, here talking of the nature of the Church of England: 
…its essentially medieval nature remained relatively unchanged, as 
did many of its responsibilities, although the submission of the 
clergy, the erection of a Royal Supremacy over the Church, and the 
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creation of a ‘Church of England’ left unanswered many questions 
about the source and extent of the Church’s powers and 
responsibilities.407 
Chief among these questions was the following: if papal jurisdiction was superseded 
by Royal Supremacy, on what basis were the jurisdictional claims of the English 
Church based?408 At the lowest level, English bishops could have been seen as having 
jurisdiction similar to that of Lutheran superintendents – that is, with little authority 
except to administer moral precepts. Yet, it could be argued that the bishops, with the 
monarch as their Supreme Governor, had their authority by grant of the monarch.409 
This could result in a problematic interpretation of the boundaries between spiritual 
and secular jurisdiction, which could have possibly implied that the monarch had an 
authority in the spiritual sphere, which was not hers to claim.410 
 
Hooker thought it necessary to divide the power of the keys into two spheres – those 
of jurisdiction and order. Surely, if the power of the keys was given by Christ to his 
Apostles, that was argument enough for clergy or ministers to wholly administer this 
discipline? This concept could be problematic in an established Church. The power of 
order was held by all deacons, priests, and bishops, which made the sacraments 
effective; and the power of jurisdiction was the monarch’s administrative, legislative, 
and judicial power over the Church.411 
 
Hence there are two spheres of influence within the spiritual regiment. One is visible, 
which is: 
                                                
407 Kernan, ‘Jurisdiction and The Keys’, 450. 
408 See Christopher Haigh, English Reformations: Religion, Politics, and Society under the Tudors 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), esp. 12-21. 
409 See chapter five. 
410 In Hooker’s autograph notes to Book VI (70r; 3:468-9, FLE), Hooker denies priestly powers to the 
monarch – which echo the queen’s own belief in her own notes to the Thirty-Nine articles. See Leo 
Solt, Church and State in Early Modern England, 1509-1640 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990) 
76-8. 







administered by them who Christ doth allow to be the Rulers and 
guiders of his Church…him only to be that fountain, from whence 
the influence of heavenly grace distilleth and is derived into all 
parts whether the Word or Sacraments or Discipline or whatsoever 
be the mean whereby it floweth.412 
The other is invisible, ruled over by Christ. The ability to administer authority within 
the visible, spiritual, sphere, depends on the power of order, and the power of 
dominion. The power of order belongs to the clergy alone and is their indelible right 
and duty, whilst the power of dominion is a right and duty shared by the monarch.413 
Hooker argues that in respect of spiritual matters, the exercise of jurisdiction is 
qualitatively different from the power of order that is given canonically to the 
clergy.414 Authority within the visible realm was administered by the temporal sword 
held by the State, which supported the spiritual sword held by the Church.415 Yet, in 
attacking the jurisdictional claims of the Roman Catholic Church, those calling for 
further reform in the English Church lent weight to their cause by criticizing the 
governmental pretensions, which had the consequence of arguing for the parity of 
ministers and cementing opposition to government. It could even be argued that this 
highlights the possible grounds for charges of sedition against those calling for further 
reform in the Church of England, since to challenge the monarch’s authority was seen 
as highly dangerous. 
 
In conclusion, Hooker defined spiritual power as that administered by Holy Orders at 
the ordination of a bishop, priest, or deacon. Having Holy Orders gives a spiritual 
power and jurisdiction that those who are not ordained do not have – even the 
monarch. Yet, people need authorization to command and judge in spiritual matters, 
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and this is where the interaction with the State comes in, especially for bishops, as it 
is the grant of the temporal See that gives the bishop the ability to exercise their 
jurisdiction in a particular place.416 Hooker gives a practical example to help the 
reader understand his argument: penitence and forgiveness. Spiritual jurisdiction is 
also about the ‘power of the keys’, and the ability to ‘bind and loose’ sins, and 
Hooker, whilst acknowledging that ‘all courts are the kings’, believes that church 
courts are theologically acceptable, and ultimately that they work ‘with civil 
courts…to maintain peace and justice.’ It is through the exercise of the temporal 
sword and the spiritual sword that the Church administers spiritual jurisdiction (given 
that penance has both an external and a spiritual outworking). 
 
This section has argued that Hooker believes spiritual power to be used for the benefit 
and good of souls, but that in order to exercise this power, public authorisation was 
needed.  To illustrate his argument, Hooker used the example of penitence and the 
forgiveness of sins, the demonstration of which is split into a private and public 
reaction.  The private element is more often associated with the Church, and the 
public element the State.  Once more, Hooker used the power of the keys to illustrate 
how they may be exercised in respect of the health of an individual.  How the keys 
were used was divided into jurisdiction (i.e. the dominion of the monarch), and order 
(which is invisible in its nature).  Hooker, though, was aware that to attack the 
monarch’s spiritual jurisdiction could potentially have been seen as seditious. 
 
4.3b  Reformed Religious Principles and Spiritual Jurisdiction 
 
If Hooker looked to bolster his argument that the Settlement of Religion was 
congruent with wider Protestantism, and that the English Church’s understanding of 
religious jurisdiction had a place within that, we need to examine how Hooker drew 
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on the claims for religious jurisdiction and the magisterial reformers. The exact 
location of the dividing line when it came to meting out punishment was hotly 
debated amongst continental reformers, especially as evidenced within the Lutheran 
Augsburg Confession, as well as Calvin’s Institutes of Christian Religion. 
 
Luther’s 95 Theses attacked the Roman Catholic Church at its strongest point – that of 
its sacramental system.417 The practice of selling indulgences for the remission of sins 
in lieu of penance particularly stank for Luther, especially as it implied that the 
papacy exclusively held the ‘power of the keys’. Luther’s theories on the justification 
of the sinner meant that such a system of sacramental penance was unnecessary, and 
so was the whole economy of salvation in Rome. As the Roman Church was attacked 
over its claims for jurisdiction, it was also attacked over its governmental claims, and 
suddenly its entire system of governance – canon law, Church courts, the episcopate – 
was up for question. A major consequence of this was the increase of secular 
authority in places that until then had been the purview of the Church. 
 
Martin Luther’s 1523 text On Secular Authority: how far does the obedience owed to 
it extend? maintained that whilst freedom is needed in the spiritual realm, the secular 
realm necessarily requires laws. Luther made clear the division between the sacred 
and the secular by explaining that whilst genuine Christians could identify where the 
limits lay, genuine Christians are very few in number, and so the Christian should 
submit to worldly powers as the likelihood is that they will have a greater knowledge 
of the boundaries and what is required for ordered living than the individual. This of 
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course also links to the more general theology of the Cross, in that submission rather 
than resistance is the more Christ-like path. 
 
Yet Luther’s acknowledgement of the powers of the prince and its consequences 
meant that the regime of cuius regio, eius religio which obtained in much of Europe 
during and after the Reformation had wide-ranging consequences. MacCulloch 
believes that this 
meant that monarchs would inevitably assume a much larger role in 
the running of the Church than Luther’s ‘two kingdoms’ principle 
suggested…after 1525 he ceased to talk about congregations 
electing their own pastors, and he agreed that the matter which had 
in the past been the concern of the Church – administering its 
landed wealth and providing for the payment of its clergy – should 
now become the business of the secular prince.418 
This was a sea change in the direction of Luther’s thought, to the extent that to 
identify the kernel of his thought now meant wading through a whole host of caveats 
and qualifications, resulting in a watering down of original principles. Luther’s 
original premise, and with it, a large part of the driving force of his reformation, was 
in dire need of bolstering from the authorities. 
 
How can we distinguish between the responsibility of the bishops and the 
responsibility of the prince? Bullinger, as Antistes of the church in Zurich, believed 
that ‘although the monarch certainly has the ultimate responsibility for the state of the 
church in his land, the bishops carry some of this weight by virtue of their advisory 
capacity.’419 Whilst the monarch has the ultimate responsibility to ensure that the laws 
of the land are enabled, laws that are a part of a Christian nation under God, the 
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bishops play a crucial role in this as they advise the monarch and the secular rulers 
from a spiritual perspective, which is part of their spiritual jurisdiction. Luther puts it 
thus: 
For my ungracious lords, the pope and bishops, should be [real] 
bishops and preach the…Word of God; but they have left off doing 
so and have become secular princes, ruling by means of laws that 
concern only life and goods. They ought to rule souls with God’s 
Word, inwardly…God has made them to be of perverse minds and 
has deprived them of their sense, so that they want to rule spiritually 
over souls, just as the spiritual authorities want to rule in a worldly 
manner.420 
Luther was writing in the context of a mixed polity, where princes, lords, and 
magistrates held office in the churches, so it may be he took a pragmatic outlook, 
which Luther justified in, amongst other works, On Secular Authority, arguing that 
the secular prince ruled with a temporal sword as well as a spiritual sword. It is 
therefore unsurprising that Hooker wished to mine Luther for all he was worth.421 
 
The English Puritans may have had their Discipline, but another outcome of reform 
was a model of Christian society based on that of Geneva under Calvin, in which an 
almost self-contained Church would be joined to the foundations of a civic 
government already in existence.422 In this model, church courts would give way to 
consistories, ‘and the civic government, effectively under the control [of] “elders” of 
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the church [who would replace bishops], was responsible for discipline.’423 In the 
English Church, however, any reform took place at the behest of the sovereign, with 
the Elizabethan Settlement meaning that any further demands for reform, as well as 
issues of discipline, had to include the Church, Parliament, and the monarch, in what 
could be described as an inclusive and holistic sense of government, even if this did 
not work out so in practice. Hooker himself believed that this stance of Calvin was a 
result of political expediency and compromise, rather than anything directly biblically 
sanctioned.424 
 
Though Calvin was a strong influence upon Whitgift’s defence of the Settlement, 
Hooker makes a conscious decision to turn away from Calvin’s arguments by stating 
that the purpose of ecclesiastical jurisdiction was to ‘provide for the health and safety 
of men’s souls, by bringing them to see and repent of their grievous offences 
committed against God.’425 Hooker’s belief that the Church’s jurisdiction over such 
offences also encompassed the unwilling is a particular departure from Calvin426 – 
what is at stake here is the subject of who wields coercive power over people, with 
Calvin following ‘Marsilius of Padua in claiming that the church cannot legitimately 
hold any coactive or coercive power as part of its jurisdiction.’427 
 
In Cranmer and Sandys’ notes on Book VI we find the closest we can get to Hooker’s 
answer to Calvin regarding the true exercise of spiritual jurisdiction. Cranmer clarifies 
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‘chiefty of dominion’ as not meaning that dominion is imported (imported, that is, 
from Rome), but rather whilst the monarch has ‘chiefty of dominion’, this does not 
mean importing the power of jurisdiction. Further, ‘chiefty of dominion’ can be 
realized as being ‘from the Lord.’428 Sandys expands this by claiming that to exclude 
the sovereign from any dominion in the Church is ‘in England…to denie the princes 
supremacie in causes ecclesiasticall.’429 Hooker regards the Church of England as 
having been given by God (through the outworking of natural law and Holy Scripture) 
the power to exercise punishment and discipline, as well as authority over the 
unwilling (by virtue of Hooker’s precept that every man is a member), yet distinctly 
not going so far as to require the involvement of priestly absolution – ‘for els when 
you answer them [the Calvinists] by this distinction, they will say that you doe petere 
principium.’430 
 
Hooker claims that Rome uses the power of the keys argument to justify its insistence 
upon priestly satisfaction. Hooker agrees with this, but states that it has two restraints 
– ‘the one that the practice thereof proceeds in due order, the other that it doe not 
extend itself beyond due bounds…yet not such soveraigntie of power that noe sinne 
should be pardonable in man without it.’431 Further, Hooker argues that ‘to remission 
of sinnes, there are twoe thinges necessarie, Grace as the only cause which taketh 
away iniquitie, and Repentance as a dutie or condition required in us.’432 Hooker 
disagreed with those English reformers who accepted Calvin’s premise that the 
‘power of the keys’ referred to ‘the ministry of the Word.’ Hooker regarded this 
power as being more paternal than anything punitive and saw it as a core part of the 
Church’s pastoral responsibility. 
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Calvinism was somewhat more severe about the effects of excommunication than 
Hooker or the Establishment divines.433 Once excommunicated, the errant individual 
was to be regarded as permanently cut off from the body of Christ, and to be shunned 
‘as a heathen man and a publican.’434 This is similar to the Roman Catholic position, 
which held that there was no salvation outside of the Church, and thus those 
excommunicated were cut off from the life-giving sacraments (though of course 
Calvinism did not hold such a high doctrine of the latter). Note though, that in 
Cranmer’s notes to Book III in the Folger edition, Hooker believes excommunication 
not to exclude from the visible Church, but rather from sacramental Communion. 
 
Calvin was not the only magisterial reformer to influence the Elizabethan Settlement 
on matters of jurisdiction. Heinrich Bullinger, who strongly supported the Royal 
Supremacy, continued to exert influence, not only as a theologian, but also as an 
advisor to bishops and princes.435 Bullinger believed that the prince had a prophetical 
role, and that there was a degree of mutual responsibility between ministers of 
religion and magistrates. Bullinger believed the magistrate to be the ‘living law’, or 
lex animata: 
For laws undoubtedly are the strongest sinews of the commonweal, 
and life of the magistrates: so that neither the magistrates can 
without the laws conveniently live and rule the weal public, nor the 
laws without the magistrates shew forth their strength and lively 
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force…By executing and applying the law, the law is made to live 
and speak.436 
This would seem to resonate with what we have already learnt: that for Hooker, the 
sacred and the secular coincided in the person of the magistrate, thus giving support to 
the position of the Elizabethan Religious Settlement that the monarch could wield 
both the secular and spiritual swords. 
 
Having acknowledged what Luther, Bullinger, and Calvin have said themselves about 
spiritual jurisdiction, the closest we can find to Hooker answering Calvin in regard to 
this is in Cranmer and Sandys’ notes to Book VI. In this discussion regarding the 
necessity of priestly forgiveness, Cranmer and Sandys believed that Hooker thought it 
not necessary but instead part of God’s gift to the Church to assure individual sinners 
of their forgiveness: Hooker was near-silent on the necessity of priestly forgiveness 
because to insist on it meant giving the clergy an ability to ‘make right’ errant 
individuals, which the State (and thus the monarch) did not have. To insist on priestly 
forgiveness would also alienate Hooker’s argument from the support of the 
magisterial reformers – hence Hooker’s belief that to do so, in the eyes of the 
Calvinists, would be petere principium. 
 
This section has argued that the matter of exactly who should mete out punishment 
was hotly debated.  Luther attacked the Roman Catholic sacramental system, and, in 
On Secular Authority, affirmed the authority of the prince within the Two Kingdoms 
theory: Christians should submit to secular authority as the latter has the greater 
knowledge and power to ensure order in society.  Bullinger argued that though in 
society, the monarch has ultimate responsibility, the bishops still have some influence 
because they advise the monarch in her duties.  For Hooker, Luther’s On Secular 
Authority was especially useful as the secular prince ruled with both the temporal and 
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the spiritual sword.  For Calvin, Hooker argued, the almost self-contained Church 
would be joined to the foundations of civil government already in existence, with the 
elders of the Church, who were responsible for discipline, controlling the civil 
government.  It is important to note, though, that in England, any reform took place at 
the behest of the Sovereign.  Calvin’s stance was different in Geneva, argued Hooker, 
because it was the result of political expediency and compromise.  Though Book VI 
has been regarded as the least complete of Hooker’s Lawes, Cranmer and Sandys’ 
notes on the book regard Hooker as arguing the Church of England as being given 
power by God to exercise punishment and mete our discipline, but not necessarily to 
the extent of priestly absolution.  For Hooker, the remission of sins needed grace and 
repentance, and the consequences of excommunication only excluded from 
sacramental communion, and not from visible fellowship in the Church.  For Calvin, 
the consequences were more extreme.  Hooker also drew on Bullinger, who argued 
that the prince had a prophetical role, with the magistrate as the lex animata.  Finally, 
for Hooker, Cranmer, and Sandys, priestly forgiveness, though not mandated, was for 
the assurance of the individual: this was because if it were mandatory, this would give 
clergy a power that the monarch did not have. 
 
4.3c English Puritans and Spiritual Jurisdiction 
 
In grappling with the question of jurisdiction, Hooker deals with the Puritans’ 
‘discipline’, or proposed manner of ruling and judging the Church.437 The terms, 
‘judging’ and ‘ruling’ were used by Hooker because ‘they [the Puritans] verie well 
knew, how little their labours soe farr bestowed, would avayle them in the end, 
without a clayme of Jurisdiction to upholde the fabrique which they had erected.’438 
The Puritans sought further reform, explicitly challenging the ability of the 
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Established Church to enforce conformity by its legal structure. It is claimed that 
Hooker’s response to this resulted not only in rebuttal of the Puritans claims, but 
provided ‘a more robust theological, social and legal foundation for the English 
Church’s involvement in the regulation of common life.’439 By extension, Hooker’s 
Lawes formed not only a defence of the English Church, but also a defence of the role 
of bishops and the monarch – an apologia for the 1559 Settlement. 
 
English Puritans such as Thomas Cartwright questioned the legitimacy of clergy 
holding any civil jurisdiction – ‘[he] which professeth himself to be an ecclesiastical 
person, ought not to have the civil sword.’440 Cartwright is keen to emphasize that 
‘touching their names and titles, [Christ] putteth a difference in these words: “And 
they are called gracious lords; but it shall not be so with you.”’441 In other words, 
according to Cartwright, the calling of ministers is to match the humility and poverty 
of a Christ-like existence, and not to enjoy the worldly trappings of civil power. 
Clearly, papal claims to hold all power and universal jurisdiction need to be refuted in 
the eyes of those calling for further reform, and Luther developed the ‘two kingdoms’ 
theory to try to address this. The argument that the secular magistrate wielded the 
temporal sword so long as their judgments did not counter those of the Pope meant 
that secular authorities were at risk of wrongly interfering with the propagation of, 
and obedience to, the Gospel, should they interfere in matters spiritual rather than 
temporal. 
 
Whitgift, in his response to Cartwright upon the subject of differences between 
princes and bishops in jurisdiction and power, says: 
for we grant that there is great difference betwixt the dominion of 
kings and princes, and betwixt the jurisdiction and authority of 
bishops. Kings have authority in all causes, and over all persons 
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within their dominions, without any limitation: if bishops have any 
such dominion, especially in civil causes, it is not in the respect that 
they be bishops, but it is from the prince, and limited unto them.442 
And further: 
Christ in this place doth not think it unlawful for Christians to be 
magistrates, neither doth he forbid bishops to have external 
dominion; but he sheweth a difference between the kingdom of this 
world, and his kingdom…he doth not forbid bishops to have 
external dominion, if they come to it by inheritance or lawful 
election.443 
 
When Whitgift writes that Christ thinks it permissible for clergy to be magistrates, we 
see an echo of Hooker’s maxim that every member of the Commonwealth is a 
Christian – if this is so, then if there is a magistrate, they must also be Christian. 
Whitgift, however, also clarifies here that the prince, the magistrate in chief, has 
authority over the Church – but clarification is needed as to exactly what authority 
means here. 
 
Hooker again uses the example of private confession to illustrate his opposition to lay 
eldership. Book VI discusses that whilst repentance is a necessary preparation for the 
reception of Holy Communion, it may sometimes be necessary to offer private 
confession for those who are still unquieted after repentance.444 Hooker reminds his 
readers that the reformed Churches do not necessarily deny the benefits of confession 
– ‘it is not in the reformed Churches denied by the learneder sorte of Divines, butt that 
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even this confession, cleered from all errours, is both lawfull and behoovefull for 
God’s people.’445 This is because, argues Hooker: 
the Churches of Germany, as well the rest as Lutherans, agree that 
all men should att certayne times confesse their offenses to God, in 
the hearing of God’s ministers, thereby to shew how their sinnes 
displease them, to receive instruction…to be soundly resolved…to 
the end that men may att Gods hands seeke every one his owne 
particular pardon, through the power of those keyes, which the 
Minister of God using according to our blessed Saviours institution 
in that case…446 
Hooker argues that auricular sacramental confession is not necessary for the 
forgiveness of sins, but in order that the penitent may receive counsel, comfort, and 
direction from the priest. If we then consider Hooker’s distinction between spiritual 
authority and the power of jurisdiction, we can see that, according to Hooker’s 
argument here, it would be inappropriate for lay elders to exercise authority where 
sacramental authority is to be dispensed: lay elders are simply incapable of 
performing the power of the keys in the forgiveness of sins.447 
 
In conclusion, Hooker is quite clear that spiritual jurisdiction is the power to 
command and to judge in matters spiritual, which is given to clergy at their 
ordination. It is not possible for lay people to exercise any spiritual jurisdiction – and 
to illustrate this, Hooker uses the example of the ‘power of the keys’, and its attendant 
outworkings of penance and forgiveness to explain how, whilst it is only the clergy 
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who can exercise spiritual jurisdiction, the Church works in tandem with the 
machinery of the State to ensure that order is maintained in the secular realm. 
 
I have argued in this section that Hooker deals with the Puritan Discipline by drawing 
on Whitgift and Cartwright’s exchanges in the Admonition Controversy.  Cartwright 
argued that ecclesiastical persons could not wield the civil sword, and that it was the 
duty of (ecclesiastical) ministers to match the humility and poverty of Christ, and not 
to enjoy civil trappings.  For Whitgift, the prince was the magistrate in chief.  Hooker 
used the example of private confession to illustrate his opposition to lay eldership, 
and cited that not all reformed Churches denied the benefits of confession – which 
Hooker concluded by saying that though auricular sacramental confession is not 
necessary, it may offer comfort to the individual.  
 
4.4 Hooker and Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction 
 
The established nature of the English Church meant that the bishops had temporal 
jurisdiction alongside the State, and, therefore, the queen. It is perhaps unsurprising 
that the powers claimed for the Crown by apologists of the Royal Supremacy were 
exercised in a rather different manner. Although Elizabeth declared that she would be 
guided by the clergy in matters ecclesiastical, she did not hesitate to intervene on 
matters of doctrine and faith. As Supreme Governor, and therefore guardian of the 
Church, she had no compunction in plundering church estates, and letting her 
favoured laity follow suit.448 
 
This section will argue that, defining ecclesiastical jurisdiction as ‘ruling with the 
Church of God’, Hooker continues to use the issue of the Puritan call for lay elders to 
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dismiss any ecclesiastical jurisdiction that is not given to those who have received the 
appropriate public and sacramental authority to do so, carefully distinguishing 
between order (which the clergy alone hold), jurisdiction (which can be held by both 
clergy and the monarch), and dominion (which the monarch alone holds). Hooker 
uses the magisterial reformers selectively – and notes that Calvin would not agree 
with extant polity in the Elizabethan Church. Hooker was able to find more common 
ground in Luther, owing to the fact that Luther had to deal with an entangled polity of 
Church and State, in which princes and magistrates often had the upper hand in the 
local church. Hooker, using that distinction between order, jurisdiction, and dominion, 
makes the case that in the monarch, the two spheres of spiritual and secular combine, 
and that it is only by working in conjunction with one another that peace and order is 
maintained in the realm. 
 
4.4a The Lawes and Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction 
 
Hooker is quite careful to distinguish between ‘dominion’ and ‘order/jurisdiction’ 
when dealing with the question of the extent of Royal Supremacy in the Church. 
Though the monarch’s lordship over the Church is derived in relation to ecclesiastical 
affairs, this is not to say that the monarch does not exercise jurisdiction in 
ecclesiastical affairs. Hooker quotes from Hebrews 5.1 in VIII.viii.6,449 distinguishing 
between the power of order, which is restricted to priests, and the power of 
jurisdiction, which is also given to the clergy, but not to them alone (i.e. it is also 
shared with civil leaders). Miller expounds a helpful threefold classification as 
regards the differences between ‘dominion’ and ‘jurisdiction’: 
first, the power of order pertains to the clergy alone; second the 
power of ordinary spiritual jurisdiction belongs to the clergy, and in 
restricted, non-ordinary forms to lay people beginning with the 
                                                
449 ‘Every high priest chosen from among mortals is put in charge of things pertaining to God on their 







monarch; thirdly, the power of dominion in spiritual affairs belongs 
exclusively to the monarch.450 
Miller’s definition of jurisdiction would allow for lay magistrates other than the 
monarch to exercise authority in the Church in non-ordinary forms – but to what 
extent does this allow for lay elders in the Church, and if it does, what scope would 
they be authorized to have?451 
 
As Supreme Governor of the Church of England, and as sovereign of the realm, the 
monarch had unrivalled human authority over the Church: ‘Only the King’s royal 
power is of so large compass that no man commanded by him according to order of 
law can plead himself to be without the bounds and limits of that authority.’452 Whilst 
constructing an argument for the authority of the monarch, the ‘very essence of royal 
power’ was found because individuals ultimately acted for their own interests. Thus, 
it was important to have one person who had authority over all, for the sake of order, 
but this person should not have such authority that it was limitless and without 
restraint lest tyranny take hold. Hooker referred to this as major singulis, universis 
minor.453 This would seem to be wholly compatible with the idea that the monarch 
was part of the community and system of law and order, both participating in, and 
leading, the formulation of laws for the good order of society. The monarch held the 
uppermost jurisdiction in order to keep people from chaos and disorder, leading 
Hooker to state that ‘there must be of necessity in all public societies also a general 
mover454, directing unto the common good and framing every man’s particular to 
it.’455 The monarch is therefore envisaged by Hooker as being a kind of arbiter in 
disputes between ecclesiastical and civil spheres. ‘The king hath a transcendent 
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authority…in all causes over both’:456 emphasizing here the unity of civil and 
ecclesiastical spheres in the person of the monarch as being a pre-requisite for this 
theory. 
 
Hooker’s autograph notes from Book VIII state that ‘all jurisdiction within this 
realme is now annexed to the Imperiall Crowne’. Is this position declaring anything 
new, or re-stating what had been the case for some time? Do Hooker’s notes imply 
that the Crown would – or indeed could – do away with the constitution of the Realm 
and start over? A more pragmatic reading would be that this is yet another example of 
Hooker that his successors could manipulate for their own ends. Miller and Kernan 
also argue that only dominion was absolute for the monarch within their realm, 
whereas jurisdiction was held by other laity alongside, albeit in a hierarchical manner, 
the monarch. Hooker writes that all jurisdiction was annexed to the Crown, rather 
than the Crown being a final arbiter and keeper, and so allowing for a dispersion of 
that jurisdiction amongst others to whom the monarch granted office. This is not a 
new idea, but what Hooker is doing here is justifying its inclusion in the Settlement. 
 
Hooker continues the example of excommunication in order to explain the boundaries 
between spiritual and civil matters, and reminds his readers that spiritual causes – that 
is, the power of the keys – are the remit of the clergy, and the congregation must not 
interfere.457 
 
Luther and other magisterial reformers attempted to rebut the stranglehold of the 
Roman Church on its Petrine claim to the ‘power of the keys’. As this power 
strengthened, the office of bishop became more and more important – bishops were 
seen as successors of the Apostles and princes of the Church, holding both 
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sacramental and jurisdictional powers. In England, bishops were officers of the State, 
in that, despite having received their power of order at their ordination, they did not 
have a territory in which to exercise that power until their confirmation of election 
from the monarch. Thus, the clergy, and indeed ultimately the monarch, were able to 
exercise ecclesiastical jurisdiction because they had received the appropriate public 
and sacramental authority to do so. 
 
This section has argued that Hooker was careful to distinguish between dominion and 
order or jurisdiction, and that as Supreme Governor, the monarch had unrivalled 
human authority over the Church.  For Hooker, the monarch is the arbiter, a 
transcendent authority, to prevent chaos and disorder – for this reason, all jurisdiction 
is annexed to the Crown.  Further, all clergy (and ultimately the monarch) were able 
to exercise ecclesiastical jurisdiction because they had received the appropriate public 
and sacramental authority to do so. 
 
4.4b Reformed Religious Principles and Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction 
 
The division of the ecclesiastical and civil spheres came once more to the foreground 
when Hooker decided which magisterial reformers to bolster his argument with. 
Though Hooker doubtless had Calvin in mind when writing Book VI, there were 
elements of the latter’s argument that Hooker would not have used – for instance, the 
Genevan consistories and synods only ruling on the spiritual affairs of the citizens, an 
element that Cartwright and Travers would have agreed with, but not Hooker.458 
Neelands believes that Hooker argues throughout the Lawes that the Genevan system 
is inadequate, and possibly even defective when it undergoes close scrutiny, and that 
‘questions of the Church’s life are to be decided by the Church, and not in scripture 
alone.’459 
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The context in which Calvin and Luther were writing must also be borne in mind, 
according to Hopfl: 
the entanglement of the institutional church and the secular 
government of sixteenth century politics was such that what Luther 
in fact had to deal with was churches in which magistrates and 
princes had the upper hand.460 
The somewhat restricted ability of the Church to punish is also reflected by Calvin: 
‘for the church does not have the right of the sword to punish or compel, nor the 
authority of force; nor imprisonment, nor the other punishments which the magistrate 
commonly inflicts.’461 
 
Therefore, Hooker has rather less material for which he can gain support in matters of 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction when considering the magisterial reformers. What is 
interesting here is that Hooker actively confutes Calvin, rather than using him as an 
ally (as he does elsewhere in the Lawes): for Hooker, at least in this instance, the 
Genevan system was inadequate and defective – questions of the Church’s life were 
to be decided by the Church, and not in Scripture alone. 
 
4.4c English Puritans and Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction 
 
Cartwright is clear that when considering the sentence of excommunication, the polity 
of the ancient Church should be followed in that ‘the sentence thereof should come 
from governors and elders of the church.’462 This contravenes Whitgift’s view that 
‘the bishop alone, both by the laws of God, and of this Church of England (which 
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hath given unto him by consent in parliament that authority), may exercise this 
discipline’.463 Hooker believed that the issue of lay elders gave rise to the necessity of 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction in order to make clear the responsibilities and rights 
pertaining to bishops and those in positions of authority in the Church.464 
 
In Book VI of the Lawes, Hooker discusses the ability of lay elders to exercise 
jurisdiction within the Church – something Hooker steadfastly refuses to countenance 
in spiritual matters, as well as in ways proposed by the Puritans’ synods and 
gatherings. Whilst the majority of Book VI seems to be spent discussing repentance465 
and the various conditions needed to be satisfied in order to ensure forgiveness, this 
debate acts as a somewhat extended preparation for the controversy over eldership, 
which is developed under the explicit guise of episcopacy in Book VII.466 
 
The debate over eldership centred on whether ‘all Congregations or Parishes ought to 
have laie Elders invested with the power of Jurisdiction in Spirituall causes,’467 and 
whether or not these lay elders would be able to ‘hear with more indifferencie the 
weightiest and last remains of that cause, Jurisdiction, Dignitie, Dominion 
Ecclesiasticall.’ 468  Hooker claims that the Puritans presume that Christ ‘by 
testament…hath left all ministers or Pastors in the Church executors equally, to the 
whole power of spirituall jurisdiction.’469 This is to deny that those who exercise 
ordained ministry have any kind of spiritual jurisdiction above any of that exercised 
by the lay elders, a core principle of Presbyterianism, and the heart of their opposition 
to episcopacy. However, we should also remember that Hooker cites the Puritans’ 
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acknowledged need for some elders to be above others in status and jurisdiction in 
order to ensure order within their Church (though it should be noted that the elders 
who do so, do so temporarily, by election, and also serve on behalf of their electors). 
 
The English Puritans Field and Wilcox, in the text of the Admonition, set out their 
case for Scripture giving sufficient polity for a model of congregational ecclesiastical 
discipline: 
this regiment consisteth especially in ecclesiastical discipline, which 
is an order left by God unto his church, wherby men learne to frame 
their wylles and doynges according to the law of God, by 
instructing and admonishing one another, yea, and by correcting 
and punishing all wylfull persones, and contemners of the same.470 
 
The Puritans were alert to the arguments that may have been used against them in 
their cause, and their skilful rhetorical methods were employed in the battle of hearts 
and minds in a tense political atmosphere, here assuring those loyal to the Crown of 
their loyalty both to it and to the laws of the realm:471 
Not that we meane to take away the authoritie of the civill 
Magistrate and chief governour…but that Christ being restored into 
his kyngdome, to rule in the same by the scepter of his worde, and 
severe discipline: the Prince may better be obeyed, the realme more 
flourish in godliness…Amend therefore these horrible abuses, and 
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reforme God’s church, and the Lorde is on your right hand, you 
shall not be removed for ever.472 
 
Though Cartwright argued for a polity in which Christ’s Word is king (rather than the 
sovereign’s), Hooker diligently uses choice aspects of the works of magisterial 
reformers to argue that the monarch’s being Supreme Governor is not in contradiction 
with reformed principles. It is in conjunction with the spiritual realm that the secular 
realm is able to maintain peace and order, namely in the person of the monarch, in 
whose role the two spheres combine. This is the Settlement that Hooker defends, 
using a careful distinction between order, jurisdiction, and dominion. 
 
This section has argued that for Cartwright, the sentence of excommunication should 
come from the elders and governors of the Church.  For Cartwright, Christ’s word 
was king, and not that of the Sovereign.  Yet, for Hooker, the issue of lay elders gave 
rise to the necessity of ecclesiastical jurisdiction to clarify the rights and 
responsibilities of bishops and those in authority in the Church.  For Hooker, the 
discussion over lay elders served as an extended preparation for Book VII and 
episcopacy.  Hooker’s issue with the Puritans was that they claimed a need for 
complete parity in spiritual jurisdiction.  Hooker pointed out the inconsistency that 
even so, the Puritans acknowledged the need for some elders to be higher in status 
than others for the sake of order (though it must be remembered that this was a 
temporary elevation in status, rather than the permanent ontological change which 
consecration to the episcopate entailed).  Hooker again was at pains to point out that it 
was in conjunction with the spiritual realm that the secular realm was able to maintain 
peace and order in the person of the monarch, aided by a careful distinction of order, 
jurisdiction, and dominion. 
                                                










I have argued in this chapter that the monarch had an absolute right to exercise 
temporal jurisdiction within the temporal sphere by virtue of being Supreme 
Governor, although Hooker did not accept any interference from the monarch in 
spiritual matters.  Hooker used Luther, Calvin, and Vermigli to evidence his argument 
that the Christian prince was able to ensure the right practice of religion was carried 
out in the land.  To further illustrate his point, Hooker used the Admonition 
Controversy to state that Puritan calls for a permanent division of Church and State 
are not congruent with wider Protestantism.  In respect of spiritual jurisdiction, this 
consisted of the power of the keys stemming from Holy Orders, which cannot be 
exercised by lay people.  In relation to this, bishops needed territory in which to 
exercise their jurisdiction, which was granted by the monarch by virtue of 
mechanisms in the Act of Supremacy.  In order to bolster his claims for the 
Elizabethan Settlement, Hooker used arguments from Luther’s On Secular Authority 
in respect of a mixed polity.  In relation to ecclesiastical jurisdiction, Hooker 
dismissed any suggestion that lay elders could exercise ecclesiastical jurisdiction that 
had not been given to those who had not received the appropriate public and 
sacramental authority to do so.  Although Calvin would not agree with the polity 
extant in the Elizabethan Church, Hooker found more common ground in Luther.  
Finally, although officers of Church and State held jurisdiction in temporal and 
ecclesiastical spheres, rather than in spiritual spheres, this had the effect of creating 
numerous grey areas. 
 
This chapter has highlighted issues of jurisdiction that are important to an 
understanding of Hooker’s concept of royal and episcopal authority during the reign 
of Elizabeth I. There are three main areas that were considered: what the Lawes said 







reformers to back up his argument, and lastly, how he used the magisterial reformers 
to answer the criticisms raised by the English Puritans. 
 
Did Hooker construct an argument that was unmistakably reformed as well as anti-
Puritan? We began this chapter by examining Hooker’s discussion of temporal 
jurisdiction in the Lawes, how he uses the continental magisterial reformers, and how 
he uses those to counter the claims of the English Puritans. We found that, as Hooker 
defines temporal ‘jurisdiction’ to be the right to exercise power within the temporal 
sphere, the monarch had absolute right to do so, by virtue of her being Supreme 
Governor of the Church of England, someone in whom ‘accidents’ of Church and 
Commonwealth dwell together. What Hooker will not countenance is any interference 
from the queen in matters spiritual, and he uses the example of penitence to work this 
concept out. Hooker also draws on Luther, Calvin, and Vermigli to illustrate that the 
monarch had a right as a Christian prince to ensure that the right practice of religion 
was carried out in their land. Hooker draws on the extant correspondence between 
Whitgift and Cartwright during the Admonition Controversy to illustrate that the 
Puritan calls for a permanent division of Church and State are not in keeping with 
orthodox reformed religious principles. 
 
We examined Hooker’s definition of spiritual jurisdiction in the Lawes: who can 
exercise it, how he uses the continental magisterial reformers to support his position, 
and lastly, how he counters the claims of the English Puritans. To exercise spiritual 
jurisdiction, the individual must have the power to judge and command in spiritual 
matters according to spiritual laws. This power is given by the conferral of Holy 
Orders at ordination, and Hooker uses the example of the ‘power of the keys’ to see 
how this works in practice. This spiritual ‘commanding and judging’, because it is 
given with the power of Holy Orders, cannot be exercised by lay people, thus 
countering the Puritan argument for lay elders. At the risk of Hooker’s argument 
giving credence to a separatist ecclesiological entity, Hooker acknowledges that as the 







jurisdiction in a particular area is given by the monarch to her bishops, which again 
links Hooker’s Lawes to the Act of Supremacy. We also found that Hooker utilized 
Luther’s arguments from On Secular Authority, not least because Luther was writing 
from a situation of forced mixed polity between Church and State, and thus the 
context in for Luther lent itself well to that in England – especially Luther’s argument 
for submission to worldly powers. Hooker uses the example of priestly absolution to 
demonstrate the acceptability of the reformed Elizabethan Religious Settlement by 
stating that priestly absolution is not necessary for the forgiveness of sins. If it were 
the case, then the Calvinists would say that the Church of England is petere 
principium. Though the debated, fragmentary nature of Book VI, and especially that 
of the Dublin Fragments thereof, means that we can never be absolutely certain that 
the version we have now is authentically Hooker, what we do have indicates that 
Hooker yet again cherry-picked from Luther and Calvin, amongst others, to 
demonstrate to the English Puritans that the nature of spiritual jurisdiction within the 
Elizabethan Religious Settlement was congruent with wider Protestantism, especially 
in relation to the role of the monarch and spiritual jurisdiction. 
 
Lastly, we examined Hooker’s discussion of ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the Lawes, 
how he uses the continental magisterial reformers in that argument, and how he 
counters the claims of the English Puritans. We found that Hooker, having defined 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction as ‘ruling with the Church of God’, continues to use the 
issue of the Puritan call for lay elders to dismiss any ecclesiastical jurisdiction that is 
not given to those who have received the appropriate public and sacramental authority 
to do so. Yet again, Hooker uses magisterial reformers selectively – especially noting 
that Calvin would not agree with the polity extant in the Elizabethan Church. It is 
perhaps noteworthy that Hooker was able to find more common ground in Luther, 
owing to the fact that Luther had to deal with an entangled polity of Church and State, 








We have shown in this chapter that Hooker uses, albeit selectively, the magisterial 
reformers to rebut the claims of the English Puritans that the polity, and therefore 
jurisdiction, of the English Church should permanently separate Church from State. 
Officers of the Church and the State held jurisdiction both in temporal and 
ecclesiastical spheres, but not in spiritual spheres, which was reserved for clergy 
alone. This meant that there were numerous grey areas in which it was not clear who 
held precedence – and the bishops of the Church of England, as both officers of State 
and officers of the Church, were at the forefront of this. 
 
This begs the question as to exactly what kind of authority Hooker regarded bishops 












The last chapter saw how the changing nature of religious authority meant that powers 
of jurisdiction in ecclesiastical areas were increasingly blurred. I examined three areas 
of jurisdiction – temporal, spiritual, and ecclesiastical, through the lens of the Lawes – 
and showed how Hooker developed his argument through engagement with the 
orthodox magisterial reformers and the English Puritans. I found that Hooker believed 
the monarch to have an absolute right to exercise power in the temporal sphere, with a 
duty to ensure that the right practice of religion was carried out in their land: a 
permanent division of Church and State is not congruent with wider Protestantism. 
Hooker did not believe the monarch to be able to exercise any kind of spiritual 
jurisdiction, and used the example of the ‘power of the keys’ to illustrate why only 
priests and bishops could ‘command and judge’ in spiritual affairs. 
 
Hooker believed that officers of the Church and State held jurisdiction both in 
temporal and ecclesiastical spheres, but not in spiritual spheres, which were reserved 
for clergy alone. The consequent grey areas, in which it was not clear who held 
precedence, meant that bishops in the Church of England were at the forefront of this 
contentious debate, unsure as to the extent and nature of their authority. 
 
Whilst bishops were given their spiritualities at their consecration, they could not 
exercise this authority without grant of temporalities by the monarch. We have 
examined Hooker’s understanding of episcopacy, which is concentrated in Book VII 
of the Lawes, and how Hooker used the continental magisterial reformers to counter 
the arguments of the English Puritans. 
 
In this chapter I will argue in section 5.2 that first, Hooker regarded the core aspect of 







administratively)473 whilst acknowledging that episcopacy was not the only form of 
oversight; second, that Hooker was very reluctant to embrace a concept of Iure Divino 
episcopacy;474 and third, that Hooker believed an uneasy relationship existed between 
the episcopate and monarch as regards intervention. In section 5.3, I will argue that 
Hooker’s stance on episcopacy is far closer to elements of orthodox reformed religion 
than anything proto-Anglican. In section 5.4, I will argue that Hooker believed the 
English Puritans’ argument against episcopacy was weak and contradictory. 
Therefore, the Iure Divino notion of episcopal authority claimed for Hooker, and 
subsequently developed by nineteenth-century ecclesiologists, was ill-founded. 
 
Book VII was published in 1662, 62 years after Hooker’s death, along with Books VI 
and VIII. These three books are regarded by Hooker as discussing specific issues for 
which the groundwork was laid in Books I-V. Hooker began work on his eight-
volume magnum opus towards the end of the 1580s, at a time when the English 
episcopate was under attack due to decades of internal and external turbulence. It is in 
the heat of this ferocious debate that Hooker’s theology of episcopal power was 
forged. 
 
5.2 Hooker and Episcopal Power 
 
Exactly what Hooker thought episcopal power to be has been distorted by many 
causes over the last few centuries, eager to frame Hooker through the lens of their 
own choosing. Was Hooker a proponent of Iure Divino episcopacy? Was he a 
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proponent of a more reformed platform? In this section, we will find that Hooker 
regards a bishop as having the same ‘sacramental’ powers as other presbyters, but in 
addition, having the power to ordain other persons, as well as a ‘power of Chiefty’ in 
government, and a pastoral jurisdiction over the Church within their allotted 
geographical area. Whilst he is a defender of episcopal ordination, Hooker admits that 
in extremis, this necessity could be done away with if to do so was necessary for the 
Church to continue. We also find that Hooker concentrated on defending and 
developing the idea of the bishop as a ‘governor and man of affairs’, who acted as a 
moderator to quell ideological fragmentation of the clergy and Church, as well as to 
maintain discipline. To that extent, Hooker argues for the necessity of a metropolitan 
or archbishop as a further measure against dissension. 
 
A large part of the Lawes may have been built upon the previous work of Whitgift, 
Bancroft, and others, but this did not mean that Hooker was restricted by their work, 
and in a number of places, Hooker’s opinion is closer to that of the orthodox 
reformers – for example, in the area of monarchical supremacy over the Church. 
Another area in which Hooker’s thought is not clear is that of Iure Divino episcopacy: 
whilst Hooker shies away from the concept that episcopacy is a merely human 
institution, neither does he claim for it the absolutism associated with Iure Divino. 
 
The manner in which bishops gained their authority is clearly marked out by Hooker, 
who believes that whilst the monarch gives them the territorial area in which they can 
exercise their jurisdiction, it is only by ordination from their fellow bishops that they 
are endowed with the spiritualities necessary to act as a bishop. Yet, the honour that is 
afforded to Establishment bishops also adds to the public perception of the authority 
of the bishop – something that Hooker calls, ‘publique marks and tokens.’ It is 
through scriptural example, apostolic origin, and the necessity for good order that 
bishops have the authority they have, in addition to any sacramental power they are 








However one sees the redefinition of the Elizabethan episcopate and the role of those 
within the Established Church as agents of the monarch, Hooker himself moves his 
defence towards more of an mainstream reformed standpoint than anything ‘proto-
Anglican’. 
 
5.2.a What did Hooker Regard Episcopacy as Consisting of? 
 
Hooker writes that the word ‘bishop’ is of Greek origin, with the term επισκοπε 
signifying ‘one which hath principle charge to guide and oversee others.’475 When this 
word began to be used in an ecclesiastical sense, it grew in the post-apostolic era to 
‘signifie such Episcopal Authority alone, as the chiefest Governors exercised over the 
rest.’476 Whether in civil or ecclesiastical regimes, ‘there are sundry operations 
publique, so likewise great inequality there is in the same operations…from hence 
have grown those different degrees of Magistrates or publique persons, even 
Ecclesiastical as well as Civil.’477 As there are many different types of public 
organizations, events, and circumstances, there must of necessity be different grades 
of public official to ensure their proper order and operation. 
 
Hooker defines a bishop as being: 
a Minister of God, unto whom with permanent continuance, there is 
given not onely the power of administering the Word and 
Sacraments, which power other Presbyters have; but also a further 
power to ordain ecclesiastical persons,478 and a power of Chiefty in 
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Government over Presbyters as well as Lay men, a power to be by 
way of jurisdiction a Pastor even unto Pastors themselves.479 
Hooker gives to bishops, as he does to priests, the power of administering the Word 
and Sacraments, but in addition, the power of ordination and governance: ordination 
being necessary to confer the grace of Holy Orders480 upon a person, and governance 
necessary to maintain order and discipline. What was of particular contention was the 
implication of ‘permanent continuance.’ For Puritans, those elected by the assembly 
to govern over them held office for a specific period of time, whereas the Church of 
England understood ‘permanent continuance’ to mean that those raised to the office 
of bishop or archbishop held that power of office continually, the distinction between 
presbyter and bishop being permanent. 
 
In Hooker’s opinion, episcopacy is of apostolic origin.481 He believed that the 
Apostles were the first bishops ‘at large’, ‘in that the care of Government was also 
committed unto them, [who] did no less perform the offices of their Episcopal 
Authority by governing, then of their Apostolical by teaching.’482 Hooker uses the 
example of Paul being sent by the Gentiles, Peter to the Jews, John to Asia, etc., to 
argue that it was lawful for them to be bishops ‘with restraint’ as well. As Christianity 
spread throughout the world, and as the original Apostles died, it became necessary to 
ensure succession from those original Apostles – hence, more bishops, who 
consequently had a specific geographical area to preside over. This method of 
exercising episcopal governance was ‘for the greater good of the Church, that they 
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480 See the exception for non-episcopal ordination for Hooker in Lawes, VII.xiv.11. 
481 Hooker, Lawes, VII.v.10. Note in VI.ii.2, Hooker believes that whilst the spiritual power that Christ 
gave to the Church does not and is not changed, the customs of the Church may be varied, altered, and 
changed incidentally for the common good. Bridges, contemporaneous with Hooker, also believed in 
the apostolic origin of the episcopate (Margaret R. Sommerville, ‘Richard Hooker and His 
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should in such sort tye themselves unto some special part of the flock of Jesus Christ, 
guiding the same in several as Bishops.’483 
 
Hooker cites Church Fathers such as Jerome as supporting the apostolic succession 
theory:484 ‘all Bishops are, saith Jerome, the Apostles successors.’485 These bishops 
have ‘power to sit as spiritual ordinary Judges, both over Laity and over Clergy where 
Churches Christian were established.’486 As the Church grew, the Apostles could not 
be everywhere, and so the need arose for governors of each Church to be resident, 
keeping the local Church in order. As more and more bishops spread throughout the 
Christian world, ‘it was the general received perswasion of the ancient Christian 
world that Ecclesia est in Episcopo, the outward being of a Church consisteth in 
having a Bishop.’487 This does not mean that bishops were essential to the Church, 
however. It was the ‘force of custome’ that kept them in place, and Hooker argued 
that this knowledge ought to 
be a bridle unto them, [and] let it teach them not to disdain the 
advice of their Presbyters, but to use their authority with so much 
the greater humility and moderation, as a Sword which the Church 
hath power to take from them.488 
                                                
483 Hooker, Lawes, VII.iv.1. VII.xviii lists six key benefits of episcopacy, which A. S. McGrade, 
‘Richard Hooker on episcopacy and bishops, good and bad’, International Journal for the Study of the 
Christian Church, 2, no. 2 (2002) 28-43, summarises as having the following benefits: 1) the country’s 
reputation improving abroad; 2) successions, doings, sufferings, and affairs of prelates going down in 
history; 3) counsel being more likely to be asked when ‘honourable personages’ are available; 4) the 
nobility and prelacy excelling together; 5) arbitrating in disputes between lower clergy and their 
congregations; 6) being a ‘loving parent’ to lower orders of clergy (p.38).  
484 Orthodoxy, Catholicism, and Protestantism all had their own understandings of apostolic succession 
in the Reformation era. See Arthur Michael Ramsey, The Gospel and The Catholic Church (London: 
Longmans, 1956), 83. 
485 Hooker, Lawes, VII.iv.1. 
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487 Hooker, Lawes, VII.v.2. 
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Hooker is here warning bishops against becoming so puffed-up with their own self-
importance and pride that they think that they are so important or powerful that they 
cannot be removed from office. Because it is only by ‘force of custome’ that they 
occupy their offices, they can be removed from their offices, or indeed episcopacy 
abolished altogether. Quite what would have been put in place of bishops is another 
matter – would it have been something akin to the discipline held by the Puritans? 
 
Why did Hooker feel he had to defend bishops in this way? Establishment divines 
such as Bancroft, Bilson, and Saravia concentrated almost exclusively on their 
attempts to prove the scriptural roots of episcopacy to the extent that other structures 
of ecclesiastical government were almost entirely ignored. There being little 
precedent, this would have given Hooker almost carte blanche to defend the 
Establishment position – acknowledging that episcopacy was the best form of church 
government currently, yet not completely dismissing other forms. Hooker therefore 
had good reason to seek a justification of episcopacy from Scripture489 in order to 
place it in parallel with other forms of ecclesiastical governance advocated by those 
pushing for further reforms.490 Yet, by taking the middle ground that episcopacy was 
the best form of church government currently available, did Hooker lay himself open 
to further attack, and thus further attack on the Established Church by those opposed 
to episcopacy? 
 
So far we have established that Hooker believes bishops to be of apostolic origin, to 
be the best form of church government available (and thus inferring that they are not 
the only form possible); and also that he argues that because they are not essential to 
                                                                                                                                      
Archbishop of Armagh (Cardiff, 1967), 129-31; M. R. Sommerville, ‘Richard Hooker’, 182-3, 184, 
187. 
489 See Acts 12.2 and 13.2 in VII.iv.2; the sending of the first Apostles in Acts 1.21-22; 1 John 1.3; 
Galatians 1.1, and Matthew 28.19 in VII.iv.4.  
490  Patrick Collinson, Godly People: Essays on English Protestantism and Puritanism (London: 
Hambledon Press, 1983), 162, states that ‘until the end of the reign, the case for episcopal government 
was rested on its antiquity and the sense that it was answerable to the state of an established church 







the Church, this acts as a bridle on the bishops’ power, because they could be 
dispatched with. Yet, what sort of power does Hooker regard bishops as having? 
Their pre-eminence was twofold: ‘first, he excelled in latitude of the power of order, 
secondly in that kind of power which belongeth unto jurisdiction.’491 In particular, it 
is the power of ordination that distinguishes bishops from presbyters: whilst 
presbyters have the power to administer the sacraments, bishops alone have the power 
to ordain, and ‘create fathers for the people of God.’492 Here, Hooker claims that 
whilst the Puritans believe there is no difference in power between bishops and 
presbyters, the presbyters derive their authority from the bishops who have ordained 
them.493 
 
In an attempt to illustrate the importance of setting one person above the other for the 
sake of good order, Hooker cites the example of Calvin.Calvin was of course opposed 
to ‘Regiment by Bishops’, yet as Hooker points out, he did write that in the ancient 
church ‘in each city these presbyters selected one of their number to whom they gave 
the special title of bishop, lest, as usually happens from equality dissension should 
arise’.494 The same logic applied to Puritans in England, Hooker argued, claiming that 
the Puritans ‘are forced to give one Pastor preheminence and superiority over the 
rest’495 in their synods – though the Puritans themselves claim that ‘he who being a 
Pastor according to the order of [their] Discipline, is for the time some little deal 
mightier than his brethren, [but] doth not continue so longer then only during the 
Synod.’496 If the Puritans, then, acknowledge the need for one minister to be placed 
over the rest for the sake of good order, then what exactly distinguishes this from 
Hooker’s concept of a bishop? First, that the tenure of the ‘superior’ is limited; 
                                                
491 Hooker, Lawes, VII.vi.1. Though Dean Kernan, ‘Jurisdiction and the Keys’, in The Brill Companion 
to Richard Hooker, ed. by William John Torrance Kirby, 435-480 (Leuven: Brill, 2008), 453, notes 
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second, because there is no ‘episcopal ordination’, there is not an ontological change 
at the point of ordination. 
 
Hooker believes that when an individual is ordained, they are ‘severed’ from others, 
making them ‘a special order consecrated unto the service of the Most High in things 
wherewith others may not meddle’. 497  This ‘consecration’ (here referring to 
ordination in the threefold sense to deacon, presbyter, and bishop) is a once-only, 
indelible event.498 It is the gift of the Holy Spirit that the individual receives at 
ordination, signified by the action of the bishop laying hands upon the candidate – 
once this gift of the Holy Spirit has been received, Hooker claims that the duties 
henceforth performed ‘by virtue of ministerial power’ can be challenged by no other 
offices on earth.499 Hooker is clear that it is from the bishop that the grace of Holy 
Orders is conferred.500 
 
Despite the power of ordination being one of the distinguishing features of a bishop, 
Hooker creates a certain degree of controversy when he argues that bishops may not 
be necessary in extremis to create new priests.501 Hooker argues that: 
there may be sometimes very just and sufficient reason to allow 
Ordination made without a Bishop…Where the Church must needs 
have some ordained, and neither hath nor can have possibly a 
Bishop to ordain; in such case of necessity, the ordinary institution 
of God hath given oftentimes, and may give place.502 
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Hooker continues: ‘therefore we are not simply without exception to urge a lineal 
descent of power from the Apostles by continued succession of bishops in every 
effectual ordination.’503 Here Hooker again shies from the necessity of apostolic 
succession held not only by Roman Catholics, but also some Establishment figures in 
the English Church.504 To be exclusivist regarding the necessity of a lineal descent 
would have risked aligning Hooker’s theory of episcopacy with a keystone of Roman 
Catholic doctrine – which would have been unpalatable when trying to argue that the 
English Church was congruent with wider Protestantism. 
 
It is also key to note that in VII.xiv.11 Hooker states that this should be the exception, 
else very quickly it could descend into an argument whereby if you can dispense with 
bishops once and the ordination is still valid, then why not dispense with them 
entirely? Hooker argues that despite this possibility, ‘these cases of inevitable 
necessity excepted, none may ordain but onely Bishops: By the imposition of their 
hands it is, that the Church giveth power of Order, both unto Presbyters and 
Deacons.’505 Even though Hooker does not take an absolute path of insistence upon 
episcopal ordination, with this caveat, it is hard to see how, with his earlier admission 
of the validity of non-episcopal ordination in extremis, Hooker’s argument can hold 
water against the Puritans. 
 
Hooker believes that whilst bishops are identical to priests in many sacramental 
functions, the only difference is that bishops are able to ordain, whereas priests 
cannot.506 This would give the bishop a role of superior authority over the priests and 
deacons in a sacramental manner, exercised through episcopal governance, thus 
reflecting Hooker in VII.xxiv.5: ‘skill to instruct is a thing necessary, skill to govern 
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much more necessary in a bishop’. Hooker believes that a bishop may not just be able 
to instruct, but also to govern – a skill that presbyters may not automatically have 
themselves. Would Hooker have had a parallel view on lay presidency at the 
Eucharist? Given Hooker’s view that episcopal ordination could be dispensed with in 
extremis, there could well have been a parallel argument for lay presidency in 
extremis, too. 
 
Whilst we have seen that bishops may be necessary for good order and governance, 
the exact form of which may be mutable according to circumstances, the argument 
can go further, in that if we have a number of bishops, it is therefore necessary to set 
one as metropolitan above the others for the avoidance of dissension. Which bishops, 
or indeed bishoprics, should be raised to the status of a metropolitan see? Hooker 
argues that it should be those sees (and their occupants) which have a dignity of place 
above that of other bishops’ sees – sees that were ‘of special desert or dignity: for 
which cause these as being Bishops in the chiefest Mother Churches were termed 
Primates, and at the length by way of excellency, Patriarks.’507 As the city already 
has a great dignity associated with it, then the bishopric (or archbishopric, 
patriarchate, etc.) associated with it will (in theory) have a greater standing, which 
will enable the office holder of that see to be accorded greater respect and dignity 
(and, by default, authority), in both sacred and secular worlds. 
 
Hooker develops the chain of episcopal command between bishops, metropolitans, 
primates and patriarchs in VII.viii.12 in detail, but in sum: 
a Bishop at that time had power in his own Diocess above all 
Ministers there, and a Metropolitan Bishop sundry preheminences 
above other Bishops, one of which preheminences was in the 
                                                







ordination of Bishops, to have…the chief power of ordering all 
things done.508 
 
We could be forgiven for thinking that an argument for the papacy would not be too 
far away from Hooker’s train of thinking, although he cites Calvin in claiming that 
metropolitans are different from popes.509 Hooker, by citing Calvin, hoped to identify 
with the English episcopate a model that based its authority on moderation and on 
honour gained through a diligent and faithful exercise of ministry, rather than 
anything that was given as a fait accompli at their consecration. Though Hooker cites 
Calvin’s thoughts above, in doing so, Hooker does not quite extinguish the papacy: it 
might have been possible that a door was left open for a ‘servus servorum Dei’ model. 
This may reflect Hooker’s reticence in embracing the Iure Divino concept of 
episcopacy, which Hooker’s Establishment colleagues were more willing to do.  
 
Yet, how exactly did Hooker think bishops gained their authority, if it were not 
directly from heaven? Whilst a man may lawfully receive the power of Order, he 
cannot exercise this power against people’s wills. Hooker writes that no one by order 
of law can be possessed with pastoral charge over a parish: the people ultimately 
choose their minister.510 Does this mean that Hooker is more sympathetic to local 
congregational elections of their pastor than his Establishment colleagues would like 
him to be? Not necessarily, for elsewhere we see that Hooker believes that a parish 
priest should minister at the direction and placing of their bishop, who is in turn 
placed by the queen. Yet is Hooker paying lip-service to the idea of congregational 
consent?511 
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Though a bishop is given the spiritualities at their consecration, they cannot exercise 
these without being given their geographical temporalities by the monarch. A bishop, 
strictly speaking, has limited jurisdiction – limited to his own diocese. Hooker gives 
this definition:  
the Church where a Bishop is set with his Colledge of Presbyters 
about him, we call a Sea; the Local compass of his authority we 
term a Diocess. Unto a Bishop within the compass of his own both 
Sea and Diocess, it hath by right of place evermore appertained to 
ordain Presbyters, to make Deacons, and with judgment, to dispose 
of all things of waight.512 
 
It is worth pointing out that in respect of the source of a bishop’s authority, Hooker is 
recognized by some scholars, such as Brydon and MacCulloch, as having a certain 
independence of thought from his peers – whilst most of Hooker’s contemporaries in 
the Established Church were happy to acknowledge that episcopacy was a human 
institution (rather than a divine one), Hooker did not.513 Lake argues from his reading 
of Foxe’s Book of Martyrs that although 
since Henry VIII’s reign it had been possible to claim direct 
sanction for the powers of the Christian prince, the whole middle 
range of ecclesiastical government…[which linked the prince with 
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the parishes on the ground] was devoid of direct spiritual sanction, 
or even of a properly protestant rationale.514 
This stalemate in Elizabethan episcopal polity, argues Lake, came with the 
development of the Iure Divino concept.515 Hooker, by contrast, argued that whilst 
episcopacy had apostolic origins, and was therefore preferable, this did not 
necessarily mean that it was indispensable. That Hooker recognized that episcopacy 
was not the only form of church government may be seen as a sop to the reformers, 
with the knock-on effect of recognizing as legitimate those polities that were not 
episcopal: this move was also highly controversial, because it could suggest a further 
destabilization of the Elizabethan mechanics of polity – further bringing about 
(ultimately) a challenge to the monarch’s authority. 
 
I have argued in this section that Hooker evidenced episcopacy as being of apostolic 
origin, remaining in place to the sixteenth century due to force of custom rather than 
of necessity. Hooker believed that the differentiation between a presbyter and a 
bishop was that the latter exercised the power of ordination and of governance over 
other ministers. The former power was given at consecration by fellow bishops, and 
the ability to exercise the latter was given by the monarch. Hooker also believed that 
being a bishop was a permanent office, and not a temporary appointment, and that 
episcopacy was the best form of church government available, in addition to bishops 
being important for ensuring good order.  However, Hooker may have fatally 
compromised his argument for one of the distinguishing features of Church of 
England episcopacy when he claimed that, in extremis, episcopal ordination was not 
necessary for the ordination of new priests. Though Hooker was at pains to explain 
that this approach could be justified in extreme circumstances only, it is difficult to 
see how the argument for bishops could have stood if exceptions were allowed. Taken 
                                                
514 Peter Lake, ‘Presbyterianism, the idea of a National Church and the argument from Divine Right’ in 
Protestantism and the National Church in Sixteenth Century England, ed. Peter Lake and Maria 
Dowling (Croom Helm, 1987) 193-224, 194. 







with Hooker’s thought that bishops were in existence by force of custom only, the 
argument for their existence at all begins to look rather shaky. For the Elizabethan 
bishops to abuse their power by thinking their existence to be on solid ground would 
endanger their continued presence in the Church of England. 
 
5.2b Episcopacy and Iure Divino 
 
Bishops, then, could not exist or function in isolation and by their own strength. 
Richard Bancroft’s manner of defending the Religious Settlement, and the place of 
bishops therein, was certainly more fervent than his predecessors, such as Whitgift. 
Bancroft achieved notoriety in his 1589 Sermon at St Paul’s Cross, due chiefly to his 
strident affirmation of apostolic succession in a manner far and above that of Whitgift 
himself, with the driving theme of the sermon serving to highlight the seditious 
potential of the Puritan movement. He emphasised that episcopacy in the Elizabethan 
Church was the form ‘ordained’ by the magistrate (the monarch), and that it was from 
her that the bishops held their territorial jurisdiction: 
it was thought agreeable to the word of God, by the chiefest and 
best learned men of the religion in all Christendome, that not onely 
the title of supreme governor over all persons, and in all causes, as 
well ecclesiastical and civil, did appertaine, and ought to be 
annexed unto the crowne.516 
Hooker himself explored this idea in the latter part of Book VII – though it must be 
remembered that Bancroft was far more extreme in his concept of Iure Divino than 
Hooker ever was.517 Three centuries later, this led the Oxford Movement to cite 
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Bancroft’s sermon as a cadential point in the assertion of divine right episcopacy.518 
Hooker’s strident self-belief and dedication to pursuing his own cause meant that he 
made no bones about not following his conformist colleagues, who put greater and 
greater emphasis upon claims for Iure Divino episcopacy in an attempt to counter 
claims for a divine right of Presbyterian polity.519 
 
Yet, to what extent, if at all, does Hooker’s acknowledgement of the apostolic origins 
of episcopacy equate with the concept of Iure Divino, that is, divine sanction of the 
episcopate? Hooker, whilst not exactly arguing for Iure Divino episcopacy, is quite 
happy to reject the idea of episcopacy as a merely human institution, but not to the 
extent of saying that it was Iure Divino.520 Hooker believes the regiment of bishops to 
be of divine origin: ‘if any thing in the Churches Government, surely the first 
institution of Bishops was from Heaven, was even of God, the Holy Ghost was the 
author of it’.521 But crucially, he does not believe bishops to be Iure Divino: 
‘Wherefore lest Bishops forget themselves, as if none on earth had Authority to touch 
their states, let them continually bear in mind that it is rather the force of custom…let 
this consideration be a bridle to them.’522 Though the first bishops, the Apostles, were 
instituted by Christ (and subsequent bishops instituted by the Apostles under the 
guidance of the Holy Spirit), bishops are not of divine right or unalterable command, 
such as baptism or the Eucharist, and, if circumstances that presently require their 
existence change, then they can be removed – this being their ‘bridle’.523 
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Why was Hooker reluctant to embrace the Iure Divino concept? With Whitgift 
proclaiming that episcopacy was a thing indifferent, and Bancroft believing that 
episcopacy was Iure Divino, Hooker, as we have illustrated above, cut a neat course 
between the two poles: whilst Scripture gave evidence that episcopacy was a divinely 
recommended form of church governance, which it has been expedient to continue, 
episcopacy, unlike baptism or the holy Eucharist, is not commanded to continue in 
perpetuity. No perpetual form of church governance is prescribed in Scripture. 
 
Like a great deal of Elizabethan Church polity, the necessity to defend and explain the 
status quo was necessitated by Presbyterian attack – in this case the argument that 
episcopacy was overtly anti-Christian, which led in 1589 to Bancroft’s assertion of 
the apostolic origin of episcopacy in his sermon at St Paul’s Cross.524 Whilst Whitgift 
believed episcopacy in general to be a thing indifferent, ecclesial thought over the 
next few years increasingly featured claims of Iure Divino for the episcopate in 
writings such as Thomas Bilson’s De diversis ministrorum Evangelii gradibus (1590), 
Matthew Sutcliffe’s A Treatise of Ecclesiastical Discipline (1591), and Thomas 
Bilson’s The perpetual Government of Christes Church (1593).525 
 
Lake believes that the reason the Iure Divino cause proved such an ‘attraction’ for 
bishops ‘was the way in which it allowed conformists to apply the same sort of 
exalted language to episcopacy as the Presbyterians used about the Discipline.’526 Yet, 
though we have already seen that Hooker was not an immediate supporter of Iure 
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Divino, how strongly does Lake regard Hooker’s adoption of this? By the time that 
Hooker came to write Books VI to VIII, the ‘Books on Power’, the concept of Iure 
Divino episcopacy was already gathering pace, and so it would have been easy for 
Hooker to jump on the bandwagon. This is not what he did, however. Rather than 
anything half-hearted, as Lake puts it, Hooker cleverly cuts a middle path, 
acknowledging that to align oneself too closely to any one theological school would 
be to place limits on the Settlement he sought to defend: for Hooker to have aligned 
his defence of the Settlement in such a way would have meant creating contradictions 
that were not always reconcilable. 
 
Hooker thinks it possible to reconcile the views that the episcopate was both not 
immutable and yet of apostolic origin: just because bishops were of apostolic origin, 
this did not mean that they were an unchangeable feature of the Church. Matthew 
Sutcliffe, in his De Presbyterio (1591), argued that no form of church government 
was ordained in perpetuity, asserting that ‘it is not fit to call Christ the law-maker of 
the external polity of the church.’ Despite Sutcliffe taking a more sympathetic line 
than Hooker did regarding Puritan practices, we can see that both, nonetheless, left a 
certain amount of discretion to each individual Church in ordering their external 
affairs of polity. Sommerville, however, contradicts her own argument over Hooker’s 
position when she says that ‘as Hooker was satisfied that “the first institution of 
bishops was from heaven”, he must be included in the ranks of Iure Divino 
Episcopalians.’527 This is rather a crass generalization, and it inaccurately classifies 
Hooker as something he is not. Yet, rather than entirely discount Sommerville, she is 
in fact adopting a wider definition of Iure Divino - that although Hooker did not 
support Iure Divino as wholeheartedly as Bancroft, he nonetheless should be classed 
in the same group? Evidence for this view is given when Sommerville later clarifies 
                                                







that Hooker believed ‘episcopacy was scriptural, apostolic, and divine in origin, but it 
was not therefore immutable or necessary to the Church.’528 
 
Why did Hooker not believe in Iure Divino to the extent that Bancroft did? McGrade 
suggests a possible answer: 
instead of opposing their unqualified Iure Divino assertions on 
behalf of Presbyterian lay elders with a similarly absolute claim for 
the legitimacy of bishops, he refuted his opponents’ claims (or 
intended to do so) in Book VI and then based his own episcopal 
position on principles that were imposing and effective but non-
absolute.529 
To suggest that episcopacy is immutable would be to suggest that even if it became 
unsuitable as the best method of governing the Church, it would not be able to be 
removed or changed, despite different possible future circumstances calling for a 
different model of governance to better suit the times. For Hooker, holding to a 
concept of Iure Divino would contradict his wider belief that church government is a 
matter not essential to salvation, but for the good ordering of the Church according to 
local circumstances. 
 
Sommerville’s article makes the claim that the issues surrounding Hooker and Iure 
Divino due to the perceived incompatibility of Books III and VII arise from scholars 
such as F. J. Shirley and W. D. J. Cargill Thompson.530  Sommerville claims that 
these authors attempt to solve the compatibility by ‘asserting that Hooker’s views 
underwent change and development when his allies in the controversy adopted a more 
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aggressive stance on the nature of episcopacy.’531   This assertion that Hooker 
underwent such a change is not true, according to Sommerville, for two reasons.  
Firstly, that Hooker was not the transitional figure depicted, as in both Whitgift and 
Bancroft schools of thought, the views of Books III and VII are found side by side.  
Importantly, Sommerville states that ‘all the major contemporary defenders of 
episcopacy accepted both that there was no immutable model of church government 
in Scripture and also that episcopacy was approved by the Apostles and, therefore, by 
God.’  Sommerville further argues, contrary to Shirley and Cargill-Thompson, that 
these two stances are compatible, because Hooker and his ‘fellow 
controversialists…[argued] that the immutable, perpetual prescription of ecclesiastical 
government was distinct from its apostolic recommendation.’532 
 
This thesis has already argued that Hooker and Whitgift share similar opinions on 
episcopacy – that there is not one form of church governance set down in Scripture.  
However, Sommerville also adds that this opinion is shared by Richard Cosin, as well 
as John Bridges, and Thomas Cooper. 533   What is equally important is that 
Sommerville claims this mutability was also supported by proponents of Iure Divino.  
Such supporters included Richard Bancroft and Matthew Sutcliffe.534  These citations 
show, for Sommerville, that Hooker’s views on episcopacy were common to other 
defenders of the Elizabethan establishment: no immutable form of Church 
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government was commanded in Scripture.  Crucially, the distinction is made that just 
because no one form was prescribed, that did not mean Scripture recommended 
nothing. Hooker did not, Sommerville argues, ‘believe that Christians had been left 
entirely without direction.  He thought that the Apostles had established episcopal 
government, but that they had not bound the Church to follow their example come 
what may.’535 
 
This is to raise further questions, though: does believing that bishops are divinely 
instituted mean that they are Iure Divino? Does Iure Divino episcopacy mean that 
episcopacy is necessary for salvation? Of the latter, clearly not – because Hooker 
states quite clearly that bishops are adiaphora. Of the former, we can clearly argue 
that though Christ himself may not have instituted bishops – it was in fact the 
Apostles under the guidance of the Holy Spirit – this does not mean that bishops 
govern by divine right, in Hooker’s thought: it is because of Hooker’s high concept of 
natural law that he claims government by bishops has received divine approbation. It 
is only by taking an extreme view of this divine approbation that a Iure Divino stance 
could be taken, which is something that Hooker does not do – evidenced by his 
willingness to accept the validity of non-episcopally ordained ministers.536 To claim 
that Hooker supported a Iure Divino case for episcopacy should also note that to do so 
would risk limiting the claims for the Royal Supremacy,537 as Hooker’s was a fight 
against ‘absolutist’ remedies for church polity, attempting instead to settle on a 
solution that provided a rational argument for the state of the Elizabethan Church, 
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borne out of his loyalty to the Establishment whose Religious Settlement he was 
defending. 
 
This section has argued that Hooker does not adopt episcopacy as being of Iure 
Divino. To claim that he does would be to assume Hooker had the same outlook and 
principles as some of his more strident peers at the time of writing the last three books 
of the Lawes, such as Bancroft and Saravia. To claim absolute Iure Divino authority 
for bishops as Bancroft did in his 1589 St Paul’s Cross sermon would have risked 
denigrating royal authority, and hence weaken the authority of the Church as a whole, 
as proclaimed in the Settlement that Hooker sought to defend.  Hooker believed 
bishops to be scriptural, apostolic, and of divine origin, but not themselves Iure 
Divino – there was no one perpetual form of church government mandated by these 
claims.  Sommerville argued the issues surrounding Hooker and Iure Divino arose 
from claims by Shirley and Cargill Thompson of the incompatibility of Books III and 
VII (which arose itself due to the claim that Hooker underwent a change of attitude 
alongside his peers – Sommerville argues that Hooker underwent no such change).  It 
is also important to note that even fervent proponents of Iure Divino, such as Bancroft 
and Sutcliffe, supported the mutability of episcopacy. 
 
In order to remain true to a moderate defence of the extant status quo on the 
episcopacy, Hooker had no choice but to avoid any opinion that could claim 
episcopacy as being able to function aside from the magistrate. This was contrary to 
the arguments of Bancroft, yet wholly distinct from the model of authority as 
presented by the Puritans. Hooker therefore had to offer a new definition of the 
episcopate as most expedient for the Elizabethan Church. 
 
5.2c Hooker and the Redefinition of Elizabethan Episcopacy 
 
The turbulent immediate history of the Elizabethan Church meant that the role of the 







do in the Elizabethan Church. By the time that Hooker started writing the Lawes in 
the late 1580s, the English episcopate had suffered socially and economically, and 
was practically weak and under theological attack. Bishops not only underwent 
economic misfortune, but also loss of status, which together ‘contributed to a 
diminished influence at Court and in the Councils of State.’538 
 
Hooker writes in Book VII that bishops are endowed with honour in title, place, 
ornament, attendance, and privilege. These ‘Publique Marks and Tokens’539 are 
important because by these endowments, the public will see the esteem with which 
bishops are held, and respect them all the more for ‘the good Government either of 
the Church, or of the Commonwealth.’540 In response to this, Lake believes that 
‘Hooker departed from the Pauline ideal of the bishop as preacher or…planter of 
preachers, to create a visual image of the bishop as governor and man of affairs.’541 
Yet, though this may seem a somewhat pragmatic approach of Hooker, he was not the 
only Elizabethan contemporary to view bishops as governors and men of affairs. 
 
Was, therefore, Hooker a rationalist of the Elizabethan era, defending the Settlement 
from a pragmatic point of view, rather than anything more idealistic – a position 
perhaps demanded by the inability of a theologian to say anything publicly that may 
be construed as being disloyal to the Establishment? McGrade argues that Hooker 
was not the rationalist that his critics have sometimes made him out to be, for their 
‘error lies in extracting the universal proposition that it never matters whether reason 
or God has ordered a thing from the very public assertion that the Puritans should 
obey their bishops whether bishops are of divine or human institution.’542 Obedience 
to bishops because they were part of a civil structure whose raison d’être was to 
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maintain good order in society was part of Elizabethan consensus (whether or not they 
were of divine or human origin) – yet it did not mean that bishops were to be a 
perpetual feature of ecclesial governance.543 Bishops as instruments of moderation 
were regarded as having an ‘authority [that] was necessary to restrain both the 
ideological fragmentation of the clergy and the seething turbulence of the laity.’544 
Collinson adds to this by suggesting ‘the moderate episcopacy prefigured in the 
Prophesyings and to some extent in the Elizabethan administrative practice, was 
fitted, as Presbyterianism was not, to the actual condition of the Church, to the 
distribution within it of both learning and endowment.’545 Contra McGrade’s assertion 
that critics of Hooker accused him of realism rather than idealism, Hooker may well 
have been a realist, but he did this with clear idealistic principles of asserting a 
biblically-founded, traditionally-inspired, and reason-influenced pattern of 




5.2d The Acquisition of Episcopal Authority 
 
Having argued the case for the existence and desirability of bishops within the 
Elizabethan Church, how did Hooker regard the bishops as gaining their authority 
within the English Church? If they received no ‘spiritual’ qualities at the 
commencement of their ministry as bishops, how and why were they distinct from the 
Puritan polity that Hooker sought to oppose? Hooker is clear that episcopal ordination 
bestows the spiritualities,546 and that ‘we cannot say Kings doe make, but that they 
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only doe place Bishops’547 – that is to say, that a ‘commission’ from the monarch is 
necessary before an office in the episcopate can be undertaken.548 Hooker makes it 
explicit that the monarch’s letters merely present a bishop to be consecrated, and give 
them their place in which they shall exercise their authority as a bishop, but that it is 
the consecration, by their fellow bishops, that makes a new bishop such. Explicitly, 
Hooker is suggesting that although the monarch can place a bishop, and give them a 
physical area in which they can exercise their episcopal power, the bishop does not 
have any episcopal power to exercise unless and until they have been consecrated by 
their fellow bishops.549 Could this approach of appointing bishops be regarded as 
restraining the power of the monarch, in the appointing of bishops, to the merely 
temporal plane? Perhaps – but what acknowledgement does Hooker make of the 
monarch’s spiritual role as Supreme Governor? 
 
At the consecration of a bishop, Hooker argues, whilst the act itself is not a 
sacrament, ‘a charism is communicated…[this being] a gracious donation which the 
Spirit of God doth bestow, [which provides continuing] assistance, aid, countenance 
and support [in their ministry].’550 Ordination was, argues Hooker, an indelible mark, 
which cannot be erased.551 This ordination, or sacramental act, confers powers upon 
bishops (and indeed priests and deacons at their respective ordinations) that monarchs 
do not have. Rather like the monarch, once consecrated: 
                                                
547 Hooker, Lawes, VIII.vii.2. 
548 Note that Lake, ‘Presbyterianism’, 215, believed that the appointing powers of the monarch, as 
agreed by Bilson, Whitgift, and Hooker, removed ‘the occasion of such disorder and [ensured] the 
appointment of able and respectable men to episcopal office.’ See also Patrick Collinson (The 
Elizabethan Puritan Movement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967, 102)). In balance, W. H. Harrison 
(‘Prudence and Custom’, 912, 913), regards Hooker as believing ‘that the whole structure of society 
must be built upon allegiance to God and that bishops are an important part of a Christian nation’s 
structure’, and also, ‘[bishops’] responsibilities exceed the ecclesiastical, however; they must be 
advisors to monarchs, so that the kingdom will walk truly in God’s way.’ 
549 See McGrade, ‘Coherence of Hooker’s Polity’, 173: ‘It is their ecclesial consecration which “gives 
being” to bishops.’ 
550 Hooker, Lawes, V.lxxvii.7. 
551 Hooker, Lawes, V.lxxvii.2, and further, ‘…the same power is in such not amiss both termed a kind 







they [clergy] which have once received this power may not think to 
put it off and on like a cloak as the weather serveth…but let them 
know which put their hands unto this plough, that once consecrated 
unto God they are made his peculiar inheritance for ever.552 
This seems to imply that Hooker regarded the consecration of a bishop as a ‘setting 
apart’ (which is indeed the root of the Latin word, consecrare), which takes place at 
an ontological level, and thus cannot be undone. 
 
Yet, despite Hooker evidencing their apostolic origins, bishops did not have unlimited 
temporal power underneath the monarch. The early bishops’ territorial exercise of 
power gradually transformed into what we would now recognize as a diocese – their 
jurisdiction was limited to a specific geographical area, the grant of which was from 
the monarch.553 Hooker was quite clear, however, that the appointment (that is, their 
making as a bishop) did not reside solely in the monarch, but in the entire corpus of 
the Church – it required both the Church and the monarch to act to make a person a 
bishop, and to enable that person to act as a bishop, which was a direct challenge to 
the unilateral appointments of Rome. This corpus could be construed to act as a 
‘moderating influence’ – though there had to be some element of genuine authority, 
this authority was moderated by law, ‘and was merely the judicial determination…of 
laws positively determined by the whole commonwealth.’554 It should be noted, of 
course, that government by bishops was in itself a positive law, and thus alterable – 
what Hooker elsewhere called ‘the bishops’ bridle’. 
 
Of this authority, Hooker writes that: 
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authority is a constraining power, which power were needless, if we 
were all such as we should be, willing to do the things we ought to 
do without constraint. But because generally we are otherwise 
therefore we all reap singular benefit by that Authority, which 
permitteth no men, though they would, to slack their duty.555 
Pertinent for the Church, Hooker adds, 
Constitutions and Canons made for the ordering of Church affairs, 
are dead Taskmasters. The due execution of Laws spiritual 
dependeth most upon the vigilant care of the chiefest spiritual 
Governors, whose charge is to see that such Laws be kept by the 
Clergy and people under them.556 
Hooker argues that lay governors are not well acquainted with these laws, nor are they 
deeply or nearly touched, and hence it is imperative that ‘Ecclesiastical persons have 
authority in such things. Which kind of Authority, maketh them which have it 
Prelates.’557 Those who are in such office are furnished with the necessary honourable 
qualities and graces.558 This would seem to suggest that Hooker argues that the laity 
are incapable of carrying out a governance role in the Church because they have not 
been endowed with the necessary grace, grace that is given to ministers, and 
especially to bishops, at their ordination and consecration. Thus, in the broader 
picture: 
wherefore if the Clergy be a beautifying unto the body of this 
Commonweal in the eyes of Foreign beholder; and if the Clergy, the 
Prelacy be most exposed unto the world’s eye, what publique 
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benefit doth grow from that order, in regard of reputation thereby 
gotten to the Land from abroad, we may soon conjecture?559 
That is to say, because the prelates (bishops) are high-profile clerics, the ability (or 
grace) that they are given at ordination to carry out their role makes them all the more 
attractive in that they are key functionaries of a well-ordered society – and thus, in 
turn, making the society in which they play a part all the more attractive for its well-
orderedness. 
 
Thus, is Hooker here arguing that giving bishops honour places them in a position of 
authority? 
The good government of the Church, or of the Commonwealth, 
dependeth scarcely on any one external thing, so much as on the 
Publique Marks and Tokens, whereby the estimation that Governors 
are in, is made manifest to the eyes of men.560 
Hooker argues that there must be honour in title, place, ornament, attendance, and 
privilege.561 
 
What marks out a bishop? Hooker argues in VII.xxiv.15 that ‘a bishop’s estimation 
doth grow from the excellency of virtues suitable unto his place…[a] deep meditation 
of holy things…shine they must as angels of God in the midst of perverse 
men…nothing but wisdom, gravity and judgment is looked for.’ Yet, says Hooker, 
men exhibiting such qualities are rarely found. We must ask, though, to what extent 
must these qualities be already present in bishops before their consecration, or to what 
extent are they entirely supplied by the gift of the Holy Spirit at consecration – that is, 
‘the needful gifts of grace’? Thus, bishops need the gifts given to them upon their 
appointment as bishops: a territory, given by the monarch, within which to exercise 
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their spiritual gifts given to them by their fellow bishops at their consecration. 
Without these two elements, bishops cannot function as bishops.562 
 
Hooker also argues that the lands and livings of the Church give those who manage 
them a degree not only of authority, but responsibility as stewards of these ‘gifts’: 
Persons Ecclesiasticall are God’s Stewards, not onely for that he 
hath set them over his Family, as the Ministers of Ghostly food; but 
even for this very cause also, that they are to receive and dispose his 
temporal Revenues, the gifts and oblations which men bring him.563 
These gifts and oblations are used for the relief of the poor (VII.xxiii.9). To deprive 
the Church of these goods, Hooker argues, is ‘extream Sacriligious Injustice’. Those 
who administer them are ‘Gods Agents’, although admittedly those who mismanage 
them have always found their way into the episcopate: 
if it be as the Apostle saith, That the Holy Ghost doth make 
Bishops, and that the whole action of making them is God’s own 
deed, men being therein but his Agents; what spark of the fear of 
God can there possibly remain in their hearts, who representing the 
person of God in naming worthy men to Ecclesiastical charge, do 
sell that which in his name they are to bestow, or who standing as it 
were at the Throne of the Living God do bargain for that which at 
his hands they are to receive?564 
This comment of Hooker’s could be seen as a tacit acknowledgement that although 
the Holy Ghost is bestowed at a bishop’s consecration, this does not stop that bishop 
becoming corrupt – bishops are fallible creatures, and the episcopate, or indeed any 
such church structure, is fallible because it is human, and therefore subject to 
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corruption. Hooker’s plea above is more of a rhetorical plea for moral probity in the 
face of divine judgment than any hope or expectation that an ultimately human 
institution will remain incorrupt before the seat of God’s judgment. 
 
Other aspects of episcopal ministry that may build up episcopal authority include 
pastoral aspects such as care of the clergy: ‘the first thing looked for is a care of the 
Clergy under him, a care that in doing good they may have whatsoever comforts and 
encouragements his countenance, authority, and place they may yield.’565 Where this 
does not happen, where men’s souls are not cared for, ‘this is the very root, the 
fountain of all negligence in Church-Government.’566 Hooker argues that in order to 
carry out episcopal ministry, ‘external helps and ornaments are useful,’567 as well as 
some reward being necessary in order to persuade people to accept the office of 
bishop.568 Further, ‘in a Bishop, great liberality, great hospitality, actions in every 
kinde great are looked for: And for actions which must be great, mean instruments 
will not serve,’569 and therefore, ‘we must needs think it a thing necessary unto the 
common good of the Church, that great jurisdiction being granted unto Bishops over 
others, a state of wealth proportionable should likewise be provided for them.’570 
Herein exists, of course, the potential to abuse the means that have been provided for 
the exercise of episcopal ministry. ‘If they abuse the goods of the Church unto pomp 
and vanity, such faults we do not excuse them.’571 Hooker takes care to distinguish 
pomp and vanity from the honour of the bishops’ office.572 Thus, for Hooker, the 
historical accoutrements of the episcopal office, such as territory and property, 
belonged to God: to remove these from temporal keeping by the bishop would be to 
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rob God: bishops hold them in trust for the office they occupy, and the honour of that 
office. 
 
Thus, for Hooker, there are many justifications for the power held by the episcopate, 
yet this may not be exercised as they please: bishops are themselves moderated, just 
as they themselves are moderators. Hooker bases his justification on scriptural 
exposition, apostolic origin, and the necessity for some sort of governance to maintain 
good order. 
 
This section has argued that for Hooker episcopal authority, consisting of spiritualities 
and temporalities, is acquired in two ways – first, the spiritualities are granted to the 
bishop at their consecration by other bishops; second, the temporalities (or grant of 
territory to exercise their authority) is granted to bishops by the monarch at the 
confirmation of election.  Ordination is an indelible mark which cannot be erased (the 
Latin root of the word, consecrare, means ‘setting apart’), and gives a power which 
the monarch does not have.  Bishops did not have unlimited temporal power under the 
monarch, and the methods used for their appointment acted as a moderating influence. 
Hooker argued that the laity could not carry out the functions of a bishop as they have 
not been given the necessary grace to do so (not having been consecrated).  Hooker 
further argues that bishops gain authority through honour in place, title, ornament, 
attendance, and privilege, but have responsibility as stewards of these gifts.  The 
primary responsibilities of a bishop, argues Hooker, are those of pastoral 
responsibility – primary among which are the care of clergy, as well as to a lesser 
extent, great liberality, hospitality, great actions, and no meanness.   
 
5.2e Episcopal Power and the Civil Magistrate 
 
Despite provision being made for commissioners, synods, and the like, Hooker is 
quite clear that this authority cannot be transferred to civil magistrates when dealing 







God, which hath appointed the High Priest and consequently the Ministerie of the 
Church alone to have it in this behalf. Therefore it may not from them be transferred 
to the Civil Magistrate.’573 Yet, even in ‘causes Ecclesiasticall’, the sovereign had 
some power, as ‘we hold without exception that all Courts are the Kings,’574 despite 
some protestations from the bishops that use and custom may provide to the 
contrary.575 Yet, although the monarch was strictly a layperson, she exercised a 
measure of jurisdiction greater than the bishops in some areas, but not, again, in 
spiritual areas.576 
 
It seems here that Hooker’s boundaries of exactly to whom jurisdiction belongs are 
deliberately vague – but why? Perhaps a judicious hedging of Hooker’s opinion was 
the only option open to him, given the political climate. It may also be due to his wish 
to leave the exact nature of ecclesial governance with less-prescript boundaries, so 
that it could be adapted to the prevailing climate. Anything more prescriptive would 
have risked resulting in a straitjacket for the Church, which Hooker did not wish to 
do. 
 
Yet, within this rather malleable ecclesial climate, there were some ‘certainties’ in the 
mind of Elizabeth. Bishops were considered the ‘lynchpins’ of the conformist system, 
owing to their status as civil magistrates in addition to their spiritual authority.577 The 
episcopate was not forbidden in Scripture (being thus a product of positive law), but 
maintained by the decision of the Christian ruler – another instance of the influence of 
the monarch.578 
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Because bishops were part of the Establishment, and because of their social standing 
due to the accumulated lands and wealth that went with their appointment,579 it was 
perhaps unsurprising that, in attempts to enforce conformity, bishops were 
approached by the lord chancellor for advice regarding appointments as Justices of 
the Peace. This should not imply any undue influence of the bishops upon the great 
offices and bodies of State – given the makeup of the Privy Council, a powerful hand 
was still held by those landed gentry. This reality led Manning to suggest that 
‘Elizabethan bishops were generally regarded by the Privy Council, lay magistrates 
and gentry as nothing more than agents of the Royal Supremacy in ecclesiastical 
affairs – or in short – as ecclesiastical JPs.’580 Does the suggestion that bishops were 
so readily able to act as agents of the Royal Supremacy mean that Elizabeth wished to 
rule indirectly in relation to ecclesiastical affairs? Was this a deliberate tactic of the 
queen to ensure that any ill feeling in relation to ecclesiastical affairs was absorbed by 
the bishops, rather than by Elizabeth? Collinson suggests that the queen stood up to 
critics of episcopacy, even if it were not for wholesome reasons: 
while Elizabeth’s contempt for the prelates was equal to that of any 
of her advisors, she left it in no doubt that her bishops were able to 
be the sole executors of her ecclesiastical supremacy, and that she 
would not tolerate the parliamentary invasion of her domain.581 
Yet, we must remember that whilst Elizabethan bishops may have been seen as 
pivotal to the conformist system, less use was made of them than under previous 
Tudor regimes. Hooker was defending what role they did have against the Puritan 
argument, apropos of the two kingdoms theory, that it was impermissible for clerics, 
especially bishops, to hold civil roles. 
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5.3 Wider Protestantism and Episcopal Power 
 
Recent critical study of Hooker has suggested that he is not so much a proponent of 
the Anglican Via Media, or indeed the inventor of Anglicanism, as Peter Lake 
notoriously said in his book, Anglicans and Puritans,582 but is rather closer in his 
thought to that of the magisterial continental reformers – Luther, Calvin, Bullinger, 
and Melanchthon.583 Exactly why was Hooker closer to the continental framework 
than was previously thought? Some European elements, notably that of Zurich, 
espoused an episcopal framework, a magisterial governance, and a form of 
Protestantism that enabled the monarch to have rather more room for manoeuvre in 
matters indifferent.584 We must also remember that a good number of the Elizabethan 
episcopal bench had either spent time in Zurich during the Marian Exile, or were now 
in correspondence with those on the Continent sympathetic to the English 
constitution; as the queen could not expect sympathy from Geneva, or indeed support 
for her ideas, she naturally turned to those sources that would give her the support she 
wanted, chiefly Zurich. 
 
                                                
582 Lake, Anglicans and Puritans, 230. 
583 R. D. Williams, Why Study the Past? The Quest for the Historical Church (London: Darton, 
Longman, and Todd, 2014), 75, believes that Hooker is a ‘very unorthodox Reformed thinker on the 
concept of grace…but in terms of his theology of the Church, he certainly seems to sustain a 
mainstream Reformed position.’ See also Lee Gibbs in ‘Richard Hooker: Prophet of Anglicanism or 
English Magisterial Reformer’ in Anglican Theological Review, 84 no. 4, 943. Gibbs argues that 
‘certain theologians’ of the Anglican Communion (that is, Kirby and Atkinson) are incorrectly arguing 
Hooker is an orthodox advocate of the Magisterial reformation in England, and that ‘the ‘myth’ of the 
Via Media as representing the peculiar character of the Church of England was the mark of a 
distinctively ‘Anglican’ theology was the creation of Nineteenth century High Churchmen affiliated 
with the Oxford Movement’ (op. cit. 945). Gibbs states that the Via Media was not the creation of the 
Oxford Movement (op. cit. 953,4), but rather that Hooker formulated a classic rendition of it, being 
both heir of his patron, John Jewel, and also John Whitgift (op. cit. 953) – though Hooker also utilized 
a much broader base of Greek and Roman classical writers, the Church Fathers, Medieval 
Scholasticism, and Renaissance humanists, for example (op. cit. 954). 
584 See Kenneth R. Macmillan, ‘Zurich Reform and the Elizabethan Settlement of 1559’ in Anglican 







It may therefore be a surprise that Hooker only mentions Calvin, Beza, and other 
magisterial reformers a handful of times in the Lawes. This does not mean that 
Hooker was devoid of their influence, though. Hooker, amongst other Establishment 
figures such as Whitgift, fights for the patronage of Calvin (an added advantage being 
that Calvin was dead by this point, and thus could not defend himself), in order to 
make the Settlement more convincing to those who opposed it.585 
 
Given the force of the Puritan argument, it is perhaps unsurprising that defenders of 
the Elizabethan Establishment sought to bolster their arguments with support from 
luminaries of the continental Reformation whose ‘theological legacy and the Genevan 
experiment in theocracy [was] upheld by English reformists as the perfect model of a 
reformed Church’,586 although defenders of the Establishment who cited Calvin 
approvingly did not by any means seek to align themselves wholly with Calvin’s 
polity.587 
 
Hooker, although he was heavily influenced by Calvinist theology, and was even said 
to have ‘trembled before the name of Calvin’,588 sought to distance himself in the 
preface to the Lawes by attempting to ‘make an impartial evaluation of an episode in 
recent history [i.e. the reformation] that was often regarded with uncritical reverence 
by his contemporaries.’589 Cargill-Thompson points out that Hooker was no more 
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well-disposed to proponents of the Puritan regime than, for example, Bancroft or 
Whitgift, and that the goal of the preface in the Lawes was ‘to discredit the Puritan 
cause, partly by exposing the novelty of the Calvinist system of discipline, and partly 
by impugning the motives of the Puritans themselves.’590 He describes Hooker’s 
selective use of Calvin as ‘a calculated piece of misrepresentation, a deliberate 
attempt to undermine Calvin’s reputation among his readers.’591 As we have seen, 
Hooker uses Calvin to support the historical roots of episcopacy, but he then goes on 
to use this same point to accuse Calvin of contradictions: 
Thus much Calvin being forced by the evidence of truth to grant, 
doth yet deny the bishops to have been so in authority at the first as 
to bear rule over other ministers: wherein what rule he doth mean, I 
know not.592 
Surely, this is what rhetoric and polemic is all about – using your adversary’s ‘heroes’ 
so as to debase their argument from within – and in Hooker’s case, to argue that the 
Elizabethan Religious Settlement was congruent with wider Protestantism.593 
 
Hooker was not the only Establishment figure to draw on Calvin. Whitgift, Hooker’s 
patron, did likewise, hoping to gain sympathy from those calling for further reform in 
the English Church for his argument for why a hierarchy in church government 
should be obeyed, without which obedience to its divinely given mandate would fall 
into chaos and schisms. The patronage of Calvin was also fought over in debates 
regarding the subject of jurisdiction. Whitgift quoted Calvin as highlighting the need 
for a moderator: ‘This thing doth nature allow, and the disposition of man require, 
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that in every society, though all be equal in power, yet some should be at it were a 
moderator of the rest, upon whom the other might depend.’594 Yet, we must note that 
although other Establishment writers used this passage to give unequivocal support 
for episcopal governance, Whitgift did not, instead using it to illustrate the chaos of 
the Puritan system and the lawful authority of the sovereign to appoint ecclesiastical 
moderators: 
the continual practice of Christian churches (in the time of Christian 
magistrates), before the usurpation of the bishop of Rome, hath 
been to give Christian princes supreme authority in making 
ecclesiastical orders and laws…whereby it appeareth that the chief 
authority in such councils was given to the emperor.595 
Shagan claims that Whitgift, and other conformists like him, in citing Calvin, argued 
‘for a via media based upon order: the government’s enforcement of uniformity for 
the sake of worldly order was a middle way between the disorder of free choice and 
the superstition of positing genuine spiritual necessity in outward ceremonies.’596 That 
is, laws were necessary due to man’s inherent nature to disobey and cause disorder. 
These laws kept peace and good order in society, to enable humans to perform their 
divinely given function: to serve God.597 
 
It was not just Whitgift who laid claim to Calvin, however. Why did other defenders 
of the Elizabethan Settlement use Calvin, and how did they use him in their 
consequent defence of episcopacy? Bridges, in his A Defence, quotes Calvin’s letter 
to the King of Poland: 
Even as nature suggesteth this unto us, that out of all colleges one 
ought to be chosen upon whom the chiefest care should lie. But it is 
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one thing to bear a moderate honour…another to comprehend the 
whole compass of the world in a government unmeasurable.598 
Some may take this to infer Calvin’s support for an episcopate – and some may not – 
and this is the reason why the claim of Calvin was so strongly fought. 
 
Collinson claims a more moderate tone for Calvin’s stance within the English Church: 
this is not to say that Calvin utterly condemned the episcopal polity 
or even the conservative liturgy of the Church of England as Beza 
would condemn them within a few years…He was on the best 
possible terms with some of the new English bishops, especially 
with Grindal.599 
Calvin’s theological patronage was worth fighting for, however, and either side would 
go to quite some lengths to claim him for their own: 
what was novel and distinctive in the Presbyterian assertion [1570s] 
was the claim that the particular form of church order and discipline 
to be found in the Calvinist churches was alone apostolic and 
necessary for all times and all places. It was Theodore Beza, 
Calvin’s successor, who made this point more emphatically than 
any.600 
 
Geneva was not the only influence upon the English episcopate during Hooker’s 
lifetime. Zurich played an important part because it subscribed to the importance of 
episcopal governance, especially one that was interlinked with the State, at the top of 
which a godly prince was chief governor. Gualter’s letter to Elizabeth of 16 January 
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1559601 outlined support for, amongst other things, the right of bishops, alongside the 
Privy Council and the queen, to govern the Church. The Second Helvetic Confession 
of Bullinger outlines a theory of the magistrate’s role in society that runs closely to 
the inherent nature of the Elizabethan Settlement with the queen at its helm: 
The Magistracy is from God. Magistracy of every kind is instituted 
by God himself for the peace and tranquillity of the human race, 
and thus it should have the chief place in the world. If the 
magistrate is opposed to the Church, he can hinder and disturb it 
very much; but if he is a friend and even a member of the Church, 
he is a most excellent member of it, who is able to benefit greatly, 
and to assist it best of all.602 
Although Bullinger does not here define what he means by ‘member of the Church’, it 
is nonetheless clear that there should not be a separation between the two swords, and 
that the monarch, as magistrate, can and should have dominion over all. The ability to 
be a ‘member’ of both sacred and secular societies can only be for the greater good, 
argues Bullinger, because of the influence and virtues one brings to the other. 
 
Further, the Second Helvetic Confession talks of the ‘duty of the magistrate’ and the 
‘duty of subjects’, which follows closely that ideal enshrined in the Settlement itself: 
the chief duty of the magistrate is to secure and preserve peace and 
public tranquillity…he promotes the preaching of truth and sincere 
faith, roots out lies and superstition, together with all impiety and 
idolatry, and defends the Church of God. We certainly teach that the 
care of religion belongs especially to the holy magistrate.603 
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The duty of subjects, argues Bullinger, is to ‘honour and reverence the magistrate as 
the minister of God…for he who opposes the magistrate provokes the severe wrath of 
God against himself…we, therefore, condemn all who are contemptuous of the 
magistrate.’ 604  Though there are clear similarities between the structure of the 
Helvetic Confession and that of the Elizabethan Settlement, it may be fair to infer 
some influence of the earlier Settlement upon the Confession – but of course the 
issues spelt out in both were common to the good ordering of a society. 
 
The Augsburg Confession, written by Philip Melanchthon, had very few active 
defenders in England – perhaps because it opposes the idea of bishops imposing civil 
penalties. Article XXVIII speaks of Ecclesiastical Power: 
There has been great controversy concerning the Power of Bishops, 
in which some have awkwardly confounded the power of the 
Church and the power of the sword…the civil rulers defend not 
minds, but bodies and bodily things against manifest injuries, and 
restrain men with the sword and bodily punishments in order to 
preserve civil justice and peace…therefore the power of the Church 
and the civil power must not be confounded. Let it not break into 
the office of another.605 
Melanchthon is clear that physical punishment must be meted out by the civil courts, 
and not by ecclesiastical ones – bishops have no power to administer this justice, 
because: 
if bishops have any power of the sword, that power they have, not 
as bishops, by the commission of the Gospel, but by human law 
having received it of kings and emperors for the civil administration 
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of what is theirs. This, however, is another office than the ministry 
of the Gospel.606 
Melanchthon is careful to make the distinction that a bishop could feasibly wield the 
civil sword – but not in the role of a bishop. 
 
It may be that Melanchthon sees that an absolutist argument would be difficult to 
carry, though, and admits that: 
it is not our design now to wrest the government from the bishops, 
but this one thing is asked, namely, that they allow the Gospel to be 
purely taught, and that they relax some few observances which 
cannot be kept without sin.607 
This could be a sign of a more pragmatic approach from one corner of the opposition 
to bishops as magistrates – though of course Melanchthon was writing in a German 
context, where prince-bishops (in effect a fully independent territorial prince) were a 
standard part of the political scene. 
 
In conclusion, then, there is a range of opinions on episcopal power amongst the 
orthodox reformers, echoing that range found within the English Puritans. Whilst 
echoes of the Settlement are found in the Helvetic Confession, this should not 
necessarily mean that there are heavy Zurichian overtones in Hooker – after all, no 
society can exist without a certain degree of order and discipline administered from 
above – and if the bishops are the ones who hold powerful roles, then surely 
discipline can be administered by them? Bishops have, after all, the power and 
command to cure men’s souls – and that includes both sacred and secular discipline, 
as Hooker himself would argue. 
 
                                                
606 Melanchthon, op. cit., Article XXVIII. 







This section has argued that Hooker is perhaps closer to wider Protestant thought than 
has been previously argued, potentially due to the influence of Elizabethan bishops 
who had spent time in Zurich during Queen Mary’s reign.  Hooker fought, with 
others, for the patronage of Calvin – but not wholeheartedly.  Hooker did use Calvin 
to support the roots of episcopacy, but also highlighted his perceived contradictions.  
Whitgift also cited Calvin, arguing for a moderate Church Order in the cause of 
uniformity.  Another Elizabethan divine citing Calvin was John Bridges.  Hooker 
made use of Bullinger, who outlined the theory of the magistrates’ role in society, 
providing a number of similarities with the English usage with the queen at its head.  
Bullinger argued that there must not be a separation between the two swords.  Further, 
though Melanchthon’s Augsburg Confession was not popular in England as it 
opposed the idea of bishops imposing civil penalties – a bishop could wield the civil 
swords, but could not do so in their capacity as a bishop. 
 
 
5.4 English Puritans and Episcopal Power 
 
In his defence of episcopacy within the Elizabethan Religious Settlement, Hooker was 
fighting against English Presbyterians who believed in the absolute parity of ministers 
in the Church. This is not to say that they did not see the need for some ministers to 
have a certain degree of ‘oversight’ over other ministers and their congregations for 
the sake of good order – an aspect that was not lost on Hooker. In his analysis of their 
argument, a great deal of which is presented as an examination of the correspondence 
between Whitgift and Cartwright, Hooker exposes what he believes to be the 
contradictions, hypocrisies, and misunderstandings of the Presbyterian argument, 
whilst at the same time not entirely condemning their principles for a reformed 
Church. 
 
In his attempt to provide a reasoned defence of the Elizabethan Settlement, Hooker 







way that did not totally exclude the validity of their polity, and more so, in a way that 
aligned the English Church with orthodox reformed thought. 
 
The authority of bishops to exercise oversight upon congregations and churches was 
challenged in the Admonition, which called upon Parliament to: 
remove Advowsons, Patronages, Impropriations, and bishoppes 
authoritie, claiming to themselves thereby the right to ordayne 
ministers and to bring in that old and true election, which was 
accustomed to be made by the congregation…Remove homilies, 
articles, injunctions, a prescript order of service made out of the 
masse book.608 
This is an attempt to bring back the polity of the English Church to that of a scriptural 
model – a model in which those calling for further reform claimed did not exhibit the 
hierarchical marks of the English Church now extant.609 In order to counter this, 
Hooker used numerous scriptural references in Book VII to argue that episcopacy was 
of scriptural origin, one of the most notable being, in order to counter the allegations 
made in the Admonition: 
The word επισκοπη, expressing that part of their office which did 
consist in regiment over others, because as then that name was 
common unto the function of their inferiors, and not peculiar unto 
theirs. But the history of their actions sheweth plainly enough how 
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the thing itself which that name appropriated importeth, that is to 
say, even such spiritual chiefty as we have already defined to be 
properly episcopal, was in the holy Apostles of Christ. Bishops 
therefore they were at large.610 
Though Hooker agreed that abuse of office should be driven out, Hooker did not 
claim, as the Admonition did, that this means by extension bishops should be 
eradicated. Far from it: though Scripture did not call them bishops as such then, 
bishops they were, and they exercised the office as such, which developed lawfully 
into that which Hooker now defended. 
 
Claims for further reform were not limited to the parity of ministers, however. The 
exponents of such claims also attacked financial exploitation and corruption, a view 
with which a number of conformist figures agreed, echoing Puritan calls for reforms 
of excess amongst the hierarchy (which in itself was a costless position to take). 
Hooker happily placed himself and his Lawes in this group. 
 
The Admonition called for parity of ministers, with an eldership or senior to govern 
the Church: ‘in stead of an Archbishop or Lord bishop, you must make equalitie of 
ministers…you have to plant in every congregation a lawful and godly seigniorie.’611 
Scripture, the Admonition argued, contained sufficient guidance on church polity that 
it could be followed as a model: 
This regiment consisteth especially in ecclesiastical discipline, 
which is an order left by God unto his church, wherby men learne to 
frame their wylles and doyngs according to the law of God, by 
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instructing and admonishing one another…and by correcting and 
punishing all wylfull persones.612 
Cartwright regarded any notion of episcopal hierarchy as a scripturally unwarranted 
deviation from the unique role that Christ played in the salvation of humankind. 
Hooker constantly fought against this by supplying copious scriptural references to 
the contrary, as well as evidence from the Church Fathers. Hence, the entire 
controversy centred on the question as to whether the authority in the Church of 
Christ is exercised and mediated by external bodies – that is, humans – or whether it 
should be left to the supposed scriptural model. 
 
How did the Lawes address the Presbyterians’ charge that the inequality of pastors 
was unscriptural, as all examples of pastors in Scripture were found to have the same 
power, ‘both of Order and Jurisdiction’?613 Hooker draws direct scriptural example to 
counter this: examples of the Apostles being sent to various Churches, 614  the 
discernment undertaken when the Apostles admitted persons Ecclesiastical,615 and the 
‘express mention [of the inequality of pastors] as well in Censures as in 
Ordinations.’616 Essentially: 
Bishops we say there have been always, even as long as the Church 
of Christ it self hath been. The Apostles who planted it, did 
themselves as Bishops rule over it, neither could they so well have 
kept things in order during their own times, but that Episcopal 
Authority was given them from above.617 
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The Presbyterians also claim that the power to excommunicate may be abused by 
episcopal tyranny. In order to counter this, the Presbyterians argue that a few lay 
elders should be chosen from the people to assist the bishops in their disciplinary 
duties. Hooker quotes Beza as saying: 
…if the power of Ecclesiastical Censures did belong unto any one, 
there would be this great inconveniency follow, Ecclesiastical 
Regiment should be changed into meer Tyrannie, or else into a Civil 
Royalty: Therefore no one, either Bishop or Presbyter, should or 
can alone exercise that Power, but with his Ecclesiastical Consistory 
he ought to do it.618 
Hooker responds to Beza’s accusations by saying that he ought to know that tyranny 
is ‘power violently exercised against Order, against Law; and that the difference of 
these two Regiments, Ecclesiastical and Civil, consisteth in the matter in about which 
they are conversant.’619 
 
The third and last argument that Hooker regards the Presbyterians as having against 
episcopacy is the ‘judgment of the wisest, the holiest, the best in all Ages, 
condemneth utterly the inequality which we allow’, whilst Scripture forbids it 
directly.620 Not so, argues Hooker, for: 
they who alledge this place against Episcopal Authority abuse it, 
they [in] many ways deprave and wrest it clean from the true 
understanding wherein our Saviour himself did utter it; First, these 
men take his words in the plain nature of a prohibition, as if Christ 
had thereby forbidden all inequality of Ecclesiastical 
power…Secondly, Whereas he did but cut off their idle hope of 
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secular advancements, all standing superiority amongst persons 
Ecclesiastical these men would rase off with the edge of his 
speech…Thirdly, whereas he in abating their hope even of secular 
advancements spake but onely with relation to himself.621 
 
The Puritans also accuse the bishops of having differentiated themselves in regard to 
‘honour’, which Hooker claims is ‘the chiefest cause of disdain and murmure against 
the Bishops in the Church of England…that evil-affected eye wherewith the World 
looked upon them.’622 Hooker claims that this will be much harder to argue against, as 
he will be fighting with ‘a stream of obstinate affection, mightily carried by a willful 
prejudice.’623 There is, argues Hooker, public good that arises from the honour that is 
given to bishops – though Hooker himself would be one of the first to say that the 
episcopate needed some reformation of its abuses.624 To not argue such would be akin 
to tolerating gross abuses of office – not a safe position to take when trying to defend 
the Elizabethan Settlement as being congruent with wider Protestantism. 
 
Despite Jewel’s call for a return to a more distinct pastoral episcopate, the appearance 
of Thomas Cartwright’s 1570 lectures (the content of which led to his deposition) 
heightened tensions over the subject. Cartwright was one of the foremost voices in the 
call for further reformation of the Church of England, and the episcopate was a 
favourite target of his, as he called for: ‘the abolition of the names and offices of 
archbishops, bishops, deans and archdeacons…the government of the Church should 
be restored from the usurpation of bishops’ and archdeacons’ officials to the minister 
and presbytery of every local church.’625 Despite Cartwright’s seemingly entrenched 
demands for parity, Collinson claims that most early Elizabethan dissenters accepted 
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‘a reformed episcopacy as a legitimate form of church order and believed that only a 
difference in inessentials divided them from those who held authority in the 
Church.’626 Here is an important point: by no means was the Puritan call for further 
reform of the Church and episcopacy united, and a range of opinions existed within 
those whom the Establishment referred to as Puritans. Hooker, it must be said in 
return, does not specifically align himself against a particular Puritan opinion, either. 
This may also be reflective of his wish for the Lawes to be as widely useful as 
possible, which would not be the case if it were too sectarian.627 
 
Cartwright contradicts himself in several places regarding the hierarchy of ministers, 
one such place being his admission that ‘you must know that the scripture setteth not 
down every circumstance’628 – therefore contradicting his own argument, surely, that 
Scripture provides a one-for-all Church polity. On this point, it would seem that 
Cartwright is in agreement with his nemesis Whitgift, who points out, in his initial 
response to the Admonition from Field and Wilcox, that regarding matters indifferent: 
Whether all things pertaining to the outward form of the church 
should be particularly expressed, or commanded in the scripture, or 
no, is the question that we have now in controversy…Affirmatively 
the argument is always good of the authority of the scripture; as, 
God hath there commanded it to be done; therefore it must be done; 
or, The scripture affirmeth it to be so; ergo it is so. But negatively, 
it holdeth not, except in matters of salvation and damnation.629 
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Whitgift holds that the Church is perfectly legitimate in legislating in matters that are 
not expressly mentioned in Scripture – and that therefore those in authority in the 
Church are given that legislative jurisdiction.630  Chapman points out that it is 
interesting that Whitgift here uses the arguments of the Early Church Fathers, which it 
seems Cartwright is more at pains to use631 – this may not be so remarkable when we 
consider that in polemic, it is sensible to cite from authorities whom your adversary 
recognizes. 
 
Yet the Admonitions were mild in their approach to demanding further reform of the 
English Church. The advent of the Marprelate tracts in 1588 and 1589 brought a new 
level of vitriol to the debate: up until this point, the disagreements were deep-seated, 
but by and large courteous. With the no-holds-barred approach of the Tracts, the 
majority of Presbyterians, such as Cartwright and Travers, suffered for what they did 
not write – and drew considerable wrath from the Establishment, thus making it far 
more difficult for their argument to be heard objectively. 
 
Undoubtedly the Tracts had a profound legacy on the nature of contentious debate in 
the sixteenth century. One of their most important legacies was the highlighting of 
print media as an increasingly crucial vehicle for debate among the literate classes, 
with the Tracts, despite the best efforts of those in authority, circulating freely among 
places of influence such as Parliament and the Inns of Court. The Establishment 
reaction can be seen in the works of Whitgift, Bancroft, and indeed Hooker,632 with 
the archbishop being especially quick off the mark to defend the Elizabethan 
Settlement. Together with the queen, he saw the Tracts as a ‘serious threat to the 
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health and safety and stability of the realm and acted accordingly.’633 The Tracts had 
a profound influence on Presbyterian debate, too. Tainted by association with their 
arguments, Rainolds, Travers, and Cartwright moved quickly to put distance between 
themselves and the Tracts, and began a radical re-think of how they were to achieve 
their goal of further reformation in the Church of England. 
 
In this section, we have seen that Hooker counters Puritan claims against episcopacy 
on a number of levels by using Scripture and long-held tradition as sources, and 
endeavours to expose them as hypocrites by explaining that the things that they argue 
against within ecclesiology, they in fact use within their own church structures. It is 
by doing so that Hooker sets up his defence of the Elizabethan Settlement for an 
alignment with principles of the orthodox magisterial reformers. 
 
I have argued in this section that Hooker fought against English Presbyterians, who 
wanted absolute parity of ministers.  Hooker, in order to do so, focussed on the 
correspondence between Whitgift and Cartwright.  Hooker attempted to counter the 
Puritans at every turn, but did not totally exclude the validity of their position, thus 
helping Hooker’s overall cause in aligning the Settlement with wider Protestantism.  
In countering the Admonition, Hooker claimed a scriptural warrant for episcopacy – 
but this did not mean that Hooker gave bishops his unqualified support, as he still 
railed against the excess shown by some.  This excess meant that Puritans were able 
to make claims of episcopal tyranny.  Finally, it must be noted that Hooker does not 





                                                







I have argued in this chapter that Hooker attempted to align his defence of the 
Settlement with several reformed thinkers in order to demonstrate that the Settlement 
was congruent with wider Protestantism.  The bishop has the power to ordain, and has 
power of chiefty and pastoral jurisdiction, and is clear that the bishop gains their 
authority through grant of spiritualities and temporalities, at their consecration, and 
confirmation of election respectively.  Hooker is reluctant to embrace Iure Divino for 
bishops, and the consequent grey areas this created later provided Keble with an 
opportunity to skew Hooker’s episcopal ecclesiology.  Hooker is clear that civil 
magistrates have no authority in spiritual matters.  This chapter also argued that 
Hooker’s episcopal ecclesiology is close to that of Whitgift, Jewel, Bridges, and, less 
so, of Bancroft (due to the latter pursuing a more explicit path of Iure Divino – though 
that did not stop Bancroft believing that episcopacy as a form of church government 
was still mutable).  Hooker believed episcopacy to be of the bene esse of the Church – 
that is, effective, but not absolute.  This chapter also argued that the Puritan position 
was by no means unified, and that Hooker chose to engage with only some aspects of 
Puritanism, but not others. 
 
This chapter began by considering how the episcopal inheritance of Elizabeth 
influenced her religious reform, finding that though Hooker may have ‘trembled in 
the shadow of Calvin’, in actual fact Hooker attempted to thoroughly align the 
Settlement with orthodox reformed thinkers, using his sources selectively, if 
necessary. As Elizabeth’s reign progressed, both she and her Court had increasing 
reason to relate to orthodox reformed thinkers – and not only because of the shared 
polity of episcopacy with Churches on the Continent, magisterial governance, and 
allowance for influence of the monarch, but also because these shared elements meant 
that orthodox reformed Churches on the Continent were frequently called upon to 
demonstrate and support an ecclesial polity which could be shown to be reformed in 








I then considered exactly how Hooker had portrayed episcopacy in his Lawes, finding 
that a bishop has the additional power to ordain other ministers, as well as ‘power of 
chiefty’ and pastoral jurisdiction. Hooker is also very reluctant to embrace Iure 
Divino episcopacy, contrary to some of his Establishment forebears. As we shall see 
in Part II, the issue of Iure Divino episcopacy in Hooker meant that his later editors, 
especially John Keble, took a rather selective reading of episcopal authority, and this 
may have resulted in a skewed understanding of episcopal authority in the twenty-first 
century Church of England. 
 
This chapter then saw that despite Hooker being quite clear on certain episcopal 
issues, such as there being no authority for civil magistrates in spiritual matters, and 
the necessity of there being a metropolitan to maintain order amongst bishops, there 
are other matters in which it is difficult to discern exactly where Hooker lies, such as 
the Iure Divino issue, and the tension of exactly how a bishop gains their authority – 
whether it is through the Crown giving them the territory in which to exercise 
episcopal jurisdiction, or at his consecration, which is performed by other bishops. 
Finally, we have seen that Hooker attempts to explore in VII.ii.2 exactly what 
episcopacy consists of as an attempt to explain its place within the Elizabethan 
conformist system. 
 
The chapter saw that attempts at defending the Elizabethan Religious Settlement and 
the status of bishops within that were undertaken by, amongst others, Jewel, Whitgift, 
Bridges, and Bancroft. Jewel, in arguing for a return to a more pastoral, godly, 
outlook for bishops, tried to address the issues of a bloated and corrupt prelature. His 
Apologia sought to defend the Church of England as a true Church, which had proper 
authority because it was based on Scripture and the pronouncements of the Early 
Church Fathers (besides being a Church whose authority was enshrined in the law of 
the land). Further, according to Jewel, nothing had been done in the English Church 
without the warrant of Parliament, which was formed at the invitation of the monarch, 







to ordain, change, or abolish ceremonies or rites of the Church that are made by man, 
and notably, unlike some of his Puritan contemporaries, Whitgift did not consider all 
things from the Roman Catholic Church to be abominable. Bancroft is perhaps the 
most strident defender of episcopal authority, however, especially in his discussions 
of the role the apostolic succession and the role of bishops had in an effective 
outplaying of the Royal Supremacy. Bancroft’s strident rhetoric is argued to have 
been in response to that of the Marprelate Tracts, bringing the Establishment position 
to a wider audience – those who would have read the Tracts and found their style 
attractive. As a proponent of Iure Divino episcopacy, Bancroft was placing himself at 
a distance from Hooker and Whitgift, who held that episcopacy, whilst desirable, was 
not immutable. Hooker’s opinion was not, in the end, somewhere between that of 
Whitgift and Bancroft, but rather held that Scripture regarded government by bishops 
as a thing necessary, but not necessary for perpetual government. Hooker’s view was, 
perhaps, imposing and effective, but not absolute. 
 
The chapter found that Hooker is quite certain that whilst the monarch may give 
bishops a territory within which to exercise their authority, the bishops do not have 
any episcopal authority to exercise unless and until they have been consecrated by 
their fellow bishops. That the monarch gave bishops their dioceses may be at least one 
reason for the queen to intervene in ecclesiastical affairs: something that became more 
and more common as her reign continued, whether indirectly through Royal 
Commissioners, or in controlling the manner of bishops’ operations in their role as 
civil magistrates – boundaries that became increasingly blurred. 
 
It is also important to emphasize that by no means was the Puritan position unified as 
regards their view of further reform of the English Church, and it is more appropriate 
to regard their viewpoint as a spectrum, rather than anything more definite. Both 
Cartwright and the Marprelate Tracts, despite their bluster, acknowledged the need 
for a definite ministerial structure. Both sides of the argument, in common with other 







‘reformed’ their ecclesiological polity would be. However, if we regard the English 
Puritan ‘position’ as a spectrum, rather than any definitive viewpoint, the question 
needs to be asked as to whom Hooker engages with, and why? Who does Hooker 
ignore, and why? Why, indeed, does Hooker seem to cherry-pick his adversaries – as 
well as those he seeks in support? 
 
Hooker in fact occupied the middle ground far more than a significant amount of the 
conformist literature he was using as evidence. 634  Of those defending the 
Establishment, Hooker was closer to Whitgift than any other – though this may not be 
entirely surprising, given that Whitgift was his patron and mentor. 
 
Throughout part I of this thesis, I have sought to redress the errant belief of Hooker 
scholarship that Hooker can be claimed for one school or another – or indeed even 
aligned with one particular magisterial reformer above all others. Hooker consistently 
picks and chooses the support he wishes to use for his argument that the Elizabethan 
Religious Settlement is congruent with wider Protestantism. This ‘picking and 
choosing’ itself threw up problems for those who, in the following centuries, wished 
to cite Hooker in support of their particular cause. The overarching issue that I shall 
concentrate on in part II of this thesis is the errant approach of the Oxford Movement, 
and Keble in particular, that Hooker claimed for bishops an authority that he did not 
intend. Given the iconic consequences of the Oxford Movement for twentieth-century 
reforms of Church of England episcopal polity, this had far-reaching consequences 
for the understanding of episcopal authority that the Church has today. 
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The first part of this thesis argued that Hooker’s defence of the Elizabethan Religious 
Settlement presented episcopal authority as being congruent with wider Protestantism, 
according to orthodox reformed religious principles, using elements of the 
ecclesiology of Zurich and Geneva. In part II, we will argue that Keble’s 1836 edition 
of the Lawes, in the editorial preface, presented a version of episcopal authority that 
diverged from that originally espoused by Hooker, and that therefore, as a 
consequence, the ecclesiology of episcopal authority of the present Church of 
England was influenced by a distorted reading of Hooker that departed from the 
orthodox reformed principles he espoused. 
 
This chapter will argue that the episcopal authority as presented in John Keble’s 
edition of the Lawes mistakenly placed too much emphasis on a tenuous Iure Divino 
concept; too much emphasis upon bishops belonging to the esse of the Church, rather 
than the bene esse; and that as a consequence, the authority exercised by bishops, and 
obedience demanded to bishops, as proposed by Keble and the Oxford Movement  
was not that proposed in Hooker’s Lawes. 
 
Chapter seven will argue that due to Keble’s edition of the Lawes being the principal 
version available before the latter part of the twentieth century, the episcopal 
ecclesiology of the Church of England was influenced by a flawed theology of 
episcopal authority. It will be argued that this flawed ecclesiology may have 
significantly affected contemporary developments in episcopacy in relation to women 
bishops and the provisions made by the Church of England for those who are unable 








6.2 The Keble Edition of the Lawes 
 
Keble’s edition of the Lawes was first published in 1836, three years after his 
landmark Assize Sermon on 14 July 1833, preached at the University Church in 
Oxford. In ‘On National Apostasy’ as it came to be known, Keble called for a ‘second 
reformation’ of the Church of England, which had slipped, according to Keble, away 
from its calling as an apostolical Church. It is generally accepted that the Assize 
Sermon marked the beginning of what was to become known as the Oxford 
Movement.635 
 
Keble was occasionally the subject of criticism that his scholarship lacked the depth 
of his peers, but the publication of his three-volume Lawes of Ecclesiastical Polity, 
which took five years to produce, would have gone some way to answer that 
criticism. Newman wrote of Keble’s Lawes in a letter of 1836 to a Miss Giberne, 
‘[Keble’s] Hooker will come out in a fortnight about, and you will find in the preface 
of it sentiments which will astonish and influence your good friends quite as much as 
Pusey’s.’ 636  This is clearly a compliment from Newman regarding Keble’s 
scholarship in the Lawes, but Newman is also using Keble’s edition of the Lawes as a 
convenient weapon that early opposition to Protestantism within the Oxford 
Movement would use.637 Keble’s edition of the Lawes was clearly his standout, large-
scale academic contribution to the academy, but any future potential contribution on a 
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similar scale was hampered by Keble’s leaving full-time teaching in Oxford in 1835. 
Keble retained his position as Professor of Poetry until 1841, but his ability to 
maintain a rigorous scholarly output was hampered by the demands of family and 
parish life. 
 
This section will argue that Keble decided to produce a new edition of the Lawes 
because of its influential importance in arguing the case for the Tractarians’ 
understanding of the Established Church of England against the claims of those 
agitating for further reformation. If there was a need for a ‘second reformation’, as 
Keble proposed in his Assize Sermon, then it had better be the right kind of 
reformation – and there were few magisterial texts of more importance for the Oxford 
Movement than Hooker’s Lawes upon which to draw: first, because the Tractarians 
thought that Hooker provided support for their cause, and second, because Hooker 
was a respected scholar and defender of the polity of the Church of England. As a 
result, to be able to claim Hooker for the Tractarian cause would have meant a great 
deal. Keble was as eager to claim Hooker as Hooker had earlier been to claim Calvin, 
and the process was no easier.638 
 
It is important to note that this chapter has found, through a careful comparison of the 
key texts for episcopal authority, Iure Divino, and also of the essentialness (or esse) of 
bishops, that Keble’s edition does not alter the text of Hooker itself, other than to 
introduce a numbering system that made referring to the text easier for those who 
wished to cite it. 
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Keble’s Lawes was the result of a careful editorial task, and so the only influence that 
Keble could have therefore reasonably exercised in his edition of the Lawes was 
limited to his editorial preface. This chapter will carefully examine what editorial bias 
Keble may or may not have placed upon the themes of Iure Divino, the esse or 
otherwise of bishops, as well as the authority and obedience that bishops could 
exercise and expect. As Keble was a leading figure of the Oxford Movement, this 
chapter will also examine what influence, if any, other prominent figures may have 
had upon the Lawes – concentrating especially upon the corpus of John Henry 
Newman. 
 
Whatever one might think of Keble’s own ecclesiological bias, his edition of the 
Lawes was the first new edition for nearly 200 years. Keble’s version was published 
six further times during the nineteenth century, until the Church/Paget revised edition 
of 1888, which continued to include Keble’s preface. This then became the standard 
edition until the advent of the Folger Library Edition in the late 1970s – which meant 
that Keble’s edition was the principal means by which Hooker was engaged with for 
nearly 150 years.639 
 
6.2a Why did Keble Decide to Present a New Edition of the Lawes? 
 
Having raised a ‘call to arms’ in his Assize Sermon against the supposed apostasy of 
the Church of England, it was inevitable that if one party were calling for an overhaul 
of the Church of England, then others would too, and therefore it was important for 
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the Oxford Movement to make their case as strongly as possible. It is perhaps 
therefore not surprising that Hooker’s sustained polemic against the Puritans in the 
Lawes should appeal to Keble. Keble, in his editor’s preface to the 1836 first edition, 
claimed Hooker as defender against the Protestantism of Cranmer and the like during 
the mid-sixteenth century. Though Keble does not say so himself, Newman claims 
that: 
Keble’s review of Hooker’s opinions is the most catholic paper that 
Anglicanism ever put forth…It is a noble specimen of παρρησια – 
written most calmly, and in doctrine saying things bolder than any 
one of us, and shaking the Reformers most resolutely.640 
Newman’s opinion of Keble’s work does not, at least here, leave much room for 
doubt that the latter’s editorship of the Lawes means Hooker’s recruitment for the 
Tractarian cause. What would have been a particular attraction would have been 
Hooker’s development of sacramental theory in Book V, which was developed further 
especially in Book VI, and Book VII. 
 
When Keble’s edition of the Lawes was published in 1836, his was by no means the 
only attempt since Hooker’s death to produce a universally accepted text. After the 
Gauden edition was published in 1662, which had reprints in 1666 (the first edition to 
include Walton’s biography), 1676 and 1682, the ecclesiastical historian John Strype 
added errant information (at least according to Keble) to Walton’s biography in 1705, 
with a re-print in 1723. In 1793, the first octavo edition (in three volumes) of the 
Lawes was published by the Clarendon Press in Oxford, with reprints in 1807 and 
1820. Benjamin Hanbury produced a ‘somewhat partisan edition of the Polity’641 in 
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1830, and it was this that Keble strove to correct: in 1836, Keble’s octavo edition in 
three volumes followed. As Keble regarded Strype’s additions to have merely 
contributed to an extant Hooker that was now a bloated and corrupt version of that 
originally intended, a new edition was needed in order to authentically claim Hooker 
for the cause of the Tractarians.642 Keble thus claims in his editor’s preface to the 
1836 Lawes: 
It is hoped that this republication of his remains, by making them in 
certain respects more accessible, will cause them to become more 
generally read and known…in their true light, as a kind of warning 
voice from antiquity, a treasure of primitive, catholic maxims and 
sentiments, seasonably provided for this Church, at a time when she 
was, humanly speaking, in a fair way to fall as low towards 
rationalism, as the lowest of the protestant congregations are now 
fallen.643 
 
Given the layout and style of Hooker’s argument in the Lawes, and especially Keble’s 
subsequent formatting and titling, it would perhaps be natural to reason that Hooker 
was seen as having parallels with Thomas Aquinas’ style of argument and reasoning. 
By doing so, Keble and the rest of the Tractarians attempted to offer a thorough, 
systematic argument that the Established Church was sufficiently reformed. The 
Assize Sermon was a ‘wake-up call’ that the Church of England had drifted away 
                                                                                                                                      
constructed upon foundations of rubble which meant that it would inevitably become a “splendid ruin”’ 
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from its apostolic roots, and here, in Hooker, was a comprehensive account of the 
Church and the faith and teaching to which it should, in Keble’s opinion, return. 
 
In presenting a new edition of the Lawes, Keble also found in Hooker a natural ally 
against the pervasive rationalism of the nineteenth century, which, together with the 
perceived ‘low-church’ climate of the early 1800s, meant that the standards of 
apostolic succession, episcopal authority, and governance, and consequently 
sacramental assurance, together all part of the Tractarian package, were at risk. Keble 
wrote in the preface to his edition: 
For saints’ days again he [Hooker] regards the same obligation as 
being in like manner determined, not only by God’s own voice, but 
also by the authorized legislation of His Church. Praise, Bounty, 
and Rest, according to the law of nature, and the analogy of Holy 
Scripture, constitute the proper elements of each kind of festival.644 
Keble here uses Hooker’s example of saints’ days and the Sabbath being treated as 
‘rest’ by the populace with precious little thought to the underlying reasons why those 
days were set aside as being of special holiness and thus requiring a particular 
observance. This would have spoken directly to the Tractarian perception of the 
prevalence of rationalism and anti-Catholicism in the early nineteenth century. 
 
The Tractarians fought for a correct and seemly observance of religion, and so valued 
Hooker’s ability to make that case for them because, according to Keble: 
[Hooker] enters into the real feelings of men, and balances the true 
relative importance of things, in a manner which no depth of 
learning, or power of language, no logical or rhetorical skill could 
                                                







insure; and without which, to persons of the description now 
mentioned, no talent or energy can make theology interesting.645 
Clearly Keble saw a thoroughness and devotion in Hooker’s approach, which he 
believed was not found in many contemporary writers of the nineteenth century – 
perhaps a reason why the Church of England was, in his view, in dire need of a 
‘second reformation’. 
 
Yet the particular value of Hooker for the Oxford Movement was that for him, as for 
them, the central question was with whom ecclesiastical authority resided. In his 
editor’s preface to the Lawes, Keble stated that ‘the nucleus of the whole controversy 
was undoubtedly the question of church authority: not so much the question as to the 
reach and limits of that authority….[but] the question, namely, with whom church 
authority resides.’646 The crisis precipitated by the Irish Temporalities Bill of 1833, 
which saw, in the eyes of Keble, Newman, and their Oxford friends, the British 
government making an attempt on the rightful status of the Established Church in 
Ireland regarding land, privileges, and ecclesiastical preferment, contributed in large 
part to Keble’s Assize Sermon. The Irish crisis also fundamentally questioned the 
symbiotic relationship between the Established Church and the State that had hitherto 
existed in Britain. As one of the foremost defenders of the relationship between 
Church and State as it had been traditionally understood, Hooker came to seem a 
natural go-to for bolstering the Oxford Movement’s case, despite any associations he 
might have with reformed theology. Though Hooker was making his case for 
appropriate jurisdiction from a different place to the Tractarians, Hooker’s view of 
that jurisdiction was so appealing to the Tractarians that they were willing to use him 
despite (and perhaps because of) any concerns regarding his alignment with reformed 
theology – which of course may have had the consequence of allaying fears over the 
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Tractarian position on jurisdiction as not being acceptable to mainstream Church of 
England polity. 
 
The alleged intrusion by the government on the rights of the Church may also have 
had echoes of the Non-Jurors in the minds of the Tractarians, in that if the current 
government of the day, and thus also the reigning monarch, were to cause the old 
balance of Church and State power to break down, then they may not feel able to 
swear their requisite oaths of allegiance and obedience – and thus would put the 
interests of the Church above those of state allegiance. For Hooker, when he wrote the 
Lawes, this argument was a compelling reason to justify the Royal Supremacy as 
being consonant with the ideals of reformed orthodoxy – and for the Oxford 
Movement, this would have meant disobeying a secularizing government more 
interested in filling its own coffers than being a guardian of the rights of the 
Established Church. 
 
One particular Non-Juror who may have been in Keble’s mind as he worked on the 
Lawes may well have been Charles Leslie, who remained faithful to the Hookerian 
concept of an ‘organic union’ between Church and State. Nockles makes the case 
thus: ‘It was Leslie’s reinstatement of the Hookerian theory, which Hutchinsonianism 
and later eighteenth-century High Churchmen imbibed and passed on to their 
successors in the Orthodox tradition.’647 The apologetic in use here would have taken 
for granted the interdependence of Church and State, and not the dependence of the 
Church upon the State – an apologetic that Hooker would have wholeheartedly agreed 
with. 
 
Of particular interest therefore to Keble in the debate surrounding the Irish 
Temporalities Bill was the matter of the State trying to legislate in Church matters 
where it had no right to do so. Keble believed ‘that church laws and constitutions are 
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on the whole left by Providence to the discretion of the civil power’648 – but this did 
not mean that the State could legislate wherever and on whatever it wanted. Inevitably 
this created a clash when Church opinion differed from that of the State: with whom 
should church authority reside? In his editorial preface, Keble wrote that, ‘Anyone 
who will consult Strype’s Annals will find incidentally very sufficient proof of the 
same kind of authoritative interference in English affairs on the part of Beza, 
throughout Elizabeth’s reign.’649 This is of interest because this creates a thread of 
‘authoritative interference’, which began at the time of the Lawes (though Keble 
would not have regarded Beza, as an outsider to the Church of England, to have had 
any authority), and continued with the Non-Juror controversy. Keble illustrated his 
dislike of foreign interference in English affairs, in this case by Theodore Beza, to 
make the point that such interference had historical precedent. If Elizabeth I permitted 
it, this did not mean, in the eyes of Keble and the Oxford Movement, that it justified 
continued interference such as that with the Irish Temporalities Bill: in the eyes of the 
Oxford Movement, only those who held legitimate office in the Church of England 
should have any say in its governance or affairs. 
 
Thus, Keble presented a new edition of the Lawes in order to correct what he deemed 
to be errors on the part of earlier editions.650 Keble considered it important to do so 
because he wanted to present a reasoned justification for the polity of the Church of 
England as the Oxford Movement wished to see it – and who better to claim as an ally 
than Hooker? 
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This section has argued that a new edition of the Lawes was deemed necessary by 
Keble in order to bolster the Oxford Movement’s arguments using such a luminary as 
Hooker.  This was not possible due to the editing of previous editions of the Lawes 
making them less compatible with key Tractarian issues, with Hooker’s sacramental 
theology in Book V being of particular interest.  Keble wanted to correct Hanbury’s 
corrupt edition (which was in turn based on Strype), with impetus being given due to 
Keble seeing the issues that Hooker had to deal with viewed as a warning from 
antiquity.  Further, Hooker’s credibility in the eyes of the Oxford Movement was 
boosted by Hooker’s formatting implying comparisons with Aquinas, whose 
sacramental focus would have appealed to Keble.  Thus, Keble saw in Hooker a 
natural ally for his arguments, which were thorough and devoted, regarding apostolic 
succession, episcopal authority, sacramental assurance, and bishops being of the esse 
in the Church.  A key aspect for Hooker, as far as Keble was concerned, was the 
questions as to with whom Church authority resided. 
 
6.2b Textual Issues 
 
If Keble and the Oxford Movement wished to look to Hooker for support in their call 
for a ‘second reformation’, then the immediate question was how to handle the 
disputed sections of the text of the Lawes. We have already seen in Part I of this thesis 
that significant questions surrounded the integrity and reliability of the last three 
books of the Lawes, but how did Keble address these textual uncertainties? 
 
Keble’s edition gathered the Lawes together in three comprehensive volumes and 
added a thorough system of notes and references. Concerning the textual integrity of 
the last three books of the Lawes, it was Keble’s belief that: ‘There can be no 
reasonable doubt that the author [Hooker] left them completed for publication.’651 
Keble also believed that Hooker’s scholarship is accurate and thorough: ‘There is not 
                                                







(as the Editor believes after minute examination) a single instance of unfair 
citation.’652 Creating a credible case for the reliability of Hooker’s scholarship would 
have been key in Keble’s wish to use Hooker as a proof-text for the orthodoxy of the 
Church of England as the Oxford Movement wished to see it. Keble believed that 
Hooker had at his disposal an ample supply of scholarly material thanks to Hooker’s 
patrons: 
As for assistance in the way of books, there is every mark of his 
having been abundantly supplied during the preparation of his 
work…everything probably was sent to Whitgift; and his stores, it 
may be supposed, were placed at Hooker’s command.653 
By presenting Hooker as a favourite of the archbishop, Hooker would have also 
seemed less like a lone voice, and more like some sort of official voice of the Church. 
Keble suggested that Hooker had access to material from the mainstream reformers: 
‘For it may be observed that [Hooker’s] uncle, John Hooker…was a keen partisan, as 
he had been at one time an associate of Peter Martyr and others of the more 
uncompromising foreign Reformers.’654 It must be noted, though, that this does not 
mean that Hooker shared the opinions of the foreign reformers – just that he had 
familial links with them, and even though he may have had a better and maybe even 
more sympathetic appreciation of them, he was also regarded by Newman as not 
sharing such opinions: ‘Even Hooker (I should speak, I think under correction), but 
gradually worked his way out of Puritanic [sic] education – but he did do so.’655 
Newman is clearly tentative when discussing Hooker’s association with Protestantism 
– which may indicate that Newman is fully aware of demonstrable links between 
Hooker and Protestantism, and does not, therefore, try to wholly dissociate Hooker 
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from them, lest Newman come across as trying to frame Hooker in his own way in the 
face of evidence to the contrary. 
 
i. Keble and the integrity of the last three books 
 
Given that the security of Hooker’s papers, including the last three books (which 
were, of course, at the time of Hooker’s death in 1600 as yet unpublished) would have 
had an obvious influence on their textual integrity and authenticity for subsequent 
readers and editors, the question of how to treat the supposed texts of these books, and 
the process by which the manuscripts came to light, was a pressing one for Keble. 
That the last three books of the Lawes covered the subjects of jurisdiction, 
episcopacy, and Royal Supremacy meant that this question was particularly urgent, 
since these passages were of especial interest to Keble and the Oxford Movement in 
their attempts to join Hooker’s defence of the Church of England Established to their 
own.656 
 
There were a number of issues surrounding these books which may have been 
problematic for the Oxford Movement. In respect of Book VI, though Hooker makes 
a clear case that lay elders are not to exercise ecclesiastical jurisdiction in cases of 
discipline, which in itself strengthens the cause of the Oxford Movement for ordained 
clergy alone having jurisdiction in these matters, the argument of Hooker is 
undermined by those who say either that Book VI is not by Hooker at all,657 or that it 
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is by Hooker, but does not belong in the Lawes,658 and therefore, may lose some of its 
quasi-magisterial status. 
 
Book VII causes problems for the Tractarians mostly in that whilst Hooker makes the 
case that bishops have been around in the Church since the time of the Apostles, they 
are of the bene esse of the Church, rather than the esse – and also that it is very 
difficult to attach a Iure Divino concept to Hooker’s episcopal ideals with any clarity. 
Evidently to be able to do so would further the cause of the Tractarians. 
 
The main problematical issue with Book VIII for the Tractarians was that the balance 
of Church and State espoused by Hooker in the sixteenth century no longer existed in 
any recognizable way in the nineteenth century. It was simply no longer the case that 
every citizen of the country was also a member of the Church of England – and that 
therefore not everyone (and this included Parliament, which was certainly no longer 
entirely Church of England, and where the monarch was fully ‘sovereign’) should, or 
could, have a say on the governance and affairs of the Church of England. 
 
Keble, in his preface to the 1836 edition, infers that Hooker did not trust his wife to 
deal with his literary estate by herself, perhaps suggesting that she may have been 
open to influence or corruption.659 Keble’s account of the administration of Hooker’s 
estate therefore leads us to believe that he thought (perhaps as did Hooker) that Joan 
Churchman, Hooker’s widow, would have been easily influenced or strong-armed by 
those who saw the Lawes as a threat: 
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Next, his papers with the rest of his chattels were given by his last 
will to his wife, whom he left sole executrix under the supervision 
of a person of the name Churchman, probably her father…in 
conjunction with his own friend and pupil, Sandys.660 
Keble then proceeds to give an account of the uncertainty and concern for the 
integrity of Hooker’s papers, indicating that they had been almost immediately 
interfered with in the days after Hooker’s death: ‘only at five days afterwards661 Dr 
[Lancelot] Andrewes being then at Court, wrote to Dr Parry…requesting him to 
provide without delay for the security of the papers.’662 Clearly, Keble seems to have 
found evidence suggesting that the material believed to be contained in the latter three 
books was so inflammatory, threatening powerful parties in the Church, that the 
papers had been tampered with immediately after Hooker’s death, with the culprits 
perhaps taking advantage of Hooker’s widow’s imbalance of mind due to grief. 
 
If the evidence that Keble included is to be believed, Hooker’s papers were not 
immediately forthcoming: 
after three months, the Archbishop having sent one of his chaplains 
to Mrs. Hooker…she was summoned before the Privy Council, and 
in a preliminary examination confessed to the Archbishop, that 
many of her husband’s writings had been burned and torn by a Mr. 
Chalke…and another minister who dwelt near Canterbury.663 
This evidence leads Keble to state that: 
on the whole, the conclusion is irresistible: that the completed 
books were irrecoverably gone; and that all that remained was to 
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secure and arrange what was left of the rough drafts...these, it may 
be supposed, Mrs. Hooker gave to the Archbishop, on occasion of 
the aforesaid inquiry.664 
And further: 
from [Prynne, one of the then keepers of Hooker’s papers on behalf 
of the State] it passed to Hugh Peters, by a vote of the Commons, 
June 27 1644. Nothing more is known of the fate of the original 
papers.665 
Hence, Keble’s explanation as to why some believed the last three books of the Lawes 
to be unreliable was because they were the dog-eared remains of Hooker’s papers, his 
study having been ransacked by clergymen and others who either themselves, or on 
behalf of others, believed the material contained therein to be dangerous and 
disruptive. 
 
Keble’s account of the administration of Hooker’s estate was not the only way that 
Keble would have been able to cast doubt on the authenticity of the last three books, 
however. The inclusion of Walton’s biography (see note 658 above) may have 
indicated an unwillingness to see the last three books as authentically Hookerian and 
authentically part of the Lawes, but Keble included it all the same because he had no 
other more reliable biography of Hooker. 
 
The first biography of Hooker was that by Bishop John Gauden, published with the 
1662 edition of the Lawes, and edited by Gauden himself. It is noteworthy that 
Gauden’s biography was replaced almost immediately in the next edition of the 
Lawes, published in 1666, by that written by Izaak Walton. The main problems 
surrounding Gauden’s biography of Hooker were that Gauden was a moderate 
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churchman, with a somewhat ‘low’ view of the episcopacy and monarch – precisely 
the opposite of what was needed to create a robust defence of the Established Church 
in Restoration England. Walton was therefore commissioned by Archbishop Gilbert 
Sheldon to write a more (polemically) reliable biography of Hooker. The issues 
surrounding the two extant seventeenth-century biographies will be discussed at more 
length in section 6.2c below. 
 
In the appendix to the life of Hooker, Walton includes the book-burning incident in a 
transcript of Joan Churchman’s confession to Whitgift666 – this incident, Martin 
points out, is the only aspect of the appendix to the Lives that is not ‘hedged about 
with documentary evidence.’667 The suggestion that this has been included by Walton 
without sufficient evidence as proof may indicate that Walton himself was keen to 
cast doubt as much as possible upon the unreliability and integrity of the last three 
books. Therefore, by including Walton’s biography, Keble throws further doubt upon 
the integrity and reliability of those books – which meant that his editorial hand 
would be able to guide, with freer rein, the reader’s interpretation of the controverted 
issues in the Lawes. If Hooker was not clear himself on what he wanted to say, then 
along would come Keble to frame the reader’s mind in the editorial preface. 
 
Given that those who wished to have more lay involvement in the governance of the 
Church would have been keen to suppress the contents of Book VI, Keble believed 
that the sixth book, on jurisdiction, would have been the first target of any such 
Puritan raiding party.668 This was because Book VI discussed at some length the 
exclusive right of the minister to administer discipline within the church community 
as opposed to a lay panel of elders. If the raiding party on Hooker’s study had 
                                                
666 Hooker, Lawes, Vol I, 92. 
667 Jessica M. Martin, Walton’s Lives: Conformist Commemorations and the Rise of Biography 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 251. 
668 Keble does not seem able to identify exactly who might have been in any such raiding party, only 







contained figures from more of an Establishment background, Keble believed the 
danger would have lain elsewhere: 
a churchman would be under no temptation of the sort [to pilfer the 
sixth book first]…more likely it would have been Books VII or VIII 
in which he might think unguarded concessions…made to the 
prejudice of regal or episcopal authority.669 
Given that Keble seems to dwell somewhat on the physical history of the last three 
books amongst Hooker’s estate, it is reasonable to assume that he thought there was 
especially contentious material therein – the authenticity of which would greatly 
affect the ability of Keble to claim them as allies (or not) for the Oxford Movement’s 
cause. 
 
Here we have the first evidence of Keble’s inherent contradictions in his editorial 
preface of the Lawes. Yes, Keble is saying that the last three books are authentically 
Hooker – but that not all of them belong in the Lawes. This is especially bizarre, 
given that as Book VI denigrates the opinion that lay elders should at the most have a 
very limited part in the administration of Church discipline, why should Keble wish to 
downplay its place amongst the other seven books? 
 
The last three books were published after Hooker’s death, and therefore it is not 
possible to say with complete certainty that they made it to press exactly as Hooker 
intended. Therefore, given that the material as now published would have been seen 
by the more Puritan parties to be somewhat inflammatory, then given the insecure 
status of Hooker’s papers post-mortem, it is possible that the manuscripts of the last 
three books were targeted by those who had most to lose from their being published. 
 
                                                







It is entirely possible that Keble is simply being a careful scholar in that it is not 
possible to guarantee the authenticity of the last three books because they were 
constructed from the remnants and remains of the chaos of Hooker’s study, and that 
there remains a question as to the extent of their interference by unknown third 
parties, the most likely target being Book VI because of its views, at least as known 
from the extant version, on lay elders. 
 
This section has argued that the security of Hooker’s papers after his death led to 
claims that the authenticity of his last three books, still to be published, was uncertain.  
This created problems for Keble, given the topics covered - Book VI (the issue of Lay 
Elders); Book VII (bishops as bene esse, and also Iure Divino uncertainty); and Book 
VIII (a balance of Church and State which no longer existed in the nineteenth 
century).  The reliability of the manuscripts were further pulled into doubt for Keble 
due to Keble’s doubts over Hooker’s wife’s competency to administer Hooker’s 
estate.  Keble’s concerns in this area mean that doubts are cast on the problematic last 
three books.  By including Walton’s biography of Hooker (acknowledging that this 
was the most reliable extant version), Keble is able to increase uncertainties over 
books VI to VIII.  Finally, Keble raises the contradiction that though the last three 
books are, on balance, by Hooker, did they belong in the Lawes? By doing these 
things, Keble was able to cast doubt on areas of Hooker’s polity which were not 
necessarily of help to the Tractarian cause. 
 
ii. Editorial conflict: The Dublin Fragments of Book VI; controversy with Books 
VII and VIII. 
 
The ‘Dublin Fragments’ are those parts of Book VI that are currently located in the 
library of Trinity College, Dublin, and which were examined by Hooker’s protégés, 







argued to be so unlike the character of the rest of the Lawes that it may not be written 
by Hooker at all.670 The textual integrity and subsequent issues of the reliability of 
Book VI are important for the question of episcopal authority because it discussed 
issues of jurisdiction, and more so who had authority over what. More particularly, 
the issues of jurisdiction and lay eldership are directly relevant to questions of 
episcopal authority, because if lay eldership was legitimate and justified, there would 
be areas of overlap with the authority exercised by that of a bishop. The Dublin 
Fragments are a key part of understanding Book VI, and therefore subsequently the 
issues surrounding episcopal and lay authority. 
 
In his preface, Keble sought to strengthen the argument that Book VI was indeed by 
Hooker, and was nearly complete – saying, for instance, ‘Dr. Elrington further 
remarks, that the [Dublin] manuscript had the appearance of being written out for the 
press.’671 Further, the fact that Cranmer and Sandys edited and annotated Book VI 
with the Dublin Fragments relating to it to further the cause of Hookerian authorship: 
…as far as it can be understood, implies the annotators to have had 
before them a work really addressing itself to the question of Lay 
Elders, and meeting all the arguments, which, as we know from 
contemporary writers, the upholders of the Puritan platform were 
used to allege.672 
Keble’s research thus leads him to conclude that ‘although it [Book VI] be found in 
the wrong place,673 yet there is no cause whatever to account it ascribed to a wrong 
author.’674 This appears to contradict the feelings of Walton somewhat, who was not 
                                                
670 See W. Speed-Hill, Essays Preliminary, who claimed that Book VI was re-written by Hooker as a 
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671 Hooker, Lawes, Vol I, xxxiv. Dr Elrington (1760-1835), Bishop of Ferns, was Provost of Trinity 
College Dublin from 1811-1820. 
672 Hooker, Lawes, Vol I, xxxvi. 
673 In that Keble believes its place in the Lawes itself is not absolutely certain. 
674 Keble, Works, Preface, p. xxxviii. Keble notes that a large part of Book VI after VI.iii.1 could be 








inclined to ascribe Book VI as it stood as being authentically Hooker’s, given the 
implied interference with Hooker’s papers: 
There appears to be both omissions and additions in the said last 
three Books; and this may probably be one reason why Dr. 
Sanderson,675 the said learned bishop…gave a strict charge near the 
time of his death, or in his last will, ‘that nothing of his, that was 
not already printed, should be printed after his death’.676 
Walton, then, was at least willing to entertain the view that the texts of the last three 
books were too suspect to be treated as authoritative. Though Keble may have thought 
that Book VI may not be best placed amongst the Lawes, Keble did not doubt its 
Hookerian authenticity. Yet, for Keble to include Walton’s remarks on the 
authenticity of the last three books (the subject of which would not always have 
helped the Tractarian argument for episcopacy) meant that Keble could cast doubt on 
unhelpful passages of the Lawes without doing so himself, thus setting himself out as 
the archetypal non-partisan, careful editor (at least in respect of the texts themselves – 
the impartial Keble as writer of the editorial preface is another matter, as we shall 
see). 
 
This editorial disagreement was nothing new, however – the early editors and 
caretakers of the Lawes were certainly not of one voice. The disagreements of Sandys 
and Andrewes, in their work on Book VI, pale in comparison to the controversy that 
raged over the content of Book VII, where Hooker is somewhat unwilling to claim 
divine right for the apostolic succession. Of this, Keble writes that for Jewel, Whitgift, 
Bishop Cooper, and others: 
                                                                                                                                      
Hooker’s remains altogether, but from forming part of the Ecclesiastical Polity’ (Hooker, Lawes, Vol I, 
xxxviii).  
675 Bishop of Lincoln, (1660-1663), of whom Walton also wrote a biography. 







it is enough, with them, to shew that the government by archbishops 
and bishops is ancient and allowable; they never venture to urge its 
exclusive claim, or to connect the succession with the validity of the 
holy sacraments: and yet it is obvious that such a course of 
argument could fully meet all the exigencies of the case.677 
Despite having said this, Keble did believe that the last three books of the Lawes were 
indeed from Hooker’s pen – but his argument in doing so was fatally flawed by the 
inclusion in his front matter of contemporary letters that cast doubt on their 
authenticity. Keble’s insistence on the authenticity of Books VI–VIII requires careful 
acknowledgement that this does not necessarily imply they have a place among the 
Lawes. If they did, this would mean a church polity that was uncertain as to the place 
of lay elders; denied bishops as being part of the apostolic succession and thus 
denigrated their authority; and also gave the monarch an ability to interact with the 
Church in a way that the Oxford Movement would have found problematic. Given 
that Keble himself was unsure of their textual integrity – and indeed even, in the case 
of Book VI, its inclusion in the Lawes in the first place – it is not easy to glean a clear 
answer. 
 
Keble, if he wished to present the Lawes as Hooker’s most valuable offering to the 
polity of the English Church, undermined its credibility by first of all surrounding his 
version of the Lawes with unsupportive evidence; and secondly, by casting doubt on 
the right of Book VI to be there in the first place. Keble may have felt obliged to 
include all eight books of the Lawes in his edition, even if he doubted the integrity of 
the full corpus. 
 
Why, then, did Keble include Book VI amongst the Lawes if he doubted its 
Hookerian integrity? The most obvious and immediate answer is that by not including 
it, Keble would have gone against the accepted consensus of the time, and would have 
                                                







therefore cast doubt on his own scholarly credentials. Keble includes Book VI 
alongside Books VII and VIII because they are accepted by consensus – even if their 
textual integrity can only ever be doubted because of the physical uncertainty of the 
manuscript remnants in Hooker’s study; and in that sense, Keble is correct to draw 
attention to that uncertainty. 
 
Keble adds to the discussion of Book VI by inclusion of Walton’s biography – though 
of course this may well have been primarily because Walton’s biography was the 
most reliable of the two extant ones in the early nineteenth century: it was the least 
bad option, and the consequences of its inclusion are discussed in the following 
section. 
 
Keble also throws doubt on the usage of Book VII by Bishops Jewel, Whitgift, and 
Cooper, by accusing them of accepting Hooker’s evident argument for the existence 
and use of bishops as being ‘ancient and allowable’, rather than delving further into 
the usefulness of bishops in ways that the Oxford Movement would have found most 
helpful. 
 
Keble also includes letters and papers in the front matter of his edition of the Lawes 
that cast doubt on the authenticity of the last three books. It could be argued that by so 
doing, Keble was muddying the waters for any conclusion as to authenticity. Though 
Keble tries to argue that the last three books are authentic, but not necessarily 
complete (in various degrees), the inclusion of any contrary front matter is surely just 
evidence that Keble is anxious to present a scholarly and thorough edition. Keble 
presents the evidence as he has found it, but prefaces that with his own polemical 
reasoning that the Lawes should, and must, be read in such a way that Hooker’s 
argument can only be seen to be justifying and bolstering the claims of the Tractarians 








Of the last three books of the Lawes, which are all problematic in respect of their 
integrity, Book VI is the most reliably Hookerian, and the Dublin Fragments bolster 
this argument. Besides which, the material contained in Book VI, on lay jurisdiction, 
was not the most incendiary for Hooker’s executors. Books VII and VIII were more 
problematic, and thus not as reliably Hookerian – but because the arguments 
contained therein were not as friendly to the Tractarian cause, Keble was less troubled 
by this. Keble included Books VII and VIII in the spirit of scholarly integrity – but by 
allowing criticism of their integrity to stand, this meant that he was able to cast doubt 
on the arguments contained therein. 
 
I have argued in this section that the discovery of the Dublin fragments indicated to 
Keble that Book VI may be in the wrong place, but are still authentically Hooker, 
which is contrary to Walton’s opinion.  This meant that Keble could, in this contested 
atmosphere, cast doubt on the unhelpful passages of the Lawes.  For Keble, Book VII 
was even more problematic, if authentic, because it gave the monarch a greater role in 
the Church, and denied the apostolic succession of bishops, as understood by Keble.  
Keble further undermined Hooker by surrounding his edition of the Lawes with 
unsupportive evidence, and also by casting doubt on the place of Book VI in the 
Lawes.  Keble also included contrary (to the Tractarian cause) front matter to make 
himself appear more scholarly and thorough, with an undoubtedly polemical editor’s 
preface.  
 
6.2c The Inclusion of Walton’s Biography 
 
The question of why Keble chose to include Walton’s biography at the beginning of 
his edition of the Lawes, together with the two appendices to Walton’s life of Hooker, 
is important for a number of reasons. Izaak Walton was an English writer best known 
for his Compleat Angler, but also for his biographies of noteworthy people, such as 








The first major biography of Hooker was undertaken by Bishop John Gauden in 1662, 
but this was soon regarded to be so inaccurate and undesirable that Walton’s Life was 
first published as soon as in 1665 and included with the revised 1666 edition of the 
Lawes. Walton was commissioned by Gilbert Sheldon to write a new Life of Hooker 
because the original one, written by John Gauden, was at odds with Sheldon’s aims. 
What the Restoration Church needed was a biography of its justifying luminary that 
fitted in with their vision: Gauden’s account of Hooker, deemed to be littered with 
errors and inaccuracies, did not. 
 
The personal views of any biographer are bound to impose themselves upon the 
subject being studied, and so Gauden’s views themselves must be taken into account 
when considering why Keble decided to include Walton’s biography (imperfect 
though that was, in turn). 
 
Gauden was Bishop of Exeter between 1660 and 1662, a ‘moderate’ who was 
considered to hold a somewhat low-church opinion in respect of the foundation of 
episcopacy. Gauden believed that the college of bishops should model a Presbyterian 
synod – an opinion that would not endear his biography of Hooker to someone of the 
opinions of Keble (though it is worth noting that Gauden believed Books VI to VIII to 
be from Hooker’s pen, but that ‘they have not that last polish that their author is so 
customarily recognized for’, anticipating Keble – especially in relation to Book VI). 
 
This moderate position was not the support that the newly re-established Church of 
England’s more outspoken partisans needed – especially as Gauden’s biography 
contained a plethora of historical inaccuracies (Gauden failed to notice that Hooker 
had been married, for example), and in general cast Hooker in an inaccurate light.678 
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What the nascent Church of England needed was a strong advocate for the apostolic 
succession of bishops and Iure Divino monarchy – both things that we now know 
Hooker to have, on balance, supported, but at the time, things that Gauden would not 
have been able to align himself with. 
 
Because of Gauden’s known personal views on bishops and monarchy, his 
endorsement of the authenticity of Hooker’s last three books could be seen to have 
claimed Hooker as more of a moderate than others would wish him to be – as 
supporting a less powerful episcopate, and a constitutional monarchy limited by law 
and grounded in the consent of the people.679 Whilst Keble would not necessarily 
have agreed that the king gained his authority from the consent of his subjects to be so 
governed, Keble would have had some sympathy for a ‘social contract’ between the 
monarch and the populace – and perhaps by extension the Church – letting each do 
what God had ordained them to do, rather than meddling in each other’s business. 
 
Gauden believed in a moderate episcopacy, and tried to further his career by aligning 
himself with the respectable Hooker – but Gauden’s earlier belief that the Church held 
some kind of blame for the Civil War, together with his rough and ready style, made 
his biography unpalatable to Restoration authorities.680 Add this to Gauden’s tendency 
to make Hooker sound like a ‘boring failure’, or his claim that the text of the Lawes 
was unreadable,681 and it is no surprise that Keble, if he wanted to build up any kind 
of credibility for Hooker, had to choose Walton, the only other extant biography of 
Hooker at the time. 
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Appendix to Hooker’s Life, which Keble includes. 
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A moderate Hooker was not what the Restoration Church needed, and so Archbishop 
Gilbert Sheldon commissioned Walton (1593-1683), a known biographer who had a 
‘reputation as a strong royalist with a high view of the episcopacy and a love of high 
church ceremonial’ to correct the damage Gauden had caused.682 Walton’s account of 
Hooker’s life, which appeared in 1665, quickly became the standard by which Hooker 
was known, principally simply because it was simply more reliable than the preceding 
attempt by Gauden. 
 
Keble may have retained Walton’s biography of Hooker not just because it was the 
standard ‘life’ of his subject, or because Walton was a royalist and a supporter of the 
apostolic succession. It may also have been the thought that Walton, according to 
Gibbs, believed the Civil War could have been avoided ‘only by the submissive 
obedience of all private individuals to their divinely appointed superiors both in 
church and commonwealth.’683 The submission of the populace to their superiors 
would have appealed to the Oxford Movement because it respected the divinely 
ordained order of things, and was therefore yet another argument against unrest and 
any potential political threat to the Church. However, it is worth considering if the 
Tractarians still regarded the government of the day ‘divinely appointed’ if it stepped 
outside of its legitimate bounds of authority, such as in the Irish Temporalities Bill. 
Perhaps this could be an example of how Hooker’s justification for obedience of 
ecclesiastical authorities trumps obedience of civil authorities if divine law is broken 
(I.xvi.5).684 
 
We have seen above that there are examples of how Walton’s theory of Church and 
State may have caused problems in its application in nineteenth-century Britain. 
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Walton presented a version of Hooker’s life that was not entirely uncontentious. 
Martin suggests that: 
The main text of Walton’s life was also propped at both ends by 
different kinds of letters and testimonies signed by a selection of 
reasonably senior clergymen, all apparently devoted to asserting 
that Hooker’s text following was regrettably corrupt and unreliable, 
and that whole chunks of the later books probably hadn’t been 
written by Hooker at all.685 
Given that bolstering a biography with evidence that the subject’s main work was 
incomplete and unreliable would do no favours at all to increase the oeuvre’s 
standing, this would not help Keble glean from Hooker the defence of an apostolically 
founded episcopate with Iure Divino potential.686 One exception to this is flagged by 
Martin, who notes that Walton stresses: 
Hooker’s…spiritual friendship with the obdurately Iure Divino 
Hadrian Saravia, which Walton confirms…with a description of 
Saravia’s deathbed attendance on Hooker …Hooker and Saravia are 
here [by Walton] assigned a common will. Saravia’s absolutist 
position on the divine right of the monarch, and on the similarly 
divine authority conferred on the episcopate by apostolic succession 
are being rubbed off on Hooker by propinquity.687 
This close friendship between Hooker and Saravia is here bolstered by Walton: ‘in 
this place of Borne, these two excellent persons began a holy friendship, increasing 
daily to so high and mutual affections, that their two wills seemed to be but one and 
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the same.’688 It is also given further credence by Walter Froude in a letter to John 
Henry Newman: 
If Rickards writes about the revival of the Doctrine of Apostolic 
Succession since the Reformation, he must get Hooker’s Dr Saravia 
who was the first that started it, and must learn something of 
Bancroft’s famous sermon in 1588 about which such a fuss was 
made.689 
It would seem that even if Hooker himself was not willing to nail his Iure Divino 
colours to the mast, then potentially Walton, and certainly the Tractarians, were 
willing to make that claim for Hooker by means of his association with Saravia. Keble 
explicitly claimed this: 
And since Saravia was afterwards in familiar intercourse with 
Hooker, and his confidential adviser when writing on nearly the 
same subjects, we may with reason use the recorded opinions of the 
one for interpreting what might seem otherwise ambiguous in the 
other.690 
This may be a reasonable assumption to make considering the Tractarians wished to 
find justification for Iure Divino episcopacy in Hooker – but as Hooker in fact refused 
to be drawn in any one direction on the matter, we can say that here, Keble, and 
indeed Newman, are asserting an opinion for Hooker for which there is no definite 
evidence.691 
 
                                                
688 Hooker, Lawes, Vol 1, 77. 
689 W H Froude to J H Newman, 15/9/1833, Newman, Letters and Diaries, Vol 4, 51. 
690 Hooker, Lawes, Vol I, lxxv. 
691 John Gascoigne makes the claim that Keble’s preface attempted to rescue Hooker from the liberal 
‘taint’ of Locke and Hoadly, and sought to pull Hooker towards the Laudian doctrine of Iure Divino 
episcopacy (John Gascoigne, ‘The Unity of the Church and State Challenged: Responses to Hooker 








However, whilst not entirely in favour of Keble’s cause, Walton’s biography was at 
least the more favourable and reliable of the two extant versions available to Keble at 
the time.692 To have included Gauden’s biography would have been injurious to 
Keble’s cause. Walton, at least, wrote his life of Hooker in a political climate that was 
looking to justify the existence of an episcopal Church with legitimate and ordered 
relations with the State and Crown. Though Keble would not have wanted the 
Tractarians to fight for a Restoration-esque Church with its emphasis on monarchy, 
Walton did at least, in Keble’s eyes, write a biography of Hooker that justified the 
near-necessity of bishops, Iure Divino, and their authority in the Church. 
 
I have argued in this section that Walton was commissioned to write a new biography 
of Hooker because Gilbert Sheldon did not like Gauden’s version, which he 
considered to be inaccurate.  Gauden was seen as ‘low church’, in favour of a 
Presbyterian synod, and thought that Books VI-VIII were authentic.  Additionally, 
Gauden’s personal views meant that his presentation of Hooker was more moderate 
than the Tractarians wished for.  Walton, on the contrary, had a reputation as a 
royalist with high church views in favour of episcopacy, who allegedly argued that 
the Civil War could have been avoided if people would have obeyed their superiors.  
Walton’s involvement was not without controversy, however, as first, his biography 
was bookended with sources which cast doubt on the reliability of Books VI-VIII; 
second, he claimed that Saravia attended Hooker’s deathbed; and third, that this 
meant claims of a Iure Divino doctrine of episcopacy could be made for Hooker.  
Thus, Walton’s biography of Hooker was able to bolster Tractarian claims for the esse 
of bishops, their Iure Divino, and their bolstered authority. 
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6.2d Editorial Integrity in Keble’s Editorial Preface and Textual Presentation 
 
In order to present his edition of the Lawes as a reputable scholarly tome, Keble 
needed to ensure his presentation of Hooker’s actual text and preface was as accurate 
as possible. We have already seen that Keble restricted his alteration of Hooker’s 
physical text as such: 
The greatest liberty taken with the text by the present Editor has 
been the breaking it up into numbered paragraphs and sections, and 
inserting, by way of running title, the chief topics of as many 
paragraphs as the space would conveniently receive.693 
The only places, then, that were left for Keble to exercise any editorial influence, 
would have been his own editor’s preface. In this section, we will consider a 
representative selection of those texts in Keble’s editorial preface dealing with such 
controverted issues as the necessity of bishops, the claim for Iure Divino of those 
bishops, and the authority that they held (notably in relation to apostolic succession); 
and whether or not Keble exercised any editorial interference with Hooker’s text in 
those areas. 
 
i.  Keble’s presentation of the texts of the Lawes in the controverted areas 
 
It would be easy to think that Keble tried as much as possible to muscle Hooker into 
the mould of the Oxford Movement. We will continue to analyse Keble’s Preface to 
the Lawes to ascertain the extent of his editorial bias – and have found so far that 
there are significant and repeated attempts to magnify the importance of Hooker 
where Hooker is in agreement with the Tractarians, and that where Hooker is in 
disagreement, Keble attempts to dismiss or explain away Hooker’s ‘errant’ thinking. 
                                                








The text that really matters, of course, is the text of the Lawes itself, and to what 
extent Keble manipulated it. In preparation for writing this chapter, I analysed the 
texts of the 1662 (Gauden), the 1666 (Walton-Gauden), and the 1836 (Walton-Keble) 
editions of the Lawes in those places where significant controverted topics were 
discussed. I found that there was no difference between the three editions, save for the 
occasional capitalization (or decapitalization) of letters at the beginning of words, and 
the occasional italicization, or not, of some words. We have already highlighted that 
Keble was the first editor of the Lawes to add a numbering and titling system with the 
aim of helping the general reader – but aside from the slight visual differences to the 
actual text, this could not be said to have manipulated the actual meaning of the texts 
in question. 
 
Keble does not alter the actual text of the Lawes itself694 – and despite on occasion 
adding an editorial footnote, nothing of significance from the editor is placed in the 
body of the Lawes that could be argued to influence the reading of the actual text 
itself. 
 
Therefore, having established that Keble did not alter the actual text of the Lawes, 
save for the editorial adjustments and additions mentioned above, the only significant 
way in which Keble could affect the understanding of Hooker’s text is through his 
editorial preface. 
 
In my analysis of Keble’s preface, I argue that whilst Keble is not afraid to highlight 
those areas of Hooker that would help the Tractarian cause, he is also happy to play 
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down those areas that do not aid the Tractarians: for example, in the claim by Keble 
that Hooker would have made more of the necessity of bishops if he had had the 
benefit of St Ignatius, whose reliability as a witness was, according to Keble, 
discovered shortly after Hooker’s death. Keble’s preface is polemical; although we 
should note that it is comparatively mild compared to what would have happened if, 
say, Newman were to have edited the Lawes instead. 
 
 
ii Three controverted doctrines in Keble’s presentation of the Lawes 
 
This section will argue that, because Keble was part of a wider Tractarian group 
reading Hooker and his Lawes, Keble was to some degree influenced by the opinions 
of his fellow scholars in the course of editing the Lawes, and also its subsequent 
interpretation, particularly in the areas of their claims for Iure Divino, the necessity of 
bishops, and consequent episcopal authority. 
 
The Tractarians were not the only group attempting to claim Hooker for their own 
ends during the nineteenth century – and so the influence of the Tractarians and the 
polemical climate in which they operated must be understood alongside the 
competing claims for Hooker by other parties within the Church of England. 
Christopher Wordsworth, Bishop of Lincoln in the mid-nineteenth century, in a letter 
to his son, made a claim for Hooker and Burke to counter, in his opinion, the 
Tractarian misrepresentation (which was in turn taken from the later Non-Jurors) that 
the Church and State were in fact two distinct entities merely accidentally brought 
into union. In its place, he proposed a counter-notion that Church and State were 
rather a wholly united entity, as opposed to the Tractarian argument that the Church 
and State were already separated.695 
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Keble did appear to espouse the Hookerian ideal of the godly prince, as evidenced in 
a sermon given on Ascension Day in 1855, preaching on a text from Isaiah 49: ‘and 
Kings shall be thy nursing fathers.’696 Further on in that sermon, Keble states the 
‘Church, of herself feeble and helpless, and so far like an infant, is committed by 
Divine Providence to the care of the State; as any child might be to the care of its 
nurse.’ This nurse, by extension for Keble, would be the chief magistrate to which 
Hooker refers in Book VIII of the Lawes, an argument on which Keble draws at 
length (though not explicitly tying it to Book VIII) in his preface: 
The whole Church, being naturally the subject in which all 
ecclesiastical power resides, may have had originally the right of 
determining how it would be governed…in as much as the Church 
did determine from very early times to be governed by Bishops, it 
cannot be right to swerve from that government in any country 
where the same may be maintained, consistently with soundness of 
doctrine, and the rights of the chief magistrate, being Christian.697 
By using the evidence of Hooker, Keble makes a case for government by bishops 
under the care of a Christian monarch – a case strengthened because this status quo 
has been in existence since apostolic times. Again, however, Keble’s conclusion is not 
entirely clear because, despite arguing for bishops under the care of a Christian 
monarch, the latter exercising their power in conjunction with a Christian magistracy, 
by the 1830s the magistracy was no longer entirely Christian, never mind entirely 
Church of England. 
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Keble, in finding no explicit evidence in the Lawes for the support of Iure Divino by 
Hooker, sought to put the words and opinions of Hadrian Saravia, the Querimonia, 
and even, albeit indirectly, St Ignatius, into the mouth of Hooker.698 
 
Keble would have been aware of the importance of clarifying Hooker’s stance on 
episcopacy in order to bolster arguments for proper church order and the duties of the 
State and the laity in relation to ecclesiastical authority, a clarification heightened by 
the Irish Temporalities Bill, amongst other things. As Hooker’s own stance is 
somewhat difficult to pinpoint even now, this would have been all the more acute a 
problem in the early years of the nineteenth century. 
 
In order to align Hooker with the desired objectives of the Tractarians, Keble draws a 
parallel between Hooker and Saravia, the latter of whom he regards as providing ‘a 
distinct and independent testimony to the doctrine of exclusive divine right in 
Bishops.’699 Keble also cites Saravia’s Three Tractates (1592): 
For God’s wisdom hath so tempered this polity, that it opposes 
itself to no form of civil government…Bishops I consider to be 
necessary to the Church, and that discipline and government of the 
Church to be the best, and divine, which religious Bishops, with 
Presbyters truely so called, administer by the rule of God’s word 
and ancient councils.700 
And he further cites the anonymous booklet, published in 1592, the Querimonia, 
which Keble claims is ‘even more express than Hooker in insisting on the divine 
origin and indispensable necessity of the episcopal order.’701 Yet, Keble also tempers 
his defence of Iure Divino episcopacy by observing that Jewel, Whitgift, and Cooper 
                                                
698 See Martin, Walton’s Lives, 252-3, and Keble, Works, Vol 1. 77, both of which discuss this point 
further. 
699 Hooker, Lawes, Vol I, lxxv. 
700 Hooker, Lawes, Vol I, lxxv. 







did not make that sacramental or apostolic successional leap: ‘it is enough, with them, 
to shew that the government by archbishops and bishops is ancient and allowable; 
they never venture to urge its exclusive claim, or to connect the succession with the 
validity of the holy sacraments.’702 Keble further acknowledges the complexity of 
discerning Hooker’s opinion when he states that ‘Hooker, as well as [Laud, 
Hammond, and Leslie], regarded the order of Bishops as being immediately and 
properly of Divine Right; he, as well as they, laid down principles, which strictly 
followed up would make this claim exclusive.’703 Keble goes on to say that Hooker 
does not press this point, as he did not have the advantage of the ‘fresh’ discovery of 
‘the genuine remains of St. Ignatius’: 
He did not feel at liberty to press unreservedly, and develop in all its 
consequences, that part of the argument, which they, taught by the 
primitive Church, regarded as the most vital and decisive: the 
necessity, namely, of the apostolical commission to the derivation 
of sacramental grace, and to our mystical communion with 
Christ.704 
Here, Keble acknowledges that Hooker does not press home the point of the apostolic 
succession guaranteeing sacramental grace – and also makes the claim that Hooker 
may well have agreed with the Tractarians, but, because of contemporary politics and 
the lack of Ignatius, did not do so explicitly. 
 
Keble attempts to put words into Hooker’s mouth when he claims that, given 
Hooker’s statements ‘on the episcopal side’, he would not hesitate to: 
set down Hooker as belonging to the same school in ecclesiastical 
opinions with Bilson and the author of the ‘Querimonia’…the 
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substance of those views being, that episcopacy grounded on 
apostolical succession was of supernatural origin and divine 
authority, whatever else was right or wrong.705 
Here we have strong evidence that Keble was trying his hardest to claim Hooker for 
the Tractarian cause – even going so far as to put words into the mouth of Hooker, 
who had on so many other subjects remained silent or indifferent. Hooker had 
censured ‘as rarely and as tenderly as possible what he found established by 
authority.’706 Keble here paints a picture of the careful scholar, and in so doing, 
attempts to attach even more weight to the opinions of Hooker, opinions that Keble 
attempts to claim for the Tractarian cause, even if Hooker does not cite what Keble 
claims he did. 
 
By attempting to claim for Hooker what Hooker did not explicitly claim for himself, 
using the texts of Saravia, the Querimonia, and even subsequent research into St 
Ignatius, Keble attempts to create a Tractarian Lawes, arguing for a long-established 
divine right of bishops and their authority, which cannot be established directly from 
the text of the Lawes itself. 
 
Keble, in his editorial preface, attempted to argue that bishops were of the esse of the 
Church, rather than of the bene esse – as the direct text of the Lawes makes clear. In 
order to reconcile this difference, Keble claims that Hooker was restrained by the 
political climate in which he wrote; qualified the example of non-episcopal ordination 
by emphasizing the extremely limited circumstances in which this was permissible; 
and emphasized the changed relations between Church and State since the sixteenth 
century – all lest the Church be tempted to follow the path of Erastianism. Bishops 
were therefore necessary to safeguard the sacraments and rites of the Church, and thus 
the apostolic succession that made this possible. 
                                                
705 Hooker, Lawes, Vol I, lxxxiii. 








One example of this is Keble’s claim in his preface that the Elizabethan bishops were 
not keen to insist upon the necessity of episcopal governance because of their 
personal friendships with foreign protestant congregations developed during their 
time as Marian exiles. Keble’s belief leads him to claim, ‘on the whole…it was very 
natural for them to waive, as far as they did, the claim of exclusive divine authority in 
their defences of episcopal rights.’707 It would seem that Keble manages to make the 
Elizabethan bishops’ reluctance to claim divine authority look like an act of humility 
and forbearance, rather than anything particularly theologically informed. 
 
Keble was keen to challenge the opinions the Elizabethan bishops held, simply 
because as they stood, these opinions and beliefs would not support the Tractarian 
cause of claiming Iure Divino episcopacy support from Hooker. It is worth including 
Keble’s justification for his views on the Elizabethan episcopate: 
Further, it is obvious that those divines…must have felt 
themselves…in some measure restrained from pressing with its 
entire force the ecclesiastical tradition on church government and 
orders…To all these causes of hesitation we must add the direct 
influence of the Court, which of course on this as on all similar 
occasions would come strongly in aid of the Erastian principle.708 
It is as if Keble is saying: ‘of course the Elizabethan bishops would have had these 
views: look at their immediate history and predecessors, and look at the control they 
had exercised over them by the State’. In other words, they had no option but to do as 
they did. If they had had more freedom in their opinion, of course, says Keble, they 
would have agreed with the obvious support for Iure Divino in the episcopate. 
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Regarding the question of the apostolic succession in the English bishops, Keble also 
tries to layer his Tractarian beliefs upon the atmosphere extant at the time of Hooker: 
‘Now, since the episcopal succession had been so carefully retained in the Church of 
England, and so much anxiety evinced to render both her liturgy and ordination 
services strictly conformable to the rules and doctrines of antiquity…’709 Keble also 
tries to claim Hooker was inspired by the likes of Thomas Bilson, Richard Bancroft, 
and Hadrian Saravia, determined to claim Hooker’s often-inscrutable mind for the 
Tractarian belief that the order of bishops was delivered from heaven by Iure Divino. 
As we shall see, this often led Keble to increase the gap between Hookerian reality 
and Tractarian fiction in the editorial preface. 
 
Keble, in his introduction to the Lawes, aligned himself with Hooker’s argument that 
the literalism so beloved of the English Puritans was incorrect: ‘all sensible things 
may have other meanings and uses than we know of, apt to assist men in realizing 
Divine contemplations.’710 Keble wanted to claim Hooker as a defender of episcopacy 
and the doctrine of apostolic succession, but stated that Hooker was held back from 
making further claims for episcopacy because of lack of credible supporting evidence 
in the late sixteenth century – an allusion to the fact that Ignatius had not yet emerged 
as a witness. 711 
[Hooker] regarded the order of Bishops as being immediately and 
properly of Divine Right; he…laid down principles, which strictly 
followed would make this claim exclusive. But he, in common with 
most of his contemporaries, shrunk from the legitimate result of his 
own premises…whereas the next generation of divines entered on 
the subject…fresh from the discovery of the genuine remains of St 
Ignatius. He did not feel at liberty to press 
unreservedly…that…which they, taught by the primitive Church, 
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regarded as the most vital and decisive: the necessity, namely, of 
the apostolical commission to the derivation of sacramental grace, 
and to our mystical communion with Christ.712 
 
Ceremonies, sacraments, and symbols were key battle standards of the Tractarians, 
and clearly Keble wanted to claim Hooker’s support for these too.713 Yet, Keble 
realized that Hooker, in his use of the Fathers and Patristics, could only draw on those 
who were known at the times in which he wrote the Lawes, and therefore Hooker 
would not have been as explicit as Keble would have liked. Nevertheless, Keble was 
unequivocal about the quality of Hooker’s usage of Patristics: ‘Surely also, on this 
point as on many others, Hooker’s sympathy with the fourth century rather than the 
sixteenth is perpetually breaking out.’714 
 
However, others in the Oxford Movement were not so sure that Protestantism and 
Patristics were reconcilable in the way that Hooker, according to Keble, attempted, 
citeing Patristic writers in a work that also cast significant amounts of reformed 
material in a positive light. In the preface to volume three of Froude’s Remains 
(1838), Newman states that: 
there can be little doubt that generally speaking the tone of the 
fourth century is so unlike that of the sixteenth on each and all of 
these topics, that it is absolutely impossible for the mind to 
sympathise with both. You must choose between the two lines: they 
are not only diverging, but contrary.715 
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Whether Newman’s opinion in Froude’s Remains would have lessened Keble’s ability 
to bolster Hooker’s credibility by stating that Hooker is able to include citations from 
the Church Fathers alongside those by reformed thinkers is not easy to discern: 
nonetheless, it is necessary to point out that by referring to Hooker as a ‘sixteenth 
century voice’, Newman is not necessarily being pejorative. He is rather stating the 
fact that a wide gulf did usually exist between the thought of the fourth and sixteenth 
centuries, theologically speaking. Yet, delve into the Fathers Hooker did, and Keble 
was keen to use this as evidence that Hooker was reliable and acceptable in these 
areas. 
 
Hooker argued that bishops had been in existence since the time of the Apostles, and 
the Tractarians argued that this factor contributed to their being therefore necessary. 
To dispense with bishops, therefore, would have consequences for a Church in which 
they had been a factor since its inception. In Part I, we saw that there were certain 
cases in which Hooker would permit non-episcopal ordination – that is, cases in 
extremis where the continuation of the Church, or the ability of the sacraments to be 
administered, would be at risk if there were not priests (or indeed bishops or deacons) 
around to perform the rites of baptism or Holy Communion (or, in the case of bishops, 
the rite of ordination). 
 
For Keble and the Oxford Movement, such a situation would risk the integrity of the 
Church, preserved (in their mind) since the time of the Apostles. Therefore, Keble 
was eager to inquire as to exactly what kind of circumstances Hooker had in mind 
when he suggested non-episcopal ordination might be permitted: ‘Here, that we may 
not overstrain the author’s meaning, we must observe first with what exact conditions 
of extreme necessity, unwilling deviation, impossibility of procuring a bishop to 
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ordain, he has limited his concession.’716 Keble does not offer a suggestion as to what 
Hooker had in mind – and merely directs the reader to be cautious of allowing non-
episcopal ordination, lest the Church of England slide even more towards a style of 
Presbyterianism that Hooker fought so hard against and that the Tractarians would 
find impossible because of the loss of the apostolic succession: 
if it really were the intention of that act to authorize other than 
episcopal ordination, it is but one more proof of the low 
accommodating notions concerning the Church which then 
prevailed; and may serve to heighten our sense of the imminent risk 
which we were in of losing the Succession.717 
Keble here attempts to highlight the success of Hooker in preserving the truth of 
ecclesiastical polity, especially given the troubled and dangerous times Hooker 
operated in: in the eyes of the Tractarians, Hooker had done very well indeed to make 
the case, albeit reduced, for episcopal ordination. Since it would be unlikely that there 
would not be a bishop around to perform ordinations in the Church of England, then 
the likelihood of non-episcopal ordinations would be low – and thus the ‘apostolic 
succession’, as the Tractarians called it, would have survived. The Tractarians 
regarded, of course, apostolic succession as necessary for the continuance of 
episcopal authority – and therefore by extension, to have non-episcopal ordination 
would be to ‘break’ that succession and would result in clergy without episcopal or 
sacramental authority. 
 
Why had Hooker felt able to permit non-episcopal ordination in certain 
circumstances? Keble does not expand on what kind of circumstances would permit 
that but suggests that ‘nearly up to the time when he wrote, numbers had been 
admitted to the ministry of the Church of England, with no better than Presbyterian 
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ordination.’718 This would suggest that some serving as ministers in Hooker’s time 
had entered that role in the Church by what Keble regarded as ‘Presbyterian 
ordination.’ This meant that there were ministers who had entered their role without 
having undergone the ‘laying on of hands’ by bishops within the apostolic succession 
– in other words, that they had not received the authority entrusted to the Apostles and 
subsequently passed down through their successors by means of episcopal 
ordination.719 
 
Should Hooker be seen to have admitted non-episcopal ordination as part of 
legitimate Church of England polity, then a certain Rubicon would have been crossed 
for the Oxford Movement. Keble was deeply afraid of the loss of apostolic 
succession, which would represent an incursion into the sacramental authority of the 
Church that was a key element of their distinction from civil authority. 
 
Keble was concerned that if the reforms imposed by the State upon the Church and its 
position in Society were to continue, a split was not only necessary, but also 
inevitable. Such an eventuality would be diametrically opposed to Hooker’s view that 
Church and State were inseparable, held together in the person of the Christian 
magistrate. Such an eventuality would be far removed from the ecclesial polity that 
was espoused by Hooker in the Lawes, and therefore a choice must be made between 
loyalty to the State, and loyalty to the Church. 
 
In a letter to Coleridge in March 1831, Keble wrote: 
If the Church and State are to be united, I do hope it will be before 
any attempt has been made to reform us by a Papysocratic 
Parliament…I am more and more inclined to think, that the sooner 
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we come to an open separation from these people, the better for 
ourselves and our flocks: and this is some comfort as one watches 
the progress of the Revolution, in which the said separation will, I 
expect, be a very early step.720 
Such was Keble’s concern over the direction the State was taking, and hence the 
effect upon the Church of England, that he wrote to Newman thus: 
I cannot accept any curacy or office in the Church of England…I 
think we ought to be prepared to sacrifice any or all of our 
endowments sooner than sanction it…take every pound, shilling, 
and penny, only let us make our own bishops, and be governed by 
our own laws.721 
This starkly unaccommodating position around the time of the Assize Sermon 
reflects, ultimately, the entirely changed character of Church–State relations since the 
formation of the Settlement in the 1550s. Thanks to religious pluralism, no longer was 
‘every man also a member of the Church of England’722 – and the Tractarian cause 
was a direct result of that: the old regime espoused by Hooker in the Lawes had fallen 
and a new one was required for the continuing health of the Church, and for the 
ability of the bishops, as successors of the Apostles, to exercise their divinely given 
authority without the constraints of the State.723 
 
In 1834, the year after the Assize Sermon, Keble developed his thinking with direct 
reference to the ideal as espoused by Hooker: 
                                                
720 Keble to Coleridge, MS Letter 31/3/1831, cited in John R. Griffin, ‘The Oxford Movement: A 
Revision’, in Faith and Reason: The Journal of Christendom College, Fall 1979, V, No.3. 
721 Keble to Newman 8/8/1833, Newman, Letters and Diaries, Vol 1, 411-2. 
722 Lawes VIII.i.2. 
723 ‘Although no Christian man can doubt the duty of obeying “the customs of the Realm,” where the 
law of God will permit. But whether the law of God does permit the continued acquiescence of those 
entrusted with the Church in a system which permits aliens and heretics to bear the chief sway in 
legislating for her, - this is the very point in dispute.’ John Keble, ‘The State in its relations with the 
Church’, a Paper re-printed from the British Critic, October 1839 and including an Appendix, a Letter 







the late changes in the Constitution affect the rights of Parliament to 
legislate for the Church. Many considerate persons think…the 
changes are so vital…as to amount to a virtual breach of the terms 
of union between Church and State. So that, in their judgment, the 
governors of the Church are at liberty, whenever in their 
consciences they shall deem it most expedient, to decline submitting 
themselves to the ecclesiastical laws of the Parliament. For the two 
societies are no longer identical, according to the theory of Hooker 
and the practice of the days of Queen Elizabeth.724 
It can be clearly seen from Keble’s letter that when the State was no longer able to 
offer protection to the Church, then the Church was under obligation to protect itself, 
even if that meant turning away from the State in a manner that, certainly in 
Elizabethan times, might seem seditious. We are reminded here of the ambiguity of 
Hooker himself regarding obedience (or otherwise) to the State when that consent to 
be so governed may have been withdrawn.725 Hooker deliberately does not define the 
exact boundaries of the monarch’s authority – other than those set out by natural-law 
theory in Book I.726 
 
Keble, therefore, attempts to manipulate Hooker’s arguments to support Keble’s own 
cause that bishops are essential for the apostolic succession, the safeguarding of the 
sacraments and rites of the Church, and for the ecclesiastical independence of the 
Church’s doctrine and teaching from the dangers of Erastianism. 
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The survey of above evidence points strongly to the fact that the concept of episcopal 
authority in the nineteenth-century Church of England had moved away from that 
enshrined in the Settlement of the late sixteenth century, and that the episcopal 
authority that the Tractarians wished to reclaim for the Church of England looked 
increasingly hard to find in Hooker. 
 
How did Keble’s involvement with the Tractarian issues of Iure Divino and the 
necessity of bishops affect the way their authority was viewed, especially in Keble’s 
Preface to the Lawes? Throughout the 1830s, Keble was deeply involved with the 
Lawes, and although his edition was not published until 1836, even by 1833 Keble 
was ‘more thoroughly acquainted with the works of that writer than any other English 
churchman,’727 meaning that Keble was able to write with a degree of authority about 
Hooker, which others of his generation could not do. 
 
In order to ‘push’ his version of Hooker, he needed to ensure continuity of contact 
with the Tractarians, despite no longer being physically in Oxford. Yet, Newman’s 
concern for him meant that his influence upon the Oxford Movement was not 
completely diminished. Though Keble wrote only eight Tracts in total, Newman 
regarded him as their ‘chief censor’, which meant that any Tracts published would 
have to have at least gained the tacit approval of Keble. Battiscombe regards Keble as 
having suffered from intellectual indolence: ‘he was, for instance, a lazy author; his 
published books are few in number and they include no work of first-class scholastic 
importance except his great edition of Hooker published in 1836.’728 This is perhaps a 
little harsh on Keble, given that he had additional responsibilities of family and 
parochial duties compared with other Tractarians such as Newman. However, that 
does not denigrate Keble’s influence upon the Oxford Movement in general, and on 
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its position on episcopal authority in particular.729 By extension, therefore, we would 
expect Keble, aside from his own opinions about episcopal authority, to have been 
cognizant of those of the wider Tractarians whilst writing his preface. 
 
Yet, just how close would Newman’s opinions have been to those of Keble, and 
therefore how much might Newman have been influenced by Keble’s presentation of 
Hooker in the Lawes? An examination of Newman’s correspondence has found that it 
is difficult to draw any direct evidence for the extent to which Newman may have 
been influenced by Keble’s presentation of Hooker in the Lawes, other than that 
Newman was impressed by Keble’s scholarship in this area, and that to be able to 
claim Hooker for the cause of the Tractarians would be a great benefit. In lieu of such 
direct evidence, however, Imberg gives a comparison of the differences in more 
general areas between Newman and Keble, which could potentially be of use when 
considering the influence of both Tractarians upon episcopal authority, as it would be 
possible, but not of course with any certainty, to identify influences upon the wider 
thought of Keble and Newman.730 
 
Though we must be careful to not make any conclusions with certainty from Imberg’s 
study, it would be fair to state that Imberg believed Keble to be more moderate than 
Newman. Pusey and Keble alike took some time to understand that Newman’s 
changing ideas were leading him toward Rome; Pusey and Keble did not share 
Newman’s views on episcopacy (although as expected they shared his more general 
theological principles), and this in part may explain why Pusey and Keble did not, 
ultimately, leave the Church of England. 
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Tract 4, one of the few that Keble is believed to have written, advises its clerical 
readers to ‘look upon his bishop as…something more than an agent of the State’, and 
to consider obedience and veneration of their bishop as the ‘safest way’ for clerics at a 
time of crisis. Keble believed that the State, despite its support and defence of the 
Church, was inferior to ecclesial ruling capacity. For Keble, authority was everything 
– and that included conscience, the Bible, the Church, and antiquity. What Keble 
hated most was ‘heresy, insubordination, resistance to things established, claims of 
independence, disloyalty, innovation [and] a critical censorious spirit.’731 
 
Ultimately, the Tracts, although written anonymously, argued for an episcopal 
authority that Hooker himself would not have ascribed to bishops. Regardless of who 
wrote a particular Tract, the aim was to claim that bishops in the Church of England 
were of apostolic descent, and that their authority was Iure Divino. Hooker was never 
clear enough in his own writing (indeed Hooker’s opinion in itself evolved during the 
time that the Lawes were written) to be able to say once and for all that bishops had 
the authority that the Oxford Movement wished for them – not least because those in 
the Church of England during the nineteenth century were unsure themselves as to 
what a bishop was for. 
 
I have argued in this section that Keble makes the case for government by bishops 
under the care of a Christian monarch – but was presented with the problem by the 
1830s that the magistracy of England was no longer exclusively Christian, let alone 
Church of England.  As Keble found little explicit evidence for Iure Divino 
episcopacy in the Lawes, he sought to transpose the opinions of Saravia and Ignatius 
to Hooker.  Keble claimed that Hooker may well have agreed with Saravia, but was 
not able to say so at the time due to the political climate, and Ignatius not yet having 
been discovered.  The problematic areas of non-episcopal ordination in extremis were 
emphasised by Keble as being only possible in a very tiny set of circumstances – with 
                                                
731 Newman, Apologia, 220. Note that Keble did not advocate blind obedience to the episcopate: see 







Hooker opting for bishops as bene esse because of the political constraints he was 
under.  Keble’s attempts to pigeonhole Hooker mean that he was able to make a 
number of unsubstantiated claims such as fabricating a definite support for Iure 
Divino, as well as attempting to align Hooker with the views of Bilson, Bancroft, and 
Saravia, amongst others.  Ultimately, the sixteenth century political climate was too 
different from that of the nineteenth century, and the Tractarians argued for an 




This chapter has argued that despite being a careful editor, Keble brazenly attempted 
to mold a sixteenth century Hooker into the nineteenth century Oxford Movement in 
his editor’s preface.  Keble placed an errant emphasis on the esse of bishops, as well 
as their Iure Divino, during a time when the authority of the Church was facing 
perceived threats from secular government.  Keble leaves contradictions between his 
preface, front material, and Walton’s biography (particularly in the areas of authority 
in Book VI, uncertain jurisdiction, and episcopal authority).  In particular, Keble 
attempted to skew Hooker in three areas: esse (as the apostolic succession was under 
threat); Iure Divino (Hooker, according to Keble, did not develop this fully as he did 
not have the benefit of Ignatius, despite being influenced by Saravia); and the 
authority of bishops (which though more than agents of the State, should not expect 
blind obedience, despite having a definitive authority).  A key goal of Keble was to 
argue for the maintenance of apostolic succession, which led him to put words into 
Hooker’s mouth.  This took place at a time when the Oxford Movement believed 
there was a threat to historic authority and the succession of bishops, as the nineteenth 
century Church of England could not, in Keble’s opinion, decide what a bishop 
should be or do. 
 
Having undertaken an analysis of the controverted points regarding episcopacy as 







being a cautious and faithful editor, did attempt to mould the sixteenth-century 
Hooker into supporting the aims and targets of the nineteenth-century Tractarian 
movement. Keble placed his own emphasis, in particular finding ways of taking 
Hooker’s silence on certain matters as anticipating the views of the Tractarians nearly 
250 years later on the divine right of bishops, and their necessity in ecclesiastical 
governance. This was because Keble was a crucial part of the Oxford Movement, 
which in the early to mid-nineteenth century was pushing for an ‘ad fontes’ approach 
to episcopal government and the authority of the Church in order to counter the 
perceived threats of secular government to the historic rights and influences of the 
Church. Keble’s Hooker was one ultimately made in the mould of the Oxford 
Movement, yet Keble does not conclusively draw the threads of the material together, 
leaving unaddressed contradictions between his preface, front material, and Walton’s 
biography – most notably over the authenticity of Book VI and the consequent 
uncertainty for jurisdiction and episcopal authority. 
 
This chapter’s examination of Keble’s edition of the Lawes has concluded that in 
three key areas, Keble draws away from the authority of bishops that other 
Tractarians may have wished to ascribe to Hooker, yet Keble’s Hooker, as framed by 
the editor’s preface, still paints a skewed picture of Hooker. In the first area, the 
necessity of bishops, Keble argues that evidence from Hooker can be drawn to 
support the apostolic succession, and that the Church of the intervening centuries 
came very close to breaking that succession. The matter of non-episcopal ordination is 
only to be contemplated in severe and extremely restricted areas. Bishops are 
necessary for good governance, ceremonies, sacraments, and symbols; Keble 
highlights the fact that Hooker drew support for his justification of bishops from the 
Church Fathers and managed to reconcile this at least reasonably well with a 
Reformed Protestant tradition – although not all Tractarians, such as Newman, agreed 
that Protestantism and Patristics could be reconciled. Should the necessity of bishops 









The second area, Iure Divino of bishops, is something that Keble admits Hooker did 
not fully develop, indicating that this may have been because the evidence provided 
by St Ignatius was not held to be as credible in Hooker’s time as it was a few years 
later in the mid-seventeenth century. Keble tries to increase Hooker’s evidence for 
Iure Divino episcopacy by emphasizing Hooker’s links with Saravia and stating that 
because Hooker corresponded so frequently with Saravia, we can take him to have 
been in agreement with Saravia on matters that he is silent on. 
 
The third area, the authority of bishops, is expounded by Keble in Tract 4. In this 
Tract, Keble encourages people to see bishops as something more than ‘agents of the 
State’, and to regard them as the safest way in times of crisis. One notable point is that 
Keble regarded bishops as deserving of authority, but that they should not expect 
blind obedience – particularly in matters of enforcing conscience and restricting 
freedom for individual priests. Given the interplay in Hooker’s time between the 
Church and State, Keble was able to claim Hooker as evidence for giving bishops 
restrained authority – restrained because of the dangers of low-church bishops to the 
ideals of the Oxford Movement, but still having a definite authority and existence in 
order to maintain the apostolic succession. 
 
Despite the careful editorial stewardship of the text itself, it is evident that Keble’s 
editorial preface made sustained attempts to influence the reader of the Lawes in the 
areas of the necessity of bishops, Iure Divino, and the consequent authority of 
bishops, going so far as to put words into Hooker’s mouth. This was an especially 
dangerous tactic during an age in which all sides of the Church were not sure what a 
bishop should actually be, evidenced by the trials for ritual abuses in the mid-
nineteenth century, and the consequent departure of Newman for Rome. 
 
Hence, as the Church of England could not actually decide exactly what a bishop 







aspects of the role, those aligning themselves with the Tractarians would naturally 
look to one of its founding fathers for answers. These answers Keble attempted to 
provide and justify in his edition of the Lawes, the editorial preface of which took 
dangerous liberties with Hooker’s nuanced argument. In the future, those who wished 
for an episcopate that emphasized the esse of bishops, their Iure Divino, and their 
authority, looked to Keble and his edition of the Lawes, and consequently risked 
developing a skewed theology of episcopacy that was not one Hooker himself would 













Having examined in the previous chapter the legacy of Hooker’s ecclesiology and 
political theology in the nineteenth century, I now move to examine his legacy in the 
twentieth and twenty-first century with respect to a particularly important debate 
within the Church of England: the ordination of women to the episcopate. I will argue 
that Hooker’s influence amongst traditional catholics – apparently the heirs to the 
Tractarian movement – is barely detectable. However, his influence over the broad 
range of the Church of England and its understanding of the character and authority of 
the episcopal office remains very clear. 
 
Neither Keble’s Hooker, nor indeed Hooker explicitly, is cited by the Forward in 
Faith or The Society documents surrounding the ordination of women to the 
priesthood and latterly to the episcopate. Hooker was instead cited by major reports of 
the Church of England, as well as by significant liberal theologians, in the run-up to 
the ordination of women to the priesthood in 1994, and by the centrist wing of the 
Church of England in the early 2010s around the time of the first ordinations of 
women to the episcopate. Both these latter groups claimed that ordaining women to 
the priesthood and the episcopate was not only consonant with Hooker’s thought, but 
that they were legitimate developments within the polity of the Church of England. 
Hooker was once the property of Anglo-Catholics, but it seems, no longer: an implicit 
admission that Anglo-Catholic opponents of women’s priestly and episcopal ministry 
have vacated the centre ground of Anglican ecclesiology. 
 
Hooker’s Lawes were a defence of the Church of England’s polity in the sixteenth 
century, and so it would not be sufficient to use a broad-brush approach when 







day Church of England – whether via the Tractarians (and from Keble’s 1836 edition 
of the Lawes in particular), or directly from Hooker himself. In order to gauge the 
influence of Hooker upon contemporary episcopacy in the Church of England, and the 
degree to which Keble’s editorial preface of the 1836 edition of the Lawes may have 
contributed to that, it is necessary to identify a number of key areas to look into that 
will assist this task. 
 
Three key areas that were identified in chapter five are: the bene esse and esse of 
bishops; the concept of Iure Divino; and the authority of bishops that is consequently 
evinced. Using these three areas will help to focus assessment of Hookerian (or 
Kebellian-Hookerian) influence upon contemporary episcopal ecclesiology.  
 
I have shown in chapter five that Hooker believed bishops to be of the bene esse of 
the Church in VII.v.2, rather than being of the esse. However, Keble believed Hooker 
to share his view that the historic episcopate was of the esse of the Church, that its 
expression in the Church of England was part of the apostolic succession and that the 
current holders of the episcopal office were part of that succession. In this succession, 
the validity of the sacraments could be assured, and hence salvation attained. 
 
To say that episcopacy is Iure Divino is to say it is a matter of ‘divine law’ – in other 
words, that bishops’ existence and ministry were prescribed divinely, manifested in 
Holy Scripture and in the traditions of the Church. To deviate from the model of 
episcopacy, as set out in Scripture and tradition, would be to depart from the model 
that is sanctioned by divine law. The claim of Iure Divino differs from that of esse 
because the former refers to the source of the authority that the bishops carry, whereas 
the latter refers to the necessity of their existence. Authority legitimately rests with 
the Church and is thus exercised by bishops. Any ecclesiastical authority that is 
exercised non-episcopally (such as, for example, by the monarch), must be done by 







practising, orthodox Christians), and if they do not do so, then the ability to exercise 
‘lay’ ecclesiastical authority ceases to exist. 
 
7.2 Women Bishops’ Legislation and Hookerian Influence 
 
There were three key pieces of official legislation and advice that enabled women to 
become bishops in the Church of England: Amending Canon No. 33, GS Misc. 1076 
(The House of Bishops’ Declaration on the Ministry of Bishops and Priests), and GS 
Misc. 1077 (House of Bishops’ Declaration on the Ministry of Bishops and Priests – 
Guidance Note).  
 
A brief survey of the key legislative texts will show that Hooker is not explicitly 
cited, but that his concept of episcopacy as the bene esse of the Church is implicitly 
endorsed by the decisions made. 
 
Amending Canon No. 33732 
 
Amending Canon No.33 is the legal instrument that replaced the existing Canon 
No.C2, removing the legal obstacles to enable women to be consecrated as bishops in 
the Church of England. It contains the necessary amendments to remove gender-
specific language in Canons C2, C4, C8, C10, C28, and C29, as well as in the Ordinal 
contained in the Book of Common Prayer, and states that any words importing the 
masculine gender are to be regarded as including the feminine. The last phrase of 
Amending Canon No.33 includes details for the resolution of the disputes procedure, 
and that any amendments to that procedure must come before General Synod, and be 
passed by a two-thirds majority in each House of that synod. 
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GS Misc. 1076 (The House of Bishops’ Declaration on the Ministry of Bishops and 
Priests)733 
 
When the ‘Episcopal Ministry Act of Synod 1993’ was rescinded in July 2014, new 
arrangements needed to be in place for those who, on theological grounds, sought the 
ministry of a male priest and/or a male bishop. Such arrangements are contained in 
the House of Bishops’ Declaration on the Ministry of Bishops and Priests as laid out 
in GS Misc. 1076 and given authority in Canon C29. The Declaration also lays out a 
grievance procedure to be followed if PCCs are not satisfied with the arrangements 
made for them under the Guidance. 
 
GS Misc. 1077 (The House of Bishops’ Declaration on the Ministry of Bishops and 
Priests – Guidance Note from the House of Bishops)734 
 
GS Misc. 1077, which is a Guidance Note from the House of Bishops in relation to 
the Declaration, offers clarification and further explanatory notes to assist PCCs and 
parishes, particularly if they wish to seek the ministry of a male priest or bishop. It 
also gives detail of how the Declaration text was reached, including details of which 
groups were consulted, and the steps taken curing its construction. It makes clear that 
the Note does not add or subtract anything from the Declaration. 
 
What all of these documents illustrate is that the character of episcopal ecclesiology in 
the Church of England is mutable in relation to inherited characteristics such as 
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gender – implying that episcopacy is not of the esse, but of the bene esse (Lawes 
VII.v.2) of the Church, and therefore the opening up of the episcopate to women is 
lawful: that is to say, if a specific gender for episcopacy was not part of the esse of the 
Church, then the arguments for female episcopacy are harder to resist. 
 
7.3 Traditional Catholic Groups and Hookerian Influence 
 
This section will argue that ‘traditional catholic’ groups in the Church of England are 
no longer influenced by Hooker, including Keble’s version of Hooker, by examining 
four key landmark texts of the Anglo-Catholic movement between 1834 and the 
present day. This section will argue that traditional catholic ecclesiology has been 
dominated by ideas such as sacramental assurance and apostolic succession, ideas that 
have no real basis in Hooker. We will also attempt to identify when traditional 
catholic usage of Hooker died out. 
 
Traditional catholics in the Church of England are, by and large, represented by two 
affiliated groups: Forward in Faith, and The Society of St Wilfrid and St Hilda (‘The 
Society’). The members of Forward in Faith735 and The Society736 are those who, due 
to theological conviction, are unable to receive the ministry of women priests or 
bishops. Forward in Faith describes itself as a ‘membership organisation’, which 
‘supports and finances the work of The Society’, whereas The Society ‘provides 
ministry, sacraments and oversight which [their members] can receive with 
confidence, so that [they] can flourish within the Church of England and make [their] 
contribution to its life and mission. It encourages vocations to the priesthood and to 
the religious life.’737 
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The Society states that it is ‘an ecclesial body, led by a Council of Bishops’, whose 
aims are to ‘promote and maintain catholic teaching and practice within the Church of 
England’; ‘provide episcopal oversight to which churches, institutions and individuals 
will freely submit themselves’; and ‘guarantee a ministry in the historic apostolic 
succession in which they can have confidence’738. Their chairman also states that 
affiliated churches and members of Forward in Faith and The Society are ‘not in 
communion with those who ordain women as priests [or bishops].’739 
 
Neither Forward in Faith, nor The Society, therefore, accepts the ordination of women 
priests or bishops as a legitimate theological development. 
 
Indicative Texts in Anglo-Catholicism from 1834 to the Present Day 
 
Relatively few texts of the Anglo-Catholic movement from 1834 to the present day 
concentrate solely on matters of ecclesiology, with most considering credal matters 
such as the incarnation and the atonement. The trials of the ritualists in civil courts 
rather than ecclesiastical courts towards the end of the nineteenth century caused 
controversy and sparked calls for ecclesiastical courts to try ecclesiastical matters, 
underlining the authority of the bishops to deal with such matters. Underlining 
Hooker’s fall from usage was the claim that since the Roman Catholic Relief Act of 
1829, the Church and the State were no longer one body, and therefore that the 
conditions of a unified Church and State in Hooker’s day no longer applied, and the 
ecclesiastical polity predicated on that no longer held sway. 
 
To attempt to trace when and why usage of Hooker fell from favour, I have identified 
four key texts associated with Anglo-Catholicism between 1834 and the present day. 
Taking each text, I have analysed how and why the text used Hooker – or if there was 
                                                
738 The Society of St Wilfrid and St Hilda. 








no explicit mention of Hooker by name, then whether there were any associated 
concepts or themes. 
 
Hurrell Froude’s Remains (1838 – 1839) 
 
Following Richard Hurrell Froude’s death in 1836, his friends Newman, Keble, and J. 
B. Mozeley rapidly published selections of his work in 1838. Newman wrote a 
preface to the two editions explaining the rationale for their publication. Though 
Froude died the same year as the publication of Keble’s edition of the Lawes, he still 
maintained a distinct allergy to Hooker and his notion of ecclesiastical authority. 
After dissenters and Roman Catholics were admitted to the House of Commons, 
Parliament could no longer be considered a ‘lay synod’ of the Church, as Church and 
State were no longer one: ‘the conditions on which Parliament has been allowed to 
interfere in matters spiritual are cancelled.’740 Froude’s thoughts on Hooker are 
further made clear thus: ‘Indeed I am myself out of conceit with old Hooker’s notion 
of a lay synod: it is unecclesiastical and whig’.741 If that were not enough to condemn 
Hooker entirely, Froude further wrote in 1835 that ‘as to the laity having power in 
synods, I don’t know enough to have an opinion; but as far as I see I disagree with 
Hooker…neither the laity nor the presbyters seem to me to have any part or lot in the 
government of the Church.’742 It is clear, therefore, that Froude regarded authority in 
the Church as belonging to bishops, and that since Catholic emancipation in 1829, the 
conditions for the State and the Church to be one were no longer in existence. Also, 
the ‘lay synod’ of Parliament no longer had any grounds for interference in Church 
business. By implication, Froude may not have been happy with a lay Anglican 
governmental influence in Parliament, let alone a lay governmental voice in the lower 
house of Convocation. 
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Why did the Tractarians, then, engage with Hooker at all – especially Keble? 
MacCulloch offers an insight: ‘on the whole, the effect of Keble’s magisterial edition 
was to cement Hooker firmly into Victorian High Church Tradition’.743 The mere 
existence of Keble’s three volumes served to show that if Keble thought Hooker 
worthy enough to have spent time and energy on such a product, then others should 
pay attention to the fruits of Keble (and, by extension, Hooker, too). If Keble’s 
magnum opus was to cement Hooker in this tradition, then why try to cement it at all 
if the circumstances underpinning Hooker’s argument for Church and State unity 
were now obsolete? 
 
If the circumstances for lay involvement in the government of the Church were now 
obsolete, why make that appeal to Hooker at all – or why invest the time in producing 
a new edition of Hooker at all? Nockles claims that ‘for Froude, however, the appeal 
to Hooker had been an essentially rhetorical, tactical device to disarm the Z’s’.744 
Froude claimed that the basis for events in 1828 to 1833 were that ‘the conditions on 
which our predecessors consented to parliamentary interference in matters spiritual 
are cancelled.’745 These conditions were, for Froude: 
according to Hooker, the representatives of the Commonwealth, i.e. 
the Parliament of England, were at the same time representatives of 
the Church, and thus a lay Synod of the Church of England. And it 
was because Parliament was such a synod, and only because it was 
so, that Hooker justified himself in consenting to its interference in 
matters spiritual.746 
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Further, Froude’s Church and State model was neither that of Hooker, nor of 
Laudianism, nor of the Caroline Divines, but ‘rather, it found its model exemplified 
by that unqualified ecclesiastical supremacy over the civil power in all capacities, 
symbolised by Becket and the twelfth-century church dictating to monarchs.’747 So 
from the beginning of the Anglo-Catholic movement, there were two approaches to 
Hooker, and in the end it would be Froude’s, not Keble’s, that would prove the most 
enduring, despite the continued existence of Keble’s 1836 magnum opus. 
 
The Church and The Ministry (1919) 
 
In 1899, later revised in 1919, Charles Gore, then Principal of Pusey House in 
Oxford, published The Church and The Ministry, which argued for the principle of 
apostolic succession in the episcopate, as opposed to the ministry that existed in the 
Presbyterians and other reformed ecclesial bodies. 
 
Gore’s work refers to Hooker twice in its 390 pages. The first occasion refers to the 
agreement between the natural and the supernatural in respect of the genesis of the 
Church coming upon humans from above: 
[The Church] makes the claim of a divine institution. It has the 
authority of Christ. Christ did not, according to this view, encourage 
his disciples to form societies. He instituted a society for them to 
belong to as the means of belonging to him.748 
In a footnote to this, Gore explains: 
Of course this antithesis requires guarding. The supernatural 
influence in the genesis of the Church did not annihilate the natural 
inclination which all men have into sociable life; but it controlled it 
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and intensified it. This consilience of the natural and supernatural is 
beautifully expressed by Hooker (EP I.15.2).749 
The first of two references to Hooker by Gore, therefore, refers to the interaction of 
the supernatural and natural spheres of existence, and consequently the role of the 
Church and humankind within them – an interaction that Hooker is able to describe, 
according to Gore, beautifully. Gore therefore makes no comment at this point on the 
applicability of Hooker to the ecclesial climate in Gore’s day. Gore talks of the 
natural and the supernatural, rather than making any explicit political comment – 
except perhaps for citing Hooker’s passage in Lawes I.xv.2, that: 
The substance of the service of God therefore, so far forth as it hath 
in it any thing more than the Law of Reason doth teach, may not be 
invented of men, as it is amongst the heathens, but must be received 
from God himself, as always it hath been in the Church, saving only 
when the Church hath been forgetful of her duty. 
Hooker’s point here is perhaps too oblique for Gore to claim explicitly that the 
Church, being a supernatural community, must obey the supernatural authority and 
not the State – and ‘inventions of men’ – but it is perhaps possible. Certainly, it is not 
clear enough to claim anything outright. 
 
The second occasion is in respect of secular interference in the spheres of church 
authority and governance: again referring to the fact that the Church and State, 
following the 1829 Roman Catholic Emancipation Act, are no longer one and the 
same: 
If circumstances here have made it absurd in England now to speak 
of the nation as committed to the catholic faith or of its national 
courts as ‘spiritual’, then circumstances have taught us also how 
                                                







dangerous it was for the Church to go even as far as it did in 
alienating its power of independent action.750 
This claim of independent action is explored thus: 
In the future [the Church] must be content to act first of all as part 
and parcel of the Catholic Church, ruled by its laws, empowered by 
its Spirit. And, if the bishops are to make an intelligible claim, they 
must make it as the responsible guardians, by Christ’s appointment 
and apostolic succession, of the doctrine and discipline and worship 
of the Church catholic ready to maintain, at all cost, the inherent 
spiritual independence which belongs to their office.751 
Gore, in his footnote, qualifies this as follows in respect of Hooker: 
As Hooker pleaded [EP VIII.8.9]: ‘If the cause be spiritual, secular 
courts do not meddle with it: we need not excuse ourselves with 
Ambrose, but boldly and lawfully we may refuse to answer before 
any civil judge in a matter which is not civil, so that we do not 
mistake the nature of either the cause or of the court.’ The supreme 
tribunals, in ecclesiastical affairs at present, established by our laws 
are ‘secular’ and ‘civil’, not spiritual.752 
The State, therefore, has no business interfering in the ecclesiastical courts – and 
those who are accused in a supreme tribunal of an ecclesiastical matter should not fear 
to remain silent as that tribunal has no authority to judge the case before them. Gore, 
therefore, uses Hooker to justify his claims that the civil courts have no right to 
interfere in spiritual matters. That right of judging in matters spiritual belongs to the 
bishops, as responsible guardians.753 Hooker was therefore a useful defence for the 
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right of the Church to try matters spiritual, and in consequence, of episcopal powers 
to be exercised and respected. 
 
Gore cited Hooker twice whilst constructing his argument of the ability of the Church 
to judge independently in matters spiritual with authority – a live issue during the 
ritual abuse trials in the late nineteenth century. Given that Gore had eight books of 
Hooker to choose from whilst constructing his case, the fact that he included only two 
citations suggests that Hooker may have been virtually indigestible to Gore. 
Nevertheless, Gore did cite Hooker, albeit only twice, and in doing so aligned, at least 
tangentially, his argument for the contemporary independent authority of the Church 
in matters spiritual with Hooker’s defence of the Elizabethan Settlement three 
centuries earlier: what was relevant then was still relevant in the late nineteenth 
century, and to suggest otherwise would be to overturn the foundation upon which the 
Church had existed since 1559. 
 
The Gospel and the Catholic Church (1956)754 
 
First published in 1936, Michael Ramsey’s intention as cited in his preface to the first 
edition was to ‘[expound] the Church as a part of the Gospel of Christ crucified,’755 
being ‘led to this line of approach both by the New Testament and by many 
discussions of the problem of the reunion of Christendom.’756 The early chapters of 
the book discuss the cross and resurrection, only then moving on to the relation of the 
Gospel to elements of the Church’s life, such as unity, church order, episcopacy, 
worship, liturgy, and creeds. The second part of the book goes on to discuss the 
Church’s development through Patristics, Catholicism, the reformers, and finally the 
Anglican Church. It is noteworthy that the second edition (1956), presented by the 
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then Archbishop Ramsey to Pope Paul VI in 1966, contained appendices on The See 
of Rome and Unity, as well as Archbishop William Temple on Apostolic Succession. 
 
Hooker has only one mention by name in the context of the legalism of Western 
Catholicism: 
The idea of Law so dominated certain parts of Christian thought, 
that it lasted far into post-Reformation theology, and is nowhere 
more apparent than in Luther and in Calvin and in Hooker. Its value 
to the Church is undeniable; it enabled S. Thomas Aquinas, through 
the union of the supernatural and the law of nature in one scheme of 
thought, to work out the profoundest Christian sociology yet 
known.757 
Hooker’s Lawes bear similarity to Aquinas not least in their layout of adversarial 
argument, but also in their claim to law as the basis of an ordered society. 
 
It is somewhat surprising that Ramsey ignores Hooker completely in the chapter 
Ecclesia Anglicana. One would have thought that the following paragraph has the 
ghost of Hooker writ large: 
Amid the convulsions of religion in Europe in the sixteenth century 
the English church had a character and story which are hard to fit 
into the conventional categories of Continental Christianity. The 
Anglican was and is a bad Lutheran, a bad Calvinist, and certainly 
no Papist. His church grew into its distinctive position under the 
shelter of the supremacy of the English King, and, its story is bound 
up with the greed and the intrigues of Tudor statesmen.758 
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Ramsey goes on to refer to Anglicanism759 as returning to the ‘scriptures as the ruling 
element in faith and piety,’ 760  yet along very different lines to the errors of 
Lutheranism (‘giving particular statements in Scripture a domination over the 
rest’)761, and Calvinism (‘pressing the use of Scripture into a self-contained logical 
system.’)762 Ramsey makes the claim that in Anglicanism, there ‘was an appeal to 
antiquity, coherent and complete, and a faithfulness to lessons of history that the 
Reformers on the Continent were missing.’763 All very well, and all very Hooker – 
except not by name. 
 
Post-Reformation, Ramsey acknowledges that ‘prominent in the old structure which 
the Anglicans retained was the Episcopate’, further explaining that: 
For some churchmen, Episcopacy was of a divine law found in 
Scripture; for others, it was the best way of imitating antiquity; for 
others, it was well suited as a buttress to the doctrine…of the Divine 
Right of Kings; for others, it happened to be the order of the 
national church, and it was thought legitimate for other Reformed 
churches to use other orders.764 
Yet Ramsey claims: 
what matters most is not the opinions of English divines about 
Episcopacy, but the fact of its existence in the English church…the 
fact that, under God, it existed. For its existence declared the truth 
that the church in England was not a new foundation nor a local 
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realization of the invisible Church, but the expression on English 
soil of the one historical and continuous visible Church of God.765 
This view of the Anglican Church in England as being the representative in England 
of the one historic and universal Church is mirrored for Ramsey in the Tractarians, 
whose emphasis on the apostolic succession illustrated this.766 For the Tractarians, the 
Church was not a ‘State department’. 
 
Ramsey comes closest to mentioning Hooker in all but name when discussing the 
doctrine of succession and its subsequent misuse. He regrets that a 
certain modern tendency to be indifferent to questions of order, to 
harp upon the distinction between the esse and the bene esse of the 
Church, and to blur the distinction between Episcopal and other 
ministries, can obscure not only the Corpus Christi but the Gospel 
as well.767 
It is telling for Ramsey’s own episcopal ecclesiology that he ends the chapter by 
stating that ‘the organ of unity will be the one Episcopate, never because it is 
Anglican, always because it belongs to the universal family of God.’768 It is perhaps 
noteworthy that Ramsey cites words most associated with Hooker’s episcopal 
ecclesiology in a somewhat pejorative sense – Hooker’s use of esse and bene esse are 
undoubtedly those of the middle ground. Ramsey is arguing not for a middle ground 
of episcopacy, but rather that its existence within the apostolic succession is essential 
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for the Gospel to be proclaimed with clarity. For Ramsey, it seems Hooker was 
willing to make compromises that he would not countenance – indicative that Hooker, 
at least for Ramsey, belongs to a centrism that Ramsey does not.769 
 
Taking the first three indicative texts, this section has argued that, overall, precious 
little mention of Hooker is made in these sources.  Froude’s Remains does not support 
Hooker’s idea of a lay synod, which is accused of being unnecessary and unwieldy.  
Further, authority in the Church belongs to bishops, and Froude displayed an 
unhappiness about even lay Anglican voices being in Parliament.  For Froude, the 
appeal to Hooker was a merely tactical one to disarm the ‘Z’s’.  Crucially, the 
conditions which may have allowed for parliamentary influence in matters spiritual 
was nullified by the events of 1828-1833.  Charles Gore’s The Church and The 
Ministry talks solely of Hooker in respect of Hooker and natural and supernatural law, 
additionally making the point that subsequent to Catholic Emancipation in 1829, the 
Church and the State were no longer the same, and hence the State could no longer 
interfere in ecclesiastical affairs, with the right of judgment in spiritual matters 
belonging solely to bishops.  Michael Ramsey’s The Gospel and The Catholic Church 
again makes reference to Hooker only in relation to law, bracketing him with Calvin 
and Luther – and of particular note, ignores Hooker entirely in the chapter on 
Anglicanism.  Ramsey makes the point that the main aspect is that episcopacy existed 
on English soil – and that for the Tractarians, the Church is not a State department.  
Finally, even when referring to esse and bene esse, there is no mention of Hooker by 
name, with Ramsey using these concepts to claim that the existence of episcopacy 
with apostolic succession is essential for the Gospel to be proclaimed with clarity. 
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Forward in Faith and the Society Commentary on the Women Bishops’ Debate 
 
The most recent Anglo-Catholic contribution to Church of England polity was 
perhaps the response of Forward in Faith and The Society to the ordination of women 
to the episcopate. Given that, as I have suggested, Hooker had largely dropped out of 
favour by the turn of the last century amongst Anglo-Catholics, it is not surprising 
that there is no explicit mention of Hooker in the response of Forward in Faith or The 
Society to this ecclesiological development. 
 
More research would be necessary on this, but these indicative findings imply that the 
use of Hooker to support Anglo-Catholic ecclesiology reached a zenith with Keble, 
and that Keble’s bold attempt to assimilate Hooker to his position was therefore seen 
to have been either unsuccessful or unnecessary even in his own time. The fact that, 
for over a century, the reference edition of Hooker was one edited and framed by a 
leading Tractarian should not blind us to the fact that Hooker has in fact never been 
successfully claimed for the Anglo-Catholic movement. The Kebellian-Hooker terms 
of esse/bene esse, Iure Divino, and episcopal authority (as understood by Hooker) 
appear nowhere in the literature of Forward in Faith and The Society. Two terms that 
frequently appear are those of sacramental assurance and apostolic succession, terms 
that appeared in the literature of the Oxford Movement, too. 
 
It is worth mentioning the role played by the 1928 Prayer Book Crisis in respect of 
the way in which apostolic succession was held in the Church of England in the first 
half of the twentieth century. As the twentieth century began, the Church of England 
ecclesiological consensus was that ‘Keble and Pusey [in the nineteenth century] did 
more than almost anyone to replace the national paradigm of Anglicanism, centred on 
the Royal Supremacy, with the catholic paradigm, centred on the episcopal 
succession.’ 770  Not everyone agreed with such an ecclesiology, however. The 
                                                







questions raised by the Oxford Movement in the middle of the nineteenth century 
were still being fought over as the United Kingdom emerged from the horrors of the 
First World War – what exactly was the ecclesiological identity of the Church of 
England? 
 
The evangelical lobby was a powerful force to be considered when attempting to 
answer this question. Conservative Evangelicals in particular held to a Church–State 
relationship framed by Protestantism: ‘Typically during this period, [Conservative 
Evangelicals] held Erastian convictions and subscribed to a Hookerian-influenced 
model of the establishment that understood parliament to be the representative of the 
laity and defender of the Reformation settlement.’ 771  In particular, evangelical 
pressure groups such as the Church Association (1865), the Protestant Truth Society 
(1889), and the National Church League (1906) lobbied Parliament hard, attacking 
ritualistic activities.772 By contrast, English Catholics and liberal Anglicans held to the 
opposite view that Parliament should not be the ‘lay synod’ of the Church, thus 
rejecting a Hookerian model. The 1919 Enabling Act, which introduced the National 
Assembly of the Church of England (known as the Church Assembly), may have 
indicated a move away from a Protestant concept of national identity and towards a 
broader concept of national faith and identity. 
 
With two opposing ecclesial identities in the Church of England, it became necessary 
to re-examine the way the ecclesial identity of the nation was expressed in its 
liturgical practices. The attempt to do so resulted in the Prayer Book Controversy of 
1927-1928, as a revision of the 1662 Book of Common Prayer was proposed to 
Parliament, having received approval by the Church Assembly. This was finally 
defeated in the House of Commons by 46 votes. Protestant fears of an ecclesial 
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submission to Rome were not realized (which in turn would have moved the Church 
of England away from the reformed Settlement which Hooker defended).773 
 
Apostolic succession and sacramental assurance, key elements of a more catholic 
ecclesiology, are concepts that were simply alien to Hooker. 774  According to 
traditional catholics, the sacraments are the means by which the faithful receive the 
grace of God, provided that the right conditions are met.775 The ‘right conditions’ are 
those defined in the Book of Common Prayer: that, for the Eucharist, bread and wine 
are used, and the service is presided over by a priest ordained by a bishop.776 Simon 
Killwick, in an article for the Church Times in 2010, argues that: 
the preface to the Ordinal makes it clear that the Church of England 
intended to continue the orders of bishops, priests, and deacons, as 
the Church had received them, going back to the time of the 
Apostles…the requirement of a priest, ordained by a bishop in the 
apostolic succession, to preside at the Eucharist is a requirement of 
Anglican formularies.777 
Traditional catholics therefore believe that the Church of England, in ordaining 
women to the priesthood and episcopate, is not continuing the priestly and episcopal 
orders as the Church has received them (‘Church’ in this context refers both to the 
Church in the past, as well as present-day Roman Catholic and Orthodox Churches). 
Both these latter worldwide Churches have not admitted women to the diaconate, the 
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priesthood, or the episcopate, and therefore the Church of England is departing from 
the consensus of the universal Church, as their orders are no longer those that the 
Apostles handed on (i.e. the apostolic succession); therefore, there is no sacramental 
assurance. 
 
Given that Keble edited the reference edition of the Lawes, which was standard for 
over a century, were these doctrines of apostolic succession and sacramental 
assurance in any way influenced by Hooker’s views, even if Hooker himself by name 
was more or less persona non grata subsequent to 1834? 
 
Keble claims in Tract 4 that the Church of England was ‘the only church in this realm 
which has a right to be quite sure that she has the Lord’s Body to give to his people.’ 
As we have already seen, for traditional catholics, you cannot have sacramental 
assurance without apostolic succession. In Tract 1 (1833), Newman wrote: 
Should the government and country so far forget their God as to 
cast off the church, to deprive it of its temporal honours and 
substance, on what will you rest the claim of respect and attention 
which you make upon your flocks?778 
That is to say, authority is built on apostolic descent – in other words, according to 
Newman: 
The Lord Jesus Christ gave His Spirit to His Apostles; they in turn 
laid their hands on those who would succeed them; and these again 
on others; and so the sacred gift has been handed down to our 
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present Bishops, who have appointed us as their assistants, and in 
some sense representatives.779 
With the Irish bishoprics controversy, and fears that State involvement with the 
Church was decreasing, the Tractarians were concerned that the authority of the 
Church would decline. They therefore cited apostolic succession, and by doing so, 
made the claim that the Church of England is the true Church – the authority of 
bishops would still come ultimately from God, but would instead be mediated by 
continual succession, rather than by the monarch. Because of this claim of 
‘continuation’, the Church could align itself with the pre-Reformation Church, and be 
thus distinguished from the other Protestant Churches. The true Church, they argued, 
consisted of Churches with apostolic succession – Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and 
Anglican. 
 
Where did Keble and the Tractarians get this idea? Chapman claims that it was an 
innovation: 
With few exceptions, most writers sympathetic to bishops before 
the English Civil War period based their arguments on decency and 
order rather than on apostolic succession. Very few…were willing 
to see bishops as necessary for the constitution of the church. On 
the whole they accepted the ministry and sacraments of the 
continental protestant churches as expressions of the true church 
relative to their particular contexts. 780  
In the late nineteenth century, against this longstanding consensus, Gore made the 
claim that episcopacy was essential to the Church, and that Anglicans should not 
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recognize the ministry of those who were not ordained by bishops.781 This is in direct 
contradiction of Hooker’s beliefs that in extremis, people may exercise priestly 
ministry without episcopal ordination. 
 
According to these Anglo-Catholics, then, the doctrines of sacramental assurance and 
apostolic succession depend on episcopacy being of the esse of the Church, and on 
that episcopacy being of Iure Divino, which thus determines the manner of episcopal 
authority exercised. Hence, traditional catholics are not only not citing Hooker by 
name, but also departing from him in substance. 
 
For traditional catholics, wishing to be assured that the sacraments they receive and 
exercise are authentic, and can therefore convey the sacramental grace necessary, the 
means by which that grace is conveyed has to be legitimate. We have seen that the 
traditional catholic groups argue that the introduction of women priests and bishops is 
an unlawful innovation that the Church of England did not have the authority to make. 
Thus accordingly, if the Church of England wishes to remain part of the universal 
Church (because traditional catholics claim that its orders are part of such), then the 
rest of the universal Church must be able to recognize each other’s orders – ergo, 
women priests and bishops should not be permitted unless Roman Catholicism and 
Orthodoxy agree. Killwick explains, in the context of ‘reception’ of new ecclesial 
developments: 
Because the C[hurch] of E[ngland] claims that her orders are those 
of the whole or universal Church (Catholic, Orthodox, Anglican), 
the new development in the ordination of women must be subject to 
reception by the whole Church. Otherwise, our Church’s claim 
about her orders would be in jeopardy.782 
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This concept must be drawn into question when we consider that the Orthodox 
Church declared the Roman Catholic Church heretical because of the perceived 
innovation of the filioque clause and papal supremacy. There is also precious little 
evidence that Rome or Orthodoxy would consult each other, nor the Anglican Church, 
when making changes of their own. There is further the argument regarding which 
issues need consultation across the three denominations – why is gender a first-order 
issue’, when other innovations are not? 
 
It is worth mentioning at this point the Chicago-Lambeth Quadrilateral, which has 
been described as ‘the primary reference point and working document of the Anglican 
Communion for ecumenical Christian reunion.’783 The Quadrilateral focuses on four 
essentials for Christian unity: 
1. The Holy Scriptures of the Old Testament and New Testament, 
as ‘containing all things necessary to salvation’, and as being the 
mark and ultimate standard of faith. 
2. The Apostles’ Creed, as the Baptismal symbol; and the Nicene 
Creed, as the sufficient statement of the Christian faith. 
3. The two Sacraments ordained by Christ himself – Baptism and 
the Supper of the Lord – ministered with unfailing use of Christ’s 
words of institution, and of the elements ordained by Him. 
4. The Historic Episcopate, locally adapted in the methods of its 
administration to the varying needs of the nations and peoples 
called of God into the Unity of His Church.784 
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Of importance for this thesis is the fourth element of the Quadrilateral, and especially 
what may be meant by ‘locally adapted’. However, right from the inception of the 
Quadrilateral, not everyone was in agreement about its importance or purpose. This is 
reflected in the North American Churches placing more importance on the 
Quadrilateral than the Church of England.785 
 
Giving such a vague definition of the historic episcopate led to the inevitable 
conclusion that: 
The terse statement of the Quadrilateral’s on the ‘Historic 
Episcopate’ has caused such a large volume of discussion, because 
the concept was not defined, and because the idea of being able 
locally to adopt the episcopate according to varying situations 
offered no limit to the adaptations and variations which might be 
produced.786 
Such a definition may be more akin to that which Hooker espoused – at least allowing 
for a closer relation with the State, and almost certainly chiming with the episcopate 
being of the bene esse rather than the esse of the Church.787 This definition, though, 
would not have helped those who were looking in particular for reunion with the great 
Latin Church of the West, whose definition of the episcopate was somewhat stricter – 
                                                
785 Slocum, ‘Chicago-Lambeth Quadrilateral’, 473-474. For more on the history and reception of the 
Chicago-Lambeth Quadrilateral see, for example, J. Robert Wright, ed., Quadrilateral at One 
Hundred, Essays on the Centenary of the Chicago-Lambeth Quadrilateral, 1886/88-1986/88, Anglican 
Theological Review Supplemental Series 10 (March, 1988) (Cincinnati, OH: Forward Movement 
Publications, 1988). 
786 Arthur A. Vogel, ‘Chicago-Lambeth Quadrilateral: Yardstick or Mirror?’ in J. Robert-Wright, 
Quadrilateral at One Hundred, 136-137. 
787 Evidence of the weight which the North American Churches placed on the Chicago-Lambeth 
Quadrilateral and its looser understanding of episcopacy is seen in the Faith and Order statement from 
the 1949 General Convention of the Episcopal Church. Quoted in J. Robert-Wright, ‘Heritage and 








with apostolic succession being a key concept.788 The fact that the Roman Catholics 
viewed Anglican Orders as invalid would not have helped discussion, either.789 
 
This section has argued that precious little reference is made to Hooker by Forward in 
Faith or The Society in the texts used in this chapter.  The key themes for these two 
groups were apostolic succession and sacramental assurance, both of which were 
entirely alien to Hooker.  Both the development of the Chicago-Lambeth 
Quadrilateral in the latter nineteenth century, which made the existence of the historic 
episcopate a key feature of ecclesiology, as well as the 1928 Prayer Book Crisis 
which gave rise to questions regarding the identity of the Church of England, were 
key aspects of the ecclesiological climate for the party history of the traditional 
Anglo-Catholic movement.  For them, the advent of female bishops meant neither 
sacramental assurance, nor the continuance of apostolic succession. 
 
Further Anglo-Catholic texts on ecclesiology 
 
In order to strengthen the claim that Keble, Newman, and contemporary traditional 
catholics of the Church of England asserted an episcopacy which was not part of the 
ecclesiological character which Hooker knew, a brief survey was conducted of works 
by A. G. Hebert, K. E. Kirk, and E. L. Mascall.790  Of Hebert’s two works cited here, 
The Form of the Church (1944) mentions Hooker by name in respect of God’s eternal 
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law,791 and defines apostolic succession as being firstly the succession of bishops in a 
see, and secondly, the succession of consecration. 792   Hebert then claims that 
episcopacy is of the esse of the Church, rather than the bene esse, laying out six 
objections as to why episcopacy is not of the esse, and then six contradictory claims 
as to why it is.793  Nowhere in these claims and counter-claims is Hooker mentioned 
by name. In Hebert’s Apostle and Bishop, Hooker is not mentioned by name at all, but 
the volume seems to take a slightly ‘softer’ approach than The Form of the Church, in 
that non-episcopal Churches are still within the Church of God due to their baptismal 
nature (despite having ‘errors’).  Yet, Hebert still claims that ‘episcopal ministry is the 
necessary framework of a re-united Christendom…episcopacy is not a mere form of 
Church government…it is a sacred office…it is in itself a witness to the Gospel.’794 
 
K. E. Kirk cites episcopacy as being an ‘essential ministry’ with ‘oversight’,795 
making a distinction between bishops as ‘essential’, and deacons as ‘dependent’.  
Further, ‘it soon became certain that no one could be a member of that ministry unless 
he had been admitted to it by those who were already members of it themselves.’796  
In other words, only bishops could ordain more bishops, which would seem to 
exclude the possibility of non-episcopal ordination – yet Kirk raises a caveat with this 
view when he later says, ‘if the problem of the validity of non-episcopal ministries is 
raised, it is raised precisely because those who so commissioned produce by their life 
and witness very many of the results we expect from the faithful service of those as to 
whose valid ordination there is no doubt.’797  Kirk concludes that the burden of proof 
that non-episcopal ministries are as valid as episcopal ministries lies with those who 
assert the former’s validity.798  Thus, Kirk, whilst acknowledging the existence of 
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non-episcopal ministries, nevertheless promotes an episcopacy that is more rigid than 
Hooker would have allowed. 
 
Later in the same volume, B. M. Hamilton-Thompson concentrates more on Hooker 
himself.  She claimed that Hooker was the only writer of his time to give systematic 
treatment to Protestant bodies, and that his position as regards episcopal doctrine was 
a complex one, claiming that his influence on his successors’ views on Divine Right 
episcopacy (such as Bilson and Saravia) was considerable.799   This is in contradiction 
to the argument of this thesis, which is that such an influence cannot successfully be 
proven.  Hamilton-Thompson made the assertion that Hooker is in fact reticent to 
claim episcopacy as being of the esse of the Church due to ‘his innate fear of inferring 
immutable principles from general laws, even if he believes them to be of divine 
sanction.’ 800   Hamilton-Thompson also considered Hooker’s two exceptions to 
episcopacy being of the esse – first, direct divine appointment, and second, non-
episcopal ordination – and stated that ‘it is difficult to see in either case that these 
exceptions are meant to provide a loophole for the Reformed ministries,’ 801 
concluding that Hooker regarded episcopal ordination as the normal form.802  She 
finds ‘considerable support among the Elizabethans for the divine origin of the 
episcopate; and it is but a step from the position they took up to the semi-political 
doctrine of divine right.’803  This would appear to make Hamilton-Thompson sound 
very much like Keble – that Hooker could nearly have reached an Anglo-Catholic 
position, but that Hooker was too cautious to follow through. 
 
E. L. Mascall, in The Recovery of Unity, is somewhat more strident in his assessment 
of Hooker’s legacy, and also of attempts to assimilate the Church of England with the 
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ecclesiology of the post-reformation period.  Though there are only three explicit 
mentions of Hooker by name in the entire volume, two of which are to do with the 
Eucharist, the third relates to episcopacy, of which Mascall says, ‘I cannot think of 
any worse service that could be done to the Church of England today than to attempt 
to bind it down to the ecclesiology of the post-Reformation period.’804  In other 
words, Mascall was fervently against any attempt to align any aspect of the Church of 
England’s ecclesiology, episcopacy included, with that which Hooker defended in the 
Lawes.  Further, Mascall writes that ‘it was providential that [Jewel, Whitgift, and 
Hooker] recognised [that episcopacy had divine authority by continuance from the 
apostolic age] even when their theology was incapable of providing anything other 
than a historical basis for it.’805  In reference to the mutability of Church polity, which 
was a strong feature of Hooker’s ecclesiology, Mascall’s article on whether women 
can be ordained to the priesthood weighs heavily on arguments against the 
development.  Mascall cites Scripture and tradition as not allowing such a precedent, 
as well as the Church of England not being able to take unilateral action when the 
Orthodox and Roman Catholic Communions have not.  Nowhere in the article is 
Hooker mentioned by name.806  
 
Therefore, both Keble and Newman, and latterly the traditional catholics of the 
Church of England, make claims for apostolic succession, and its definition, that are 
simply not part of the Anglican tradition, and would certainly not have been part of 
the Church of England’s character that Hooker knew. Such claims by the Tractarians 
may well have been created out of a political expediency to shore up the authority of a 
Church that they deemed to have been under attack from government interference at 
the time. 
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The argument outlined above makes it clear that Hooker dropped out of favour with 
Anglo-Catholics shortly after the publication of Keble’s 1834 edition of the Lawes.  
 
This section has argued that four further texts in the history of Anglo-Catholicism in 
the twentieth century Church of England mention Hooker more frequently, but did not 
make the claims for him which Keble did in his editorial preface to the Lawes.  
Hebert, in The Form of the Church, made reference to Hooker when discussing God’s 
eternal law, but not in relation to apostolic succession, succession of consecration, or 
bishops being of the esse of the Church.  In Hebert’s Apostle and Bishop, Hooker was 
not mentioned at all, save for some parallels when discussing how non-episcopal 
churches may still be considered part of the Church of God due to their baptismal 
nature.  Bishops were, for Hebert, of the esse of the Church.  Kirk, in The Apostolic 
Ministry, referred to bishops being an essential ministry, a key factor of which was 
oversight.  For Kirk, episcopal ordination was necessary, but conceded that there are 
difficulties when the fruits of non-episcopal ministries were similar to those of 
episcopally ordained ministries.  Kirk was, however, more rigid than Hooker in 
regards of episcopal ministry.  Further on in The Apostolic Ministry, Hamilton-
Thompson claimed that Hooker was the only writer of his time to give a systematic 
treatment to Protestant bodies, and that Hooker’s doctrine of episcopacy was a 
complex one.  She claimed that Hooker had a crucial influence on Saravia and 
Bilson’s doctrine of the Divine Right of bishops (although such an influence cannot 
be proven).  Further, Hamilton-Thompson regarded Hooker as being reticent to claim 
episcopacy as esse, and that though she found support in Elizabethan times for the 
divine origin of episcopacy, it was only a small step to the semi-political doctrine of 
Iure Divino.  Finally, E. M. Mascall, in The Recovery of Unity, made only three 
mentions of Hooker.  Two are in relation to the eucharist, and the third, to episcopacy.  
Mascall believed that it was a serious mistake to try and align the modern Church of 
England with that of the post-Reformation Church.  Though Hooker, Jewel, and 







limited to only making a historical basis for it.  Mascall also weighed heavily against 
the case for women bishops, citing a strong scriptural and tradition argument against. 
 
7.4 How is Hookerian Ecclesiology Employed in the Contemporary Church 
of England? 
 
Amongst the literature researched for this chapter surrounding the introduction of 
women bishops in the Church of England, and in particular amongst the literature 
produced by traditional catholic groups, there are very few explicit mentions of 
Richard Hooker. We have seen in the section above that after Keble, the Anglo-
Catholics more or less stopped using Hooker as an authority, apparently finding that it 
was just too much of a stretch to assimilate him; even Keble had only been able to do 
that by claiming a link between Hooker and Saravia that was very tenuous. Anglo-
Catholic ecclesiology has been dominated by ideas such as apostolic succession and 
sacramental assurance, which have no real basis in Hooker. 
 
In 2015, the Council of Bishops of The Society published a statement, ‘Communion 
and Catholicity in the Church of England: A Statement of Principles by the Council of 
Bishops of The Society’807, and in the section on ‘Our Vocation as Catholic Christians 
in the Church of England’, it states: 
Furthermore, as Anglicans we rejoice in the patristic and Western 
Catholic tradition we have inherited. That tradition is embodied in 
The Book of Common Prayer, in the work of Richard Hooker, and 
in the writings of the Anglican divines of the seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries it was 
further developed by the Oxford Movement and by later 
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theologians, liturgists, spiritual writers and canonists who were 
influenced by that movement.808 
Quite what The Society means by the ‘patristic and Western Catholic tradition we 
have inherited’ is not developed convincingly in the paper – and there are no 
references that indicate which parts of Hooker they claim to evidence for this. 
Because The Society offer no further reasoning behind their citation of Hooker at this 
point, it is difficult to think that they do little beyond paying lip-service to a luminary 
of the Anglican tradition, and one at that who has become a symbol of centrist and 
anti-Puritan Anglicanism. 
 
The second explicit mention from the traditional catholics in recent history is that in a 
paper written by Dr Colin Podmore, ‘A Wonderful Order: Essentials of Anglican 
Identity’, presented at a Vocations Day for those affiliated to Forward in Faith, in 
2013. Under the heading, ‘What’s in a name?’, Podmore writes: 
But though…Richard Hooker was one of its first defenders against 
those who wanted to overthrow its structure and tradition, we are 
not…Hookerites. Our Church is not named after an individual, a 
belief, or a practice. ‘Church of England’ and ‘Anglican’ tell us 
nothing about doctrine: neither of them is a denominational name at 
all.809 
This tells us that Podmore, and by extension, traditional catholics, recognize Hooker 
as a positive threat to their viewpoint. By stating to a group of traditional catholics 
that Hooker has no special authority that they would need to accept, the reader is 
perhaps left wondering whether Podmore protests too much. Yet, what of the famous 
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‘three-legged stool’ that Hooker is often believed to have developed? Podmore 
continues: 
Scripture is primary. (It is sometimes claimed that Richard Hooker 
spoke of Scripture, Tradition, and Reason forming a ‘three-legged 
stool’, but such a stool could not exist in the Anglican tradition, 
because the Scripture leg would have to be longer than the others. 
Tradition and reason are tools for interpreting Scripture, not 
independent authorities of equal standing with Scripture. 
Accordingly, you will search Hooker’s Laws of Ecclesiastical 
Polity in vain for any reference to such a piece of furniture).810 
Therefore, according to Podmore, attempts to place Scripture on a parallel with 
Tradition and Reason is not what Hooker would have argued, and is not what the 
Church of England teaches about the authority of Tradition and Reason, according to 
Podmore’s Hooker. 
 
Further on in his paper, Podmore comments that ‘the imposition of the 1662 Prayer 
Book and episcopal ordination after the interregnum marked the definitive drawing of 
a line in the sand, and the Puritans left to form the Presbyterian, Congregational, and 
Baptist churches.’811 Accordingly, then, from this point the Church of England 
adopted episcopal ordination as a pre-requisite and doctrinal necessity: bishops 
became of the esse of the Church, with the outworking of that polity written in the 
Prayer Book. 
 
What Podmore does here is to point out that episcopacy is part of the heritage of the 
Church of England, a Church that shares its governance structure with Roman 
Catholic and Orthodox Churches: Churches that are different from the reformed 
Churches because of their retention of this ancient form of governance – which 
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Scripture has allowed, and tradition maintained. What Podmore does not elaborate on 
is Hooker’s strong insistence that the exact nature of episcopal governance is 
essentially a matter of adiaphora – an insistence that the Tractarians, and indeed 
Keble’s Hooker in particular, do not pick up on either. 
 
Given that such an influential figure as Keble edited an edition of the Lawes, which 
could be taken as Keble giving weight to Hooker’s opinions and stance on the 
ecclesiology of the Church of England, why are there so few mentions of Hooker in 
contemporary traditional catholic literature? Why does Podmore cite Hooker when 
none of his contemporaries do?812 Though Podmore does cite Hooker, the citations 
are relatively few, and the conclusion is that it is the power of association that 
Podmore is trying to make. 
 
By citing Hooker, Podmore is attempting to cast the ecclesiological stance of Forward 
in Faith and The Society in a more reasonable light. That is, the views of Forward in 
Faith and The Society are legitimately part of the spectrum of long-established 
Anglican teaching on the subject and are not to be rejected by those who disagree 
with them. 
 
This then leaves us with the question as to whether Keble’s Hooker has died out. The 
claims made for the contemporary episcopate by traditional catholics, the heirs of the 
Tractarian movement, do not make numerous or explicit mention of Keble’s Hooker. 
This is because they realize that to do so, would be to stretch the ecclesiology of 
Hooker to a point beyond reasonable credibility. 
 
We have established that the Tractarians, and their present-day heirs, the traditional 
catholics, have long ceased to use Hooker as a justification for their understanding of 
ecclesiology. Yet, Hooker’s is still a name which, though perhaps not entirely 
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understood, is still reasonably well-known amongst present-day Anglicans. Who is 
claiming Hooker for their cause, then, and does this explain why the traditional 
catholics have ceased to use Hooker? 
 
Stephen Sykes, Bishop of Ely from 1990 to 1999, published a paper entitled, ‘Richard 
Hooker and the Ordination of Women to the Priesthood’ in 1990, as part of a larger 
tome on the issues surrounding that debate at the time.813 Sykes’ paper offers a 
consideration of the objections to women being ordained to the priesthood and argues 
that they are no longer tenable according to the theological method of Richard 
Hooker. The two strands of argument that Sykes exhibits are, first, that the way 
Hooker wrestles with the concept of church order demonstrates that it ‘can and should 
be related to particular times and places’814; and second, that ‘it is possible to hold 
that both a particular church order is divinely ordained and also that it is not 
immutable.’815 
 
Sykes presents Hooker’s argument that laws given by God were mutable for the 
following reasons. First, Sykes examines the disciplines of law, philosophy, ethics, 
medicine, and theology, which argued for the inferiority of women. Citing the 
example of the French jurist, André Tiraqeau, and his work De Legibus connubialibus 
(1513), in arguing for the inferiority of females, Sykes claims that within such 
circumstances, ‘the marriage of Aristotle’s anatomical and ethical theories to the 
patristic understanding of the creation and fall had contrived to produce a synthesis 
according to which woman was an incomplete version of the male (a mas 
occasionatus).’816 Sykes interprets the impact of this on Hooker as follows: 
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[that] although Aristotelian medical theory provides a basis for 
morality, and medicine and ethics underlie law, the synthesis of 
Aristotelian and Christian theses is full of ambiguities, apparent and 
real contradictions and open possibilities which make it responsive 
to slow change. Hooker’s participation in the synthesis was 
total…his significance is that he provides the Church with a way of 
understanding what it might mean to come to terms with the new 
view of woman which was shortly to develop in modern 
Europe…the case that can be argued in this connection rests on 
Hooker’s awareness that certain aspects of church law can properly 
vary with time and place.817 
This meant that Hooker would not have contemplated the ordination of women 
because the role of women in the sixteenth century was defined by long-developed 
philosophical, medical, legal, ethical, and theological views. These views were soon 
to begin to change with the Enlightenment; as the Aristotelian view of the inferiority 
of women began to wane, the remaining barrier to the ordination of women would 
have been positive law, which, according to Hooker, is open to change. 
 
Sykes argues that this meant church polity, and specifically that of who can and 
cannot be ordained, could be changed, and that Hooker could be claimed in support of 
that argument because: 
It shows Hooker to be the architect of an understanding of church 
polity which can seriously consider the necessity of change, even in 
an institution as traditional as an all-male priesthood. It does not, of 
course, turn Hooker into an advocate of women’s ordination. But on 
his own principles, Hooker would undoubtedly have been ready to 
                                                







consider an argument which destroyed the doctrine of women’s 
subordination as a deliverance of natural reason.818 
If Sykes’ argument is therefore believed, the potential mutability of Hooker’s 
episcopal ecclesiology means that claiming the latter for a gender-rigid polity is no 
longer attractive for traditional catholics and would be one reason why Hooker is so 
rarely cited by those arguing for an all-male priesthood and episcopate. Sykes 
anticipates the arguments of contemporary traditional catholics when he states: 
It is, therefore, quite consistent with Hooker’s basic theory for him 
to say that there are conditions under which it would be legitimate 
to vary the form of church polity. The Tractarians found it a 
difficult passage to swallow, and Anglo-Catholics have choked on it 
ever since, but it is plain enough. [Hooker argued that] the 
scriptures are not so insistent or clear on matters relating to 
ecclesiastical polity that ‘much of which it hath taught [might] 
become unrequisite, sometimes because we need not use it, 
sometimes also because we cannot.’ [Lawes III.xi.16]…This is a 
clear example of Hooker’s readiness to judge of times and 
seasons.819 
Sykes, therefore, clearly states that the conditions under which women were to be 
considered inferior are no longer in force, and that as church polity is a matter of 
positive law, and is not of the esse of the Church, the nature of episcopacy can change 
– which includes the opening up of the threefold orders of ministry to women. Sykes 
strove to neutralize the ability of the traditional catholics to claim Hooker for their 
cause, and instead stridently attempted to claim Hooker for the liberals. Sykes’ 
argument is made in a logical and persuasive manner, which makes it hard to discount 
– perhaps playing here on the ability of Hooker to be claimed for pretty much any 
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viewpoint within modern Anglicanism. Sykes’ argument also marked a milestone in 
the usage of Hooker for contemporary ecclesiology, evidenced by the numerous 
citations of Sykes’ paper in Church of England official documents surrounding the 
ordination of women to the episcopate, and the associated necessary mutability of 
ecclesiastical polity, which will be discussed next.820 
 
With Sykes’ paper in 1990 clearly making a case for women to be ordained to the 
priesthood (which happened in 1994), in 2004, the Church of England commissioned 
what has become known as the Rochester Report, to investigate a possible route map 
to enable women to be ordained as bishops. The report cites Hooker a number of 
times, often in pursuit of Sykes’ goal of establishing that Hooker gives historical 
precedent for the Church of England’s authority in making changes to its episcopal 
polity. 
 
The report states of Hooker’s episcopal ecclesiology that: 
Hooker argues that episcopacy is of apostolic origin, and he also 
defends the way that episcopacy is structured in the Church of 
England, including government by metropolitans, on the grounds 
that this is necessary for the good governance of the Church. 
And further, in reference to episcopal authority and esse: 
On the one hand, as we have already indicated, Hooker strongly 
asserts the apostolic and God-given origin of episcopacy. On the 
other hand he does not hold that it is an absolutely necessary part of 
the life of the Church. 
                                                







The Rochester Report makes reference to the significance of apostolic succession and 
Hooker when considering the traditional catholic groups and their understanding of 
the importance of apostolic succession: 
The reason this [apostolic succession] is seen as significant is that 
the office of bishop has traditionally been seen as representing the 
continuation of the ministry of the apostles in the later life of the 
Church. Hooker, for instance, sees the apostles are the first to 
exercise episcopal oversight in the Church and bishops as their 
successors in this regard (VII.iv.4). This being the case, evidence 
that women exercised some kind of apostolic function in the Early 
Church would point towards the appropriateness of women being 
permitted to exercise an episcopal role in the Church today.821 
Therefore, though there is an acknowledgement that apostolic succession matters, the 
Rochester Report does not claim that the nature of episcopacy in the apostolic 
succession has to remain unchanged – the reference to women in the Early Church 
suggests that church polity has departed from the apostolic precedent, and that the 
ordination of women to the episcopate would restore the nature of the contemporary 
episcopate to that which was evident in the Early Church. 
 
The Rochester Report also addresses the claim of whether the proverbial Hookerian 
three-legged stool has legs of equal length. Earlier in this chapter, we saw that 
Podmore claimed these three legs to be unequal, with the scriptural leg being the 
longest, and therefore the most important. In section 3.3.18 of the Rochester Report, 
Hooker and the authority of the Bible is discussed in the context of Hooker’s battle 
with the Puritans over scriptural authority: 
This was an issue which was discussed in relation to the issue of 
ecclesiology by Richard Hooker in his debate with the radical 
                                                







Puritans in the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity. Both Hooker and his 
opponents accepted that Scripture possessed normative authority. 
However, while the radical Puritans argued that issues to do with 
worship and the government of the Church should be decided solely 
on the basis of what was taught in Scripture itself, Hooker argued 
that this was too restrictive and that what needed to be asked was 
how to apply the basic principles of biblical teaching in situations 
which the Bible did not directly address or where the circumstances 
that had occasioned the biblical teaching had changed.822 
It is important to quote this passage in full because it illustrates that the argument 
concerned whether absolutely everything about church polity was only permitted if it 
was mentioned in the Bible. To take such a line of scriptural literalism would mean a 
very different Church indeed – and would mean that a number of traditional catholic 
practices would have to be outlawed because they were not explicitly mentioned in 
the Bible. 
 
Having illustrated Hooker’s views about the primacy of Scripture, the Rochester 
Report then makes the case for the utilization of human reason in deciding on non-
essential matters to salvation, of which church polity was one area: ‘it is also because 
they have this capacity for rational thought that human beings are able to engage in 
theological reflection.’823 Human beings, being enlightened by the gift of rational 
thought, must not slavishly obey the dictates of Scripture: God has given human 
beings the capacity to reason, and it is their duty to do so in matters non-essential to 
salvation – matters of the bene esse, rather than the esse. 
 
Hence, it appears that Sykes’ approach has for the time being won out, and the weight 
of usage of Hooker now falls firmly on those who argue that church polity, and 
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specifically those issues relating to the governance of the Church and the nature of the 
episcopate, are open to change. Although the order of bishops has existed from the 
Apostles’ time, this does not make it immutable – and it is the arguments of Scripture, 
reason, and tradition that such mutability is permissible, precisely because matters of 
church government are matters indifferent. Sykes’ paper in 1990, and the utilization 
of that, together with further arguments proposed in the Rochester Report (2004), 
make a strong case for explaining why traditional catholics are no longer able to claim 
Hooker for themselves, and that the Hooker that Keble tried to claim in his editorial 
preface to the 1834 edition of the Lawes is long dead. Hooker, it would seem, is well 
and truly claimed for the moderate liberal group of the Church of England. 
 
Having argued that both Sykes and The Rochester Report make use of Hooker in their 
claims for the legitimacy of mutable episcopal polity, and hence the lawfulness of 
women bishops, it is prudent to tie this argument back to that developed in chapters 
two to five of this thesis.  This thesis makes the claim that Hooker’s episcopal polity 
is underpinned by the Royal Supremacy, yet this is an aspect which neither Sykes, nor 
the Rochester Report, explicitly comment on – and is only implicitly considered.  For 
example, in chapter four, this thesis argued that one of the duties of a monarch in a 
reformed environment was to enable the right practice of religion to be carried out. 
Exactly how ‘right practice’ could be defined would be discerned by theological 
reflection using human reason on matters of positive law.  Both this thesis and Sykes 
argue that Hooker is correct in regarding matters of positive law as being mutable, as 
they are not of the esse of the Church.  Though, as stated above, the Royal Supremacy 
does not feature by name in either the Rochester Report or Sykes, the mechanism for 
which changes to the episcopal polity of the Church of England occur meant that the 
monarch still had to sign into law the Act of Synod enabling women to be bishops.  
Hence it could be argued that the Royal Supremacy still underpins Hooker’s account 
of episcopacy – though this was not discussed, nor perhaps understood, in the explicit 








In respect of bishops themselves, there is agreement that bishops are of apostolic 
origin, yet, because they are of not of the esse, that their polity is mutable.  Both 
Sykes and Hooker agree that certain aspects (those which are regarded as adiaphora) 
of Church law can vary with time and place – and that the conditions since the 
Enlightenment, and strongly in the twentieth century, indicate that it is appropriate to 
change episcopal polity.  Though Sykes concentrates on a technical discussion of the 
mutability of positive law, and hence the mutability of episcopal polity, the Rochester 
Report focuses more on the mutability.  It agrees with the points Sykes raises in 
respect of mutability, but also makes the point that though bishops are indeed the 
successors of the Apostles, women also exercised an apostolic function in the Early 
Church.  Consecrating women to the episcopate would therefore restore the nature of 
the Early Church in this respect.   
 
Of particular note in respect of comparisons between the argument of this thesis and 
the Rochester Report is the utilisation of human reason for deciding on matters 
adiaphora.  Both the Report, and this thesis, highlight the capacity of rational human 
thought for theological reflection (or reason) in order to discern what may be a ‘right’ 
development in polity.  In particular, chapter 3.2a argues for the role of natural and 
supernatural law, and the use of discernment in such matters.  It could be argued, by 
extension, that it is a summum bonum for women to have a just role in the Church, as 
the subordination and inferiority of women no longer apply as acceptable social 
positions in the twenty-first century.  
 
I have argued in this section that The Society, and Colin Podmore, made no reference 
to Hooker when discussing the inheritance of the Western Catholic tradition, although 
Podmore himself argued that Hooker would not have placed scripture on the same 
level as tradition and reason, making the claim that after 1662, bishops became of the 
esse of the Church.  As part of the arguments surrounding the development of women 
bishops, Sykes argued that the social barriers to equality for women no longer existed, 







women bishops being a lawful development.  The Rochester Report cited Hooker in 
respect of the apostolic origins of episcopacy, and that bishops were of the bene esse 





I have argued in this chapter that in respect of the key themes for the Tractarians and 
episcopacy – Iure Divino, episcopal authority, and the esse of bishops – there was no 
trace of the Keble’s Hooker in the legislative documents surrounding the development 
of women bishops in the Church of England.  Keble’s themes of sacramental 
assurance and apostolic succession were woven throughout traditional catholic 
documents, but there is no mention of Hooker by name.  In half of the indicative texts 
discussed in this chapter, there was precious little mention of Hooker, save for 
drawing parallels, and stating that the context in which he wrote his Lawes no longer 
exists.  The other indicative texts from Mascall, Kirk, Hamilton-Thompson and 
Hebert make more reference to Hooker, but not especially so to episcopacy. Sykes, in 
making arguments for the lawfulness of the development of women bishops, argued 
that the prior assumption of women being inferior to men is no longer in existence.  
Further, Sykes argued that such ecclesiological laws for the Church were mutable, 
and that positive laws were open to change – making the leap that it would have been 
consistent for Hooker to argue that the ordination of women was a lawful 
development.  The Rochester Report picked up on Sykes’ arguments, stating that 
Church polity is mutable because it is indifferent to salvation.  Thus, Hooker, and the 
ecclesiastical polity he promoted, were able to change according to the prevalent 
circumstances of the time. 
 
The aim of this chapter has been to take key areas of episcopal ecclesiology as 
identified in Keble’s editorial preface to the Lawes and examine key documents in the 







Kebellian Hooker had a significant effect on the episcopal ecclesiology of the Church 
of England. 
 
Taking Keble’s definitions of esse, Iure Divino, and episcopal authority, we briefly 
assessed three key legal documents in the women bishops debate for any evidence of 
Kebellian Hooker, finding no trace. It was more predictable that common themes 
between Keble’s Hooker and those prevalent in traditional catholic understandings of 
episcopacy would be found – though there was little trace of Hooker by name. To 
attempt to find out why this was the case, two additional areas were studied because 
of their prevalence in the literature of traditional catholic groups – apostolic 
succession and sacramental assurance. Whilst these two additional areas showed a 
degree of overlap between Kebellian elements of esse, Iure Divino, and episcopal 
authority, and the themes of traditional catholic groups, very little mention was made 
of Hooker by name, most notably by Colin Podmore. 
 
To establish when and enquire why Hooker had fallen out of favour amongst the 
traditional catholics, we then took four indicative texts published between 1834 and 
the present day to examine for traces of Hooker. Hooker and his polity are dismissed 
by two of the texts on the grounds that the circumstances underpinning Hooker’s 
Lawes – that of the Church and State being one and the same vis-à-vis membership – 
had now changed, and that therefore any arguments based on that were now invalid. 
Ramsey’s The Gospel and the Catholic Church makes precious little explicit mention 
of Hooker, save for coming close with a number of parallels on the mutability of 
Anglican concepts of episcopacy, which, for Ramsey, go against his understanding 
that episcopacy is an essential element of ecclesiology, and finally, the commentary 
of Forward in Faith and The Society on the women bishops’ debate makes no mention 
of Hooker. 
 
If Keble’s Hooker had died out in the Church of England, was Hooker being used at 







that regarded women as inferior being no longer applicable, and that as Hooker 
argued that positive law was open to change, with church polity being part of it, then 
it would be entirely consistent with Hookerian principles to consider the ordination of 
women. The Rochester Report (2004) picked up on this, and developed the idea of 
church polity, because it was a matter indifferent to salvation, being mutable. A 
conservative interpretation of Hooker in respect of the mutability of ecclesiastical 
polity was incorrect, and not in the spirit of Hooker himself. Hooker, and the 
ecclesiastical polity he promoted, was legitimately able to change according to the 
prevalent circumstances of the time. This was a Hooker who was able to be faithful to 
the tenets of natural and positive law, faithful to the primacy of Scripture interpreted 
through reason and tradition, and faithful to the inheritance of the Elizabethan 









8  General Conclusion 
 
I have now demonstrated that Hooker’s episcopal ecclesiology, as presented in the 
Lawes, is a coherent and skilful defence of the 1559 Settlement as being congruent 
with wider Protestantism, and that despite efforts by the nineteenth-century 
Tractarians to claim Hooker for an ecclesiology that was not authentic to the Church 
of England, Hookerian episcopal ecclesiology now rests once more in the middle 
ground. This final chapter returns to the opening chapter, giving some concluding 
thoughts. Throughout the Lawes, Hooker attempts to demonstrate that the 1559 
Settlement, and the episcopal ecclesiology that it encapsulates cannot be manipulated 
either by the Puritans, or by those closer to Rome, for their own ends. This thesis has 
demonstrated the resoluteness of Hooker’s defence through the prism of the 
Tractarians in the nineteenth century, and lastly, the traditional catholic groupings in 
the twentieth and twenty-first-century Church of England. 
 
The opening chapter set out the argument for this thesis. The first part of the thesis, 
chapters two to five, followed a threefold approach to Hookerian episcopal 
ecclesiology, due to the deeply interwoven nature of Church and State subsequent to 
the 1559 Settlement. Part two of this thesis then argued that two major ecclesial 
movements of the Church of England tried to claim Hooker for their own cause. 
Chapter six argued that John Keble, in his editor’s preface to the 1834 edition of the 
Lawes, erroneously attempted to envelop Hooker in the Tractarian bosom, and chapter 
seven argued that the traditional catholic movement could not, and largely did not, 
attempt to claim Hooker’s ecclesiology in support of their argument against the 
introduction of women bishops: Hooker ended up being claimed not by the traditional 
catholics, but by the official Church of England position itself. 
 
Chapter two, together with chapter three, formed the first part of the threefold 
argument that Hooker’s episcopal ecclesiology had a justified place within the 1559 







principles. The argument concentrated on Hooker’s understanding of the monarch as 
Supreme Governor, and the authority associated with that title – the legal basis being 
the 1559 Settlement. Chapter two argued that Hooker’s defence of the monarch as 
Supreme Governor is congruent with wider Protestantism, and also compatible with 
reformed religious principles. The authority that the monarch held as Supreme 
Governor was based on a divine sense of calling, and of right, but also on the 
community having given their consent to be so governed: thus chapter two argued that 
Hooker’s defence was based on theologically justified and politically necessary 
grounds. 
 
Chapter three concentrated on the role of natural and supernatural law, and how 
positive law, Zurich, Geneva, the magisterial reformers, and the monarch interwove 
through my demonstration. Key to this compatibility was, as previously highlighted in 
chapter two, the consent of the community to be governed, thus giving the monarch a 
parental role to the nation. The chapter argued that Hooker’s defence of the Royal 
Supremacy being consonant with reformed religious principles was demonstrated 
through his use of the two kingdoms theory, and the subsequent engagement of the 
English Puritans with that. Chapter three argued that because the English Puritans had 
a faulty understanding of the two kingdoms, they did not, therefore, accept the 
legitimacy of the Royal Supremacy within a reformed Church. Essentially, chapter 
three claims that underpinning Hooker’s theo-political defence of the Royal 
Supremacy was an orthodox Christology, which avoids a Nestorian separation of the 
two natures of Christ, and a Eutychian conflation. Hooker was ultimately after unity-
in-distinction, which he saw in a particular form of monarchy expressed through two 
united, yet distinct, kingdoms. Hooker did not want any separation of the munus 
triplex Christi, that is, of Christ’s offices of prophet, priest, and king. It is the 
argument of chapter three that in such a structure, Hooker was able to offer a strong 
defence of the Settlement, and hence of the ecclesial structure of the Elizabethan 








Chapter four, the second of the threefold approach to my argument, examined 
Hooker’s understanding of jurisdiction. In order for any power to be exercised, there 
needs to be (at least nominally) a defined area of jurisdiction. With the understanding 
that under Elizabeth I all ecclesiastical jurisdiction was annexed to the Crown, and 
that this jurisdiction meant that the queen had power to make binding decisions and 
judgments within the temporal and spiritual realms, Hooker argued that the Royal 
Supremacy was neither corrupt, nor repugnant to the laws of God, illustrating this by 
stating that the power exercised by the monarch and by the clergy are quantitively 
different. This difference was stipulated in the 1559 Act of Supremacy, which, 
according to Hooker, made plain that Christ is the head of the invisible/spiritual 
realm, and the monarch is Supreme Governor of the visible/political realm. Chapter 
four also argued that Hooker achieved a harmony between the Thomist structure of 
Book VI and the Augustinian structure of Book VIII, which meant that the mechanics 
of Church and State were mediated by eternal and natural laws, assisted by the grace 
of God. These two areas of spiritual power and the power of jurisdiction give Hooker 
a framework for understanding how authority and jurisdiction were exercised within 
the realm, and as a consequence, what constituted a legitimate challenge to that 
authority. Chapter four also argued that Hooker echoed Luther’s Zwei Reiche theory, 
with bishops being key members of the conformist system. However, chapter four 
also argued that Hooker made use of Calvin and Bullinger, thus laying himself open 
to charges of cherry-picking, which thus risked a contradiction of principle and hence 
the coherency of the Lawes. 
 
Chapter five constituted the last of the three central tenets of my argument for 
Hooker’s defence of the 1559 Settlement being congruent with wider Protestantism. 
The chapter examined elements of Hooker’s episcopacy: its origins, what sort of 
power episcopacy had, ordination, the argument for a metropolitan, and the placement 
of bishops and presbyters, as well as the links between episcopacy and the Iure Divino 
of bishops. The chapter argued that Hooker did not believe the monarch to be able to 







example). This was because whilst officers of Church and State held jurisdiction in 
temporal and ecclesiastical spheres, they did not in spiritual spheres, which were for 
clergy alone. However, there were grey areas of jurisdiction within the Settlement, 
which meant that clergy were involved in contentious debates. The interwoven nature 
of Church and State was illustrated by the process in which bishops gained their 
authority: first, they gained their temporal power from the confirmation of election, at 
which they received their letters patent from the sovereign, which gave them a 
specific area in which to exercise their episcopal power. Second, they gained their 
spiritual power at their ordination as bishop from their episcopal colleagues at the 
laying on of hands. Chapter five argued that Hooker regarded the core aspects of his 
understanding of episcopacy to include oversight, a reluctance to embrace a Iure 
Divino concept, and an uneasy relationship between the episcopate and the monarch 
in respect of intervention in ecclesiastical affairs. Chapter five therefore argued that 
Hooker’s stance on episcopacy is far closer to elements of mainstream reformed 
principles than anything proto-Anglican. Hooker believed the English Puritan 
arguments against episcopacy to be weak and contradictory – and that therefore, as a 
consequence, the Iure Divino notion of episcopal authority as claimed for Hooker by 
John Keble and the Oxford Movement in the nineteenth century was ill-founded. 
 
The second part of this thesis considered two main ecclesial shifts and the influence 
of Hooker’s concept of episcopal power upon them. Chapter six argued that John 
Keble, having decided that a new edition of the Lawes was needed, tried to claim 
Hooker for the Tractarian cause by means of bias and misrepresentation in his 
editorial preface. Areas of particular problem for Keble included the doubtful 
integrity of the last three books – if they were authentic, then their argument for a less 
authoritarian episcopate would not chime with Tractarian claims for the necessity of 
such. Chapter six therefore argued that Keble included the last three books as part of 
the Lawes because not to do so would have gone against scholarly consensus – it was 
for the same reason that Keble did not alter the actual text of the Lawes, but rather 







Hence, chapter six argued that Keble’s Tractarian polemic was contained to the 
editorial preface with the three controverted areas of the necessity of bishops, the 
issue of Iure Divino, and hence, consequences for the authority of bishops, all three 
receiving strong manipulation from Keble in order to fit into the Tractarian mould: for 
example, Keble claiming that Saravia and Hooker were in agreement regarding Iure 
Divino, despite Hooker’s silence on the matter. Thus, chapter six argued that Keble’s 
edition placed too much emphasis on the tenuous Iure Divino argument, because of 
Hooker’s alleged friendship with Saravia, and too much emphasis on the esse, rather 
than the bene esse, of bishops: thus, the Tractarian proposals of episcopal authority as 
espoused in Keble’s editorial preface to the 1836 edition of the Lawes were not what 
Hooker himself would have recognized. There simply was not enough evidence to 
prove conclusively that Tractarian episcopal ecclesiology was compatible with 
Hooker’s presentation of episcopacy in the Lawes. 
 
Chapter seven argued that by the end of the twentieth century, traditional catholics 
had ceased attempts to claim Hooker for their own cause, illustrated in the debate 
surrounding the ordination of women as priests and bishops. Chapter seven argued 
that this was due to the intransigence of Hooker’s episcopal ecclesiology, especially 
in areas of apostolic succession and sacramental assurance, both of which are key to 
traditional catholics. The chapter then took four indicative Anglo-Catholic texts and 
argued that usage of Hooker for Anglo-Catholics fell out of favour more or less at the 
end of the Tractarian era, with Hooker claimed instead by liberal centrists, such as 
Stephen Sykes in his 1994 paper, written as a prelude to the ordination of women as 
priests in the Church of England. Though Hooker did not feature by name in any key 
legislation in relation to the ordination of women as bishops, Hooker does appear 
significantly in the 2004 Rochester Report, which considered the theological rationale 
for women bishops. It is also noteworthy that the Rochester Report also cited Sykes’ 
paper. Hence, chapter seven argued that apostolic succession and sacramental 







from an ecclesiology that was largely alien to accepted mainstream Anglican 
tradition. 
 
Each of these chapters, both in the first and second parts of this thesis, present a 
strong case for believing that Hooker presented his defence of episcopal ecclesiology 
within the 1559 Settlement of Religion as being congruent with wider Protestantism, 
and that the subsequent misuse and reclamation of an authentic Hookerian approach 
to episcopal ecclesiology in the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first centuries 
demonstrates that Hooker can be pulled neither towards Geneva nor Rome. This is not 
to suggest that Hooker is unformed and vague in his original defence or his 
subsequent application. This thesis has argued that Hooker uses rigorous theological 
and political application to prove his case, stating that the three key areas that 
constitute a comprehensive picture of episcopal ecclesiology – Royal Supremacy, 
jurisdiction, and episcopal power – are compatible with mainstream reformed 
concepts: and that this is why neither the Tractarians of the nineteenth century, nor the 
traditional catholics of the twenty-first century, were ultimately able to claim Hooker 
for their own arguments. 
 
This work hopefully opens up avenues for future investigation – both within the 
Church of England, and possibly on a wider ecumenical scale. 
 
First, any realistic understanding of the episcopal ecclesiology of the Church of 
England is far from static, and Hooker’s argumentative framework for what is 
permissible, and what is not, lends itself to authentic study of what the governmental 
nature of the Church of England may look like in the future. With the advent of 
women priests and bishops, the way in which the Church of England understood its 
episcopal ecclesiology may have seemed to undergo a seismic shift in the last twenty 
to thirty years – but there are further developments to which Hooker could lend an 
element of understanding when considering what constitutes an authentic expression 







issue of whether it is right for the Church of England to remain the Established 
Church in England? Should the right of Church of England bishops to sit in the House 
of Lords be maintained, or should the ‘Lords Spiritual’ be opened up to include senior 
representatives of other denominations and faiths, reflecting the reality of 
contemporary multi-cultural Britain? To go one step further, should the Church of 
England retain its Established status? What might Hooker have to present to any such 
debate? How much could the spiritual and constitutional character of the nation 
change before it changes beyond what is encompassed by Hooker’s episcopal 
ecclesiology? 
 
Second, and in extension to the questions raised above, what might Hooker have to 
contribute to a re-forming of the spiritual and political makeup of the United 
Kingdom – and even so far as contemplating an increasingly globalized society, and 
the contribution of different denominations and faiths to that? Does Hooker have 
anything to contribute to efforts to avoid radicalization and extremism within 
Christian and other religious denominations? 
 
Perhaps the key is to remember that Hooker does not strive to define: rather, he seeks 
to encompass and include. In the same way that he strives to defend the 1559 
Settlement as being congruent with wider Protestantism against claims from radicals 
that it is not so, and that an authentic Hookerian episcopal ecclesiology can neither be 
claimed nor misused by radicals (in whatever age), Hooker’s thorough and theo-
political model has something to offer in the search for ecclesiological authenticity. 
Hooker’s framework may not be the only method within which to address the future 
conflicts of the Church, but his overwhelming goal, as stated at the beginning of the 
Lawes, surely does give us a guiding light: 
But our hope is, that the God of peace shall (notwithstanding man’s 







and even gladly to suffer all things, for that work sake which we 
covet to perform.824 
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